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ABSTRACT 
In January 1961, a fundamental change in the structure of 
ownership of the gold mining industry in Ghana occurred, when the State 
entered this field of economic activity for the first time. From 1877, 
the industry had been owned, financed and operated by foreign -based 
limited liability companies. Although the industry was slow to mature 
largely owing to the constraints of the subsistence environment, it 
proved to be one of the main spearheads in the structural transformation 
of the economy from a subsistence to a monetary basis. By the first 
decade of the twentieth century, the full geographic extent of gold 
mining had been established, and today the mining towns which have grown 
up in these areas are among the largest settlements in their respective 
regions, and support a population of over 60,000 inhabitants. 
Geographically, the gold mining centres created 'islands of 
development' in an otherwise underdeveloped hinterland, and throughout 
its history, much of the value of gold won left the country in the form 
of salaries repatriated by the expatriate staff and as dividends to the 
shareholders abroad. Nevertheless, gold has traditionally been a leading 
export, second only to cocoa in its contribution to the value of exports, 
and through diverse payments of export duty, taxes, royalties and the 
purchase of local goods and services, the gold mining industry contributed 
to the well -being of the economy. In addition, by employing labour on 
a large scale, the gold mines represented key foci in the labour market. 
Production was interrupted by two world wars, and the 
inflationary economy which developed after the second world war had a 
dramatic effect on both the geographic distribution of gold mining and 
its profitability in the post -war decades. By 1960, only seven companies 
had survived and further closures were imminent, unless financial support 
could be secured from the Government. The Ghana Government chose the 
alternative of buying the marginal mines instead of supporting the 
private companies indefinitely by public subsidy. In January 1961, 
therefore, five of the seven remaining companies were purchased by the 
State, and a sixth was added in 1965. These mines were incorporated 
as the State Gold Mining Corporation, and there remains only one gold 
mining company in the private sector. 
The takeover of the marginal gold mines was based on socio- 
economic principles; to maintain output and employment in these long - 
established mining communities and to earn foreign exchange for the 
economy. In contemporary Ghana, the two major political and economic 
problems are a high level of unemployment and an acute shortage of 
foreign exchange, with the added burden of large -scale external commer- 
cial debts. In these terms, the justification of keeping open 
unprofitable enterprises by public subsidy can be readily understood. 
The inter -relationship between politics and geography is well demonstrated 
by the survival of the gold mining industry in Ghana. 
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X. 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which 
the gold mining industry has affected the economic geography of Ghana, 
the problems the industry encountered in its growth and development, 
and its contemporary importance in the economy. In these terms, the 
study fulfils a two -fold aim: 
(i) The history of gold mining in Ghana is largely unwritten, and 
so the first objective of the study is to fulfil the need for such a 
piece of work. The growth and development of the industry is essentially 
presented from the geographical point of view in an attempt to assess 
the impact gold mining has made on the spatial pattern of economic 
activity in Ghana. At the same time, the industry is treated as an 
entity in itself. 
(ii) The second aim of the study is to analyse the performance of 
the industry in the modern context, largely from an economic point of 
view, in an attempt to assess the contemporary importance of gold mining 
in the economy of Ghana. Within this framework, the survival of the 
gold mining industry in Ghana is assessed in the light of the current 
economic pressures which face all gold producers. 
Thus, the two aims of this study, while distinct, are 
complementary; the historical growth and development of gold mining 
providing the basis on which the modern structure of the industry can 
be more readily analysed and understood. 
Within these terms of reference, it is the thesis of the 
author that, historically, the gold mining industry was one of the key 
initiators in the structural transformation of the economy of Ghana 
from a subsistence to a monetary basis, and that, once established, the 
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gold mining industry stimulated certain lines of change which affected 
the regional pattern of development in the country. The first line of 
railway was constructed to serve the mining districts and large settle- 
ments have grown up in these areas. It was the gold mining companies 
that first introduced men from the Northern Territories to wage- earning 
employment in the South, and the seasonal pattern of migration from the 
North remains an important feature of the labour market. Despite the 
growth of other forms of economic activity in the industrial sector, 
gold mining continues to be a key element in the economy, functioning 
in its dual role as a major source of employment and as an earner of 
foreign exchange. In recent years, gold has declined relative to other 
products in its contribution to the value of exports, but gold still 
has a real and continuing contribution to make to the economy because 
of its stability on the world market. This intrinsic quality sets gold 
apart from Ghana's other main exports which all suffer the volatility 
characteristic of the market for primary products. In essence, the 
gold mining industry has both a historical and contemporary importance 
for the country, and this study attempts to emphasise both. 
Gold is only one of the economic minerals exploited in Ghana 
for the export market, the others being diamonds, manganese and bauxite. 
For geological reasons, all the gold mines are located in the south -west 
part of the country, where they form in effect 'islands of development' 
in an otherwise underdeveloped, although not undeveloped, hinterland. 
The forest belt of the south and west is the source of all the main 
export commodities of Ghana, for this region contains, in addition to 
the gold mines, the principal diamond, manganese and bauxite workings, 
as well as the main timber and cocoa -producing districts. However, it 
is the gold mining towns which have attracted population and tertiary 
activities. Thus, the mining towns stand out as pockets of high -density 
in an otherwise sparsely populated hinterland. Today the mining towns 
are among the largest settlements in their respective regions. 
Since modern mining is a highly capital -intensive enterprise, 
the gold mining industry in Ghana today is organised into a few large - 
scale units, operated and administered by private and publicly -owned 
corporations. The modern structure of ownership, divided into a private 
and public sector, is of recent origin, dating from 1961. Formerly, 
the gold mining industry was owned and operated by foreign -based limited 
liability companies which had worked the gold deposits in the country 
since the late 1870s. At the turn of the century, as many as 400 
companies were registered and held mining concessions, although relatively 
few ever took up their options. In fact, as far as the records show, 
the maximum number of companies carrying out active work (although not 
necessarily producing) on their properties was no more than thirty -one; 
this was recorded in 1936 -37, at a time when the industry was experiencing 
a renaissance. Today, only one company survives in the private sector, 
the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, Ltd., which. has been in production 
continuously since 1897. The Ashanti company was recently (January 
1969) taken over by the Lonrho group, a conglomerate company which 
holds investments in mining and other fields in Ghana and elsewhere in 
Africa. The mines operated by this company, on its 100 square mile 
concession, remain the only profitable gold mines in Ghana. By contrast, 
the public sector, comprising the State Gold Mining Corporation, operates 
four deep -level gold mines and one gold -dredging subsidiary, but none 
of these enterprises is profitable. Production from both sectors is 
destined for the export market, the locally smelted gold being sent to 
England for refining. A gold refinery was, in fact, built in Ghana in 
the mid- 1960s, at Tarkwa, but it has not been put into production and 
is unlikely to be so in the future since Ghana's gold output is 
insufficient to support the high cost of maintaining a refinery. 
The private sector produces two - thirds of the gold output of 
the industry, and employs one -third of the labour engaged in gold 
mining. In addition, the private sector provides revenue for the local 
treasury through various payments; profits tax, minerals duty, the 
purchase of local stores and ancillary services. On the other hand, 
the State mines produce only one -third of the total output of the 
industry, the sale of which earns Ghana valuable foreign exchange, but 
they employ two -thirds of the labour force of the cold mines, which 
helps to absorb some of those who would be otherwise unemployed. 
Indeed, in socio- economic terms, the State group has a more important 
role to play in the economy. The State Gold Mining Corporation was 
created as part of a wider economic policy of maintaining employment 
and output in long- established enterprises in an attempt to redress the 
negative balance of payments and the high level of unemployment which 
has characterised the economy since independence. By independence, the 
majority of the gold mines had become marginal concerns, and the State 
purchased five of the seven surviving gold mining companies in 1961 to 
prevent the social disruption which their closure would have meant in 
the mining communities where no other source of employment on a comparable 
scale exists. In addition, the loss of revenue from gold mining, had 
the threatened closures taken place, would have had an adverse effect 
on the economy, which was becoming more and more heavily indebted to 
overseas creditors. 
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OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
After a brief survey of the literature available on the subject 
of gold mining in Ghana, some comments are made on the problems of field 
research in mining as judged from the experience of the author in Ghana. 
The study is divided into three parts. The first part provides a 
general background to the study in theoretical and physical terms, 
thereby creating the framework on which the historical evolution of 
gold mining in Ghana is superimposed in the second part. Finally, in 
the third part, the performance of the industry in the modern context is 
analysed in some detail, based on data collected in the field. Part I 
comprises two chapters, the first treating the gold mining industry in 
Ghana within the general theoretical framework of mineral geography. 
The factors in mineral exploitation are discussed, and the case -study 
placed into this general context. In this way, the unique characteristics 
of gold in general and gold mining in Ghana in particular are presented. 
In the second chapter, the geological basis of gold mining in Ghana is 
described, as an aspect of Chapter 1 that deserves separate examination 
since the geological conditions of mineral exploitation are, in absolute 
terms, the determining factor in the location of mining activity. Thus 
the geographical distribution of gold mining in Ghana is the main focus 
of Chapter 2, which is briefly introduced by a note on gold and its 
geological characteristics, the place of gold mining in the general 
African and regional contexts, and concludes with a commentary on the 
practical problems of mining which derive from the nature of the gold 
deposits in Ghana. Part II contains four chapters, preceeded by an 
introduction. Each chapter describes a period in the historical growth 
and development of the gold mining industry with special reference to 
the impact the industry made on the economic landscape and on the 
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structure of the economy in the periods selected. Throughout the 
historical analysis, which covers the period 1877 -1961, emphasis is 
placed on the various constraints and stimuli to the geographic spread 
of gold mining, and the associated effects thereof, both on the industry's 
performance and on its contribution to tie economy. In Chapter 3, the 
intrusion of modern mining is described, and its effect on the 
structural transformation of the economy is indicated, and in Chapter 4 
the consolidation of gold mining as a permanent feature of the economic 
landscape is outlined. Chapter 5 involves the revival of interest in 
gold mining in the country, and the beneficial effects to the economy 
arising out of this revival. Finally, Part II is concluded in Chapter 6 
in which the post -war contraction of gold mining is analysed, and the 
history of the industry brought up to 1961, when the State entered the 
field of gold mining for the first time. Part III, comprising Chapters 
7, 8, 9 and 10, completes the study. In each chapter, an aspect of 
gold mining in Ghana is analysed, with particular reference to the 
performance of the State Gold Mining Corporation. In Chapter 7, case - 
histories of the mines of the State group are presented and provide the 
background to the detailed study of their performance since takeover in 
1961. In Chapters 8 and 9, the production of, and employment in the 
gold mining industry are surveyed, and in Chapter 10, an analysis of the 
economics of gold mining is undertaken in an attempt to assess the 
extent to which the State Gold Mining Corporation has fulfilled the 
socio- economic objectives with which it was charged: to maintain employ- 
ment and output in the mining communities. The cost of government 
support of the sub -marginal mines is, therefore, weighed against the 
benefits arising out of this policy. Finally, the salient points of 
the study are summarised, and the general implications and conclusions 
are presented. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Since no comprehensive survey of gold mining in Ghana has 
been previously undertaken, it will be useful to comment on the source 
material available and to indicate those works which seem to be of 
greatest importance. There exists, in fact, a surprising volume of 
literature, in published and unpublished documents, of varying useful- 
ness to the research worker in this field. The published material is 
scanty and deals with the field in breadth rather than in depth, whereas 
the unpublished sources are not only more numerous and more detailed, 
but also more interesting and substantial in content. 
The published works can be divided into four main groups: 
references to gold mining in books, both academic and narrative; articles 
in periodicals; departmental reports of the various ministries of the 
Ghana Government; and 'ad hoc' reports on the mining industry. The first 
of these sources is the least fruitful, since gold mining is generally 
treated as part of the wider economic fabric of the country. However, 
two texts deserve particular mention: 
"Structural changes in the economy of Ghana, 1891 -1911" 
(Szereszewski, R., 1965); and 
"A study of contemporary Ghana" (Birmingham et alia, eds., 1966, 
Volume I - The economy of Ghana). 
Szereszewski's text covers the early pioneering years of commercial 
gold mining, and while the main focus of his work is the role which 
cocoa played in the structural transformation of the economy, he does 
place gold mining in the wider context of the early economic development 
of the country. Chapter 11 of the latter work deals with the modern 
performance of the mining sector in general, but also gives a particularly 
enlightened account of the contemporary problems of the gold mining 
industry. Both works were produced by economists, and it is noteworthy 
that geographers have paid scant attention to the subject, except to 
place gold mining in the context of the general geography of Ghana; as 
in E.A.Boateng's "A geography of Ghana" (1963), and K.B.Dickson's recent 
book, "A historical geography of Ghana" (1969). The most interesting 
literary work, which gives a remarkably vivid picture of the environ- 
mental problems which the early pioneers faced in developing the gold- 
fields, is "We two in. West Africa" by D.Moore and F.G.Guggisberg (1909). 
It is notable that the large body of published works devoted to gold 
and the gold mining industry of the world is largely devoid of anything 
but passing reference to the gold mining industry in Ghana; one of the 
most recent of these, "The world of gold ", by T.Green (1969) dismisses 
the gold industry in Ghana in a few lines. 
The second category of published material comprises a vast 
number of articles which vary in their usefulness to the geographer 
since most are found in technical journals oriented to the needs of the 
mining engineer, the metallurgist, the geologist and related professions. 
The Transactions of the Institution of Mining and Metallurgy deserve 
particular mention since they contain some of the most informative, 
accurate and reliable accounts of various aspects of mining in Ghana. 
Articles are also scattered in trade or other non- learned journals, but 
in common with much secondary source material, accuracy is sacrificed 
to the literary panache of the author, and are too lacking in objectivity 
to be very useful. Geographical journals are especially barren on the 
subject. The large collection of old newspapers, published in the former 
Gold Coast and held in the Colindale branch of the British Museum, is 
an interesting source of historical information, although the factual 
content of many of the articles is minimal. For contemporary commercial 
news, the London -based weekly, "West Africa ", covers the main events 
in the industry with reasonable accuracy. 
Thirdly, there are the departmental reports, as the Annual 
Reports of the Mines department, which date from 1903, and the Annual 
Reports of the Geological Survey Department, which date from 1913, as 
well as the Annual Reports on the Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti and the 
Northern Territories, and the accompanying Blue Books of Statistics. 
In all three series, the gold mining industry is dealt with in summary 
form, and their usefulness is accordingly limited to providing a general 
picture of the state of the industry in any one year. Of greater 
significance are several Bulletins and Memoirs published by the Gold 
Coast Geological Survey, and those of the inter -war period are 
particularly relevant to the gold mines. These provide detailed 
information about the geology of the goldfields, are well illustrated 
with diagrams and maps, and also carry historical commentaries on the 
principal gold mining companies. These publications are the most 
substantial of all the secondary sources of material and they are still 
consulted by the mining companies in respect of the geological information 
they contain. Finally there are the Annual Reports of the local Chamber 
of Mines and they contain useful summaries of the events in any one 
year as they affect the mining industry, such as labour disputes and 
legislative developments. These reports, which date from 1928 also 
carry statistical appendices, both on individual companies and summary 
returns for the mining industry as a whole. 
Finally, in this brief survey of published sources, valuable 
information is contained in 'ad hoc' reports. While no report has been 
produced exclusively on gold mining, the mining industry has been subject 
to official enquiries on two occasions. In 1953, the "Report of the Mines 
Labour Enquiry Committee" was published. The terms of reference of the 
working party were, "To enquire into the conditions in which labour 
employed in the Mining Industry works and lives, having particular 
regard to such factors as Housing, Social Environment, Health and 
Welfare, Feeding and Underground conditions and to report ". This 
survey was purely a fact - finding one and no recommendations of policy 
were involved. The second report, "Report of the Gold Coast Mines 
Board of Enquiry ", published in 1956, was aimed at discovering the 
extent to which the mines were profitable with particular reference to 
their ability to survive further proposed wage increases. This 
enquiry arose following a general strike of all mine workers in support 
of wage claims. Both documents contain useful historical and 
statistical data. Apart from these two official enquiries, a few other 
official papers of earlier date have a bearing on the development of 
the industry. Professor W.Simpson's "Report on the sanitary conditions 
of the mines and mining villages in the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti" 
(1924), and "Report on Silicosis and Tuberculosis among mine- workers 
in the Gold Coast" by A.J.Murray and J.A.Crocket (1946) provide back- 
ground information on the social conditions which existed in the earlier 
period. The economic situation of the gold mining industry in the 
immediate post -war years is well covered in the award of an arbitrator 
(William Gorman) who was called in to settle a wages dispute in 1947; 
his report (briefly known as the Gorman Award - for full reference see 
Bibliography) was fully appendiced, and these contain valuable statistics 
and other exhibits which clarify some of the problems faced by the 
industry in this period. 
The published sources are limited in number and scope, but 
nonetheless provide valuable generalised information upon which the 
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results of detailed investigation of the subject from unpublished 
material and interviews can be superimposed. In this context, the 
unpublished documents are much more significant for they allow a 
deeper understanding of the problems the industry faced in its growth 
and development. Undoubtedly, the most exciting source of historical 
information is to be found in the files of the Public Record Office in 
London, where is kept the original correspondence between the mining 
companies and the Colonial Office. These bound volumes of letters are 
classified under C.0.96, and from 1880 to 1937, there are over 600 
volumes: C.0.96/133- 0.0.96/741. In addition, there is the series of 
confidential print, a collection of printed papers in which selected 
correspondence, memoranda and other documents were copied for internal 
use in the Colonial Office; of these, fourteen volumes are relevant to 
the investigation, and are classified under 0.0.879. All the Gold 
Coast Government Acts, Sessional Papers, Government Gazettes and the 
Blue Books of Statistics (0.0.97, 90, 99 and 100 respectively) are 
also located in the Public Record Office. It is, however, the 
correspondence which gives a much clearer picture of Colonial Policy 
toward the gold mining industry, and its effect on the geography of 
Ghana can be extracted by a thorough examination of these letters. It 
is worth noting that the National Archives of Ghana in Accra is a 
very disappointing source of material for this investigation since the 
collection of documents is limited and cannot compare with those of the 
Public Record Office. Much of the detail of Part II was derived from 
the original correspondence. By contrast, the findings presented in 
Part III of the study .sere based largely on statistical and documentary 
material generously supplied by the State Gold Mining Corporation. 
The greater part of that material is confidential, and accordingly, to 
respect the confidentiality of many of the documents and maps consulted, 
many of the references quoted in Part III are labelled under the 
'umbrella' title, S.G.iI.C. Also for this reason, the detailed statistics 
on which most of the results are based are not reproduced. The inter- 
pretation of the facts and figures consulted in the files of the State 
Gold Mining Corporation is entirely that of the author, and does not 
necessarily represent the official view of the Corporation, unless 
otherwise stated. 
Finally, some comments on the problems of research in the 
field of mining seem apposite. From this review of the literature, and 
in the experience of the author, the most difficult problem is that of 
gaining access to detailed information about the operations of the 
mining companies, and this difficulty is largely responsible for the 
imbalance in the treatment of the modern structure of the gold mining 
industry presented in Part III of the study. The emphasis lies on an 
analysis of the performance of the State mines, while the private sector 
is largely ignored in detail despite the important contribution which 
it makes to gold production and the employment of labour. However, it 
was impossible to gain access to material about the Ashanti mine beyond 
that which is made public. Since any meaningful analysis depends 
almost entirely on the degree of co- operation which the researcher meets, 
the rather superficial comments about the private sector's performance 
should be understood in these terms. Indeed, the original plan of the 
study, to assess the impact of all the export minerals on the economic 
geography of the country, had to be abandoned owing to the lack of 
detailed information from the private companies engaged in diamond, 
bauxite and manganese mining; Consolidated African Selection Trust, the 
British Aluminium Company, and the African Manganese Company respectively. 
The general unwillingness of private companies to divulge information 
is understandable, but undoubtedly this is the major obstacle to detailed 
research work. Finally, no attempt was made in the study to investigate 
the mining settlements because of recent work done in this field by 
S.A.Darko, on the theme, "The changing pattern of settlements in the 
mining areas of Ghana" (unpublished M.A.thesis, University of London, 
1962). 
P'LCNIlTG IN THE ECONOMY OF GHANA 
Ghana's economy is still basically agricultural, dominated 
by economic activity in the rural economy. The pre -industrial sector 
absorbs about three -quarters of the labour force, and cocoa, other 
agricultural and forest products make up over half the Gross Domestic 
Product (G.D.P.). Cocoa is the most important single commodity in the 
economy, contributing some ten per cent of G.D.P., and nearly two- thirds 
of the value of exports. Thus, Ghana's internal and external situation 
is heavily influenced by cocoa, a crop which is subject to large fluctua- 
tions in quantity, price and, to a lesser extent, value. The historical 
importance of the mining of gold, diamonds, manganese and bauxite in 
the economic development of Ghana is great, but, in recent years, the 
mining sector has come to play a relatively minor role in the national 
economy in terms of its contribution to G.D.P. and employment. The 
mining sector's share of G.D.P. has fallen from 5.7L in 1957 to 3; 
1967, and its share of wage - earning employment has fallen from 12¡ in 
1957 to2 ¡:in1967. 
The central problem in the Ghanaian economy since Independence 
has remained the balance of payments, with high unemployment an added 
pressure. It is in these broad terms that the mining sector has a 
continuing importance; it is the secónd largest earner of foreign 
exchange after cocoa, exports amounting to 15% of the total value of 
exports of domestic produce in 1967. In addition, the mines are points 
of large -scale employment; in 1966, the mining industry employed a 
total labour force of some 21,000, of which the gold mines employed the 
greater proportion, some 10,000. In recent years, the physical output 
of the mining sector has declined; in 1967 (with 1958 as the base year), 
the index of mineral production had dropped to 09.1 (Fig.1). Any 
reversal of this trend depends on Government policy and on the state 
of the world market. As far as gold is concerned, it should continue 
to play its vital role as a stabilising element in the export trade of 
the country, assuming continued Government support for the industry. 
The contribution of the other minerals exported is less certain since 
their output and export value is conditioned by world demand, price 
variations and the degree of competitive advantage which the producers 
in Ghana can achieve. Nevertheless, since agriculture occupies a 
strategic role as a potential source of additional exports, food and 
industrial raw materials, employment, and as a means of reducing 
disparities in income and of slowing down the drift to the towns, the 
highest priority in economic planning over the next few years will be 
given to the promotion of agriculture consistent with sound economic 
operation. 
MINING POLICY AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
It is recognised that the critical shortage of foreign exchange, 
combined with the magnitude of the external indebtedness 
of the country, 
is the most pressing and immediate problem the economy 
faces, and indeed 
is the major constraint on its development. 
At Independence, Ghana's 
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foreign exchange reserves amounted to over E200,000,000 and by 1966, the 
Nkrumah regime had accumulated external commercial debts of some 
E300,000,000. It is also recognised that unemployment is a serious 
economic, social and political problem. Wage- earning employment has 
stagnated at about 356,000 since 1966, and there are some 200,000 
entering the work force every year. Current unemployment estimates 
suggest that at least 2Z of the economically active labour force are 
unemployed. It is within this wider framework that contemporary 
economic policy toward the mining sector can be understood. This 
policy is detailed in the Two -Year Development Plan, covering the period 
mid -1968 to mid -1970. The main objective for the mining sector is to 
reverse the declining trend in production, particularly with respect to 
gold mining. The plan outlines the need for intensive prospecting for 
new gold- bearing ores and the development of ore reserves in the 
existing gold mines as a means of fulfilling this objective. The 
plan continues, 
"It is also Government policy to encourage the mining of lower 
grade ores; therefore future policy will be aimed at providing 
a tax structure consistent with this objective. Such mining 
would result in proportionately higher employment because working 
the lower grade deposits is generally a more labour -intensive 
operation. It would also increase exports" (ibid., p.46). 
In Part III of this study, emphasis is placed on an analysis of the 
various constraints on production which led to the decline in the 
physical output of the gold mining industry. The position in respect 
of ore reserves is given particular attention in this context, as 
indeed is the capacity of the industry to offer employment and 
contribute to export earnings. In these terms, the relevance of this 
study to contemporary mining policy is evident, and it is hoped that 
this study will justify the need for a positive Government policy to 
ensure the survival of the gold mining industry in Ghana. 
PART I 
BACKGROUND TO TIE STUDY 
CHAPTER 1 
THE THEORETICAL FRAIVEFVWORK TO GOLD MINING IN GHANA 
INTRODUCTION 
"Mining is the only sector of economic activity in Africa entirely 
in the monetary economy of which it has been and still is one of 
the decisive initiators in many parts of the continent" (U.N., 
1959, p.61). 
This statement supports the thesis of the author that the gold mining 
industry in Ghana was one of the key elements in the structural 
transformation of the economy from a subsistence to a monetary basis. 
Since mining is based on 'wasting assets', its impact on the economic 
landscape is necessarily ephemeral, but the sectoral changes which 
mining stimulates have a lasting effect on the spatial pattern of 
economic activities in any country. Such has been the role of the 
gold mining industry in Ghana. 
More than one thousand years ago, the gold trade flourished 
on the coasts of Africa, and ever since, mining of gold and other 
minerals has played a special role in the lives of Africans. Gold 
has long figured as one of the traditional commodities of Africa, 
along with copper and diamonds, although more recently a change has 
been taking effect with the large -scale exploitation of other mineral 
resources, especially iron ore, bauxite and petroleum. The changing 
emphasis from the precious metals to the non -ferrous and fuel minerals 
is a reflection of the increasing world demand for more and varied 
sources of supply, as well as a larger number of minerals to satisfy 
the ever -increasing demands of industry. Indeed, the sequence of 
mineral exploitation in Africa clearly demonstrates 
the 'mineral cycle' 
proposed by De Launey. The exploitation of minerals 
has been one of 
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the main bases of many of the national economies of Africa, a continent 
which is characterised by "islands of development" created in many 
instances by mining activity. Indeed, the concentration of mineral 
income at a few foci is one of the typical geographic expressions of 
mineral exploitation, resulting both from the uneven distribution of 
mineral deposits in nature and from the uneven distribution of production 
in the national, regional and local contexts. Nevertheless, income 
from the mineral industry is a more important part of the Gross 
National Product of Africa than of any other continent, and it is the 
mining sector which has attracted most of the foreign investment in 
Africa. As a result, a not insignificant part of the income of those 
African states, as Ghana, richly endowed with mineral resources has 
traditionally been derived from export duties, taxation on profits, and 
royalties levied on the producers and from import duties on equipment 
and materials required by the mining companies. Today this is even 
more true owing to the recent trend toward greater State participation 
in the mineral industries in many African countries. 
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, mineral output in Africa 
was limited by the prevailing simple, labour- intensive mining methods, 
by the lack of technical knowledge, by poor communications and the 
primitive transport systems, by the ignorance of the value or demand 
for most metals, and by inadequate capital resources to develop them. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, most of these former constraints 
on production were removed with the building of railways, the opening 
up of the interior, and the inflow of both capital and talent of 
individuals and later companies from Europe. There is no doubt that 
it was Africa's mineral prospects, and particularly 
the gold prospects, 
which first stimulated large -scale foreign investment 
in Africa, whose 
3. 
mineral resources are surpassed only by those of North America, and 
which dwarf those of South America, Western Europe, Southern Asia and 
Oceania (De Kun, 1965, p.3). In addition to gold, Africa also plays 
a significant part in the production of minerals in industry (Table 1.1). 
Gold represented no less than one -third of the value of 
African mineral output in the early 1960s, rising from a value of some 
£250 million in 1957 to over E400 million in 1964. Since 1965, gold's 
share has been declining relative to other minerals, in particular 
oil, which is forecast to deprive gold of its traditional first place 
by value in the mineral exports of Africa. In absolute terms, however, 
it is likely that Africa will continue to be the world's leading 
supplier of gold, with South Africa maintaining its predominance 
(Table 1.2). 
It is apparent from these statistics that Ghana can only be 
regarded as a minor gold producer, despite its ranking as sixth largest 
producer in the world, a position which it has maintained for most of 
the twentieth century. Nevertheless, its importance in the economy of 
Ghana has been a major one. In many of its aspects the gold mining 
industry in Ghana may be regarded as a microcosm; the nature and variety 
of problems which faced the growth and development of the industry and 
the current difficulties which confront the industry in Ghana reflect 
in miniature the circumstances of the broader world scene in the field 
of gold mining. In addition, the case -study illustrates many of the 
general principles of mineral geography, as the following discussion of 
the factors in mineral exploitation brings out. 
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TABLE 1.1 
AFRICAN CONTRIBUTION TO JORLD PRODUCTION 
OF SELFCT.ED MINERALS FOR THE YEAR 1962 
Mineral Group World Output 
(tons)* 
African Output as 
j World Output 
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TABLE 1.1 (Continued) 
Mineral Group World Output 
(tons)* 
African al _ as 
azt-7,ut 
VII. Cr JICAL INDUSTRY 
Pyrite and sulphur 3 n. (long; 
Antimony 60 th. 
Baryte 3 n. 
Fluorspar 2.5 m. `. 
Diatomite 1.5 n. 
Arsenic 60 th. - 
Bismuth 7 th. 1:11''er 
Sodium 20 n. fi 
VIII. AGRICULTURE 
Salt 100 m. 
Phosphate 45 a. '(log) 
Nitrogen 15 m. 
Potash 12 n. 
IX. BUILDIIdG AUD CEUTAICS 
Cement 340 m. (lo'n) 
Gypsum 50 m. 
Asbestos 3 n. 
'Mica 200 th. 
Vermiculite 300 th.** 
Talc 3 n. 
Pumice 14 n 
Graphite 500 th. 
_,. 
2.5 
* all quantities in short tons, unless ot.namTriss -_ = 
** free world output only. 
Source: De Xun, 1965, pp.3 -9. 
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TABLE 1.2 
FREE WORLD GOLD PRODUCTION (I',i TRIC TQNSl : 1064:1968 
c>. 
Country 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 output 
South Africa 905 950 960 950 970 76.8 
Canada 118 112 102 92 84 6.6 
U.S.A. 45 53 56 49 48 3.7 
Australia 30 27 28 25 24 1.7 
GHANA 27 23 21 24 22 1.7 
Rhodesia 18 17 17 16 16 1.3 
Philippines 13 13 14 15 16 1.3 
Colombia 11 10 9 8 7 0.6 
Japan 9 9 8 8 7 0.6 
Mexico 7 7 7 6 6 0.5 
Nicaragua 7 6 5 5 4 0.3 
Congo 7 2 5 5 4 0.3 
Brazil 4 5 6 6 6 0.5 
India 4 4 4 3 3 0,3 
Elsewhere 50 49 48 47 45 3.8 
TOTAL 1255 1287 1290 1259 1262 100.0 
Note: 1968 Estimate for U.S.S.R. of 450 metric tons. 
Source: Gold, a World Survey, Charter Consolidated Ltd., 1969. 
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FACTORS IN TIC ; EX1'LOITATIQN OF MINERALS 
Mineral exploitation is subject to a variety of factors of 
diverse origin; geographical, geological and technological, economic, 
social and political. The known existence of a mineral deposit is not 
sufficient to warrant its immediate exploitation. Its value is conditional 
on man's needs, his willingness to pay to satisfy his needs and his 
technological capability to overcome the problems in the equation. 
Before mining proceeds, an evaluation of all the relevant factors is 
necessary since mining is the most speculative and risky form of 
capital investment in the whole spectrum of man's economic activities. 
The exploitation of a mineral deposit will therefore normally begin 
only when and where the combination of factors proves favourable and 
profits are assured. Because of the several risks in mining a larger 
profit is deemed necessary than in fabrication or manufacturing to 
justify the risks involved. Gold, however, is something of an exception 
in that man has not always awaited the point in time or space at which 
the optimum or near - optimum balance of factors has presented itself. 
Gold has always carried a unique attraction to man, who by exploiting 
it in the remote corners of the globe, has disobeyed the normal 
sequential pattern of mineral exploitation. 
With the foregoing general points in mind, the rest of the 
chapter is devoted to an assessment of these various factors and the 
relevance of each to the case -study. This in turn serves to 
illustrate 
the unique position gold holds in the mineral world, while 
at the same 
time sets the local scene for the main body of the 
study. 
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1. Georanhical Factors in Mineral Gxoloitation 
The most important geographical factors influencing the 
development of mineral deposits comprise the influence of climate, the 
availability of transport and the supply of labour. 
(i) Climate 
While underground mining conditions are not affected by 
surface climatic changes, surface operations are often handicapped by 
variations in temperature, rainfall and other elements. Under extreme 
conditions, mining may even be reduced to a seasonal activity. On a 
world scale, it is evident that the distribution of metallic minerals 
is intimately associated with orogenic belts, and the most extensive 
belts of mineralisation are found in Pre -Cambrian shields and younger 
mountain belts. Typically, these structural elements are located in 
regions which suffer climatic hazards; from the extreme cold of the 
Canadian and Siberian Shields, where ores freeze hard, as does machinery; 
to the desert heat of the Western Australian Shield, where water supply 
for processing and domestic use is often difficult to obtain; to the 
high mountain mines of the Andes, where the rarified atmosphere induces 
mountain sickness and diminishes the efficiency of labour. 
In Ghana, the mineralised zone is located in the south -western 
part of the country, where the Pre -Cambrian Shield (part of the wider 
Guinean Shield) is exposed. This region is subject to a 
Tropical 
Maritime regime, characterised by high temperatures all the 
year round 
(mean 80 degrees Fahrenheit), high humidity (rarely 
dropping below 75-), 
and heavy rainfall (over 60 inches per annum). 
This combination 
affects adversely the efficiency of both men 
and machines. The 
installation of air -conditioning in all 
surface plants, offices and 
residences counteracts to some extent 
the full impact of these 
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debilitating conditions, although air -conditioning was not available 
in the pioneering period of the industry's development. As a result, 
staff turnover was high, tours were of short duration and there was 
little continuity of management. The unhealthy environment, an indirect 
effect of the climate, therefore produced inefficiency inasmuch as there 
were continual changes in staff. In tura, this increased the cost of 
mining. Equally, it is recognised that the working life of plant and 
machinery is reduced by up to twenty years in the Tropics, and hence 
it depreciates at a faster rate than in more temperate climates. In 
Ghana, it is the gold -dredging operations that are more directly 
affected by climate than deep -level mining since the bi -modal rainfall 
regime of the south -west produces varying water levels in the rivers 
throughout the year. Consequently, in the dry season, the low water 
level makes flotation of the dredges difficult, and in the wet season, 
sudden flooding can disrupt operations. On both accounts, dredging is 
often slowed down or even stopped altogether for short periods each 
year, and these interruptions ultimately affect the profitability of 
the dredges. A secondary but important by- product of the climate of 
the mining areas in Ghana is that the vegetation is High Rain 
Forest. 
Prospecting is thus made difficult, both in terms of accessibility for 
men and equipment and in terms of the oppressive 
atmosphere which 
prevails under the thick, closed canopy of trees in 
the Rain Forest. 
The drying effect of the Harmattan, which brings 
some relief to 
southern Ghana in the first quarter of the 
year, is minimised in the 
south -west under the dense vegetation cover. 
One advantage of the 
mines' location in the forest zone, however, 
is the ready availability 
of timber for fuel and underground 
timbering. Of local significance, 
there is one final aspect of climate 
which deserves mention. 
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Underground working conditions are made uncomfortable by the steep 
geothermal gradient and the high humidities which obtain with increasing 
depth; costly cool air ventilation is installed to offset the worst 
effects. 
Although the problems of mineral exploitation caused by 
climate are many and varied, their importance must not be exaggerated. 
In Ghana, the climatic factor was more important in the pioneering 
years in reducing the efficiency of labour owing to the high sickness 
rates bred in the environment. It has been possible to overcome some 
of the effects of climate on the efficiency of man, although at a cost. 
(ii) Transport 
A second geographical problem of mineral exploitation is 
related to the availability of transport, vital to the movement of men 
and machinery to the mining sites, and to the movement of the ores or 
concentrates to the consuming markets. Most of the important mining 
centres in the world are now linked to other area by railways; some 
built on the expectation of traffic from mining alone; others constructed 
for more general developmental purposes; and private mining companies 
have even constructed lines for their own use if the value of the ore 
bodies justified the capital outlay. On the other hand, as one writer 
suggests, 
"... there must be ... an immense number of ore bodies, unfavourably 
situated with reference to rail or water transport whose develop- 
ment must remain improbable because the expected gain from the sales 
of the mineral would not cover reasonable profit and also the 
amortisation of investment in gear for mining and transporting the 
produce" (Pounds, 1950, p.245). 
Gold is one mineral, however, whose development 
has not always followed 
the strict logic of mineral exploitation with reference 
to accessibility. 
Throughout history, gold has attracted man into 
remote, difficult 
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terrain, lacking links with the outside world; hence, the gold rushes, 
to California in 1848, to the 'Comstock' Lode of Nevada in 1858, and to 
I{londike in Alaska in 1896 (Jones, 1963, p.114). 
Ghana's gold deposits were no exception in that they too drew 
men, in the late 1870s to invest capital in what was then a virgin 
territory, linked rather tenuously by a diffuse network of 'bush' paths. 
The main gold belt in Ghana begins some 30 -40 miles inland from the 
coast (a treacherous surf -beaten coast with no natural harbours) and 
stretches in a 100 -mile wide zone for 200 miles in a north -easterly 
direction. The terrain is characterised by a large number of small 
rounded hills, separated by narrow valleys, and although no extensive 
areas of high elevation exist, there are a few isolated ridges reaching 
1500 -2000 feet (Boateng, 1969, pp.19 -20). Several small river systems, 
principally the Tano, Prah, and Ancobra, drain the south -west, and 
flow directly southward into the sea. These provided the early and 
only means of access into the interior in the early pioneering years 
of the industry's development, but their usefulness as transport axes 
was extremely limited by the presence of rapids, rock bars and the 
seasonal variations in the water level. The nature of the relief and 
drainage in the south -west is therefore inimical to easy road and rail 
construction, and even at the present time, the road pattern is tortuous 
and twisting. But, in spite of the environmental problems which 
confronted the early gold mining companies, and later the railway 
engineers, the machinery for mining was headloaded to the mining 
sites, even as far inland as Bibiani, some 160 miles inland 
from the 
coast. The ultimate survival of the gold mining 
industry was secured 
at the beginning of the twentieth century when 
a railway, the first to 
be constructed in the country, was built 
through the forested south -west. 
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The line was constructed explicitly to provide the nascent mining 
industry with a lifeline, as is evident from its alignment; it runs 
125 miles from the port of Sekondi- Takoradi to Kumasi, passing through 
the Tarkwa and Obuasi goldfields en route, and a branch line leads to 
the Prestea goldfield. From the railway's completion to Kumasi in 
1903, the gold mines along or near to the railway flourished, and the 
line also opened up the interior to other developments, so that the 
combination of the attraction of gold to investors and the advent of 
the railway which ensured the profitability of the gold mining industry, 
had a profound and lasting influence on the economic landscape of the 
south -west region of Ghana. Because of the mining industry's successful 
bid for a railway line to serve its needs, the gold mining industry 
was one of the 'spearheads' which transformed the economy of Ghana 
from a subsistence to a monetary basis at the turn of the twentieth 
century. 
(iii) Labour 
The supply of labour, in both quantity and quality, is a 
third geographical factor influencing the exploitation of minerals. 
Since the main metalliferous regions of the world are located in shield 
and high mountain belts, most are peripheral to the main centres of 
population and industry. As a result, shortage of labour is a 
recurrent theme in mineral geography. In the African context it has 
been said of the entire labour market that, 
" ... the distinguishing feature of labour problems 
in Africa is 
the inadequacy of the supply of labour" (Hailey, 
1933, p.603). 
In mining, it has been estimated that labour 
costs constitute some 6, 
of total operating costs, and that in 
regions which rely on native 
labour, labour costs comprise an even 
higher proportion of working costs 
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(Hoover, 1933, p.143). The low level of productivity achieved by a 
native labour force, unused to the regular work patterns of industrial 
work, largely account for the high cost of labour in such circumstances, 
where high rates of turnover and absenteeism inevitably increase the 
cost of mining. In essence, the problems are best summed up in the 
four -stage sequence involving, "recruitment, advancement, maintenance 
and commitment" (Yd.n.dleberger, 1965, p.105). The mining industry, in 
addition, faces the problem of attracting expert staff, at managerial 
and supervisory levels, to work in remote and difficult environments. 
In Ghana, the gold mining industry has suffered labour 
shortages throughout the history of commercial mining. In the 
pioneering period, mining was on such a small scale that no acute 
shortages were felt, although the cost of labour was exorbitant since 
large gangs had to be engaged to headload all the equipment from the 
coast to the mining sites. With the coming of the railway, and the 
proliferation of companies at the turn of the century, the difficulty 
the industry experienced in obtaining an adequate labour supply was a 
serious threat to its progress, and labour had to be drawn from other 
West African countries to supplement the local deficit in supply. The 
south -west was, and still is, sparsely populated, and the mines have 
always had to tap distant sources; an experiment to bring labour from 
the Northern Territories was introduced in 1905, and from that time 
the North has supplied a large proportion of their requirements. 
By 
the 1960s, over half the mines' labour force originated in the 
North. 
Since the mining industry's labour force is composed 
largely of 
migrant labour, high rates of turnover, absenteeism 
and low productivity 
are characteristic. In addition, the industry 
is failing to attract 
expatriate staff, a problem which has 
intensified since the State 
entered the field of gold mining activity. 
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2. Geological and Technological Factors in 'Mineral Exploitation 
The second set of factors influencing mineral exploitation are 
those of geological and technological origin. These factors can be 
conveniently treated together because of their mutual inter- dependence. 
The discovery of a mineral deposit does not imply that it will be 
immediately developed. Whether it is opened up or not depends, inter 
ali_a, on the geological characteristics of the deposit and the state of 
mining and metallurgical technology. The geological characteristics 
which may give value to an ore -body are various; as the grade of the 
ore which may determine its ability to bear transport costs; the 
nature of the ore, whether monometallic or polymetallic; its purity, 
which will determine the ease by which it can be treated; the size and 
shape of the deposit, which will influence the ease of extracting the 
metal- bearing ore; the characteristics of the country rock, which will 
determine the amount of pre -mining preparation, the degree of timbering 
required, and the stoping method adopted; and the type of deposit which 
will influence both the cost and method of exploitation. In sum, the 
complexity of the mineral deposit in its mode of occurrence and in its 
relationship with other mineral elements pose technological problems 
for the geologist, mining engineer and the metallurgist. If these 
problems prove insuperable, either technically or economically, the 
mineral deposit will be relegated to nothing more than a mass of 
'neutral stuff' (Zimmerman, 1951, pp.3 -19). 
Gold is so overwhelmingly important that, despite the 
difficulties and costs in extracting gold, man 
has striven to overcome 
the geological and technological problems 
associated with its winning. 
South Africa has been the source of all the 
major advances in gold 
mining technology, which in itself 
has progressed at a faster rate than 
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for most other minerals. Nevertheless, although gold is one of the 
oldest metals known to man, it was not until 1987 that the cyanidation 
process was invented; this allows gold to be recovered from the most 
complex ores. Prior to its invention, gold was recovered by simple 
panning methods from placer deposits; deep- seated lode or vein deposits 
were technologically inaccessible. 
In Ghana, as in other parts of Africa, the natives had a 
remarkable knowledge of the distribution of gold- bearing rocks, but 
their primitive technology limited the depth of their 'mining' and 
the scale of their output. When the first European companies began 
to work the gold deposits in the country, their knowledge of the 
geological characteristics and structure of the deposits was also 
minimal, and the detailed geological mapping was not initiated until 
the early 1920s. The geological basis to gold mining in Ghana is the 
subject of Chapter 2; practical mining problems are also examined. 
At this juncture, therefore, it is sufficient to note that before the 
advent of mass -mining techniques, many of the small but high -grade 
pockets were left intact by the early companies. Today, the existing 
companies find it profitable to re -work the upper levels of the mines 
to extract the ore left by their predecessors. In the case of 
dredging for gold, the early dredges in use at the beginning of the 
century were inefficient which meant that much of the finer gold was 
not recovered, and, 
... whole villages along the river banks were said to turn out 
and wash the dredge tailings with considerable profit" (Howat, 
1940, p.245). 
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3. Economic Factors in Mineral Ex-oloitation 
Mineral exploitation is also influenced by factors of economic 
origin, the most important of which are: the demand for the metal and 
the uses to which it is put; the price level that can be obtained in 
the world market; the introduction of valorisation and restriction 
schemes; the invention of substitutes or the obsolescence of the metal 
in particular end -uses; the discovery and development of new sources of 
supply; and the technological improvements which may permit the lower 
grade ores to be mined at a profit. Ultimately, the exploitation of 
minerals is a matter of economics in that if production costs exceed 
expected revenue, the deposit will lie unworked until changed circum- 
stances permit its exploitation. 
Gold and the other precious metals have an economic value 
sufficient to overcome the economic constraints of a remote, physically 
adverse environment, and the inherent value of gold has stimulated 
technological progress in its winning. However, most of the gold - 
producing countries today maintain their output only under government 
subsidy. Gold is unique, in economic terms, for a variety of reasons. 
Unlike most metallic minerals, the demand for gold is insatiable, so 
much so that the supply is unable to meet the demand. Secondly, its 
main end -use, as a backing for national currencies, gives gold an 
assured market, whatever the level of production, unlike most metals 
the demand for which fluctuates according to the requirements of 
industry and other factors. Thirdly, the price of gold 
is officially 
fixed at 35 US dollars per ounce. Under the 
'two -tier' established 
in 1963, this is the selling price for monetary 
gold only, while gold 
for other uses sells at higher levels 
according to the condition of 
the free market, but the free market 
price rarely moves more than 10 US 
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dollars above the official price. The gold producers are, therefore, 
concerned with the problem of balancing revenue with working costs 
which increase inexorably. Gold mining companies are in the difficult 
position of being unable to pass on to the consumer any increases in 
working costs, in contrast with other metal producers who can at least 
command prices more in level with current production costs. It is 
significant that gold reacts economically in a direction opposite to 
other commodities in that, 
... its production becomes more profitable during periods of 
economic depression and least profitable during periods of 
prosperity, especially if accompanied by monetary inflation" 
(Jones, 1963, p.115). 
Fourthly, in contrast to most other metals, gold cannot be debased by 
being produced artificially, and this is one of the reasons for its 
continuing acceptability as 'international money'. Gold is, therefore, 
unique in that gold mining is less subject to the normal array of 
economic factors in mineral exploitation. 
The uniqueness of gold is largely a function of its uses. 
Iiistorically, gold has been used as both national and international 
money, although today its main function is in the latter category. 
However, gold supplies are limited, both by the facts of geology and 
by the profitability of mining the metal at a selling price of 35 US 
dollars, and not by lack of demand. Indeed, the phenomenal rise of 
world business, and the associated demand for international liquidity 
over the last century, has proved well beyond the capacity of the gold 
mining industry. 
In addition, gold is also used in industry, and the remainder 
is locked up in private hoards. The leakage of monetary gold to 
private hoarders is deplored by the official hoarders, since the metal 
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is in short supply owing to the insufficient growth of the gold mining 
industry. Despite a series of attempts to move all gold through 
official hands, gold markets developed in European capitals and else- 
where since the second world war. Accordingly, it has been estimated 
that only 7 out of 10 ounces of newly -mined gold moved into official 
reserves between 1935 and 1959 (Busschau, 1961, p.72). Of the remainder, 
an estimated 12% moved into private hoards and 205 was absorbed by 
industry and the arts. More recent estimates suggest that an even 
lower proportion of gold is reaching official monetary stocks; between 
1952 and 1957, official reserves received about 54ó of total supplies, 
private hoarders bought 29jó and the remaining 19 went to industrial 
and artwork consumers (Triffin, 1961, p.53). The demand for gold for 
non -monetary purposes has increased markedly, largely owing to the 
relative cheapening of the metal, and a growing number of end -uses for 
gold. In the pre -war years, for example, the most important non - 
monetary outlet was in jewellery, followed by dental uses. Today, gold 
is increasingly used as a coating, as protection against heat and 
corrosion, for aircraft and satellites. High purity gold, employed in 
the fabrication of silicon transistors and diodes for use in computers, 
missiles and related articles, can attain a selling price of 65 US 
dollars per ounce, but only small quantities are required. It has been 
estimated that by 1987 the demand for gold APART from monetary 
requirements will reach some 50-60 million ounces (Noakes and Shaw, 
1969, p.235). Accordingly, producer surveys it is said suggest that 
the pressure of traditional hoarding and the ever -widening industrial 
demand will force an upward trend in price in the future, regardless 
of monetary factors (Financial Times, 11 January, 1971). 
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The gold mining industry in Ghana, based on relatively low - 
grade deposits, suffers particularly from the impact of these external 
economic factors. On the State mines, working costs are well above 
the expected revenue, based on the tagged price of 35 US dollars per 
ounce. Under these circumstances, the survival of the industry depends 
on continuing government support, since by 1961 all but two of the 
seven operating mines had become marginal concerns. But since gold has 
a high internal and external value to the economy, in terms of the 
large -scale employment generated by the industry and its capacity to 
earn foreign exchange, the sub -marginal mines continue to operate 
under heavy government subsidy. 
4. Social Factors in Mineral Exploitation 
The occurrence of metalliferous mineral deposits in remote 
shield and mountain areas has social implications for the mining 
companies. Since mining is more often than not the initial industrial 
activity in these regions, it falls to the mining companies to create 
communities, served with a certain minimum of facilities in order to 
attract and maintain a permanent labour force. There are numerous 
examples of towns created entirely for mineral exploitation, from 
Kitimat in British Columbia, to Port Radium in the Canadian Arctic and 
Kalgoorlie in the Australian desert. 
In Ghana, many of the gold mining towns were the sole creation 
of the mining companies, as Prestea and Obuasi, while others were built 
around existing urban nuclei, as Tarkwa and Bibiani. The mining towns 
in Ghana have become the largest settlements in their respective regions, 
and throughout the history of commercial mining these towns have acted 
as foci of population attraction. Other activities have multiplied in 
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and around the mining settlements since the mines offer a considerable 
market for goods and services. The mines have also provided a wide 
range of welfare, medical, recreational and other facilities in an 
attempt to stabilise the mines' labour force, and the provision of 
these facilities further adds to the cost of mining. Local factors, 
such as the presence of quartz in the ore -bodies increase the need for 
precautionary measures against silicosis among the miners. The growth 
of the mining settlements into sizeable towns illustrates the important 
role which the industry has played in forming the geography of the 
country. 
5. Political Factors in Mineral Exploitation 
Finally, a number of political factors influence the temporal 
and spatial sequence of mineral exploitation. In essence, the climate 
of investment in any country endowed with commercial mineral deposits 
can affect the development of the industry. Prior to the second world 
war, when the major European powers were still in possession of vast 
colonial empires, there were relatively few political pressures with 
which mining companies had to contend. However, with the granting of 
independence to many territories, particularly in Africa, political 
independence has brought with it ideas of economic independence, which 
for the mining companies has often meant nationalisation of their 
interests or at best a sharing of mineral development with 
the host 
government as co- partner. 
In Ghana, the gold mining industry grew and developed 
in the 
hands of European companies, and few political 
problems harassed its 
development. IJlore recently, the high burden 
of taxation imposed on 
foreign mining companies is seen as a deterrent 
to large -scale investment 
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in the country. Equally, the restrictions on the repatriation of 
salaries of expatriate staff is said to account for the difficulty the 
mines experience in attracting staff. The Ghana Government's attitude 
to foreign investment has been favourable, and in practice, at least 
up to 1961, the Government allowed the old commercial pattern of 
colonial days to continue almost unchanged. There was no nationalisa- 
tion, or expropriation of Western -owned interests on independence. 
As the Prime Minister said, speaking in the Gold Coast Legislative 
Assembly on 1 March, 1954, 
"In formulating its policy the Government has accepted the fact 
that it will be many years before the Gold Coast will be in a 
position to find from its own resources people who can combine 
capital with the experience required in the development and 
management of new enterprises. It is, therefore, apparent 
that the Gold Coast must rely to a large extent on foreign 
enterprise and the Government is anxious to give it every 
encouragement." 
Despite Nkrumah's constant war of words against colonialism and neo- 
colonialism, in practice foreign interests in the country found the 
government sympathetic. And indeed, when the gold mining industry 
faced its major crisis in 1961, when some of the mines threatened to 
close down, as one writer stated, 
... their assets were acquired on the London Stock Exchange by 
the Ghana Government in a takeover bid whose orthodoxy and 
propriety were equal to any similar operation by the most staid 
British capitalist enterprises and differed from such only in 
the more generous terms it accorded to the retiring shareholders" 
(Bing, 1968, pp.12 -13). 
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CONCLUSION 
From this brief survey it emerges that the various factors 
in mineral exploitation vary in importance through time and space 
according to the value man sets on known mineral deposits, and according 
to local circumstances. Gold is unique in many ways, since its 
development has always attracted men and money, regardless of the 
difficulties of its exploitation. In the case of the gold mining 
industry in Ghana, the initial constraints posed by the environment 
were soon eclipsed by the problem of obtaining labour, and this problem 
has never been resolved satisfactorily despite the efforts of the 
mining companies to stabilise labour by providing a wide range of 
welfare, housing and recreational facilities. In the recent poriod, 
economic factors have come to dominate the industry, in Ghana and 
elsewhere, where the inflation in working costs has forced the industry 
to contract spatially. Ultimately the survival of gold mining throughout 
the world depends on the ability of technological progress to cheapen 
the winning of gold, since it is expected that there will be an ultimate 
limit to the financial support which the governments of the producing 
countries are willing to give to the producers. 
In Chapter 2, the geological basis to gold mining in Ghana 
is discussed as it determines the geographical distribution of the 
gold mines, and the practical mining problems which derive from the 




THE GEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND TO GOLD MINING IN GHANA 
INTRODUCTION 
Gold is not a particularly rare element in the Earth's Crust. 
It can be detected in almost all rocks, having an average concentration 
of 0,0045 parts per million.. It is also present in sea -water in 
varying quantities up to 0.006 milligrams per ton. Although several 
processes have been invented to recover gold from the sea, the free 
market price never rises high enough for long enough periods to permit 
its extraction (Noakes and Shaw, 1969, p.235). The same economic 
constraint limits its exploitation from the more conventional type of 
deposits. In nature, gold rarely occurs in a pure form. It is 
generally associated with silver and other minerals of the platinum 
group. Consequently, most of the world's gold is obtained from what 
is known as 'native' gold, or the metallic mineral which is predominantly 
gold. When the silver ratio is high, the mineral alloy is called 
'electrum' which is paler in colour than native gold, which is very 
strongly yellow. The second most important source of gold is the gold 
tellurides, mainly calaverite, with a gold content, and sylvanite 
and petzite. Thirdly, some gold is also recovered as a by- product 
from polymetallic mineral deposits, generally from the base metal ores 
as copper, lead and zinc (Jones, 1963, p.117). 
The economic deposits of gold vary in type from the uncon- 
solidated alluvial deposits of the Yukon, from which visible gold can 
easily be separated by simple washing, to the conglomerate reefs 
of 
South Africa, in which the gold is so finely disseminated 
that it can 
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be recovered only by chemical treatment, and to the auriferous quartz 
lodes of such famous mines as the St John del Rey in India and the 
Ashanti mine in Ghana. Gold is therefore won from three types of 
deposit: from alluvial or placer deposits, from conglomerates or 
' bankets', and from veins or lodes. 
Auriferous gravels were the chief source of the world's gold 
supply until recently, and they still produce some 2:7, of the world 
output. Because of its insolubility and high specific gravity gold 
occurs unaltered and concentrated in such deposits. The gold in 
placers was derived from the weathering of veins which outcrop on the 
surface of the ground to form 'eluvial' deposits in situ, or 'alluvial' 
deposits where the material has been transported by water and deposited 
at lower levels. Owing to the high density of gold, the richest 
auriferous gravel is generally located at the bottom of the deposit 
and, depending on the amount of weathering, gold occurrences in placers 
vary from minute grains to large nuggets in size. 
The second type of deposit, where the gold is found in 
conglomerate bands or bankets, is essentially similar to placers in 
origin but with the major difference that they are found below the 
surface, covered by newer layers of sedimentary rocks, or lava flows. 
All authorities concur on the origin of these conglomerate bands, as 
found in South Africa and parts of Ghana, but not all geologists agree 
on the genesis of the gold disseminated through the matrix. Some 
believe the gold is contemporaneous with the conglomerate, while others 
believe the gold is younger, having found its way into the conglomerate 
beds as the result of infiltration by mineralising solutions which also 
deposited the pyrite with which gold is generally associated. 
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The third type of deposit, the auriferous quartz vein, is 
more often than not located close to granitic bodies. The most 
favourable areas for such mineralisation are generally near the contact 
of small granitic intrusions which protrude upwards from a massive 
batholith. Gold- bearing quartz veins are among the most productive of 
all gold deposits, although in many cases the gold is found enclosed 
in sulphide minerals as pyrite, arsenopyrite, pyrrhohtite and 
chalcopyrite, which makes its recovery more difficult, while in other 
ores the gold is visible to the naked eye. 
GOLD IN AFRICA : THE CONTINT NTAL SETTING 
The African continent is distinguished by extensive 
mineralised regions; Nicholas De Im recognises ten regions, all Pre - 
Cambrian in age, and these are divided by younger basins and tectonic 
zones (De Kun, p.215). Gold is one of the widely 
minerals in Pre -Cambrian Africa, although it is found localised in 
commercial quantities in only four of the ten mineralogenetic provinces; 
High Africa, containing the South African, Rhodesian and Zambian gold; 
Eastern Africa, containing the smaller Tanzanian deposits; the Atlantic 
Rim, with the gold of Gabon; and the Guinean Shield, the largest 
deposits of which are in Ghana (Nap 2.1). 
The principal commercial deposits are the bankets, those of 
South Africa being 2000 million years old, while the much less extensive 
bankets in Ghana are 1800 million years old. The minor occurrences, 
more widespread geographically than the bankets, are found as veins or 
placers eroded from them in other parts of Africa. The auriferous 
vains are older geologically than the bankets, ranging from 2200 million 



































































































































































years in Tanzania and elsewhere. South Africa holds some 94- of the 
continent's known reserves, and it is expected that they will be 
sufficient to last to the end of the twentieth century. The Congo, 
Rhodesia and Ghana each contain of African reserves, and Tanzania 
1 ¡. Few realistic data are available on gold reserves, estimates 
varying between 500 and 1000 million ounces, or 17000 and 34000 tons 
of ore (De Kun, 1965, p.6). 
GOLD I J .TH GUINEAN SELLD : T'FIL REGIONJAL SETTING 
Ghana belongs geologically to the Guinean Shield, which 
stretches from Conakry to Accra, averaging 400 miles in width. The 
shield consists of gneisses, granites and middle Pre -Cambrian meta - 
sediments, with the structural axes trending north -north -east and 
distinguished by iron, manganese and gold deposits (Map 2.2). The main 
zone of mineralisation is much less extensive, running from Freetown 
to Accra averaging some 200 miles wide. De Kan recognises four distinct 
provinces, each characterised by its own particular group of economic 
minerals. These are Togo, distinguished by chromium and iron; Liberian, 
distinguished by iron, bauxite and gold; the Diamond Arc, which 
effectively marks the northern limits of the mineralised zone; and 
Ghanaian, featuring gold, manganese, and bauxite deposits (De Kun, 1965, 
pp.229 -230). 
The Ghanaian province occupies a 250 -mile band from Grand 
Lahou in Cote d'Ivoire to Takoradi in Ghana. It is made up of 
arenaceous sediments, of the lower Birrimian (see Table 2.1), which 
are set in compact folds, and interlayered metasediments and volcanics 
of the upper Birrimian formation. Gold is located in fissures of 












































































































































































































































































Recent Unconsolidated clays and sands of 
























Partly consolidated red continental 
deposits of sandy clays and gravel. 
Marine sediments, sandstone, 
glauconitic sandstones, clay and 
shale, limestone, oil, sand. 
"Amisian ". Fresh water series of 
bouldery and sandy clays and 
conglomerates. 
'Sekondian'. Marine series of sand- 
stones, shales, black sulphurous 
shales. 
'Accraian'. Middle Devonian only, 
sandstones and shales. 
'Voltaian'. Sandstone,shale,mudstone, 
conglomerate, limestone tillite. 
'Buem formation'. Folded and meta - 
Toao 
morphosed sediments. Not 
granitized or intruded by 
Tarkwaian granites. 
'Birrimian'. Geosynclinal sediments 
and volcanics, partly granitized 
and greatly intruded by granites. 
'Dahomeyan'. Massive crystalline 
gneisses and migmatites representing 
thick series of argillaceous, cal- 
careous and arenaceous sediments, 
but with few sohist remnants. 
Note: - unconformity. 
Source: B.A.Bates, in Wills(ed.), Agriculture and Land Use in Ghana, 1962. 
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and Bibiani (a,b,c and d respectively, on Map 2.2). Another alignment 
connects Abidjan with Boundoukou, bifurcating into a north- eastern, lower 
Birrimian branch and a northern series of lenses (e, on Map 2.2). In 
Ghana, gold is also found in Tarkwaian formations, where the strata 
have been folded into a large syncline, with the gold occurring in 
conglomerate bands of the structure (f, on Map 2.2). The distribution 
of manganese and bauxite is similarly associated with Birrimian rocks 
and located variously in Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Upper Volta. 
GOLD IN GIíAïA : THE LOCAL SETTING 
1. Progress in Geological Investigations in Ghana 
Ifnowledge of the geology of Ghana as a whole was first 
stimulated by interest in the distribution of gold, which had long been 
one of the main articles of trade between the natives and European 
merchants. This trade was confined to the beaches, and few Europeans 
had ventured inland before the annexation of the Colony in the nineteenth 
century. Prior to 1860, therefore, very little was known of the 
geology of the country except for a few descriptions of the rocks near 
the coast. Indeed, although the first gold mining concessions were 
taken out as early as 1877, it was not until 1890 that the first 
geological reports of any significance were published. In that year, 
two important papers drew attention to the economic potential of the 
Gold Coast, as it then was, as a source of minerals. The first 
contained a description of the geology and mineralogy of the Tarkwa 
banket deposits which the author recognised as similar to those of the 
Rand (Halse, 1890). The second paper was a more general 
description 
of the geology of the eastern part of the Colony and 
Ashanti, but it 
contained notes on the location of economic minerals 
and forecast the 
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important role which they were later to play in the economic develop- 
ment of the country (Ferguson, 1890). 
The turn of the century witnessed a virtual 'boom' in the 
granting of gold mining concessions, which led to a marked increase 
in the knowledge of the Tarkwa goldfield in particular. Consequently, 
the first decade of the twentieth century produced a series of geological 
papers on the distribution and genesis of the gold deposits in Ghana, 
notably by Sawyer (1902), Truscott (1902) and Collins (1909). The Gold 
Coast Geological Survey ( G.C.G.S.) was established in 1913 and, up to 
1925, its work was largely concerned with reconnaissance surveys, 
prospecting for minerals, and water investigations. In 1925, the 
geological mapping of the Tarkwa goldfield was begun, and Bulletin No.1 
of the G.C.G.S. was published, outlining the mineral and power resources 
of the country as known up to that time (Kitson, 1925). With the 
increase in the price of gold in 1931, the gold mining industry was 
given a new impetus, and the G.C.G.S., anxious to assist the further 
development of the industry, concerned itself in the 1930s with a 
comprehensive survey of the gold resources of the Gold Coast, the 
results of which were published in a series of bulletins and memoirs, 
notably by Whitelaw (1929), Kitson and Felton (1930), Junner (1932), 
Cooper (1934), Junner (1935), Hirst (1938), Junner and Service (1942) 
and Hirst and Junner (1946). During these investigations, other 
economic mineral deposits were discovered and mapped. In relation to 
gold, it is significant to note that no new gold deposits 
have been 
discovered outside the areas worked by the natives in the 
years before 
the arrival of European mining companies. 
It is very evident, from a survey of 
the literature of both 
private individuals and the official papers 
of the local Geological 
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Survey department, that knowledge of the general geological background 
of Ghana was derived incidentally to research into the distribution of 
economic minerals and the distribution of gold in particular. The 
total expenditure of the G.C.G.S. from 1913 to 19L3 was a mere 2225,000 
(Junner, 1946), a reînarkably small figure in relation to the wealth of 
knowledge that department had built up in the thirty years of its 
existence to 1943. It is equally remarkable when it is remembered 
that much of the southern part of the country is thickly covered by 
High Rain Forest, and that the transport network was and still is 
poorly developed over much of the country. 
2. Economic Geology 
The relationship between Pre - Cambrian orogenies and metalli- 
ferous mineral deposition is very clearly demonstrated in Ghana (Nap 2.3). 
The lines of past folding, trending in a north- north -easterly direction 
effectively outline the areas over which the Pre -Cambrian formations are 
exposed in Ghana, and, with a few minor exceptions, these are coincident 
with the distribution of all the known metallic mineral deposits in the 
country. 
Ghana can be divided into three main geological regions, 
based on the age of the rock formations. First, the lower and middle 
Pre- Cambrian systems, made up locally of the Birrimian and Tarkwaian 
rock suites, cover the central south and west of the country. Secondly, 
the upper Pre -Cambrian formation, consisting of the Buem and Togo series, 
lies on the eastern margin of Ghana. Thirdly, the Voltaian system, 
which covers about 45¡ of the entire surface area of Ghana, is exposed 
in the centre and north, presumably overlying the extension of the 
Pre -Cambrian shield complex. 
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The zone of mineralisation in Ghana is found in the first of 
these three geological regions, namely the lower and middle Pre -Cambrian 
systems, which extend over some 54,000 square miles, and are believed 
to contain the richest concentration of minerals in West Africa. The 
main gold deposits are localised within this region in a 100 -mile wide 
belt, running 200 miles in a north -easterly direction from just south 
of Tarkwa to the junction of the Pre -Cambrian with the Voltaian rocks 
east of Konongo. The localisation of gold in this belt, or 'channel', 
is attributed to three factors, partly geological, partly structural 
and partly erosional. The principal geological factor is the wide and 
deep geosyncline of little metamorphosed sediments in the gold belt, 
which favoured the concentration of gold in the conglomerate bands of 
the geosyncline. Secondly, the deep- seated faults and shear zones 
formed during the folding of the Birrimian rocks and their intrusion 
by granitic rocks were favourable structures for vein mineralisation. 
Lastly, the intense pre -Tarkwaian erosion of the Birrimian rocks, and 
the tertiary to recent erosion exposed gold reefs on the surface, thus 
favouring the development of alluvial deposits of gold. In Ghana, 
therefore, gold occurs in three types of deposit, in conglomerates or 
bankets, in veins or lodes, and in alluvials or placers. 
THE GEOGRAPHICAL PATTERN OF GOLD MINING IN GHANA 
Map 2.4 illustrates the geographical distribution of gold 
mining in relation to the geological background. There is an obvious 
relationship between zones of structural weakness, associated with the 
juxtaposition of different rock suites, particularly the older and more 
extensive Birrimian system and the younger Tarkwaian 
system, and the 
location of mines, past and present. All the gold 
mines are found on 
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or near these geological boundaries. The majority of the gold mines 
are located along the main gold 'channel' at various points between the 
lower and upper Birrimian rocks, or between the upper Birrimian and 
Tarkwaian rocks while outliers at Siwum and Bibiani are located in 
'offshoot cracks' astride the junction of the upper and lower Birrimian 
rocks on the western edge of the 'golden rectangle'. The river systems 
crossing the area contain auriferous gravels. 
Within this broad locational pattern, certain well- defined 
belts can be identified: 
(a) Gold in Birrimian rocks, which can be subdivided into four 
major goldfields focusing on Prestea, Obuasi, Konongo and 
Bibiani. 
(b) Gold in Tarkwaian rocks, the principal goldfield centred on 
Tarkwa. 
(c) Gold in placer deposits, found in the rivers Ancobra, Offin, 
Jimi, Prah and Tano. 
(a) Gold in Birrimian rocks 
With the exception of a few gold prospects in the Eastern 
region of Ghana, all the mines and gold prospects are situated in a 
narrow belt on the north -west side of the Tarkwaian rocks between Axim 
and Konongo. The ores consist of lenses of quartz and generally lie 
concordant with the bedding of the country rocks. The strike is north- 
east and most of the reefs dip at high angles over 60 °. It has been 
found that gold is disseminated in quartz of a smoky and bluish grey to 
black colour and rarely in white glassy quartz. In fact, hard white 
quartz is usually barren. In several places the gold is locked up in 
pyrite, and it is often difficult to detect gold in unweathered 
ores 
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of this type except by assay. Displacements due to faulting are seldom 
of sufficient magnitude to cause trouble in following the reefs 
underground. 
The Prestea goldfield stretches over 30 miles from Pura, 
south-west of Prestea, to Insu. The importance of this belt for the 
exploitation of gold derives from the great strength and persistence 
of the ore bodies. The main reef channel follows the contact zone of 
the Birrimian and Tarkwaian systems at the southern end of the gold- 
field, and the junction of the upper and lower Birrimian rocks toward 
the northern end of the belt. The detailed geology of the Prestea 
goldfield is described in G.C.G.S. Memoir No.3 (Cooper, 1934). 
The Prestea goldfield has been worked commercially since the 
late 1880s, by a number of mining companies, notably Ariston Gold Lanes 
(1929) Ltd, and Gold Coast Main Reef Ltd; these were amalgamated in 
1963, and thereafter known as Prestea Goldfields. The third most 
important company that has worked in this belt is Marlu Gold Mining 
Areas Ltd, which closed in 1975. Between 1912 and 1963, the mines of 
Gold Coast Main Reef produced 1,017,023 ounces of gold, from 2,605,578 
tons of ore. This produced a total revenue of Z1O,947,097. Over the 
same period, the mines of the Ariston company produced gold to the 
value of £35,569,562; this represented the milling of 11,376,123 tons 
of ore, yielding 3,972,248 ounces of gold. From their amalgamation in 
1963, their combined production up to 1967 was 536,967 ounces of gold, 
valued at £5,818,687. The output of the Marlu mines from 1912 to 1955 
came in between that of Aniston and Main Reef, at 923,913 ounces 
of gold, 




The Obuasi goldfield extends 15 miles from Akrokerri to the 
south of Sansu. The main lodes are some 2 -22 miles from the contact 
of the Birrimian and Tarkwaian rocks. In terms of gold content, this 
belt has been called the 'bonanza' belt, owing to the consistently high 
values obtained from the main lodes. Details of the geology of the 
Obuasi goldfield can be found in G.C.G.S. Memoir. No.2 (Junner, 1932). 
Apart from the Akrokerri mine which had a short life from 
1900 to 1909, this belt has been the domain of Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation Ltd, for nearly three- quarters of a century; the company 
was registered in 1897, and obtained by special agreement a 100 square 
mile concession, with both the mining and timber rights to this 
extensive area. This has proved to be the richest section of all the 
gold mining regions in Ghana, producing 10,687,888 ounces of gold, from 
a mere 11,663,553 tons of ore, between 1912 and 1966. This produced a 
gross revenue to the company of 298,834,403 over the 54 years in 
question. Early in 1969, the assets of the original company were sold 
to Lonrho for some á15,000,000, and the Ashanti mines continue to 
increase their output annually. It is believed that this mine is the 
richest in the world for its size. 
The Konongo goldfield is situated at the north -eastern 
extremity of the main gold 'channel', and the lodes are located in 
Birrimian rocks within one -third of a mile of the boundary with the 
Tarkwaian system. The richest reef, in fact, is located almost on the 
contact between these two rock suites, and in this respect it is similar 
in location to the main reef at Prestea. The persistence of the reefs 
in similar positions, parallel to the strike of the country rock, 
indicates that they are situated in a strong fracture -zone (Junner, 
1935, p.35). The geology of the area is described 
in detail in G.C.G.S. 
Bulletin No.14 (Hirst, 1942). 
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Two mining companies, Lyndhurst Deep Level (Gold and Silver) 
Ltd, and Konongo Gold Mines, have been largely responsible for the 
exploitation of this belt. The former company was in existence for 
only 7 years, between 1949 and 1956, whence its assets were bought by 
the latter company, Konongo Gold Mines, which still operates as a 
subsidiary of the State Gold Mining Corporation, of which it became a 
part in 1965. The combined output of these two companies (and their 
predecessors earlier) between 1912 and 1966 was 1,386,669 ounces of 
gold, valued at £14,657,407. 
The fourth and last major goldfield in Birrimian rocks is 
the Bibiani goldfield, located some 100 miles to the west of the main 
gold 'channel' in an 'offshoot crack', or fissure, at the junction of 
the upper and lower Birrimian systems. The main ore bodies are regarded 
as saddle reefs formed in low pressure areas beneath porphyry dykes 
1934, p.16). The richest ore is invariably associated with 
sheared and crushed zones cutting through the original hard quartz, the 
bulk of which is rather low grade and characterised by a patchy distri- 
bution of gold. Commercially, therefore, this belt has proved less 
profitable than the reefs located along the main gold 'channel'. This 
field has been worked largely by one company, Bibiani (1927) Ltd, which 
became a subsidiary of the S.G.M.C. in 1961, and is very nearly at the 
end of its life. Between 1912 and 1966, the mines of Bibiani produced 
gold to the value of £22,725,079 from 9,187,975 tons of ore. The 
geology of the Bibiani goldfield is described in G.C.G.S. Memoir No.9 
(IIirst and Junner, 1946). 
(b) Gold in Tarkwaian rocks 
Gold is widely disseminated throughout the Tarkwaian system, 
where the ore is an auriferous conglomerate, termed banket. The gold- 
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bearing conglomerate bands occur in the lower strata of the Tarkwaian 
series about 1500 feet above the Iiawere conglomerate band at the base 
of the series. The gold- bearing conglomerate band can be traced 
discontinuously over 120 miles between Bonsa and Konongo in the 
Tarkwaian geo- syncline. The series is highly faulted, and the beds 
are overturned in many places. Consequently, the banket is far from 
continuous and structurally more complex than the vein deposits in the 
Birrimian rocks. The distribution of gold is irregular and high 
values occur in patches rather than shoots, although it is more finely 
divided than the gold in the Birrimian reefs, one of the main arguments 
favouring the placer theory of origin of the gold in the Ghana bankets 
(Junner, Hirst and Service, 1942, p.65). 
The Tarkwa goldfield, running for 26 miles between 
Iduapriem and Damang, is the only section of the entire 120 -mile long 
Tarkwaian system which has been exploited for gold. Its commercial 
exploitation dates from the late 1870s; indeed, this area was the 
springboard from which commercial mining later spread. Ore is found 
on all the limbs, crests and troughs of the folds in the geosynclinal 
structure. The known ore bodies are richest in gold content on the 
eastern edge of the goldfield, toward the boundary between the 
Tarkwaian and lower Birrimian systems, and there is a progressive 
diminution of values westward. The bulk of the gold is associated 
with detrital hematite, the absence of which generally indicates 
barren patches. Dozens of companies have worked the banket from time 
to time, although the low grade of the deposits in general forced the 
amalgamation of adjacent properties. Of the many companies involved in 
the Tarkwa belt, two companies in particular have been largely responsible 
for its exploitation. These are the Taquah and Abosso Mines Ltd, and 
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Amalgamated Banket Areas Ltd. The former closed down in 1955 after 
having produced from 1912, gold to the value of £18,959,167 from 
8,584,466 tons of ore which yielded 2,708,032 ounces. The latter 
company is still in existence, being one of the companies bought by 
the State in 1961. From 1912 to 1966, 15,294,606 tons of ore were 
milled, yielding 3,246,762 ounces of gold, valued at £31,448,076. 
Details of the geology of the Tarkwa goldfield can be consulted in 
G.C.G.S. Memoir No.1 (Whitelaw, 1929), G.C. G.S. Bulletin No.10 (Hirst, 
1938), and in G.C.G.S. I\Iemoir No.6 (Junner, Hirst, and Service, 1942). 
(c) Gold in placer deposits 
Auriferous gravels are found in varying quality in all the 
rivers, and their associated alluvial flats, which traverse the gold - 
bearing Birrimian and Tarkwaian rocks. The principal rivers which have 
been exploited commercially for gold are the Ancobra, Pura, Offin, Birim, 
Prah, Jimi and Tano. Dredging was continuous from 1902 to 1925 when 
all operations ceased, owing more to the inefficiency of the dredges 
than the lack of payable deposits. Gold- dredging operations recommenced, 
however, in the late 1930s, notably by the Bremang Gold Dredging Company, 
which first re- worked the Ancobra river from Prestea northwards, and 
later transferred its dredges to the Offin and Jimi river valleys where 
the company's four dredges are currently operating. Up to 1966, the 
Bremang company's dredges had treated 199,458,841 cubic yards of 
auriferous gravel, which produced 1,040,854 ounces of gold, valued at 
£11,980,359. 
Jú 
PRACTICAL iIINING PROBL;jS 
The geological and structural characteristics of the gold 
deposits in Ghana give rise to several problems in the discovery, 
mining and treatment of the ores. All three types of deposit, the 
bankets, the quartz veins and the alluvials, have certain peculiarities 
which pose technical problems to the geologist, mining engineer and 
the metallurgist. 
Of all the geological characteristics of the banket, the one 
which has the most far -reaching implications for mining is the highly - 
faulted nature of the series (Map 2.5). The reefs are displaced by 
distances ranging from a few feet to hundreds of feet, and it is rare 
to find unbroken stretches of reef of more than 200 feet There is an 
infinite variety of faults which have been classified into three groups, 
as found at the Abbontiakoon mine on the property of Amalgamated Banket 
Areas Ltd. These are overlap faults, which are reverse strike faults 
parallel to the strike of the reef; underlap faults, lying normal to 
strike; and steeply dipping transverse faults, which are often nearly 
normal to the strike of the reef ( Jenner and Service, 1942, p.40). The 
Sumang -Fanti overthrust fault may be taken as an illustration of the 
difficulties such faults pose for mining. It is located in the north 
of the mine and has produced overlaps of hundreds of feet. Very long 
cross -cuts would be required to reach the gold -bearing band displaced 
by this fault, and the cost would be out of all proportion to the 
expected returns. In addition to the several faults in the banket, 
there is widespread sheering following the dip of the reef, and 
occurring not only along its footwall, where it is most common, but 
also within the reef or its walls. (See Appendix I for an explanation 
of technical terms as used in Ghana.) 
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From the mining point of view, the faulted and folded beds 
in the syncline are a mixed blessing for although they cause repetitions 
of the reef they are often difficult to follow and it is easy to miss 
some of the faulted or folded portions of the reef when driving out 
lines to locate it. Equally, dips in the banket are not regular; there 
are many changes through the series from a dip of less than 30° on the 
east limb of the syncline to one of over 90° on the west limb at Tarkwa. 
Even as late as 1954, the complexity of the gold- bearing structures of 
the Tarkwa goldfield were causing pessimistic assessments about the 
economic feasibility of developing certain sections of the banket, 
despite technical advances in mining methods. For example, of the 
Fanti shaft it was said that, 
"The northern section of the mine is too badly faulted to be 
tackled at this time, if ever" (Amalgamated Banket Areas, 
Annual Report of the Directors, 1954, p.6). 
The displacements create a practical problem for the geologist also, 
in that there is frequently a juxtaposition of several conglomerate 
bands, not all of which are gold -bearing. The true banket cannot 
always be detected by the naked eye because of the 'apparent' similarity 
it bears to other conglomerate bands, the so- called 'x' and 'y' bands 
at Tarkwa. This situation has caused much 'off -reef' development in 
the past and a consequent wastage of capital. Other problematic 
features of the banket concern the narrowness of the reef in many 
places, which means that a large volume of waste or 'gangue' has to be 
mined to gain access to the gold, and the variable width of the pay 
channels. Under such circumstances, the planning of forward production 
and the forecasting of ore reserves are made more difficult. 
In marked contrast to the banket, the auriferous quartz veins 
are relatively fault -free. However, the lode mines have their own set 
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of problems, the most significant one being the occurrence of graphite 
in the hanging and footwall sections of the reefs. Graphite has in 
fact been described as the 'bete- noire' of the quartz mines (Eaton 
Turner, 1928), since the weak walls of graphite, which surround the 
veins as a selvage of loose material, are not self -supporting. This 
makes mining conditions dangerous. Indeed, to prevent caving in, it 
is often necessary to leave part of the gold- bearing quartz vein. intact; 
an official of the Prestea company confirmed that as much as 9 inches 
of reef may have to be left intact as support, which of course means 
leaving much valuable gold in the ground. Otherwise, special stoping 
methods have to be adopted, such as 'close -setting' and 'back -filling', 
a method which increases the timbering requirements. 
The quartz mines suffer from other practical mining difficul- 
ties arising from the geological nature of the veins. In the first 
instance, not all quartz emplacements are gold- bearing. In addition, 
the ore shoots tend to be of variable width and strike length, which 
reflect on mining costs, and indeed mining methods. For example, at 
Bibiani the main ore -body is remarkable for its magnitude, attaining 
a width of some 200 feet in places. Mass mining techniques are there- 
fore appropriate and economic. By contrast, the Odumase ore -body 
(the principal reef at Konongo) although attaining a strike length of 
1600 feet in the upper levels of the mine, pinches out to three 
relatively narrow stringers below the tenth level. Of equal signifi- 
cance in affecting mining. costs and methods is the fact that there are 
many spurs and offshoots from the main ore -body, a feature which 
increases the length of drives and cross -cuts required to reach them. 
Whatever the dimensions of the reefs in the quartz mines, the gold 
values are found to be erratically distributed. Indeed, zones of 
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impoverishment are characteristically interposed with zones of enrich- 
ment throughout the quartz mines. This increases mining costs 
substantially, since zones of unpayable, barren reef have nevertheless 
to be worked in order to reach the payable sections. The nature of the 
Obuasi reef, on the Ashanti mine, may be taken to illustrate this point. 
At a depth of 500 feet the values were found to be poor, but enrichment 
of the reef encountered at level 3 continued down to levels 6 and 7, 
where values once again pinched out; the grade was found to increase 
again at level 9 and continued in the same tenor down to level 19, 
below which progressively poorer values showed. This example also 
serves to illustrate the lenticular nature of the quartz deposits. 
The pay bands vary also in width, and it is only with recent improve- 
ments in mining methods that many of the small but high -grade pockets 
of ore have become accessible. The uncertain direction of the reefs in 
many places adds to the amount of lateral development necessary to 
define them, and this also reflects on the cost of mining in Ghana. 
Lastly, the nature of the alluvial gold deposits.in Ghana 
creates problems for their exploitation. Dredging for gold is carried 
out over entire alluvial flats, but the distribution of values is found 
to be very erratic. Such a distribution makes accurate forward 
evaluation difficult, and means that profit margins fluctuate over a 
wider scale than in underground mining, where it is possible to maintain 
a pre -determined level of profit by 'mixing' high -grade ore with low 
- 
grade ore taken from different working places within the mine. 
With 
dredging, on the other hand, the gravel has to be treated 
as it comes, 
regardless of its value, as the dredge moves along the valley. 
In 
addition, the river courses in Ghana are spotted 
with rockbars, which 
can demand the total dismantling of the dredge 
and its re- erection on 
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the other side of the obstruction if there is no other way of circum- 
venting it, or if the bar cannot be blasted. Much potentially valuable 
dredging ground has been left intact in Ghana because of such situations. 
For example, when the Bremang Gold Dredging Company moved their dredges 
from the Ancobra river to new grounds in the Offin valley in the late 
1950s, the original plan was to set up the dredges to the south -east 
of Dunkwa, where high values are known to occur. However, the valley 
floor is so badly interrupted by natural obstructions that dredging in 
that area would have been costly, if not physically impossible, and 
the plan was abandoned; the dredges were set up in the Offin valley to 
the north -west of Dunkwa where the river valley is relatively free of 
such barriers. Another feature of the alluvial deposits which 
adversely affects the profitability of gold dredging in Ghana is the 
nature of the overburden which in places is stiff and heavy clay. 
This slows down the stripping operation and reduces the throughput of 
the dredges. The occurrence of diamonds in the auriferous gravels does 
not compensate for the poor values encountered because all but the 
largest stones are lost owing to the inability of the company to raise 
sufficient capital from profits to adapt the dredges for the simultane- 
ous recovery of diamonds. The seasonal variations in the river levels 
affect the continuity of production, adding a further economic 
constraint to gold dredging in Ghana. 
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CONCLUSION 
Within the limits of present knowledge of the geology of 
Ghana, the Pre- Cambrian complex exposed in the south and west of the 
country contains all the deposits of economic minerals. The gold -bearing 
rocks are concentrated in an area of some 20,000 square miles, in which 
the geographical distribution of gold mining is related to lines of 
structural weakness trending in a north -north -easterly direction, in 
accordance with the general structural trend of the wider Guinean 
shield. 
Gold is extracted from bankets, quartz veins and alluvial 
deposits, each of which has certain characteristics posing practical 
mining problems which affect the economics of gold mining. 
In the world context, Ghana is a minor producer of gold with 
an average annual output over the last decade of under one million 
ounces. Equally, Ghana's gold is won at a high price compared to other 
gold- producing countries, related in no small measure to the comparatively 
small size of the main goldfields and to the difficulties encountered 
in their exploitation, derived, inter alia, from the facts of geology. 
But, while its role in world mining is insignificant, gold has been 
and continues to be important in the economy of Ghana; in Parts II and 
III of the study, the historical and contemporary importance of gold 
mining in Ghana are respectively discussed. 
PART II 
TIE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
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PART II : I TTRODUCTION 
"The economic development of most African countries until the 
second world war took the form of the growth of exports, 
either of agricultural produce or of minerals, to the 
industrialised countries" (Ihetham and Currie, 1969, p.260). 
In Ghana, both agriculture and mining provided the basis'for 
the economic development of the country, and their products provided its 
propulsion to an export- oriented economy. On the one hand, cocoa, 
introduced into the country in 1879, came to dominate the agricultural 
sector of the economy and, on the other, gold mining, which began on 
a commercial basis in 1877, took the lead in the industrial sector, at 
least up until the second world war. Cocoa farming was developed by 
peasant farmers and its proceeds provided both the rural community with 
cash which stimulated the local market for consumer goods, and the 
local government with revenue, through various forms of taxation, which 
made development possible. By contrast, the gold mining industry was 
developed by foreign capitalists, and although the local government 
drew taxes from the export of gold and thousands of men entered wage - 
earning employment on the mines, the bulk of the profits from mining 
were remitted overseas to those countries which supplied the develop- 
ment capital, the mining technology and the managerial expertise. For 
most of the twentieth century, gold has taken second place to cocoa 
in its contribution to the value of exports, except for a short period 
in the late 1930s and early 1940s when, owing to a depression in the 
cocoa market and a marked increase in the scale of production by the 
mining industry, gold exports eclipsed cocoa exports by value, and 
contributed over half the value of domestic exports. Under normal cir- 
cumstances, however, cocoa is Ghana's leading export, 
and no change in 
the relative export value of cocoa and gold is 
forecast. 
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In Part II of the study, the problems of the growth and 
development of the gold mining industry are examined with the objective 
of assessing the impact of the industry on the economic geography of 
the country. The historical evolution of gold mining from its early 
intrusion in 1877 up to 1961, the year in which the State bought five 
of the seven surviving gold mines, can be divided into four major 
periods, based on the various problems which faced the industry at 
different stages in its development. Thus each chapter of Part II 
is devoted to a discussion of the stimuli or constraints which favoured 
or hindered the rapid growth of the industry in the periods selected. 
Although the dividing dates between periods are somewhat arbitrary, in 
the sense that the impact of particular problems is inevitably linked 
both forwards and backwards through time, each stage is distinguished 
by a core of exclusive features, and the industry's role in the economy 
varies accordingly. 
The four periods to be discussed are: 
(i) 1377 -1901. During these twenty -four pioneering years, the 
industry struggled to gain a foothold in an environment where the lack 
of modern transport threatened the very existence of the industry 
before it had barely begun. Only some 369,000 ounces of gold were 
produced up to 1901, the peak year for gold exports being 1899, when 
some 25,000 ounces, valued at £103,000, were produced. 
(ii) 1902 -1930. The following 'twenty -eight years were years of 
consolidation, when the spatial pattern of gold 
mining reached its 
maximum extent, fostered above all by the construction 
of the railway 
to serve the mining districts. South African 
capital and expertise 
were transferred to the Gold Coast, following 
the Boer War, and these 
allowed the first large-scale equipment of the 
gold mines to be 
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undertaken. The main constraint on progress was the recurrent shortage 
of labour, which intensified towards the latter part of the period as 
other sources of employment developed. Gold mining operations were 
interrupted during the first world war, and it took some time for the 
industry to recover from this interruption. Gold production was some 
6,5O0,000 ounces over the period, with the peak year in 1914, when 
some 410,000 ounces of gold, valued at nearly £1,750,000, were exported. 
(iii) 1931 -1941. Following the United Kingdom's abandonment of the 
gold standard in 1931, the industry experienced a 'renaissance'. 
Exploration, investment and development occurred on a large scale, and 
long -term programmes for the rational development of the gold mining 
properties were begun. Production increased dramatically in the 1930e, 
surpassing all previous production records to reach a peak in 1941 -42, 
when some 882,000 ounces of gold, valued at almost 'x7,500,000, were 
exported. In the same year, gold's share of exports by value attained 
some 53. 
(iv) 1)42-1961. Operations were interrupted a second time by a world 
war, and in the post -war years, the gold mining industry struggled to 
re- establish its pre -war level of production in the face of inflation 
in working costs and an unrealistic price for its product. Many gold 
mining enterprises became uneconomic under these circumstances and 
closed down. icy 1961, only two of the surviving seven gold mining 
companies had an assured future, and with the threat of the immediate 
closure of two of the marginal mines, the Ghana Government offered to 
buy five of the seven gold mines. The offer was accepted, and the 
seven mines continued to function. 
By 1961, gold exports comprised 9.5 of the total value of 
domestic exports, and the seven gold mining companies 
employed a labour 
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force of nearly 20,000. With the entry of the State into the field of 
gold mining there was, for the first time in the history of the 
industry, the assurance that the larger part of the revenue from the 
sale of gold would remain in the country, in contrast to the previous 
eighty years of gold mining, when the larger share of the profits was 
repatriated in the form of dividend payments and salaries to expatriate 
staff employed in the industry. Statistics relating to gold production 
and labour employed in gold mining can be consulted in Appendices II 
and III respectively. 
In the following chapters, the historical importance of gold 
mining in Ghana is discussed, beginning with a description of the 
intrusion of modern mining in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: 
1877 -1901 : THE INTRUSION OF MODERN MINING 
INTRODUCTION : THE FRAKEJORK TO DEVELOPMENT 
It was not until 1874 that the British assumed full control 
of the coastal strip of modern Ghana by annexing it as the Gold Coast 
Colony. Prior to this, the economy was based on simple techniques and 
the family labour unit, exchange was of the simplest kind, and transport 
was limited to a diffuse network of bush paths. The landscape was 
dominated by small -scale units of organisation, the great bulk of the 
population being engaged in the traditional sectors of agriculture, 
fishing, hunting and craft industries. European contact was limited 
to the coastal strip, where gold -dust, ivory and hides were bartered 
in exchange for simple metal tools and ornaments. 
annexation, the development potential of the Colony became gradually 
apparent as European contacts were forged inland. 
The last two decades of the nineteenth century and the first 
decade of the twentieth century were significant in terms of the 
structural changes in the economy brought about with the introduction 
of new forms of economic activity (Szereszewski, R., 1965). The 
simultaneous development of commercial gold mining and the intro- 
duction of cocoa spear- headed the transformation of the economy from 
a subsistence to a monetary basis. In geographic terms, the spread of 
cocoa farming from its initial foothold at Akwapim, north -east of 
Accra, westward and northward to Akim, Ashanti and Brong -Ahafo 
created 
a diffuse pattern of development over a wide area 
in the south of the 
country, while the spread of gold mining created 
'islands of 
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development' in an otherwise subsistence environment. The growth of 
the cocoa industry was more significant in affecting directly the 
indigenous pattern of economic activity, since the mines merely 
superimposed a set of foreign enclaves on the landscape. Nevertheless, 
together these introduced activities established certain spatial 
patterns of development, the essential features of which are unchanged 
in contemporary Ghana. It was the forest belt of the south and west 
which felt the impact of these new activities, and the previously 
undeveloped resources of the forest took on a new significance with 
the application of modern technology and capital. Regionally, the 
south -west remains the main source of Ghana's principal export 
commodities, although a new regional balance is emerging with the 
development of the Volta River Project in the mid- 1960s. The south- 
east is destined to become the main focus of secondary economic 
activity, based on the industrial complex of Accra -Tema, while the 
south -west will continue to lead in the production of primary products, 
a lead which was established in the late nineteenth century. 
The introduction of modern mining methods and capital had 
the effect of allowing a large -scale increase in the production of 
gold. In addition, the advent of commercial mining meant that native 
labourers entered wage -earning employment for the first time, were 
introduced to the concept of industrial employment and given the 
opportunity to learn new skills. While the cocoa industry offered 
seasonal employment for unskilled labourers, the gold mines offered 
opportunities for a wide variety of skilled and unskilled jobs 
all 
the year round. Manufacturing industry was not established 
in the 
country until 1904, but it was slow to develop and not 
until after the 
second world war did it provide significant revenue 
or employment. 
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It was the gold mining industry which provided the main focus for 
large -scale employment in the country. In the pioneering stage of 
its development, however, the gold mining industry struggled to gain 
a firm foothold, and the geographical expansion of the industry was 
limited by the constraints of the 'subsistence' environment, particularly 
the absence of a modern infrastructure. 
GOLD MINING IN THE P] E -CO IERCIAL PHASE 
While the main theme of this chapter is the intrusion of 
modern mining into Ghana, a brief comment on gold mining in the pre - 
commercial phase will serve to place the modern developments into the 
wider historical perspective. 
It is not Down when gold mining began in Ghana, although 
most writers agree that the local inhabitants had been winning gold 
long before the first European contact with the West African coast in 
the fifteenth century. Previously, gold had been one of the main 
items of northward- oriented trade when the forest and savannah zones 
were more intimately linked than today by the southern extension of 
the long -established trans - Sahara trade routes (Hodder and Harris, 
1967, p.225). Prior to the eighteenth century, most of the gold was 
won from alluvial sources, from stream and beach gravels, by simple 
panning methods. Later, auriferous reefs were also worked where they 
outcropped on the surface. The natives dug pits to find the extension 
of the reefs and recovered the gold by crushing the rock with 
crude 
implements (Meredith, 1912). 
Geographically, native mining was widespread (Map 3.1), 
although the northern limit of native lode -mining 
was in the region 
of Kumasi (Junner, 1934, p.12). Indeed, it 
seems that the entire 
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south -west of the country had been prospected and worked by natives, 
whose workings outline very clearly the distribution of gold- bearing 
rocks as subsequently established by geological survey. Bosman (1689) 
and Barbot (1732) confirm that most of the gold dust traded with the 
European powers along the coast came from Dinkira (Denkera), Acanny 
(somewhere between Ashanti and Akim), Ashanti, Akim, Awine (Aowin), 
ïassaw, Igwira (Gwira) and Quakoe (possibly Kwahu). It is highly 
significant that none of the main reefs worked in depth by the 
commercial companies were new discoveries outwith the areas known and 
worked by the native inhabitants from time to time. Indeed, the 
spatial expansion of commercial mining was largely guided by evidence 
of the reef alignments shown by native pitting. For example, of the 
early history of the development of Ashanti Goldfields Corporation at 
Obuasi, it was stated, 
... the ore indicated by outcrop workings ... formed the 
earliest and most rapidly available source of revenue to the 
corporation ... the native in his primitive way of work had 
discovered a number of ore- bodies ... it was found what 
consummately good prospectors the old natives had proved 
themselves to be ... the various scattered workings 
represented, with one or two notable exceptions, all there 
was to find on the property" (Feldtman, 1916, pp.257 -261. 
The ability of native mining to advance from the simple 
techniques of washing and panning for gold from alluvial sources to 
digging and crushing rock from sub -surface sources may be attributed 
to the advent of European tools, which were readily exchanged for gold 
dust and other products of the coast. Indeed, the articles most in 
demand by the native in the simple barter -trade carried out along the 
beaches included heavy hammers and wedges of iron as well as 
cloth, 
beads, brass, lead and pewter basins (Oliver and Fage, 1962, 
pp.109 -10). 
Native miners showed the ability to adapt to new techniques 
of production. 
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For example, the use of dynamite and other facets of introduced 
European technology was observed by travellers in the late nineteenth 
century (- McCarthy, 1332). However, it was essentially the primitive 
technology which prevented the native gold mining industry attaining 
a high level of annual production. The native miner was able to sink 
circular pits but the ultimate depth of the pits was restricted by 
the water- table, for he had no means of combating the inflow of more 
than small quantities of water. The deepest pits, up to 150 feet 
deep, were located on hillsides where the natural water -table is far 
below the surface. Equally, the native did not know how to support 
his workings, and it was common to find as many as 100 pits per acre, 
none of them connected underground. Adits were driven into the 
hillsides only where the country rock was self -supporting. Treatment 
of the ore was limited to washing the gold from the containing 
material, so that gold locked up in sulphides or other refractory 
minerals was not worked by the natives. 
The crude methods of winning gold were a major constraint on 
output in the pre -commercial phase, and earnings were low. Earnings 
from the alluvial sand and beach gravels were estimated to be about 
10d per day per head, while the reef workings at Tarkwa provided an 
average daily income of between 1s and 2s per head (Skertchley, 1878). 
The wide scatter of native workings was by no means a criterion of 
the richness of the deposits of gold since some of the deposits were 
worked by forced labour, and, 
" ... even voluntary labourers were content to work 
very poor 
ground when there was a chance of finding patches of rich 
gold- bearing ground" (Junner, 1935, p.12). 
Estimates of the total gold production of the country, 
prior to the 
intrusion of modern mining in 1877, vary from 
wildly exaggerated to 
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very conservative figures. One writer estimated that between 
£6,000,000 and £7,000,000 worth of gold had been exported from the 
coast in the centuries before 1800 (Macdonald, 1898). But these 
figures seem questionable in the light of another estimate for the 
entire world production of gold between 1400 and 1800 of under 
£7,000,000 in value (Ridgeway, 1929). From all available evidence, 
N.R.Junner estimated that some 14,500,000 ounces of gold dust must 
have been exported from the coast between 1471 and 1880 (Junner, 
1934, p.14). The amount of gold kept in private hoards for 
ornamental purposes would add at least a further million ounces to 
Junner's figure. By contrast, in the subsequent commercial phase, 
over 32,000,000 ounces of gold have been produced (Appendix I). 
THE INTRUSION OF "MODERN MZNING 
Native methods of winning gold were superceded in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century by capital- intensive methods 
introduced by Europeans. The entire spatial structure of the industry 
was changed from a pattern of scattered working sites based on labour - 
intensive production techniques to a relatively small number of modern 
mining centres based on capital -intensive production methods. The 
growth and development of the industry was thereafter controlled by 
outside interests. 
Despite the widespread distribution of native workings, 
commercial mining was initially confined to the Tarkwa region, a mere 
40 miles inland from the coast. The Tarkwa goldfield was the spring- 
board from which the later expansion further inland developed. Indeed, 
the banket ores of the Tarkwa area remained of prime economic importance 
for some 30 years despite the fact that the banket ores are of lower 
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grade than the auriferous reefs located further inland. The undue 
concentration of European interest in this area for so long was due 
to two main factors. First, the lack of adequate transport and the 
unsettled political conditions in Ashanti, until its final pacification 
in 1900, prevented the movement of men and goods into the interior. 
Secondly, the fact that the banket ore was recognised to be very 
similar geologically to the conglomerate deposits of the `ditswatersrand 
goldfield in South Africa meant that capitalists were more willing to 
invest in the Tarkwa goldfield than elsewhere, regardless of the 
results obtained from the assay of the richer quartz ores. Indeed, 
as late as 1911, it-was stated that, 
"The investing public of London have learned to attach great 
weight to the word ' banket'. There is a prevailing idea 
that it is synonymous with the word 'dividend' ... 
Naturally promoters find it easier to secure money for 
banket deposits than for quartz" (Sharpless, 1911, pp.119 -120). 
The first concessions were taken by a Frenchman, Marie 
Pierre Bonnat, who is recognised as the 'father of modern mining' in 
Ghana. Bonnat was not in any sense a mining engineer. He was, in 
fact, a trader and explorer. He had been a prisoner of the Ashantis, 
and on his release in 1874 returned to France, and formed a company in 
1377 to investigate the gold deposits in the Wassaw district of which 
he had learned during his imprisonment in Kumasi. In the same year, 
Bonnat obtained concessions along the Ankobra river near its junction 
with the Bonsa river, but he left those original concessions unworked 
in preference for other concessions in the Tarkwa area which he 
obtained in 1878 -79. His company, 'La Compagnie Miniere de la Cote 
d'Or d'Afrique', was therefore the first European company to work the 
gold deposits in Ghana. 
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Bonnat's choice of area was guided simply by the intensity 
of native pitting along the east limb of the syncline of the Tarkwa 
goldfield. The main focus of native workings at that time was the 
'Intaya Mine' (the later site of the Tarquah shaft), and Bonnat 
therefore obtained three concessions to the north, south and west of 
Intaya, at Abosso, Taquah and Tamsoo respectively; soon after he 
absorbed the native enclave also. Bonnat was guided more by instinct 
than sound geological knowledge in developing his concessions, as was 
evident by the way he approached the problem of mining. Much time, 
effort and capital were wasted in the first few years by driving 
tunnels into the hillsides in search of the 'golden core' which Bonnat 
believed the natives could not reach owing to the limitations of their 
primitive mining methods. 
Nevertheless, despite Bonnat's ignorance of the true nature 
and structure of the banket, his enthusiasm stimulated a general 
interest in the gold deposits of the Gold Coast, and other companies 
were formed. In fact, there was a rush to take up concessions, and by 
1831 they were being granted indiscriminately all over the Tarkwa 
region. Soon after Bonnat's company was floated, a Dr A.Horton acquired 
concessions at Abbontiakoon, Tamsoo and Dixcove, and he later formed 
the Gold Coast Company to work these properties. The Effuenta Gold 
Mining Company was floated on behalf of James Irvine from Liverpool 
about 1880, and about the same time, a Mr Crocker of Messrs F. & A. 
Swanzy and Company, a trading firm, took up concessions at Adjah Bippo, 
Cinnamon Bippo and Crockerville for the 'Vassaw Gold Mining Company. 
These were the four pioneer companies in the field of gold mining in 
Ghana (McCarthy, 1909). 
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The location of the original mines is shown on Map 3.2, and 
Table 3.1 gives details of the Europeans working in the Tarkwa district. 
The first mines to be worked were as follows: Abosso 1879, Crockerville 
1879, Effuenta 1380, Taquah 1381, Adjah Bippo 1882, Abbontiakoon 1882, 
and Teberibi also 1882 (Halse, 1890 -91). Although the four pioneer 
companies were producing by 1883, they did not prosper despite the 
richness of some of the ores, and a mere 7,000 ounces of gold had 
been produced by the end of 1884 (Junner, 1935, p.8). Indeed, 
" ... by 1885 the general impression is one of stagnation and 
loss of confidence in the industry" (Bevin, 1956, p.75). 
The original companies struggled to survive, and none had declared a 
dividend from mining profits. Some of the companies failed and 
several mines were closed down only a few years after opening. 
According to E.Halse, who visited the Tarkwa goldfield in 1889, only 
the Taquah, Abosso and Teberibi mines were then still in active 
production, and mining was carried on at very shallow depths. A good 
example of one of the early failures is found in Raise's description 
of the abandoned Abbontiakoon mine, 
"A pile of old machinery on one side of the path, and the 
remains of a stonebreaker and a portion of the stamps shed on 
the other, all overgrown with tropical vegetation are sad 
relics of unsuccessful mining on the Gold Coast (op.cit., p.75). 
CONSTRAINTS ON SPATIAL EXPANSION 
The lack of progress in the industry can be attributed to 
many factors, the most important of which were the lack of transport 
facilities and the need for legislation to regulate the granting of 
land for mining. Of lesser importance in affecting the progress of 
gold mining in these early years was the problem of obtaining labour 
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TABLE 3.1 
EUROPEANS EMPLOYED IN GOLD MINING, 1882 
Name of Mine Persons Employed Nationality 
Length of 
Residence 









(Abbontiakoon) Engineer /fitter Welsh 1 
Head miner English 22 
Miner Welsh 12 
Effuenta Gold Manager Scotch 24 
Mines Co. Clerk English - 
(Tarquah) Engineer /fitter " 1 
Carpenter It 1 
Miner " 1 
Tarquah Gold Manager English 2 
Mining Co. 
(Tamsoo) 
African Gold Transport officer French 8 
Coast Co. Accountant English 30 
(Taquah) Chief miner French 3 
Miner English 15 
Blacksmith 11 5 
Carpenter " 12 
Reduction officer French 12 
The Abosso Gold Engineer Swiss 12 
Mines Co. Accountant English 3 
( Abosso) Carpenter French 12 
Messrs.Swanzy & Proprietor English 28 
Co.Gold Mines Civil engineer " 28 
( Abosso) Accountant Scotch 9 
Source; Holmes, 1926. 
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importance in the thirty years after the turn of the century than 
before 1900, the problem of labour supply is discussed in Chapter 4. 
1. The Need for Transport 
The difficulty of transporting machinery, incidental to a 
forest -clad country, in the absence of roads, bridges, railways, 
wheeled transport of any kind or even pack animals, was undoubtedly the 
major constraint on the rapid spatial expansion and the structural 
development of the gold mining industry. Although Tarkwa is a mere 
40 miles inland from the coast, access was then limited to a diffuse 
network of bush tracks. The easiest, and at that time, the most 
direct route to Tarkwa was from the surf port of Axim, via the Ancobra 
river to its confluence with the Bonsa, and thence by the village of 
Appankrom a further 20 miles along a bush -path to Tarkwa (Wyatt, 1879, 
p.3). During the dry season the Ancobra and Bonsa rivers were barely 
navigable, except by light canoes, owing to the occurrence of rapids 
and to the masses of fallen timber that encumbered the channel. In 
such times, it was necessary to headload all the cargo, using local 
labour as carriers, via the same route, a journey that took several 
days through dense tropical forest and swamp. This system was both 
inefficient and costly. Many pieces of vital machinery never reached 
the mines since they were either damaged on landing through the heavy 
surf which beats along the coast, or abandoned by the carriers en rout. 
A particularly graphic description of these problems is contained in 
this extract from the narrative, ''pie Two in 'Jest Africa' , 
"It takes those forty men (i.e. carriers) four days, at least, 
under the most favourable conditions, to traverse the forty 
miles to Tarkwa. Swollen streams and wet, slippery foothold 
after rain, steep hill- sides, swamps, and fallen trees may 
delay them another three or four days. Again they may get 
tired of the job and, dumping their burden down in the bush, 
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depart to find new and more congenial work. That piece of 
machinery is probably not missed for a month or two, until 
the whole consignment has arrived at the mine and is checked, 
or until the niche into which it fits in the general order of 
things is reached. Then there is a hullabaloo, abusive letters 
to the London office, indignant replies, and finally a hue and 
cry which eventually unearths the absentee, reposing peacefully 
in the shade of an odum tree and almost, if not entirely, 
covered by a tangled mass of creepers and undergrowth" 
(Moore and Guggisberg, 1909, p.119). 
Since all machinery had to be headloaded to the mines, it 
had to be sectionalised into manageable loads in the first instance. 
This, added to the environmental obstacles to transporting machinery 
inland, meant that the cost of such transport was inevitably very high, 
and was in part responsible for the poor returns on investment of the 
early companies and indeed the failure of many. The profits of mining 
were totally absorbed in transport costs. For example, in a report on 
the Wassaw District by Mr IT.L.Peregrine, the District Commissioner, 
dated 1 April, 1897, details are outlined of the transport costs, 
"Now the transport of the imports for the Tarkwa / Abosso Gold 
Mining Co., from Axim to Tarkwa for the last year weighed no 
less than 341 tons, which did not, so I understand, include 
the heavy machinery; the cost of landing the same at Axim 
amounted to x,153, forwarding it up the river to Bonsah carne to 
E2615, and the charge of carriage from Bonsah came to E2000, 
therefore the transport alone from steamer to the mines of 341 
tons of goods amounted to £3968" (Co 879/49/ìvo.531:18404/186). 
From all available evidence it seems that up to some £50 per ton was 
the typical cost of getting equipment to Tarkwa from the coast. 
Labour costs were high: a letter -carrier, for example, received 13s 6d 
a day, plus a subsistence allowance of another 3d daily, from Axim 
to Tarkwa, while the short two -hour walk from Tarkwa to Abosso cost 
the companies 5s per carrier (Wh.itelaw, 1929, p.6). 
Not only were transport costs high, but progress was slow 
which, of course, added further to the cost of getting 
the equipment 
to the mines. The rate of progress was limited to 
under 12 miles a 
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day and, although the river section could be passed in as little as 
10 hours, under optimum conditions, it was more common for the river 
journey to take over two days (Skertchley, 1878, pp.274 -283). The 
last section, 20 miles of bush -path, could also occupy over two weeks. 
For example, Mr H.Higgins, Civil Commissioner, writing in 1882, 
reported that, 
"Mr Gowan, Manager of the above hine (Abbontiakoon), has brought 
two trucks, laden with machinery, in all Weighing one and a 
half tons from Bonsah to Abontynakoom. This is the first time 
that such a thing has ever been attempted in these parts, no 
one here believing it possible to drag trucks along such roads. 
It has taken him a fortnight to accomplish the journey, about 
17 miles, and he has fifty -seven men engaged in the work" 
(Affairs of the Gold Coast 1882, Fourth Monthly Report, p.6). 
Nevertheless, despite the high costs of mining in the 
pioneering days, a virtual gold rush developed in the 1880s, a gold 
rush which was premature in the extreme in the light of the transport 
bottleneck, and also because no legislation governing the granting of 
land for industrial purposes was in existence. 
2. The Need for Legislation 
Hundreds of concessions had been taken up throughout the 
Tarkwa region following Bonnat's example in the late 1870s, and the 
Civil Commissioner warned as early as 1882 that, 
"This indiscriminate granting of Concessions will lead to serious 
complications in the future unless rules and regulations are 
established for the guidance of the European and native 
labourers" (Higgins, op.cit., p.3). 
The news of the discovery of this new goldfield had been quickly and 
widely disseminated, and the granting of concessions for mining turned 
into a 'business' in its own right, which threatened to stifle the 
industry before it had barely begun (Leigh, 1904). The lack of legis- 
lation regulating these transactions led to a great deal of confusion 
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with respect to title of land, and this hindered the rapid spatial 
and structural development of gold mining in the pioneering period. 
Once the commercial value of the Colony's gold resources 
became known, the forest belt was overrun by prospectors, and Europeans 
began to acquire land for mining, the exploitation of timber and other 
purposes in an unprecedented wave of speculation in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century. Grants of land were made in the language 
of English conveyancing, itself not understood by the local inhabitants, 
and purported to convey the 'fee simple' or grant conditions of leases 
which essentially conflicted with the inherent land tenure rights of 
the natives. The native land tenure system was based on communal 
principles, the land belonging to the local 'stool', tribe, or more 
rarely the individual. These facts were not appreciated by the new 
British administration until later, but meanwhile hundreds of square 
miles of land had been alienated by the local Chiefs to Europeans for 
small fees, and, in most instances, neither party was clear what was 
involved in the transaction. Indeed, there had grown up an extensive 
commerce, in quite worthless concessions, between the natives, who were 
quick to realise the profits that could accrue from such transactions, 
and unprincipled European speculators, who traded the leases for profit 
to unsuspecting buyers. The need for legislation was urgently required 
on three main counts: to protect native rights to land and prevent 
landowners being fraudulently treated; to prevent capitalists gaining 
any sort of monopolistic control over large tracts of land; and to 
regulate the rights of competing concessionaires by establishing 
priority over them inter se. 
The first attempt to introduce some measure of control was 
made in 1883 when the local legislature empowered the Chiefs to make 
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bye -laws with respect to mining, under the Gold Coast Native Juris- 
diction Ordinance of 1883 (Stone, 1920). However, there were immense 
difficulties in introducing any formal legislation which would be 
effective, not only in regulating the concession 'industry' but also 
in encouraging the gold mining industry. The country had not been 
surveyed, no topographic base maps existed, and the natives themselves 
knew only the approximate boundaries of their lands as far as topographic 
and other features could mark them. The natives were ignorant of the 
amount of land they leased, had no idea what extent of country was 
contained in a given number of square miles, nor did they profess to 
know the meaning of fathoms. As a result, 
"They always imagine that what they are granting is a mere 
fraction of the area which they actually dispose of" 
(Belfield, 1912, p.9). 
The direct result of this was the recurrent problem that overlapping 
areas, or indeed the same areas, were granted to competing concession- 
aires. For example, in a letter, dated August 9, 1899, from Consolidated 
Mines Selection Co. Ltd., to the Colonial Office, the company complained 
that, 
"The way of these native chiefs is to make a fresh agreement 
every day of the week with anyone who comes along and gives 
them a 'dash" (African No.578, 21203/59). 
Under these circumstances, the prevention of the improvident 
alienation of land was virtually impossible, and the embryonic gold 
mining industry was severely handicapped as a result. Litigation was 
frequent and much capital was wastefully absorbed in the pioneering 
years as one lawsuit after another was filed over competing claims to 
the same blocks of land: one typical example can be consulted in 
Appendix IV. As the paper transactions multiplied and the general 
confusion over concessions mounted, the investing public reacted with 
ój. 
increasing distrust of gold mining prospects in the Gold Coast. 
Capital became scarce at the very time when the companies required 
substantial capital for the proper prospecting and development work 
in the preliminary stages of establishing the mines. 
I-t was thus into this state of general confusion that the 
Concessions Ordinance, No.14 of 1900 was introduced. This ordinance 
represented the resolution of legal and other difficulties which had 
prevented bills proposed earlier passing into law. Two bills proposed 
before 1900 were aborted because they failed to recognise fully, inter 
alia, the inherent rights of the local inhabitants with respect to 
land tenure. These were the Crown Lands Bill of 1894, and the Lands 
Bill of 1897, about which some comment is appropriate inasmuch as they 
bear on the progress of the gold mining industry. 
The first, the Crown Lands Bill of 1894, was more precisely 
entitled "An Ordinance to vest waste -land, forest land, and minerals 
in the Queen". As the title suggests, it attempted to give the colonial 
power full administrative control over land in the Colony. This not 
only contradicted native customary law, but also would have had a 
serious effect on economic development since it would have prevented 
the inflow of capital from overseas on which much of the development 
of the country's resources depended. That this was clearly realised 
in the Colony is shown in a letter, dated 8 July 1895, to the Secretary 
of State for the - Colonies from the Attorney -General, who commented that, 
"One chief hope for this Colony, is that 
capitalist will become interested, but 
Ordnance, if passed, will frighten him 
century as he won't know what's coming 
Enclosure No.1 in 12117/19). 
Governor Hodgon, who also expressed disapproval of the import of the 
the speculative 
I fear that this 
off for half a 
next" (African No.513, 
Bill, stated that, 
}. 
"The Bill appears to me to be in many respects incomplete, 
even in the embodiment of the principles involved, and in 
my opinion, it goes too far in the direction of confiscation 
and spoliation" (ibid, enclosure No.2). 
As a result of all the unfavourable reactions, the Crown Lands Bill 
of 1894 was shelved, but the problem still remained that the bona fide 
companies were failing to attract fresh capital largely because of the 
continuing malpractice in the concession industry. As a temporary 
measure, in an attempt to stop all trading in new concessions until 
new legislation could be drafted that would satisfy both the local 
inhabitants and the companies alike, Governor Maxwell filed a notice 
in the late part of 1395 prohibiting the conveyance of any land for 
industrial purposes (the full text of this notice can be consulted in 
Appendix V). 
Early in 1896, Maxwell prepared a new draft bill, known as 
the Lands Bill of 1897. This bill dealt with basically the saine 
matter as the abortive Crown Lands Bill, except that it was recognised 
by that stage that the Crown had no tenurial rights over the land. 
This second bill met with similar opposition, both from the newly 
formed Gold Coast Aborigines Protection Society and from the mining 
industry. The gold mining companies objected particularly to the 
clause which required the payment of a royalty on the gross value 
of gold won. It should be recalled that mining costs were still very 
high at this period due in the main to the high transport costs in 
the absence of modern facilities. In this light it is easy to under- 
stand the objections of the mining companies to the royalty clause. 
The following extracts from contemporary correspondence summarise the 
main objections to the 1897 Bill. In a letter dated May 3, 1897, 
from 
the Wassaw (Gold Coast) dining Co., to the Colonial Office, it was 
stated that, 
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... if such an ordnance were passed, it would most surely 
cripple the existing companies, and discourage the further 
investment of capital in the mining districts of the Gold 
Coast ... The total gross returns of this Company (which was 
typical of the whole industry) up to the end of last year 
amounted to 131,453 1, against an outlay of 163,243 1, and 
no dividends have yet been paid" (African No.531, 9394/97); 
James Irvine, of the Effuenta Co., echoed similar alarm in a letter 
of May 3, 1897, stating that, 
"I can only look upon this as absolutely prohibitiva of any 
further enterprise in the Colony" (African No.531, 9471/98); 
and finally, F. Swanzy, owner of several concessions in the north of 
the Tarkwa goldfield, pointed out in a letter to the Colonial Office 
dated May 5, 1897, that, 
'ode know of no goldfields in the world which are being worked 
successfully, where 5 per cent on the gross output is charged, 
it being generally realised that such a charge would be 
ruinous to ordinary quartz mining and very excessive on even 
rich mines" (African. No.531, 9555/100). 
For these, and other reasons, the Lands Bill, like the Crown Lands 
Bill, was abandoned, and it was a further three years before the 
Concessions Ordinance No.14 of 1900 was passed. 
The Concessions Ordinance was made retrospective to 1895, 
the year in which Maxwell had filed the notice stopping all land 
transactions pending the enactment of such legislation. This ordinance, 
however, was only applicable to the area of the Colony, and as the 
attention of the capitalists had begun to turn further inland to 
Ashanti by this time, it became necessary that the Supreme Court should 
also exercise jurisdiction in Ashanti to prevent the same improvident 
alienation of land there as had occurred in the Tarkwa mining district 
in the years before legislation existed. The formation of Ashanti 
Goldfields Corporation, Ltd, in 1897 and the promising results it 
obtained had drawn the attention of Europeans to the possibilities of 
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profitable investments in Ashanti. Ashanti Concessions Ordinance No.3 
of 1903 was therefore speedily prepared and passed into law. 
Needless to say, the Concessions Ordinance did not immediately 
solve the problems at which. it was directed. All the mining concessions 
needed to be overhauled in light of the new regulations; for example, 
Clause 20 imposed a 5 square mile limit on the size of concessions. 
Some of the older grants of leases could not be traced, particularly 
those granted before 1893, when the registered lists were first 
published in the government Gazette. The need for survey was the 
primary requirement to expedite the work of the Concessions Court (set 
up under the Ordinance), as was pointed out by the Fanti Corporation 
Ltd., in a letter of March 7, 1901, 
... the efficiency of the Concessions Court will be decreased 
without the general guidance of a reliable map of the Gold 
Coast. All existing maps, as is well known, have been compiled 
from the independent observations of various travellers and 
others, and large areas of the country remain unmapped, 
consequently the Concessions Court may not be able to avoid 
the granting of concessions which will be found to overlap when 
the boundaries are defined on the ground" (African No.652, 
8611/37). 
It was proposed that the cost of carrying out official surveys of the 
mining companies' concessions should be charged to the concessionaires 
at the rate of x.20 per square mile. To this end, a party of surveyors 
was sent out to the country in 1901. A particularly vivid account of 
the work of marking the boundaries of the mining properties can be 
consulted in Appendix VI. 
The efficient working of the newly constituted Concessions 
Court was unfortunately hindered further by the somewhat untimely 
occurrence of a second boom in the gold mining industry in 1900-01. 
This second wave of speculation (the reasons for which are discussed 
in Chapter 4) was accompanied by a similar but even larger wave of 
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concession -hunting to the detriment of any real progress in the industry. 
In an attempt to curb the worst features of the trade in worthless 
documents which had bedevilled the previous boom in the 1880s, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies inserted a general warning to the 
investing public in 'The Times' of 23 February 1901, through his private 
secretary, which read, 
" ... the fact that the prospects of the gold industry in a large 
country are promising from the point of view of the ability of 
the Colony to bear its own burdens, should be no inducement to 
the investor to subscribe to a particular enterprise without the 
most careful. investigation ... the present speculation in west 
Africa appears to him (the Secretary of State for the Colonies) 
to be premature, and that the solid prosperity of the Colony is 
likely to be endangered by the disappointment which will be 
caused by injudicious investment." 
However, gold has a unique fascination to man, and, in spite of this 
warning, the concession industry continued to flourish. The legal 
ratification of deeds were therefore long delayed in the Concessions 
Court, and the mining companies could not develop their properties at 
a satisfactory rate. These delays contributed in a significant way 
to the lack of progress experienced by the gold mining industry in its 
pioneering stage. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from all the available evidence that two main 
constraints on the rapid spatial and structural development of the 
industry in its pioneering years can be identified. First, the lack of 
efficient transport not only caused long delays in the work of setting 
up the machinery at the mining sites but also meant that the pioneer 
companies bore abnormally high costs owing to the high cost of transport. 
Secondly, the time and money wasted by the companies in attempting to 
establish their claims to concessions in the absence of legislation 
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regulating such transactions, further delayed progress in developing 
the industry. In terms of the relative weight of these two factors, 
the need for transport was undoubtedly the primary cause of the limited 
-progress made by the early companies, while the lack of legislation 
assumed a secondary role in hindering the rapid spatial and structural 
expansion of gold mining in the pioneering stage of its development. 
Other minor factors which contributed to the slow progress included 
the unsuitability of the climate for Europeans, resulting in high 
staff turnover, the generally unhealthy and unsanitary conditions which 
obtained, and the inefficiency of the equipment then in use. In 
addition, the pioneers had a very limited knowledge of the geological 
characteristics of the gold- bearing ores and extraction and reduction 
methods were inevitably in an experimental stage. 
During the first 20 years, therefore, production of gold was 
intermittent, insignificant and more or less on a trial basis. Mining 
operations were confined to surface work or mining at very shallow 
depths. The general impression is one of stagnation rather than progress 
with the pioneer companies struggling to hold out in very difficult 
conditions. Geographically, the Tarkwa goldfield, located some 40 
miles inland from the coast, remained the main focus of commercial gold 
mining until 1897 when the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation was formed 
and took out mining concessions some 120 miles inland in Ashanti. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the many difficulties which faced 
the companies in the early period, it was recognised that the Gold 
Coast was a potentially profitable area for gold mining operations, and 
by the first decade of the twentieth century all the goldfields had 
been opened up by European companies. In Chapter 4, the spatial expansion 
of the industry is described, the stimuli to its geographic spread are 
isolated and the subsequent constraints on its progress are examined. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: 
1902 -1930 : THE CONSOLIDATION OF GOLD MINING 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the intrusion of modern mining in 1877, and the 
premature 'boom' of the early 1880s, it was not until the turn of the 
twentieth century that the industry spread inland from its initial focus 
on the Tarkwa goldfield. This expansion was accompanied, and indeed 
partly induced, by a second but much more significant 'gold rush' over 
the period 1897 -1901, reaching a peak in 1900 -1901. According to the 
West African Yearbook for 1901, a total of 402 companies had been 
formed to acquire gold mining rights in the country by that date. 
Nearly (40,000,000 had been subscribed by the public, and it was 
estimated that more concessions had been granted to different competing 
companies than the total area of the Colony covered: As with the 
earlier boom, many of the companies failed, and most of the money 
invested by the public was lost very quickly. The causes of failure 
were largely those that had led to the collapse of the boom 20 years 
earlier, namely, 
fi ... difficulty and high cost of transport of mining material, 
too much optimism, inefficient or careless prospecting and 
fraudulent reports" (Kitson, 1932, p.4). 
Nevertheless, despite the bad features of the boom, this second wave 
of speculation produced some good features to the benefit of the 
industry; in particular, all the main goldfields were opened up by 
bona fide companies, and by 1910 the full areal extent of the gold 
mining industry had been established. Geographically, gold mining 
crystallised around five main core areas, namely, Tarkwa, Prestea, 
¡v. 
Obuasi, Bibiani and Konongo. In addition, dredging for gold was 
established along the main south -flowing rivers, particularly along 
the Ancobra, Prah and Teno. 
SPATIAL EXPAi`iSION 
From Tarkwa the second area to attract European attention 
was the Prestea goldfield, some 20 miles to the north -west of Tarkwa. 
The opening up of the Prestea district can be seen essentially as an 
offshoot development from the Tarkwa area. By 1389, two European - 
financed companies were operating at Prestea. The first, the Gie 
Appanto Gold Mining Company, Ltd., whose ¡mine was about one mile from 
the Ancobra river, began work in November 1337, some ten years after 
Bonnat had taken up concessions in Tarkwa. The second, the Prestea 
Mine of the Essaman Gold Mining Company, which had been registered in 
1385, was also operating by 1389 (Junner, 1935, p.21). Access to the 
Prestea district was then limited to the Ancobra river route. The 
opening up of the goldfields further inland was closely linked with 
the construction of the Government railway, which passes through the 
Tarkwa district and hence to Obuasi, which it reached by 1902. 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, formed in 1897, was the first company 
to take up concessions in Ashanti and it began. production in 1898. 
The Bibiani goldfield, some 70 miles to the north -west of Obuasi, was 
first exploited on a commercial basis in 1900, and the Konongo area, 
some 20 miles east of Kwnasi, was at least prospected, if not actively 
worked, by Europeans around 1902. The mines on the Tarkwa, Prestea 
and Obuasi goldfields prospered after the coming of the railway, but 
the Bibiani goldfield was never linked to an arm of the railway as 
the original companies had hoped it would when they began operations. 
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In addition, two small dredges commenced work in 1902 on the Offin 
river near Dunkwa (through which the Government railway also passes en 
route to :a masi), and these were quickly followed by others on the 
Ancobra, Prah, Birim and Fura rivers. The peak of dredging activity 
was reached about 1909, when 15 dredges were in operation. But in 
these early days, dredging for gold was not as successful as deep -level 
mining, and most of the dredging companies failed owing to, 
" ... unsuitable dredges, difficulty with waterlogged and drifted 
timber, rocky bars across the rivers, theft of gold and amalgam 
from the dredges, incapable and careless management and super- 
vision, want of forethought regarding rivers subsiding quickly 
after the rains, drifting and sinking of dredges during floods, 
ill -health, bad habits and bad luck" (Kitson, 1932, p.4). 
With the spread of the industry inland and the discovery of 
all the main goldfields by the first decade of the twentieth century, 
an era of prosperity seemed at hand. Many of the original companies 
were reconstructed and benefited from the inflow of fresh capital which 
attended the boom of 1897 -1901. But, the inevitable crash came as is 
usual when the market overruns its industry, and by 1902 the mining 
market was in a state of collapse. This had the effect of discouraging 
investors who were impatient of returns on their investments, and many 
lost confidence in gold mining in West Africa. This distrust of the 
industry continued throughout the first decade of the century even 
though some of the mines began to show profits, albeit small, and gold 
to the value of £100,000 was being exported each month by 1907. The 
principal reason for the distrust of the industry in the City was the 
inflated prices and subsequent collapse in prices of mining shares 
which had occurred during 1900/01. At the height of the boom, prices 
reached absurd levels, .1 shares of some mines rising as high as £30 
to £40 (Moore and Guggisberg, 1909, p.116), and in the aftermath, as 
the market settled down, the depreciation of twelve of the more important 
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companies amounted to over £8.25 million in a matter of three weeks 
(Leigh, 1904). Most of the ventures were heavily over -capitalised, 
with companies floated on quite fraudulent assays and, in some 
instances, shares were even sold on behalf of mining properties which 
had never been visited by a European. A flood of prospectuses entered 
the Colonial Office but most would not have borne examination in the 
field. 
Under these circumstances, the only means of restoring public 
confidence in gold mining in the Gold Coast was to show some return on 
the capital invested in the form of gold exports. To this end, mine 
managers were urged by their London -based directorates to initiate 
crushing operations even before all the necessary preparatory work had 
been completed. This was done on many properties, with the result 
that development work lagged behind and eventually several companies, 
which had mistakenly adopted this policy to appease their shareholders, 
went into premature liquidation. Apart from the mistakes made through 
mismanagement at the London headquarters, there were, of course, also 
examples of the squandering of development capital by incompetent mine 
managers. Moore and Guggisberg quote cases of mine managers drawing 
salaries of between 1:100 and £150 per month who never got further 
inland than Cape Coast or Sekondi. Nevertheless, as they pointed out, 
"The mail would carry away progress reports of the work done 
on the mine, fictitious returns of the gold found, and 
sanguine anticipations of future prospects found thereon; 
urgent demands for another draft on the Bank of British 
West Africa, and occasionally, specimen lumps of rich 
quartz, probably procured locally" (op.cit., p.125). 
Fortunately for the survival of the industry, a few bona 
fide companies carried on and the results of their efforts were 
sufficient to restore public confidence, and a revival of interest in 
gold mining in the Gold Coast began about 1909. At this time, 
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financial backing was secured from three of the most influential South 
African mining houses for the development of the Tarkwa goldfield, and 
thereafter the industry developed on a sounder basis. Structurally, 
the industry was rationalised through the amalgamation of the smaller 
properties and other companies were entirely reconstructed, emphasising, 
in their statements of policy, 
... the importance of dealing with the mines on an extensive 
scale in order that costs may be reduced considerably" 
(Jackson and Morgan, 1909, p.15). 
By 1910, therefore, the broad locational pattern of gold 
mining as it is found in modern Ghana was fully established. 
Geographically, the industry is still focused on the five centres of 
Tarkwa, Prestea, Obuasi, Bibiani and ñonongo, where deep -level mining 
has been continuous since the turn of the century, and earlier in the 
case of the Tarkwa centre. The only significant locational change 
since 1910 has been the shift of gold- dredging from the Ancobra, Prah 
and Tano rivers, which were worked earlier, to the Offin and Jimi 
river valleys, where current dredging operations are located. The 
modern structure of the industry, however, bears little resemblance to 
that of the earlier period which was characterised by a large number 
of small -scale companies. Today, the industry is run by two large 
corporations, one in the private sector and the other publicly- owned. 
As a corollary, it is important to ask what happened to the 
402 companies which were floated in the period 1897 -1901, and indeed 
what effect did they have on the geography of gold mining? On this 
question, an important distinction has to be made between 'concessions 
filed' and 'concessions which gained a Certificate of Validity'. 
According to the records, some 3,500 concessions were 'filed' by 
competing concessionaires at the turn of the century, but very few of 
these concessions were given Certificates of Validity to allow mining 
operations to begin.. In other words, very few of the mining concessions 
taken out have ever been worked, since most failed to be validated by 
the Concessions Court as required under the Concessions Ordinance ìáo.14 
of 1900. The large number of concessions 'filed' on behalf of the 402 
companies floated at this period merely cluttered up the Land Registers 
with worthless paper transactions and had no effect on the geography 
of gold mining. The extent of land actually given over to mining was 
very small since most of the 3,500 concessions lay idle and were 
eventually abandoned. In this light, it is important to read the 
early 'maps', as `rrallach's Mining Map of 1900, with extreme caution, 
since the vast number of concessions plotted on such maps gives a 
misleading impression of the extent of gold mining in the country. As 
stated, gold mining crystallised around five main centres of Tarkwa, 
Prestea, Obuasi, Bibiani and Konongo, whereas a cursory examination of 
the early maps tends to give the impression that the entire south- western 
part of the Colony and Ashanti were given over to gold -mining: This 
conclusion is borne out by other evidence, derived from the Annual 
Reports of the Mines Department, from which it is seen that the 
maximum number of companies actively producing gold in any one year 
was recorded in 1939 -40 when 16 companies were responsible for the 
total output of the industry for that year, and that the maximum 
number of companies engaged in mining activity of some kind (although 
not necessarily at the producing stage) was recorded in the years 
1935/36 and 1936/37, when 31 companies were carrying out work on their 
concessions. From these facts, it is evident that a very large number 
of the 402 companies registered in the boom period of 1897 -1901 failed 
to gain Certificates of Validity to enable them to work on the 
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TABLE 4.1 
LAND ALIENATED FOR INDUSTRIAL PURPOSES 
IN THE GOLD COAST COLONY, 1901 -1911 
(square miles) 
Year (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
1901 3.529 - 3.529 
1902 8.991 6.142 - - 15.133 
1903 69.307 21.657 - - 90.965 
1904 110.652 20.957 - 131.609 
1905 86.734 22.939 - - 109.673 
1906 15.695 10 15 - 40.695 
1907 29.953 2.105 3.332 - 35.390 
1908 20.639 1.489 36.913 59.041 
1909 - - 145.920 145.920 
1910 22.717 21.283 1.366 - 45.366 
1911 38.360 20.112 2.136 141.148 201.756 
TOTALS 406.577 126.685 204.607 141.148 879.077 
(i) mining. 
(ii) mining with other rights. 
(iii) timber and other rights. 
(iv) petroleum and other oil. 
(v) total land alienated. 
Source: Belfield, 1912 (Cmd.6278). 
concessions leased at that time. The extent of land alienated for 
industrial purposes (i.e. land covered by Validated Concessions) in the 
Gold Coast Colony between 1901 and 1911 amounted, in fact, to less 
than 1/27th of the total area of the Colony (see Table 4.1), whereas 
the total area encompassed by concessions 'filed' has been estimated 
from the old records as some 3,000,000,000 square miles (Belfield, 
1912, para.40)! 
STIMULI TO SPATIAL EXPAI SION 
The 'gold rush' which occurred at the turn of the century 
leading to the opening up of the goldfields further inland can be 
attributed to many factors. Several events coincided at that period, of 
which four in particular seem to have been largely responsible for the 
renewed interest in the gold mining industry. These were favourable 
encouragement from government circles; substantial geological reports; 
the formation of successful mining ventures, particularly Ashanti 
Goldfields Corporation; and the construction of the railway. 
1. Official Backing. 
Early in 1899, the attention of the capitalists in the City 
was called to the improved possibilities of gold mining in the Gold 
Coast in a speech by Joseph Chamberlain, then Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, made in the House of Commons on March 11, 1899, 
"I am more confident than ever that these Colonies will turn out 
to be a most valuable possession, and acting on that belief, I 
am placing on the Colony a certain burden in the shape of a 
duty, with the fullest confidence that before very long they 
will be able to repay it. I base this, not on the commerce of 
spirits but a general increase in trade which is taking place, 
and which I anticipate will develop to an extraordinary degree 
as soon as we get Railway communication (this has already 
commenced) and also upon the prospects of the gold industry of 
the country. I confess that I do not wish to boom that 
 
industry at this time but from all the information that I have 
obtained, it is going; to be I believe a most solid, valuable 
and profitable industry in the Colony" (Parl. Debates, House of 
Commons, August, 1899). 
Despite Chamberlain's cautionary note, his speech had the very effect 
of booming the industry, and corroborative statements made by local 
officials left the investing public in little doubt that they could , 
profit from gold mining in the Gold Coast, even if some of the local 
reports were over- enthusiastic. For example, in the Annual Report of 
the Gold Coast for 1398, it was stated, 
"In the Western Province of this Colony it is estimated that 
there are about 20 miles of banket formation, and if this land 
were treated in the same way as similar land in Johannesburg 
it is estimated that it would contain 13,000,000 tons of banket 
reef from which about £40,000,000 worth of ;old could be 
extracted by ten years' operations ... ;fielding an annual 
profit of one and a quarter millions sterling." 
The local government itself even displayed some interest in participa- 
ting directly in gold mining. An attempt was made by public enterprise 
in the mining industry in 1397, when the then Governor, Maxwell, was 
authorised to spend £1000 on a scheme for alluvial gold mining, 
complete with imported Chinese miners and prospectors (Kimble, 1963, 
p.24): Although this particular venture came to nothing, all evidence 
suggests that the Colonial Office and local officials regarded the 
gold mining industry as the primary point of the Gold Coast's industrial 
and economic potential. The more conservative reports of the period 
recognised that the Gold Coast would probably not become 
a leading 
world producer of gold, but that nevertheless, gold would attain 
a 
high local and external value in the economy. 
2. Geological Reports 
At the same time, several important studies 
were made by 
geologists of the gold deposits of the country. 
In particular the 
Tarkwa goldfield was investigated in some detail, and the gold- bearing 
ores were recognised to be similar in structure to the ores of the 
Witswatersrand goldfield in South Africa, which had proved its 
potential profitability by the turn of the century. The reports of 
Halse (1890/91) and Sawyer (1901) were widely circulated and evidently 
aroused public interest in gold mining in the Gold Coast. In March 
1900, encouraged by the geological information and by Chamberlain's 
speech, a prospecting company, the Gold Coast Agency (a subsidiary of 
Consolidated Goldfields of South Africa Ltd.) was formed to prospect 
the Tarkwa area by means of boreholes. The banket formation was 
proved to be so consistent in character that capital for development 
was easily obtained from the investing public. Of particular 
significance in creating confidence in the minds of the investing 
public was a report by Mr Louis Webb, a mining engineer of some 
experience from the Rand, who reported having struck a banket reef at 
a depth of 773 feet, 43 inches in width and yielding some 22 dwts per 
ton (CO 96/424/1904: Memorandum on History of eTining on the Banket 
Reefs, unsigned). In addition, because of the Boer Tar in South Africa 
much capital was diverted to the 'Jest Coast; for the Tarkwa goldfield 
alone, over 22,000,000 of working capital for exploration was subscribed. 
3. The Formation of Ashanti Goldfields Corporation 
Although the geological reports favoured the development of 
the Tarkwa goldfield, the possibilities of profitable ventures based 
on the gold- bearing quartz ores, located further inland, were high- 
lighted by other events. In particular, the opening up of the Obuasi 
goldfield by the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, registered in 1897, 
and the publication of this company's outstanding assays stimulated 
widespread interest in the quartz ores. This company was formed on 
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the basis of assays of ore samples sent to England in 1895 by Edwin 
Cade, a merchant in the Gold Coast. The samples he forwarded to London 
assayed on the average at over 10.5 ounces per ton, and other specimens 
yielded up to 2757 ounces to the ton (Eaton Turner, 1947). Cade 
secured, in fact, the most lucrative bargain in the field of gold 
mining by obtaining a written agreement leasing no less than 100 square 
miles of land from the Chiefs of Adansi and Bekwai. The Government 
was at that time unable to sanction or disallow Cadets negotiations 
since they had taken place in Ashanti, over which the Administration 
had still then no jurisdiction. But, when the Ashanti company was 
registered in 1897, a fresh agreement was drawn up, under which. the 
Government was to receive a royalty on the gross profits and the 
local Chiefs were to receive annual rent payments amounting to £100 and 
£66 going respectively to the Chiefs of Adansi and Bekwai. This 
agreement was unique in that it was exempt from the operation of the 
Ashanti Concessions Ordinance of 1903. The terms of this agreement 
were not to be repeated, however; but its very existence, once known, 
encouraged other prospectors into the interior in search of gold- mining 
concessions. In this way, the formation of Ashanti Goldfields played 
a significant role in the spread of commercial gold mining from its 
initial focus around Tarkwa, and stimulated a general interest in the 
commercial possibilities of the gold- bearing quartz ores which had 
hitherto been largely ignored. 
The Construction of the Railwa 
The construction of the first line of railway in the Gold 
Coast was by far the most important stimulus to the mining boom which 
occurred at the turn of the century. This line, a 3 -foot 6 -inch gauge, 
single -line track, was begun in 1898 and linked the Tarkwa goldfield 
with the coast at Sekondi. The line was further extended from Tarkwa 
to isnasi which it reached in September 1903. The costs of gold 
production were thereby substantially lowered and at the same time the 
existence of the railway encouraged the spread of modern mining into 
the interior. The building of the railway in effect resolved the main 
bottleneck to progress in the gold mining industry and indeed to the 
general economic development of the country. The alignment of the 
route was chosen with the development of the gold industry particularly 
in view, as was officially stated on many occasions. For example, in 
correspondence with the Manchester Chamber of Commerce in 1897, an 
official of the Colonial Office wrote, with respect to the Sekondi- 
Tarkwa section, 
"I am to state that this Railway is being undertaken to serve 
the gold mines in the Tarquah district, the whole length 
being only about 40 miles" (African No.531:15039/325). 
The extension to Kumasi was similarly designed to serve the Obuasi 
goldfield; it passes through the property of Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation and was sanctioned in 1901 under a guarantee from that 
company that it would make up the annual net earnings of the railway 
to a sum agreed upon. Consequently, the simultaneous development of 
mining and the railways brought about a considerable inflow of capital 
and encouraged a general increase in imports which rose by some Cl million 
per annum between 1898 and 1902. 
The decision to build the Sekondi -Kumasi railway, in fact, 
represented the resolution of a prolonged controversy between the 
commercial and mining communities in the Colony. Each community sent 
delegation after delegation to the Colonial Office with suggested 
schemes for lines of railway which would open up the interior and serve 
general developmental purposes. From the late 1870s, railway -building 
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projects were submitted to and rejected by the Colonial Office, and 
indeed a great deal of time, effort and capital were expended in 
testing and surveying alternative routes. Axim, Dixcove, Cape Coast, 
Shama, Appam and Accra were all put forward as suitable terminal ports 
for railways before Sekondi was eventually selected. A great number 
of the earlier schemes were proposed by private mining interests, as 
for example, when a mining company sent out a Mr Barham to Tarkwa in 
1382, 
... to survey the Country with a view to ascertain the 
possibility of the construction of a line of railway from 
the coast to the mines" (Affairs of the Gold Coast, 1882, p.76). 
Other surveys were appointed by the Colonial Office, on the recommenda- 
tions of the commercial community, as for example, Captain Lang's 
expedition to the Gold Coast in 1892. In his report, he recommended 
that the first priority was a line of railway to serve the central 
region, from Appam to Kumasi, and a subsequent survey by F. Shelford 
in 1895 made a similar recommendation. However, it was obvious that 
neither the mining community nor the commercial community could be 
allowed to implement any of their proposals without thorough investiga- 
tion by the authorities, and in order to prevent the undue division of 
the country by a series of unconnected lines reaching the interior from 
points along the coast, the Colonial Office decided that it would 
neither sanction the construction of railways by private companies nor 
accept the reports which had advocated the central line. The least 
satisfactory feature of the lines demanded by the mining companies was 
that they were wanted for the sole purpose of transporting heavy 
machinery to the mining sites, after which the mining industry would 
generate very little traffic. 
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With these considerations in mind, the decision was therefore 
delayed for some twenty years until such time as either the mines or 
the trading prospects of the Colony could be shown to be viable and 
long -term propositions. This hindered the progress of gold mining in 
its pioneering period, although it was made clear that the general 
policy likely to be adopted with respect to railways would be along 
the lines of the Earl of Derby's decision of July 1883, that, 
"It would be impossible to give a guarantee to a private 
.company from the Colony revenue but if satisfied that the 
railway would pay, the Colonial Government might itself 
construct and work it" 
(African No.531: Enclosure in 16785/339). 
But it was not until 1896 that the railway- building policy became 
clearer. In December of that year, the Governor recommended that a 
survey should be made to the Tarkwa district at least, and so, inspired 
by the Governor's request and by the ever -growing volume of correspon- 
dence from the mining companies, who pleaded their case for a railway 
with both sensible and emotionally- inspired facts and figures about the 
impending failure of gold mining in the absence of modern transport, 
the authorities in London were convinced of the need for such a railway 
to link the Tarkwa goldfield at least with the coast. Thus, early in 
1897, a mining expert was sent out to the Gold Coast to obtain, 
" ... trustworthy information as to the mineral resources of 
the country, in order that it may be possible to judge whether 
it would be worth while to spend some (200,000 upon a railway" 
(African No.531:2804/48; Colonial Office to Crown Agents, 
26 February 1897). 
Meanwhile, Shelford and Sons was instructed to carry out a survey 
from Sekondi, or other point along the coast, to Tarkwa. 
Fortunately for the mining community, if unfortunately for 
the commercial community, Shelford's report submitted in 1897 was 
accepted, and, backed up by the opinion of the mining expert's 
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confidential report which underlined the long -term profitability of 
the gold mining industry given adequate transport, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies ordered the Sekondi - Tarkwa line to be started 
in December 1897, stating that, 
"The construction of railways must be for some time to conte 
limited to works which promise to be immediately remunerative" 
(African No.531: Enclosure in 16785/339; Memorandum on Gold 
Coast Railways). 
This long- awaited decision created an immediate upsurge of renewed 
interest in the industry. Orders for new equipment were speedily 
despatched to England and many mining properties which had lain dormant 
since the early 1880s were taken in hand and the preliminary work, as 
the clearing of trees, was begun in readiness for the installation of 
machinery when the railway line was completed to Tarkwa. Prices of 
mining shares rocketed, and companies proliferated once the news of 
the Sekondi- Tarkwa railway was made public. Similarly, in 1900, with 
the announcement of the extension of the line to Kumasi, interest in 
the industry heightened and provided an added stimulus to opening up 
the goldfields further inland. This revival of interest was, however, 
premature and long delays in the completion of the railway and therefore 
in the progress of gold mining was one of the causes of the disillusion- 
ment in the industry which immediately followed the mining boom. (A 
discussion of the problems. of railway construction in the Gold Coast 
and the reasons for the slow rate of progress in completing the Sekondi- 
Kumasi line can be consulted in Command Paper 2325 of 1905.) 
While the spatial expansion of gold mining can be attributed, 
inter alia, to the advent of the railway, its construction did not go 
without protest from the commercial community which even attempted to 
have the decision for its particular alignment reversed. For example, 
the Manchester Chamber of Commerce complained to the Colonial Office that, 
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"The Tarquah scheme is designed mainly if not exclusively in 
the interest of gold mining, and there is little likelihood 
that it can do much toward serving the general industrial 
and commercial interests of the Colony" 
(African No.531: 16785/329) . 
And again, doubly annoyed that their claims had been overruled in 
preference for the extension from Tarkwa to Kumasi, it was stated that, 
" ... it is not unreasonable for the commercial community to 
ask that the long -promised Central Railway should be 
immediately put in hand, even if so doing would mean a 
delay in the full extension of the Tarkwa line to Kumasi" 
(co 96/370: Memorandum on Gold Coast Railways put before the 
Director of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, May 9, 1900). 
All the remonstrations were in vain, however, and perhaps for the 
important reason that financial support for railway building could 
not readily be met out of the Colony's revenue. It is quite evident 
that the Tarkwa-Kumasi extension would not have been sanctioned at 
that period had not the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation proposed to 
give financial backing to the line in the form of some (.30,000 guaranteed 
revenue per annum. In these terms, the mining industry had a stronger 
case for a railway to serve their needs than did the commercial 
community. Gold mining thereafter became the key export sector of the 
economy, attaining an export value of over f.1 million by 1907, which 
represented 50jß of all exports by value, for that year. Improved 
communications also encouraged the export of other products, notably 
rubber, timber, palm oil products and kola nuts as well as cocoa. 
The pace of economic development was quite remarkable, due in no small 
measure to the capital investment in the mines consequent on the 
construction of the Government railway. This in turn stimulated the 
development of other resources of the forest zone, and in 
these terms 
the gold mining sector can be said to have propelled the 
economy from 
a subsistence to an export economy. 
CONSTRAINTS ON PROGRESS 
While the coming of the railway and other events at the turn 
of the century favoured the consolidation of gold mining in the Gold 
coast and its steady expansion from about 1902/3, the industry did face 
other and new difficulties to its rapid growth and development. Indeed, 
many problems dating back to the earlier pioneering period remained 
unsolved, and new problems arose. From the available evidence, it is 
possible to isolate three difficulties which impeded the rapid spatial 
and structural development of gold mining: the continuing isolation 
of some of the goldfields from modern transport lines; the continuing 
high costs of production owing to the high level of freight charges 
on the Government Railway; and the problem of obtaining an adequate 
supply of labour. 
1. The Need for More Railways 
The mines on the Tarkwa and Obuasi goldfields, through which 
the Government railway passed, benefited from their newfound 
accessibility, but other companies were less fortunate in their 
continuing isolation from modern transport lines. Consequently, further 
proposals for branch lines to reach other mining properties were put 
forward. For example, the development of the mines of Bibiani Ltd., 
registered in 1900, was hampered above all by inaccessibility, and the 
enormous cost oftransporting plant and machinery by head loads from 
Cape Coast, a distance by hammock path of some 150 miles. The company 
proposed as early as August 1901, in a letter to the Colonial Office, 
that their property should be put into direct communication with the 
proposed Sekondi -Kumasi railway, but their request was turned down 
(0096/393). Although the arrival of the railway at Dunkwa in 1902 
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alleviated considerably the financial position of the company, supplies 
still had to be carried by road some 70 miles from the railhead to the 
mine. The financial position of the company gradually deteriorated, 
and in 1913, the company was forced to close down after having produced 
212,000 ounces of gold, valued at some £890,000. The annual expenditure 
of some £6,500 on road transport alone had proved too high a burden on 
the company's limited finances. Other mining companies in the same area 
were similarly disappointed by the Colonial Office's refusal to 
sanction this line. In a minuted comment on a letter, dated 12 
February 1913, from Ashanti Rivers and Concessions Ltd., an official 
wrote, 
"It is highly unlikely that this line will be constructed by 
the Government at any time in the near future, as all the 
papers here go to show that the line would only benefit the 
Companies and the Government has other fish to fry" 
(0096/540). 
To this day, the Bibiani goldfield is without a direct rail link, 
although in 1944, a branch line was constructed to nearby Awaso to 
transport bauxite from the Kanaiyerebo mine. The premature closure of 
Bibiani Ltd. in 1913 was a fate shared by many other companies in 
similarly inaccessible locations, and only the mines along or within 
a reasonable distance of the railway survived. 
Although the authorities would not sanction the construction 
of railways by private companies, approval was given to the construction 
of light railways or tramlines for internal use on the mining properties. 
By 1907, there were two such private lines, the first from Fura to 
Broomasie, and the second from Dunkwa to Attasi. These light tramways 
served a limited use and could not compare with the direct rail links 
to the coast. To take the transport problems of the Prestea district 
as an illustration, the means of communication between the Coast and 
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the Prestea range at that time comprised an awkward and costly 
combination of river and tramway transport. Goods were first carried 
by boat on the Ancobra river some 40 miles from the port of Axim to 
Pura, and thence by light railway some 26 miles to the mines. This 
route was unsatisfactory owing to the bar at the mouth of the Ancobra, 
the fluctuations in the river level, and the cost involved. On 
these grounds, therefore, the companies requested that a branch line 
be built from Tarkwa to Prestea, a short distance of about 20 miles, 
stating that, 
... the whole of the development of the properties on the 
Prestea range must come to a standstill pending the building 
of the line" (Co 96/464; Fanti'%,Lines to C.O., 17 July, 1 907). 
In contrast to Bibiani's unsuccessful bid for a branch line the 
Colonial Office authorised the Tarkwa Prestea line in February 1908. 
The line was virtually complete by the end of 1910, and production 
increased dramatically; at Prestea Block A, gold production rose from 
20,000 ounces in 1910 to over 100,000 ounces in 1914, and its neighbour, 
the Broomasie mine, doubled its output over the same period. The 
future of the mines on the Prestea goldfield had thereby been secured, 
and this serves to re- emphasise the inter- relationship between cheap 
and effective means of transport and the survival power of the gold 
mining companies in the early years of its development. 
2. Railway Rates 
The construction of the Government railway was an important 
factor, if not the most important single factor, in inducing capitalists 
to venture their money in Gold Coast mining. However, a contentious 
problem arose over the scale of freight rates charged on the carriage 
of mining machinery and supplies on the Government railway. The 
companies contended that the level of charges was prejudicial to the 
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full development of the industry, and particularly so to the opening 
up of the low -grade banket ores. Twelve companies with interests on 
the Tarkwa goldfield were signatories to a petition handed to the 
Colonial authorities on this issue, and this was backed up by an 
endless flow of complaining letters from other companies on the 
subject. It was pointed out, for example, by the Akrokerri (Ashanti) 
Mines Ltd., in a letter dated 4 March 1904, that the cost of carriage 
of equipment on the Government railway to their property, located some 
132 miles inland, was almost as much as the prime cost of the equipment 
itself (CO 96/424). A number of small concessions were given, but the 
revised schedule of rates still made uneconomical some of the concerns 
working low -grade ores. Secondly, many of the smaller and undercapitalised 
companies showed losses, and went into liquidation. The larger companies 
survived, nevertheless, and in some cases high dividends were paid to 
their shareholders. The success of these few merely showed that the 
failure of the many was due to other factors, such as incapable 
management. In these terms, the controversy over railway rates 
assumed an exaggerated importance since as far as the evidence suggests, 
the main effect of the prevailing level of freight charges was to 
produce a rational development of the gold mining industry by a small 
number of bona fide companies. On the Tarkwa goldfield, many of the 
smaller companies amalgamated to achieve economies of scale, which in 
the event was the most rational means of developing these low -grade 
properties. In other words, the problem of high freight rates on the 
railway was a temporary issue, and only affected the smaller companies 
which might not have survived for long in any case. But, for the 
companies which survived, there was one final problem which hindered 
the development of the industry in this period, that of obtaining an 
adequate supply of labour. 
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3. Labour Supply 
Finally, the inadequacy of labour supply, both in quantity 
and quality, was an added constraint on the rapid growth of the gold 
mining industry. Indeed, shortages of labour were apparent from the 
outset of modern mining in the late 1870s, became more acute once the 
industry had become solidly established after the turn of the century, 
and have persisted throughout the history of the industry. Thus, while 
labour shortages were not unique to the period under discussion, they 
proved to be a relatively more important constraint on the progress of 
gold mining in the period 1902-1930 than at other times. In the 
pioneering years, carrier labour was difficult to obtain and more 
difficult to retain, and, once the minim machinery had been installed 
on the properties following the coming of the railway, labour to work 
on the mines was even more difficult to secure. 
According to the population estimates for the Cold Coast in 
1891, the total population was just over 1,500,000, of whom 907,000 
lived in the Colony, 314,000 in Ashanti and 429,000 in the Northern 
Territories. The human resources of the country were therefore limited, 
and, in terns of quality, only a small core of skilled artisans, 
fostered by the Basel ',Mission, existed from which the mines could draw 
their requirements. Since the majority of the local inhabitants were 
engaged in the traditional sectors ofthe economy, a reason for the 
failure of most of the early gold -prospecting expeditions was the 
difficulty of obtaining labour. Before commercial mining was established 
in 1877, many foreign expeditions had visited the coast with the hope 
of establishing gold mining companies. But all had failed in their 
attempts owing, inter alia, to the difficulty experienced in 
obtaining 
carriers for their tools and stores. One traveller, on a visit to the 
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gold fields of the Wassaw district in 1877, related this problem, 
"A shilling a day wages and threepence per day subsistence was 
offered, accepted, and declined half a dozen times a day" 
(Skertchley, 1878, p.274). 
The general pattern seemed to be that carriers once engaged would fail 
to turn up at the required time, or disappear en route, which made for 
chaos in the carriage of goods into the interior. 
However, once inland and on arrival at the sites of native 
gold 'mining', there appeared to be no shortage of labour from which 
the pioneer companies could draw their requirements, as the following 
selected extracts from contemporary documents show: 
"At the time of our arrival, there were upwards of 6000 men 
and women at Tacquah ( Tarkwa) all engaged in working the gold" 
(Skertchley, 1878, p.277); 
" ... large numbers (of natives) from different parts of the 
Country averaging about 5000 people have resorted to the 
Mining districts in search of employment" (Blue Book, 1880, p.323); 
"At the period of my visit (to the Tarkwa area) there must have 
been about 1000 natives at work, sinking and driving .." 
(Mr C.J.Harvey's report, dated 18 May 1878, quoted in fl itelaw, 
1929, p.5); 
... there are at present 1306 natives working at the Tacquah 
Mines and the number is increasing every day" (M.Bonnat's 
report, dated January 12, 1879, quoted in Holmes, 1926, p.81). 
Even as far inland as Bibiani, some 120 miles from the coast, the then 
Consulting Engineer of Bibianaha Goldfields Ltd., Kendrick, estimated 
in his report of April 3, 1900, that there were between 10,000 and 
12,000 natives living in villages on the company's property (CO 96/372). 
From these extracts, it might appear that the pioneering 
companies at least had no great difficulty in obtaining labour to work 
on their mines. However, when the situation is studied more closely, 
it seems that these figures taken alone give a very misleading impression 
of the state of the labour market, since the local inhabitants, being 
unused to industrial work, could not be relied upon to give regular 
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service, and most would engage only for one month at any time, and in 
some cases for even shorter periods. Indeed, other evidence suggests 
that labour shortages were felt from the inception of commercial mining. 
As long as the mining companies were engaged in the preliminary work 
of preparing their properties for mining, such as the clearing of the 
bush, the erection of buildings and the transport of machinery from 
the coast, the supply of labour was adequate if inefficient. But, as 
soon as crushing operations began, the shortage of labour, particularly 
for underground work, became apparent. The Acting Civil Commissioner 
of the Tarkwa District, writing in 1882, stated that, 
"The natives of these parts are bad workers, and are employed 
as little as possible at the mines ..." 
Initially, to supplement the domestic supply of labour, the 
mining companies imported men, particularly Iiroos and Bassahs. But, 
again, these men were generally engaged for a mere twelve months and 
then returned home. According to the first Annual Report of the Mines 
Department, 
"The best carriers are drawn from the Hausa tribes, who are 
capable of carrying loads of 100 to 150 lbs for a distance 
of 10 or 12 miles a day" (A.R.M.D., 1)03, p.30). 
Another contemporary document stated that the labour on the mines of 
the Tarkwa goldfield was made up of local Fantis, who did the light 
work, as hammock- bearing, while the imported Kroo and Bassah men were 
preferred for the heavier work (Halse, 1890/91). Table 4.2 sets out 
the tribal origin of the mines labour force for the year 1903, and it 
illustrates clearly that the local inhabitants did not provide all the 
immediate labour needs of the industry. During the early years of 
modern gold mining, therefore, labour shortages can be said to have 
had a marginal effect on the progress of the industry in the sense that 
distant sources had to be tapped to fulfil the industry's requirements. 
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TABLE 4.2 
ORIGIN OF LABOUR IN GOLD MINING INDUSTRY, 1903 
Place of Origin Number 
jó Labour 
Force 
FOREIGN COUNTRIES 3228 18.94 
Kroo 2382 13.97 
Bassah 846 4.97 
BRITISH COLONIES 2329 13.67 
Mendi 743 4.36 
Lagos 1187 6.97 
Hausa 399 2.34 
GOLD COAST 11487 67.39, 
Ashanti 2766 16.22 
Fanti 6545 38.40 
Krepi 1934 11.35 
Appolonian 242 1.42 
TOTAL 100.00 
Source: A.R.M.D., 1904 
Nevertheless, compared with the other problems of the period, 
particularly the lack of modern transport, this problem assumed a 
relatively minor role in influencing the slow pace of development. 
With the proliferation of companies during the boom at the 
turn of the century, and the installation of machinery on all the main 
goldfields made possible by the construction of the railway, the 
question of labour supply for the gold mines became paramount. With 
the problem of transport at least partially solved, it became clear 
that many of the companies would fail, at least in part because of 
their inability to satisfy their labour requirements locally. Hence, 
several schemes for importing labour on a large scale were suggested. 
For example, Lord Harris, writing to the Colonial Office on behalf of 
mining interests in the Gold Coast, stated in a letter, dated 30 June 
1901, that the chief mining companies would accept an order modelled 
on that of Trinidad, involving the importation of Indian coolie labour; 
this proposal was backed up by a deputation of mine managers to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, who suggested that alternatively 
500 Chinese should be brought into the country on a trial basis (CO 
96/393/22940). This idea was not new; Burton and Cameron visiting the 
Gold Coast twenty years earlier had strongly advocated the importation 
of coolie labour to work on the gold mines. Again, in a letter dated 
July 10, 1901, L.P.Bowler pointed out that, 
... the most important factor in facilitating the rapid 
development of the mining industry of the Gold Coast is the 
supply of cheap and reliable labour ", 
and to this end, he suggested that the Colonial Office should sanction 
the importation of labour that could cope with the climate, mentioning 
as possibilities Indian coolies, Chinese, or Shangaans of East Africa 
(Co 96/391). None of these various proposals was ever given official 
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authorisation and the reasons were minuted in reply to a similar 
suggestion in J.Moffat's letter to the Colonial Office of 26 July 1912, 
"1. Indian coolies in Fiji, British Guiana etc. are agricultural 
not mining labourers, and would not take to mining work. 
2. There would be no opening for such indentured labourers in 
Gold Coast when their service was ended. 
3. The climate would not suit. 
4. The labour difficulty is not yet so acute as to call for 
any outside assistance" (CO 96/526). 
Competition for labour from other sources of employment was 
seen by the mining companies to be the major cause of labour shortages 
in the mining industry, and road and railway construction, harbour 
works, load carrying (for example, during the Ashanti uprising of 1900 
when carriers were diverted to military purposes), and cocoa farming 
were all cited. Surprisingly, the companies even objected to the 
competition for local labour which inevitably arose when the lines of 
railway were being constructed to Tarkwa, to Kumasi and later to 
Prestea. The fact that the railways were built in the first instance 
to serve the mining industry seemed irrelevant when it meant that their 
labour supplies were threatened: The companies even suggested that 
labour should be imported from Lagos or the Northern Territories to 
work on the railways so that the local inhabitants would be free to 
take up employment on the mines. The Directors of Prestea Block A 
(one of the gold mining companies working on the Prestea goldfield) 
went as far as proposing in a letter, dated 21 October 1908, that no 
natives should be recruited for railway work within a forty -mile radius 
of Tarkwa (CO 96/478). And, in a further letter, dated 10 December 1910, 
the same company complained to the Colonial Office that, 
"There are large villages adjacent the Mine Camp and isolated as 
these are from other parts, except for bush tracks, a large 
part of the population has been available for our mine. The 
opening of the railway, while being a boon in other respects, 
will enable labour to drift more easily to the Tarquah field" 
(co 96/504). 
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From all the conflicting evidence, it seems that the mining companies, 
while undoubtedly suffering from periodic shortages of labour and 
having a limited choice of labour of the required quality for mining 
work, were prone to exaggerate the magnitude of the shortages, because 
according to the annual statistics of the Mines Department, the numbers 
employed in mining grew from some 12,000 in 1905 to 20,000 by 1910. 
One possible reason for the recurring complaints from the 
companies concerning the supply of labour perhaps lies in their failure 
to stabilise the labour force, despite efforts to do so. When the 
industry began on a large scale at the turn of the century, they 
established native villages at great expense in the hope that the 
natives would take up permanent residence and settle down to mining 
work, thereby creating for the mining industry a stable labour force. 
The first of such villages was at Effuenta, and others were laid out 
subsequently at Abbontiakoon, Fanti mines, Adjah Bippo, Abosso, Tacquah, 
Cinnamon Bippo, all located on the Tarkwa goldfield, and at Prestea. 
The mining companies pulled down the haphazard groups of buildings 
which had grown up around the mining works when the mines first started 
on a commercial basis in the late nineteenth century, and in their 
place they erected proper villages in which the houses were systematically 
built with good spaces left between the houses. The rebuilding of these 
villages had stopped epidemics, which had impaired the efficiency of 
labour in the earlier period, and at the same time the existence of 
these orderly villages had induced a number of foreign natives to 
settle permanently around the mines (A.R.M.D., 1903 /4, p.31). Practically 
every village was under European supervision, with a Medical Officer 
in charge of sanitation. Thus, as early as 1900, the mining companies 
had attempted to stabilise the labour force in the belief that good 
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housing conditions would induce the native labourers to serve long 
periods in the industry, acquire the necessary skills and thereby 
provide the industry in turn with an efficient and reliable labour 
force. But for various reasons the degree of permanency hoped for did 
not materialise. First, between 1903 and 1908, when a number of the 
mines were closed down after the collapse of the boom, most Of the 
villages were allowed to get out of control, and as a result people 
with no connection with the mining industry whatsoevery- settled in these 
villages. This period of inaction brought about the recurrence of 
epidemics as sanitation arrangements were allowed to slip and the 
houses became overcrowded and fell into disrepair. The result was that 
... natives in the Gold Coast simply squat in their (companies') 
villages and come to work when they feel inclined to do so" 
(CO 96/503: Gold Coast Amalgamated Mines Ltd. to the Colonial 
Office, 1 November 1910). 
Thus, while the mines had attracted large numbers of people to settle 
in or around the mining areas, the majority of these people had no 
connection with the industry. This_in itself re- emphasised the labour 
shortages suffered by the industry, although in many ways it was the 
fault of the mining companies themselves. Some of the smaller companies, 
set up in the general enthusiasm created in the boom at the turn of the 
century, put their mines on a care and maintenance basis until such 
time as the larger and more heavily- capitalised companies had proved 
that gold mining in the Gold Coast would pay. This policy was partly 
responsible for the lack of control in the mining settlements in the 
first decade of the twentieth century. In order to offset the apparent 
apathy of the local inhabitants to mining work, the operating companies 
were forced to offer higher wages than those adopted by the local Mine 
Managers Association, and this in itself forced many of the smaller 
companies to close, since production costs were still relatively high 
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at that period. The minimum wage rates of the period were quoted as 
1s 6d per diem for miners, 1s 9d for shaftsmen, 1s 3d for surface 
labourers, between 3s and 3s 6d for fitters and between 2s 6d and 
3s 6d per diem for carpenters (A.R.M.D., 1904). 
Several companies had reached the profit -making stage by the 
middle of the first decade of the twentieth century, and this encouraged 
expansion in the industry. Por example, for the year 1905/6, the 
Abosso Gold Mining Co. Ltd. declared a profit of X56,136 of which 
w34,950 was absorbed by the payment of a 10 dividend to their share- 
holders; Bibiani Goldfields Ltd. declared a profit of 241,184; and 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation a profit of 40,454 (A.R.M.D., 1906). 
Under these circumstances, it was vital that the industry should be 
able to tap an adequate supply of labour to cope with the planned 
expansion in the industry. Since the Colonial Office would not sanction 
the large-scale importation of labour from outside ']est Africa, the 
companies turned to the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast for an 
alternative source of labour to make up the deficiency in the local 
supply. To this end, in December 1905, some thirty labour representa- 
tives were brought from the North by the Gold Coast Government Transport 
Department (which at that time was the body responsible for labour) so 
that they could see the different kinds of work and the living conditions 
in the mining districts in the South. This experiment was slow to 
accelerate, and by 1907 there were only 280 men from the North employed 
in the various works on the mines compared to a total labour force of 
some 14,700 for that year. Indeed, the northern component of the mines' 
labour force remained small for some time, largely because of the poor 
recruiting arrangements. 
98. 
Recruiting of men in the north was carried out by the District 
Commissioners with the help of the local Chiefs. The Chief Commissioner, 
then A.E.Watherston, was extremely enthusiastic about the scheme and 
in order to encourage the local Chiefs to co- operate he suggested that 
head -money should be paid to the Chiefs for the men they provided (1953 
Acc.No.1292, G.N.A., Letter of 2 September 1907, Watherston to Colonial 
Secretary). This arrangement was held satisfactory by the mining 
companies, and payment of the head -money was made through the Mines 
Department (1953 Acc.No.1296, G.N.A., Letter of 2 September 1909, 
Watherston to Commissioners). But the scheme failed in part due to 
the 'wastage' incurred through ill- health of many of the men sent south 
or through desertion en route, to cocoa - farming in particular, and 
in part due to the absence of formal contracts between the employer 
and employee. The lack of binding contracts on the mining labourers 
was in fact one of the causes of the general instability of the mines' 
labour force. The only law under which labour could be bound in service 
to an employer was the Masters and Servants Ordinance No.8 of 1893, the 
terms of which were not applicable to the mining industry. The 
companies, both individually and collectively, canvassed the Colonial 
Office for help in this matter. Proposals were put forward for labour 
legislation which would empower the companies to hold labour under 
contracts of between one and three years, and further that a Pass Law 
should be introduced to prevent desertion (CO 96/503; Notes on a meeting 
between Representatives of the Mining Industry and the Colonial Office, 
dated 2 November 1910). But nothing came of these proposals, and the 
lack of response from labour from the North was attributed time and 
time again to the lack of legislation with respect to the employment 
of men to work on the mines. Indeed, the Chief Commissioner for the 
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Northern Territories was disinclined to send further new recruits from 
the North until effective regulations concerning the employment of 
labour were agreed (CO 96/503; Letter from C.J.Murray to Colonial 
Office, 24 August 1910). The essence of the recruiting problem was 
summed up by the Head Chief of Lamprusi, 
"A few of my people would doubtless be willing to go at once, 
but the question of future supplies of labourers would depend 
on the story which they would have to tell upon their return. 
If they come back rich, in possession of money and goods, 
and could tell their fellow- villagers that they had been 
well -fed and housed, as well as properly looked after, then 
I am sure that 100s of others would wish to work for you. 
The whole success of your proposals depends upon the manner 
in which the first few gangs are treated" 
(Enclosure in Murray's letter, op.cit.). 
In the light of these circumstances, and in particular in 
the light of the failure of the proposals concerning the establishment 
of formal contracts between the mines and the labourers, the labour 
shortage continued to harass the industry. In 1911, several of the 
mining; companies started to bring labour from other Colonies in view 
of the poor local response of labour (A.R.ii.D., 1911). Practically 
every country in 'West Africa supplied labour to the gold mining industry 
as a result of this new policy (Table 4.3). 
Unfortunately, the progress of the industry was interrupted 
during the first world war, and the consequent diversion of labour 
from the mines to military purposes had a serious effect on production. 
The total strength of the mines' labour force dropped from some 19,000 
in 1910/11, the peak development yesr in the industry, to under 10,000 
by 1920. After the war ended, the gold mining industry was very slow 
in re- establishing full operations, especially since the cocoa industry 
experienced a boom in the immediate post -war years. This led to 
competition for labour, and the cocoa farmers paid unnecessarily 
high 




ORIGIN OF LABOUR IN GOLD MINING INDUSTRY, 1)11 
Place of Origin Number j Labour 
Force 
FOREIGN COUNTRIES 2370 15.5 
Dahomey 82 
French Guinea 168 
Liberia 1470 
Ivory Coast 285 
Togoland 365 
BRITISH COLONIES 2161 
Gambia 222 
Northern Nigeria 263 










Northern Territories 1972 
Sefwhi 699 
Wassaw 511 
TOTAL 15343 100 
Source: A.R.M.D., 1911. 
as a considerable proportion of labour available locally was diverted 
from mining work into cocoa farming. The mining industry was in a 
depressed state as the result of the shortage of labour, which was 
described as the 'fons et origo' of its depression in the years after 
the first world war (A.R.M.D., 1920, p.1). 
It is significant, however, that by 1920 some 56% of the 
labour force in the gold mining industry originated from the Gold 
Coast, and of this, one -third of the men came from the Northern 
Territories (Table 4.4). This position can be compared with the 
situation in the years prior to the outbreak of the first world war, 
when only 18% of the labourers originating in the Gold Coast came from 
the North. In absolute terms, however, the northern component of the 
labour force had not varied very much, being of the order of 2500 men 
in 1922 and 2000 in 1911. Further efforts to increase the number of 
recruits from the North in the 1920e were no more successful than they 
had been in the earlier period, since, 
"The cost of recruiting was out of all proportion to the number 
of recruits and of those recruited many deserted before 
reaching the mines" (A.R.LI.D., 1920, p.7). 
The varying response of labour to the recruiting agents is set out in 
Table 4.5. It appears that the system of collecting and despatching 
Northern Territories' labour in gangs was disliked, and was one of the 
major causes of its failure. Equally, the schemes for importing labour 
from other neighbouring West African countries had proved a costly 
failure for the most part; the cost of transporting labourers from 
Liberia, for example, was some 37s per head, but it was found that the 
men gradually drifted away from the mines. By 1924, all the companies 
had stopped recruiting in Southern Nigeria, largely for the same reason. 
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TABLE 4.4 
ORIGIN OF LABOUR IN GOLD MINING INDUSTRY, 1920 
Place of Origin 
% Labour 
Force 
FOREIGN COUNTRIES 28.36 
Dahomey 
French Guinea 
Ivory Coast 17.81 
Liberia 8 
Togoland 2.55 
BRITISH COLONIES 15.63 
Gambia 
Northern Nigeria 2.81 
Southern Nigeria 8.57 
Sierra Leone 3.60 
Others 0.65 










Source: A.R.M.D., 1920. 
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TABLE 4.5 
MONTHLY ARRIVAIS OF INDENTURED LABOUR FROM TEE 
NORTTHERN TTERRITORiIES, APRII: 1921 - MARCH 1923 
Month Number Month Number 
April 1921 220 April 1922 5 
May 315 May 5 
June 12 June 0 
July 168 July 115 
August 88 August 325 
September 45 September 75 
October 60 October 125 
November 320 November 365 
December 380 December 605 
January 1922 20 January 1923 520 
February 312 February 95 
March 410 March 0 
Sources A.R.M.D., 1922/23. 
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No effective recruiting system was ever evolved, and the 
industry was forced to struggle on in the face of periodic shortages. 
Indeed, in the year 1925, all methods of formal recruiting were 
prohibited by order of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on the 
basis of Professor William Simpson's report of 1924 on the sanitary 
conditions of the mining areas. This report pointed in particular to 
the appallingly high death rates among recruited labour compared with 
the local labourers. This trend was officially construed as resulting 
from indiscriminate recruiting by the mining companies, and this led 
to the banning of all formal recruiting. However, coincident with that 
decision, a number of voluntary labourers arrived at the mines from 
the Northern Territories and offered themselves for employment; of 
those, some 50 men had returned from previous service in the mining 
industry (A.LM.D., 1924/25, p.6). From that time, the flow of labourers 
from the North became a permanent feature of the labour market, bene- 
fiting not only the gold mining industry but also other sectors of the 
economy. 
A final characteristic of the labour situation in this period 
which deserves mention is the fact that the wage rates in the gold 
mining industry were raised substantially for the first time in the 
history of the industry (Table 4.6). These increases were adopted as 
a result of growing competition in the labour market from other sources 
of employment. There were three main sources of competition for labour: 
the cocoa industry, which was booming in the years following the first 
world war; the newly established manganese and diamond mining industries, 
which dated from 1916 and 1922 respectively; and the construction 
industry, which experienced a rapid growth following the implementation 
of the Guggisberg Ten -Year Development Plan, with its emphasis on 
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TABr,F 4.6 
NATIVE WAGE RATES IN GOLD MINING, 1918 and 1920 
Occupation 
Min.. 





Blacksmith 2s 6d 3s 6d 2s 7s 6d 
Bricklayer 2s 6d 3s 6d 2s 4s 9d 
Carpenter 2s 3s 6d 2s 10s 
Cyanide hand 1s 6d 2s 6d 1s 3d 3s 9d 
Fireman 1s 9d 2s 9d 1s 9d 3s 9d 
Fitter 2s 6d 3s 6d 2s 10s 
Hammer boy 2s 3s 1s 9d 4s 
Pump boy 2s 3s 1s 9d 5s 
Mill hand 1s 9d 2s 9d 1s 6d 4s 6d 
Rockdrill boy 3s 4s 2s 5s 
Shoveller *1s 3d 1s 9d 1s 6d 4s 3d 
Signal boy 1s 6d 2s 1s 6d 2s 6d 
Spanner boy 2s 3d 2s 9d 2s 9d 3s 6d 
Surface labourer * *1s 3d 1s 9d 1s 3d 2s 3d 
Timberman 2s 3d 3s 3d 2s 7s 
Trammer 1s 6d 2s 1s 3d 4s 3d 
Winch driver 2s 6d 3s 6d 2s 4s 6d 
Source: A.R.M.D., 1918 and 1920. 
NOTE: The wage rates for the lowest paid workers, the 
underground* and surface labourers ** were in 1918 
unchanged from 1904. 
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infrastructural development. The mines could no longer continue their 
'cheap labour' policy if they were to attract the required numbers of 
men into their employment. 
CONCLUSION 
The construction of the Government railway linking Kumasi 
with the coast, and passing through the Tarkwa and Obuasi goldfields, 
was the main stimulus to the spread of commercial mining inland during 
this period. While the companies set about installing new machinery, 
ordered on the expectation of the early completion of the rail link 
with the coast, production fell, and at the height of the boom in 1901, 
a mere 5223 ounces of gold, valued at £22,187, were produced; this was 
the lowest figure recorded for half a century. 
With the large -scale equipment of the industry, following 
the arrival of the railway at Tarkwa in 1901, Obuasi in 1902, and with 
the completion of the branch line to Prestea in 1910, production 
increased steadily until the outbreak of the first world war. The 
demand for base metals during the war meant that supplies and fuel for 
the gold mining industry had a low priority in the allocation of 
shipping space. The industry became disorganised, and only the larger 
companies working properties close to the railway survived. The output 
of gold was severely curtailed under these wartime restrictions, and 
the downward trend intensified after 1918, largely owing to the acute 
shortage of labour, brought about by the boom in the cocoa market and 
the more general development which took place in the economy in the 
1920s. As a result, over the period 1902 -1930, the gold mining industry 
attained its peak output in 1914, when 410,655 ounces of gold, valued 
at £1,744,499, were produced. 
In Chapter 5, the third major phase in the development of the 
gold mining industry is discussed, and the impact of the events of the 
1930s are examined as they affected the geography of gold mining. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: 
1931 -1941 : TES RENAISSANCE OF GOLD MINING 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 4, the progress of gold mining in the Gold Coast 
up to 1930 was discussed. It was shown how the pace of mining quickened 
after the building of the railway; how the interruption of operations 
during the first world war acted as a brake on its progress; and how 
the industry was only slow to recover from that impact in the following 
decade. This slow rate of progress might have continued into the 1930s 
but for an unexpected turn of events which revitalised gold mining in 
1931. It was in that year that the United Kingdom abandoned the gold 
standard, and as a result, the price of gold to the producers rose 
immediately from 84s 11-21-d to 135s per ounce. This stimulated a virtual 
renaissance of gold mining in the country, especially when it was 
realised that working costs would not rise in proportion to the new 
high price of gold and that there was no likelihood of an immediate 
return to the gold standard. The expansion of gold mining activity 
following this event and the new problems which attended this expansion 
are the subject of this chapter. In 1931, production was less than 
250,000 ounces and only four companies were still in active production. 
However, the abandonment of the gold standard made old mines, which 
were of little commercial value at the former price, potentially very 
profitable, and opened up possibilities for the mining of lower -grade 
ore bodies. By 1941, there were 16 companies in production, and they 
produced some 882,000 ounces of gold, valued at nearly £7,500,00, in 
that year. The tripling of production within a decade was due both to 
the geographic spread of gold mining and to the enlarged capacity of 
the industry resulting from the increased scale of capital investment 
in gold mining in the 1930s. 
GEOGRAPRIC EXPA.ATSION 
The sudden increase in the price of gold stimulated a marked 
revival of interest in the gold deposits of the Gold Coast, and led 
to an avalanche of enquiries for information regarding abandoned mines 
and gold prospects in the country generally. Very little published 
material existed on the distribution of gold prospects except that 
contained in the Annual Reports of the Mines Department, and the 
Geological Survey, and these were very generalised. In order to 
provide interested parties with information about the gold resources, 
the Geological Survey began a comprehensive study of the known and 
potential auriferous districts of the Colony and Ashanti. The survey 
included both field investigation and the collation of documents 
relating to gold mining activities in the past. The survey was begun 
in 1931 and its results were published in the Gold Coast Geological 
Survey Memoir No.4 (Junner, 1935). By the time the survey was completed, 
the producing mines were making good profits and many dormant mines 
had been reopened. At the same time, dredging for gold had become an 
economic possibility, in effect for the first time in the history of 
the industry. 
Of course, the general circumstances prevailing in the 1930s 
were more favourable to profitable mining than ever before. There 
were now 500 miles of railway and some 6000 to 7000 miles of motor 
roads and a modern harbour at Takoradi; sanitation was vastly superior 
to the earlier period; mining and metallurgy had improvrd 
to :;.7 _i.Ú î 
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better recovery of gold and permit lower mining costs. At the same 
time, the revival of gold mining coincided with a depression in the 
cocoa industry, so that surplus labour was available for the mines 
whose requirements had increased. However, notwithstanding the local 
advantages which favoured successful mining activity in the 1930s 
compared to the earlier period, it was essentially the external stimulus 
of the 58 increase in the price of gold which led to the renaissance 
of gold mining and the consequent geographic expansion. Many of the 
large mining houses, such as Consolidated Goldfields of South Africa, 
gave their financial support to the industry in the Gold Coast, and 
that financial backing ensured that the industry had a better chance 
than ever of making rapid progress. The entry of these large mining 
houses into the field also increased the market value of the existing 
companies (Table 5.1), and the inflow of fresh capital which followed 
permitted reconstruction and expansion of operations on existing 
mining sites and the spread of mining to new areas. 
One of the main features of the geographic expansion of gold 
mining in the 1930s was that, apart from the normal exploration and 
development of ore -bodies usually carried out to keep ore reserves 
ahead of production, exploration and prospecting were undertaken on a 
much larger scale than before, and wider areas encompassed by these 
activities. In 1928, an exploratory company was formed, namely the 
Gold Coast Selection Trust, which acquired large tracts of land in 
the country, but it was not until 1932 -33, encourages by the new high 
price of gold, that the Trust began active field work on the concessions 
and options it had acquired earlier for the purpose of developing and 
floating gold mining companies. The Trust controlled practically the 
whole line of reefs between the Ariston mine (on the Prestea goldfield) 
TABLE 5.1 
SHARE QUOTATIONS FOR THE GOLD COAST MINING COMPANIES, 
mid -1934 
Company Nominal Value Ruling Prices 
s d. s d 
Akim (1928) Ltd. 2 6 6 3 
Appolonia Goldfields Ltd. 1 - 3 - 
Ariston Gold Mines (1929) Ltd. 2 6 11 9 
Ashanti -Adowensa (Banket) Ltd. 4 - 3 3 
Ashanti Goldfields Corpn., Ltd. 4 - 44 6 
Atta Gold Company (1928) Ltd. 2 - 9 - 
Bibiani (1927) Ltd. 4 - 29 - 
Central Wassaw Gold Mines Ltd. 1 - 4 
Fanti Mines Ltd. 5 2 - 
Gold Coast Main Reef Ltd. 5 8 
Gold Coast Banket Areas Ltd. 2 - 4 6 
Gold Coast Selection Trust, Ltd. 5 - 45 - 
Konongo Gold Mines, Ltd. 2 - 4 9 
Kwahu Mining (1925) Ltd. 2 62 - 
Lyndhurst Deep Level, Ltd. 1 - 4 9 
North Ashanti Mining Co. Ltd. 4 - 5 - 
Obuom Gold Mines Ltd. 5 13 6 
South Banket Areas, Ltd. 2 - 2 10 
Taquah & Abosso Mines, Ltd. 4 - 29 9 
Tarkwa Banket West Ltd. 1 - 8 7r 
Tarkwa Gold Mines Ltd. 
Marlu Gold Mining Areas, Ltd. 
Gold Coast Associated Cos., Ltd. 
Source: J.R.Williamson & Co., July 1934 
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and the Ashanti mines (on the Obuasi goldfield) as well as several 
outlying properties (Map 5.1). The Trust's concessions were all 
closely mapped, and the promising occurrences of gold were tested by 
trenching, pitting and diamond drilling. Its activities reached a 
peak in 1935 -36, when up to 50 European geologists and mining engineers 
were employed by the company in evaluating the various properties. In 
spite of the wide area covered by the Trust's prospecting programme 
(as indeed that of the Geological Survey carried out simultaneously) 
the geography of gold mining was not affected dramatically. The Trust 
erected a treatment plant on a promising prospect at Bibiani North, 
but it proved short -lived, and the Trust finally ceased field operations 
in 1940. Only one important discovery was made in this period, that 
of the oxidised surface deposits at Bogoso, situated on the .Enchi road 
some seven miles west of the Insu railway station. The Marlu Gold 
Mining Areas Co. Ltd. was formed in 1934 to work these surface ores. 
The second important feature of the expansion of gold mining 
in the renaissance period was the reopening of old, abandoned mines in 
and around the existing mining centres, or the development of new mines 
adjacent to the existing mines. Thus, in geographic terms, gold 
mining activity was merely intensified around the five core areas 
established at the beginning of the century. Gold mining operations 
had been found to be most profitable along the reef extensions already 
proved at Tarkwa, Prestea, Obuasi, Bibiani and Konongo, and the 
expansion of mining activity in the 1930s represented no more than the 
lateral spread of mining around these long- established centres. The 
revival of gold- dredging in the 1930s was also no more than a 
renaissance of activity along the same river valleys worked in the 
earlier period. No fresh dredging grounds came to light, in spite 
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of the intensity of exploration work done at that period. The Bremang 
Gold Dredging Co. was formed to rework the gold- bearing gravels of the 
Ancobra river valley. 
The new companies formed in the 1930s, therefore, concentrated 
their efforts on exploiting the long- established lines of reefs about 
which more detailed information was now readily available from the 
Geological Survey Department. On the Tarkwa goldfield, the Cinnamon 
Bippo mine was reopened by Gold Coast Banket Areas Ltd. in 1933; Tamsoo 
mine was reopened by South Banket Areas Ltd., formed in the early 1930s, 
as was Effuenta mine, also acquired by the same company; and the old 
workings at Iduapriem and Eduapriem, lying some six miles due south -west 
of Tarkwa, were reopened by Tarkwa Gold Mines Ltd. At the northern 
end of the banket formation, the Ntranang mine, located some 80 miles 
to the north -east of Tarkwa, was reopened by the Ashanti -Adowsena 
Banket Goldfields Co., and this mine is the only one ever developed 
on the banket fo Elation outwith the immediate locality of Tarkwa. 
On all the other goldfields, the same sequence applied. On the Prestea 
goldfield, for example, Ariston Gold Mines (1929) Ltd. reopened the 
old Anfarguah mine, which is located a few miles to the south -west of 
the company's main. mine at Prestea; and Gold Coast Main Reef Ltd. re- 
activated the Bondaye and Tuappim mines in 1933. On the Obuasi gold- 
field, the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation intensified their activities 
by reopening some of the earlier abandoned mines, such as Justice's 
mine and Ayeinm mine. At the same time, the Corporation floated a 
sister company, Bibiani (1927) Ltd., to reopen the old Bibiani mine, 
which was then equipped with modern plant and machinery. And 
finally, 
mining operations were resuscitated on the Konongo goldfield 
after a 
Swedish prospecting company had investigated the feasibility 
of 
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profitable mining on behalf of Konongo Gold Mines, registered in 1933, 
and Lyndhurst Deep Level (Silver and Gold) Ltd. A smaller company, 
the Obuom Gold lanes Ltd., reopened the Obuom mine, located south of 
Konongo. 
It can be seen from the foregoing discussion that a relatively 
small number of companies was responsible for the renaissance of gold 
mining in the Gold Coast in the 1930s. Many more companies were 
floated than survived to reach the producing stage; most ceased when 
it became evident that the gold resources of the country could not 
support more than a handful of companies since the gold deposits were 
not of sufficient extent or richness to do so. This decade is notable, 
nevertheless, in that the maximum number of companies engaged in field 
operations and in gold production were recorded at this stage in the 
history of the industry; in 1935 -36, no less than 31 companies were 
engaged on active work on their concessions, of which 28 were recorded 
as working lode deposits and 3 working alluvial deposits. Of those 
31 companies, only 10 were actually producing gold, however. It was 
nearer the end of the decade that the maximum number of companies 
producing gold in any one year was recorded; in 1939-40 and 1940 -41, 
16 companies had reached the producing stage, of which 14 won gold 
from lode deposits and 2 won gold from alluvial sources. The fresh 
capital invested in gold mining in. the Gold Coast at the beginning of 
the decade had begun to bear fruit; gold exports showed an increase 
of nearly 300¡ in 1941 over 1931. 
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INCREASING THE SCALE OP OPERATIONS 
This vast increase in gold production between 1931 and 1941 
can be explained not only in terms of the increase in the number of 
operating mines, but also in terms of the increased scale of mining 
adopted in the 1930s. Long -term plans were drawn up, by the existing 
or reconstructed companies, with a view to stepping up the tonnages 
mined. The main features of these plans were the provision of new 
shafts, the deepening and re- equipping of the existing shafts, and the 
construction of new treatment plants with larger milling capacity to 
accommodate the planned expansion of mining. It was realised that, 
given the new high price of gold, the best way to ensure the long -term 
survival of gold mining was through economies of scale, and to this 
end, all the mining companies adopted similar plans to reconstruct and 
modernise their physical assets. Thus, an era of shaft -sinking and 
plant construction began, reaching a maximum just prior to the second 
world war. 
1. Shaft -sinking 
On the Tarkwa goldfield, Amalgamated Banket Areas Ltd., formed 
in 1935 after the amalgamation of several contiguous concessions, and 
the Taquah and Abosso company prepared to step up production by first 
sinking new shafts. On the Abbontiakoon section of the former company's 
property, the existing main incline shaft was replaced by a vertical 
shaft to intersect the reef at about 18 level, close to the synclinal 
axis of the banket series at this elevation underground. This was 
the Abbontiakoon Vertical Shaft (A.V.S.) and sinking began in 1936. 
At the same time, the company started on a second vertical shaft to 
open up the Tlantrain section of its property further south. This new 
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shaft, the i,Zantrain Vertical Shaft (M.V.S.) was sunk some 1400 feet 
and eventually connected on the bottom level by a cross -cut, some 3000 
feet lon, to the Taquah mine which had been dewatered for reopening. 
The property of the Taquah and Abosso company was served by two incline 
shafts in the early 1930s. These shafts, the Abosso and Adjah hippo 
shafts, were, under the expansion programme, connected by a reef drive 
at 13 level, and below this horizon the mine was served by an internal 
incline shaft down to the 20 level. However, the hoisting capacity 
of these shafts was inadequate for the higher rate of output planned 
for the future and a new shaft, the Huni Vertical Shaft, was therefore 
sunk in 1935 to allow the development of the deeper levels within the 
mine. This shaft was sunk some 2400 feet and intersected the reef at 
the 26 level. 
Similar improvements were made on the mines of the Prestea 
goldfield, where at the mine of the Aniston company, the Prestea shaft, 
a compound shaft, which served the mine down to 21 level, was in a very 
bad state of repair by the 1930s. It was therefore replaced by a new 
vertical shaft, sunk some 3100 feet to 24 level; called the Central 
shaft, it was the first of the modern shafts to be sunk in the country. 
On the adjacent property of Gold Coast Main Reef Ltd., no new shafts 
were constructed, but the existing ones were re- equipped and subsequently 
deepened as required. 
In the case of Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, the planning 
staff decided that it would be more economic to explore the mine in 
depth from the existing shafts before embarking on a costly programme 
of shaft -sinking. It was not until after the second world war, 
therefore, that the new 13 -feet diameter Eaton Turner Shaft was sunk 
and reached its final depth of some 4354 feet as recently as 1956. 
But the corporation's sister mine at Bibiani was immediately re- 
equipped with a modern Central shaft to replace the old No.4 shaft 
which was in bad repair and had a limited hoisting capacity. 
On the Konongo goldfield, the main innovation of the period 
was the sinking of a new vertical shaft, the Odumase Shaft, to develop 
the Odumase reef, while the other sections of the mine continued to 
be served from existing shafts. 
2. Plant Construction 
To complement the enlarged hoisting capacities of the new 
shafts, new treatment plants were designed and built in line with 
contemporary developments in metallurgy. At Abbontiakoon, the old 
9000 -ton capacity stamp and tube mill was replaced by a new plant 
designed with an eventual capacity of some 60,000 tons. The new plant 
commenced milling in 1940, but was put on a 'care and maintenance' 
basis during the latter part of the second world war, and did not 
resume operations until 1946. Similarly, the Taquah and Abosso company 
constructed a new plant, raising the capacity of the mill from the 
older rate of 12,000 tons per month to a new rate of 20,000 tons per 
month. Their new plant began operating in 1936. 
At Ariston, a new treatment plant was designed for a capacity 
of 30,000 tons per month, and a smaller mill was built by the neigh- 
bouring company, Gold Coast Main Reef, to treat between 8000 and 10,000 
tons of ore per month. The former began milling in 1939, the latter 
earlier, in 1936. 
At Obuasi, the Ashanti company did not build its new treatment 
plant until after the second world war, when a new plant designed to 
treat some 30,000 tons of ore per month was constructed, although it 
was not put into commission until 1949. But on the corporation's 
sister mine at Bibiani, a pilot plant was erected in 1933 for 
experimental purposes to determine the best form of ore treatment for 
the Bibiani ores, which differ substantially from those found elsewhere 
in the country. Once the most suitable metallurgical process was 
discovered, the company embarked on the construction of a large milling 
plant which was completed by 1939. 
At Konongo, a new mill was constructed in 1936 with an 
initial capacity of 6000 tons per month, which was later increased to 
treat up to 10,000 tons of ore per month. This plant served both the 
Konongo company and its neighbour, the Lyndhurst company; both companies 
were eventually merged under one management to achieve economies of 
scale. 
These were, therefore, the main aspects of the expansion 
programmes undertaken in the 1930e. These measures, combined with 
improvements in the treatment of ores adopted simultaneously, largely 
account for the marked increase in gold production recorded by the 
industry in the 1930s decade. 
OTHER ITáIPROVLu1TEüTS OF Trill,` DECADE 
In addition to the physical enlargement of the capacity of 
the gold mining industry in the renaissance period, considerable 
improvements were made in other ways, which helped to put the industry 
on a more solid basis than ever before. There was the question of 
securing an adequate source of power, now demanded on a larger scale 
owing to the increased scale of mining activity, and secondly, the 
mining companies were faced with improving the sanitation and living 
conditions in the mining villages, as well as improving the terms of 
staff contracts to attract highly- qualified specialists into the 
industry in the Gold Coast. 
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1. Power Supply 
There are no coal deposits in Ghana, and in the early 1930s, 
when the second expansion and large -scale reconstruction of the industry 
began, the principal source of power in use on the mines was steam 
raised from wood -fired boilers. On only a few mines were wood -producer 
gas engines and diesel -oil engines in use. From the inception of 
modern mining, one of the advantages of the gold mines' location in 
the forest belt had been the ready availability of timber for fuel. 
Indeed, most of the mining companies acquired the timber -cutting 
rights in addition to the mining rights on their concessions; otherwise, 
separate timber concessions were leased for that purpose. However, 
the terms of such leases were such as not to require replanting, so 
that the areas adjacent to the mines were quickly denuded of timber. 
The sources of supply thus became increasingly more distant and transport 
a serious problem. Prom time to time, the mines had experimented with 
the use of coal to generate power, but it was found to be too costly, 
and all such schemes were soon abandoned. Moreover, the firewood- 
cutting operations were generally contracted out to native contractors, 
n who had no illusions about the importance of their work 
to the mines and who by their demands and strikes frequently 
placed the power supply in jeopardy" (Allen, 1958, p.231). 
As a result of these circumstances, a review of the power 
supply situation was undertaken in 1935 in the light of the increased 
power requirements of the industry as new shafts were sunk and new mills 
erected. The main problem was to decide whether it would be better to 
provide a central source of power for all or various groups of mines, 
or to expand the capacity of individual stations. 
An interesting proposal for centralising the power supply 
had been put forward by the North Ashanti Mining Company. 
They suggested 
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that its subsidiary company, the Prah H.E.P.Exploration Ltd., could 
supply hydro- electric power to the gold mines by harnessing the 
Busimassi rapids on the Prah river. In May 1931, the parent company 
applied to the Colonial Office for a licence for that purpose, but 
official reaction to the scheme was negative. Indeed, both. official 
and unofficial circles regarded the project with great suspicion. It 
was thought that the company was merely trying to 'hawk' around on 
the Stock Exchange for financial backing for itself, using this scheme 
as 'bait' (Co 96/697/6924; Minuted comment on file devoted to this 
project). Unfortunately, much of the correspondence dealing with this 
particular scheme has been destroyed under statute, and the full story 
cannot be reconstructed; but it appears that a similar proposal to 
harness the Busimassi rapids was fully considered earlier, around 
1920; the scheme was rejected then mainly on financial grounds. Even 
in the 1930s, the most accessible mine was at Nsuta (manganese deposits), 
25 miles from the rapids and the intervening swamp and dense forest 
would have proved difficult to traverse with cables. Also, the cost 
of transmission would have been excessive because special tracks would 
have had to be cut and kept clear to every mine. The gold mining 
companies themselves were against the project because of the high unit 
cost of such a source of power, and the Secretary of Mines, writing 
to the Colonial Office in a confidential despatch, dated 20 January 
1932, stated that the Mine Managers' 
... unanimous opinion is that it cannot be done under present 
conditions, while one manager went as far as to say that in 
his judgement the whole scheme is nothing but a ramp designed 
to boost the shares of the North Ashanti Mining Co." 
and he concluded that, 
'While I am inclined to subscribe to this 
view privately, it 
would hardly become me to do so officially, 
but I may say 
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that I entirely agree that the scheme is an economic 
impossibility at the present time" (CO 96/702/7201; 
Confidential Despatch No.66b/79/1932). 
A further objection to this scheme for centralising the power supply 
of the gold mines at the Busimassi rapids rested on the fact that the 
total power requirements of the mines, while greater in the 1930s than 
previously, would be considerably less than the envisaged generating 
capacity of the Busimassi project; of the total of )5,000,000 units of 
power envisaged, the mines' needs would barely have reached some 
45,000,000 units, and of this the mines of the Tarkwa -Prestea district 
would not have consumed more than some 24,000,000 units annually. 
There would have remained, therefore, a surplus capacity of some 
50,000,000 units for which no immediate customers could have been found. 
In the final analysis, therefore, the mines preferred the 
alternative of expanding the capacity of their individual power stations 
to that of drawing their power supply from a central source. However, 
improvements were made and the old wood -fired boilers were converted 
to oil -firing. The changeover to oil -fired boilers was to the advantage 
of the local treasury since an import tax was payable on oil, and at 
the same time much valuable timber was left intact. An additional 
benefit of the conversion from wood to oil was that it released labour 
to work that was more directly productive than wood -cutting. It was 
not until after the second world war that a degree of centralisation 
of power supplies was effected when the Ancobra Power Company, which 
operated a station on behalf of the Bremang Gold Dredging Company, 
extended its services to the nearby mines on the Prestea range, namely 
those of Ariston Gold Mines (1929) Ltd. and Gold Coast Hain Reef Ltd. 
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2. Health and Sanitation 
The renaissance of gold mining in the 1930s also brought to 
the fore the necessity of securing a healthy environment on the mine 
camps in order to reduce the turnover of the labour force. In colsulta- 
tion with the mine managers and other officials of the mining industry, 
'Mining Health Areas' were designated in the mid- 1930s. Under the 
accompanying regulations, all the companies were legally required to 
provide housing and medical facilities for their labour, irrespective 
of whether that labour was engaged locally or from outside the country. 
In addition, the legislation provided for measures designed to control 
the 'aggregations of insanitary hovels' which had gradually grown up 
in the immediate vicinity of each mining area and to facilitate the 
relaying of the grossly congested areas in and around such places. 
Type plans of model dwellings were distributed to all mine managers for 
their guidance in constructing the housing compounds, and the control 
of buildings in the towns and villages adjacent to the mining settle- 
ments necessitated a clear -out agreement by the Government to undertake 
the responsibility for the perimeter of these 'mining health areas'. 
Although the implementation of these measures was a costly 
exercise, model villages were laid out to replace the earlier ones 
built at the beginning of the century, which by the 1930s were totally 
inadequate both in the number of houses available and in the quality 
of the amenities provided therein. In addition, by this period, the 
mining districts had become more than ever points of attraction for 
population from Ashanti, from the North and from the surrounding French 
territories, and many of these people settled in parasitic villages on 
the edge of the mining health areas. This made it very difficult to 
control the transmission of disease from adjacent areas outwith the 
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control of the mining companies, but in spite of this hazard, sanitation 
and living conditions in the mine camps was markedly improved compared 
to former years. Most of the housing compounds still extant on the 
mine camps in contemporary Ghana date from this period; subsequent 
improvements have included the installation of electricity in the 
compound houses and the provision of a wider range of recreational 
and related facilities. 
Improvements in the living conditions of the expatriate staff 
were also effected in the 1930s. It was at this period that a West 
African branch of the Ross Institute was formed, and it carried out an 
intensive study of the habits of the local species of mosquito with 
the financial backing of the mining industry. Based on the Institute's 
recommendations, the mining companies undertook schemes of drainage, 
bush -clearing and oil - spraying which greatly reduced the number of 
mosquitos in the mining camps, and so reduced the rate of sickness 
among staff. As one writer points out, even in the mid -1930s Gold 
Coast mining companies were, 
" ... reluctant to give permission for the wife of an employee 
to accompany her husband to the mine, largely on account of 
the poor health and living conditions that obtained there at 
that time ... It was hardly contemplated that European 
children could live on the mines" (Allen, 1958, pp.233 -4). 
To rectify this situation, a programme of building well -designed 
bungalows for senior staff was implemented. But good housing alone 
was not sufficient to attract the high calibre of expatriate staff 
required to run the industry efficiently. Staff contracts also needed 
revision. 
3. Staff Contracts 
Even as late as 1935, some five years after the beginning of 
the renaissance of interest in gold mining in the Gold Coast, the 
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companies were having difficulty in attracting the top mining engineers 
into their employment. While the poor health record of the country and 
the generally unsuccessful nature of the vast majority of the mining 
enterprises established in the past accounted in part for this situation, 
the main obstacle was the unattractive nature of the staff agreements. 
The agreements which obtained until the middle of the 1930s were hardly 
designed to encourage either stability of employment or to encourage 
first -class specialists into the industry. In essence, the contracts 
were for one tour of nine months' service, followed by three months 
of paid leave, provided that the employee signed a fresh agreement to 
return for a further tour. The staff contracts were, therefore, 
anachronistic, the short nine months tour being a hangover from the 
early pioneering days of modern mining when nine months was about the 
limit Europeans could bear in the environmental conditions of that time. 
Thus, one of the most important improvements undertaken in the 1930s 
was a revision in the terms of staff contracts to bring them in line 
with modern conditions. Contracts were made continuous, and leave pay 
was thereafter granted as a reward for past service rather than as a 
bait to encourage the employee to return. Secondly, tours were extended 
from 9 to 12 months for underground staff, and from 12 to 15 months for 
surface employees. The longer tours meant that fewer European staff 
had to be employed, and savings were also effected in the cost of 
passages. All these measures provided for a more stable labour force 
and ensured continuity of management, and in turn the gold resources 
of the country were more efficiently developed. That production did 
rise in the 1930s to an unprecedented level can be attributed to the 
many improvements in the industry's organisation undertaken under the 
initial stimulus of the increase in the price of gold. But, despite these 
many improvements, there were also obstacles to progress. 
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OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS 
By the latter half of the 1930s decade the gold mining 
industry was, technically speaking, better equipped than ever before 
to prosper and inspire investors' confidence in the industry, and 
although a substantial amount of fresh capital did flow into gold ` 
mining in the Gold Coast, it should be noted that the capitalisation 
of most of the companies was nevertheless low relative to gold mines 
in other parts of the world (Williamson, 1934). Possible reasons for 
this were the failure of most mining ventures and the consequent loss 
of capital in the earlier period, and the higher potential profitability 
of the more extensive gold fields elsewhere. In addition, the government 
had introduced in 1931 a new export tax of 1Z on all gold sales. It 
was considered that the rise in price from 84s to 135s per ounce of 
gold was a windfall to the producers, and that the companies could 
therefore comfortably bear this new tax on the gold premium (CO 96/709/ 
16852). Notwithstanding these circumstances, it appears that the 
relatively low capitalisation of gold mining in the country compared 
to other areas can be attributed to two main causes. First, the 
circulation of false press reports about gold prospects led to widespread 
distrust of the industry in the City. Secondly, the renaissance of 
gold mining in the Gold Coast brought forth the old problem of confusion 
over concessions and the validity of leases to property, due to the 
inadequacy of the legislative machinery to deal with the situation. 
1. False Press Reports 
Much of the initial confidence that investors had gained in 
gold mining in the country at the beginning of the decade was offset 
by the circulation of grossly misleading press reports and false 
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prospectuses. Such developments are not uncommon in the mining 
industry when boom conditions, such as obtained in Gold Coast mining 
shares in the 1930s, occur. The number of misleading reports 
circulating in English financial newspapers was apparently causing 
concern not only to the bona fide mining companies but also to the 
Colonial and local authorities, as the following example illustrates. 
In a confidential despatch, dated 13 Lurch 1935, the Governor wrote, 
"I have heard privately from Junner (the then Director of the 
Geological Survey) that the reports which have been circulated 
in English financial papers in connection with 
A. Lower Ancobra (Gold Coast) Areas, 
B. Amari (Nigeria) Tin lanes (1931) Ltd., 
C. Central Wassaw Gold Lanes Ltd. 
are all grossly misleading and will tend to deceive the 
public. It is desirable that 'dud shows' should be nipped in 
the bud." 
Continuing, with a quotation from the prospectus of the Lower Ancobra 
(Gold Coast) Areas Ltd., the Governor noted that the engineer of that 
company falsely reported that he had proved the existence of some 
11,500,000 cubic yards of alluvium averaging 4s 1O-d per cubic yard, 
on the company's Essuawah concession, ground averaging 11s 3jd per 
cubic yard. The Governor backed up his assertion with evidence produced 
by a geologist of the local Survey Department, who wrote in a private 
note accompanying his geological report on the same area, that, 
It ... the high -grade gold- bearing alluvium on which the company 
was floated does not exist and that the reefs do not average 
more than 2 dwts of gold per ton" (CO 96/722/31072). 
The Lower Ancobra company went into liquidation in July 1936. 
The solution to this problem came from the Stock Exchange 
itself, which refused to permit dealings in the shares of companies 
whose assets consisted of concessions unvalidated by the Concessions 
Court in the Gold Coast. 
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2. Concessions Legislation 
The second problem which hindered the progress of the industry 
in the 1930s, the continuing problem of confusion in the Concessions 
Court with respect to the validity of land titles, is clearly related. 
There was a new rush for land and mining leases in the Gold Coast 
following the increase in the price of gold in 1931. This boom in 
the land market differed from the earlier booms in the 1880s and the 
early 1900s on two accounts particularly, that the new high price of 
gold made a more general development of the goldfields worthwhile 
including relatively low -grade ores, and that as a result of improved 
local conditions, the location of the gold prospects of the country 
was more perfectly Down. Despite these favourable circumstances, 
however, steps to expedite the work of the Concessions Court were badly 
required. The whole procedure needed reviewing to accelerate the legal 
process of granting validity of title to concessionaires. 
The main need was to ensure that a Certificate of Validity, 
once issued, should be final and unchallengeable, thereby avoiding 
costly, time -consuming litigation. The then Commissioner of Lands, Prîr 
Stacpole, recommended that the only means of achieving this end was to 
centralise the records of land transfers in the Lands Department. In 
a memorandum on the lands question, dated October 1935, he pointed out 
that the existing situation was still as confused as it had been since 
the introduction of the Concessions Ordinance in 1900 both as regards 
overlapping and as regards conflicting interests; 
" ... I am aware of concessions leases and options being hawked 
around London, which, if they could be validated, and there is 
some chance of this, would defeat some of the validated leases 
of operating companies" (CO 96/721/31052/2). 
The machinery set up by the Concessions Ordinance of 1900 was completely 
out of date by the 1930s since it made no allowance for developments in 
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communications. Information about grants of land continued to reach 
the Lands Department from all directions: from the Colonial Office in 
London, from the divisional courts, and from registers of concessions 
filed at Cape Coast, Sekondi, Kumasi and Accra. There was still no 
co- ordination of the various steps in the validation of concessions at 
one central point, so that it was impossible for the government to view 
the current developments as a whole and if necessary take well- advised 
and timely steps to deal with any aspect of land transactions which was 
irregular. As a result, enquiries from prospective concessionaires 
about particular areas took months to answer because there was no 
indexed quick reference to concessions. Under this chaotic system, 
mistakes were inevitably made by the Courts, and particulars of con- 
cessions which had gained a certificate of validity were often 
inaccurately published in the Gazette. As Starpole commented, 
"Finality, the aim of the Concessions Ord., can only be achieved 
when full and accurate information is before the Court" (op.cit.). 
As a result of Stacpole's recommendations, and the appreciation 
of the difficulties in which individuals, companies and the courts 
found themselves from lack of information, measures were adopted in 
the latter part of the 1930s to regularise the position. In 1935, a 
fairly successful attempt to centralise, in the Lands Department, all 
the records and key maps of extant validated concessions, was made. 
Secondly, from July 1, 1937, a special Concessions Supplement was 
published in the government Gazette at monthly intervals. From that 
date, therefore, it is possible to obtain ready information on all 
land that was subsequently alienated for industrial and other purposes. 
This publication was one of the most significant advances made in the 
1930s, and subsequent amendments to the concessions legislation, 
including provisions to stop the costly litigations against concessionaires, 
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went a long way to restoring investors' confidence in the gold mining 
industry in the Gold Coast. 
CONCLUSION 
The revival of interest in gold mining which followed the 
abandonment of the gold standard by the United Kingdom in 1931 had 
beneficial results both for the industry itself and for the economy 
of the Gold Coast. The increase in the price of gold attracted a 
substantial amount of fresh capital into the industry which allowed 
not only the intensification of mining and prospecting activity but 
also permitted a large -scale reconstruction and modernisation within 
the industry to take place. At the same time, gold increased its 
share of the export market, and by 1941 gold exports represented over 
50% of the total exports, by value, of the Gold Coast (Table 5.2). 
This is, of course, only partly explained by the expansion of production; 
the renaissance of gold mining coincided with a slump in the cocoa 
industry, whose relative contribution to exports fell accordingly. 
In addition, the gold mines provided employment on an ever -increasing 
scale, and by 1941, the gold mines' labour force numbered over 35,000. 
On many accounts, therefore, the gold mining industry played a key 
role in the economy i.n the period 1931 -1941. 
However, notwithstanding these positive achievements, the 
gold mines still remained to some extent 'economic enclaves' perpetuat- 
ing the typical colonial pattern of development which characterised 
most African countries at least until the second world war. Although 
the gold mining companies were subject to higher rates of taxation in 
the 1930s than ever before in the history of the industry, 
the proportion 




MEASURES OF THE VALUE OF GOLD MINING 
IN THE GOLD COAST ECONOMY, 1931 -1941 
Year (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (V) 
1931 9,300,620 1,069,581 11.0 100,000 7,165 
1932 8,348, 879 1,236,591 14.8 87,012 8,004 
1933 8,048,484 1,841,883 22.8 91,203 8,882 
1934 8,117,456 2,421,595 29.8 165,428 10,452 
1935 9,971,535 2,635,527 26.4 304,500 15,163 
1936 12,636,899 3,047,545 24.1 288,844 23,535 
1937 15,949,533 3,910,757 24.5 304,532 27,091 
1938 11,079,870 4,841,633 43.7 336,153 27,313 
1939 12,747,258 6,177, 725 48.4 486,647 30,534 
1940 13,478,990 7,207,827 53.4 699,513 33,724 
1941 12,833,887 6,850,942 53.3 1,022,334 35,274 
(i) Total domestic exports by value (E sterling). 
(ii) Gold exports by value (E sterling). 
(iii) Gold exports as % of total exports. 
(iv) Royalties, export duty, and profits tax (E sterling). 
(v) Labour force (number). 
Sources; (i), (ii), (iii): Gold Coast, Annual Export Statistics. 
(iv): Junner, 1946. Bull.imp.Inst., , 1. 
(v); Gold Coast, Chamber of Mines, Annual Reports. 
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to the profits made and, in some cases, the high dividends paid to 
the shareholders abroad. 
It was not until after the second world war that the local 
government made attempts to obtain a larger share of the profits from 
gold mining through higher and more realistic taxation, and secondly, 
to obtain a larger share of the management through requiring a number 
of indigenous personnel in the skilled grades, and to improve wages 
and working conditions in the industry through trade union pressure 
and labour legislation. These issues are discussed in Chapter 6, in 
which the post -war developments in the gold mining industry are 
reviewed, and the history of the industry brought up to 1961. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE HISTOzICAL PERSPECTIVE: 
1942 -1961 : THE POSTWAR CRISIS 
INTROLUCTION 
As was shown in Chapter 5, the 1930e was a period of moderni- 
sation for the fold mining industry in the Gold Coast. By the end of 
the decade, modern shafts had been completed, new mills had been put 
into operation, living conditions on the mine camps had been vastly 
improved, and the legal framework with respect to land grants had been 
regularised. The response of the industry to these improvements was 
clearly seen in the rapid rise of gold production, which trebled over 
the decade. But, this progress was not destined to continue, since 
the outbreak of the second world war placed a severe brake on gold 
mining operations. The impact of the interruption of full operations 
during the period of the war, and the post -war effects of this inter- 
ruption are the subject of this chapter. 
The interruption of gold mining operations during the second 
world war had a profound effect on both the geographical distribution 
of gold mining, and its profitability in the post -war years. Production 
did not cease in 1939, and the industry was allowed to continue in 
production, within the limitations of obtaining supplies under wartime 
restrictions, until the end of 1942. In that year, the Colonial 
office issued instructions that, owing to the wartime necessity of 
conserving fuel oil and tanker space, all but four of the gold mines 
were to close immediately. The industry replied that, in the light of 
the importance of gold, and the possibility that once closed many of 
the mines would be unable to afford to reopen later, an effort should 
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be made to keep them all open. A plan was worked out to this effect, 
and details drawn up of ways in which the industry could reduce its 
fuel oil consumption by some 10,000 tons. After negotiations between 
the companies and the Colonial Office, it was decided that all but 
four of the mines should be kept open; the four mines to be kept on 
a 'care and maintenance' basis were Marlu, Amalgamated Banket Areas, 
Gold Coast Banket Areas, and South Banket Areas. Those left in 
production paid for the cost of keeping these four on a 'care and 
maintenance' basis, by paying a levy which amounted to £587,006 (Gold 
Coast Chamber of Mines, 1950, p.24). As a result, gold production did 
not decline immediately with the advent of the second world war, and 
for the year 1940 -41, the year before the concentration scheme came 
into effect, a record output of 882,241 ounces was attained. Both 
output and employment in the industry declined thereafter; output from 
080,000 to 527,623 ounces from 1942 to 1945, and employment from 
35,274 in 1941 to 24,539 in 1945. 
POST -WAR PROBLEMS 
The problems which faced the industry on its full resumption 
in 1946 can be summed up in one word, inflation. Inflation affected 
all items of working costs, and in particular the component of labour 
cost, which comprises 50, to 60¡., of total working expenditure, rose 
inexorably. The industry reacted in two ways to the inflation in 
costs which intensified in the post -war years. First, the industry 
contracted spatially with the closure of several mines. Secondly, 
the surviving companies had no alternative but to increase the scale 
of their operations to achieve economies. Thus, by 1961 there 
were 
only 7 mines open compared to a total of 16 active mines 
in the pre -war 
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decade. Nevertheless, although the industry contracted spatially in 
the post -war period, production never fell below 500,000 ounces of gold, 
as a result of the increased scale of operations adopted by the 
surviving mines. In this context, it is important to note, however, 
that it was not until 1960 -61 that the industry attained an output 
comparable to the 1940 -41 record of :82,241 ounces; the 1960 -61 
Production of 915,317 ounces of gold represents, in fact, the highest 
annual output ever achieved in the history of commercial mining. 
Employment statistics for the period 1941 -1961 reflect more emphatically 
the spatial contraction of the industry after the second world war; 
employment in gold mining declined by some 15,000, from over 35,000 in 
1940 -41 to under 20,000 in 1960 -61. 
The performance of the fold mining industry in Ghana since 
the second world war accords in fact, with the world -wide trend in the 
industry. All gold producers have found themselves caught between 
rising production costs and a relatively, stable selling price for gold. 
'.ith the re- establishment of bullion markets in London and other 
centres in the mid- 1950s, prices obtained on the free market for gold 
were never high enough to attract new capital into the industry, nor 
to prevent the closure of marginal mines. It should be recalled that 
gold reacts in an opposite direction to other metals in times of 
prosperity, especially if accompanied by inflation such as has been 
characteristic of the post -war era; supply contracts rather than 
increases under such conditions. This is precisely what has happened 
in the world gold mining industry since the second world war. In spite 
of the insatiable demand for gold to meet international trading debts, 
and the ever -widening industrial market for the metal, the gold mining 
industry has contracted spatially, in Ghana and elsewhere. 
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In Ghana, a large number of problems emerged in 1946, the 
year in which the industry set about restoring production to its 
former level. These difficulties were varied in origin, but all 
worked in the same direction to squeeze profit margins: stores showed 
large price increases from the pre -war level; taxation was higher; 
labour supply was both inadequate and more difficult to secure with 
the growing competition in the labour market; and labour costs continued 
to rise while labour productivity fell. In essence, production costs 
escalated while the selling price of gold showed but a slight increase 
over the pre -war level. 
1. Stores 
The industry faced a formidable task in 1946 to restore 
production to its former level. The four raines which had been on a 
'care and maintenance' basis from 1943 faced the inevitable delays in 
bringing their mines back into full operation, and the entire industry 
faced the inevitable delays in the delivery of supplies and new 
equipment. But, a factor of greater importance in affecting the 
resumption of full production was the new post -war prices for stores; 
all the main items of consumable stores showed considerable price 
increases in 1946 over the 1939 level. These increases were in the 
range of 15 to 131, For example, cyanide, the chemical 
used in the separation of gold, cost £71 16s 2d per ton in 1946, 
compared to the 1939 price of Z60 las 4d; carbide had risen in price 
from £13 7s 10d per ton to £24 7s 9d; steel balls, used in grinding, 
had more than doubled in price from £14 10s 1d per ton in 1939 to 
£33 9s 2d by 1946; and gas oil showed a 121jß price increase 
in 1946 









































































































































































































































the industry in 1946, no doubt they could have been borne without 
having any dramatic effect on the profitability of the industry, but 
unfortunately for the companies, there were accompanying increases in 
practically all other items of working costs, of which a higher rate 
of taxation was one of the most significant. 
2. Taxation 
In the post -war period, the industry was liable for a much 
higher rate of taxation than formerly, and this also affected the 
profitability of gold mining. The mining companies were subject not 
only to double income tax, payable in the Gold Coast and in the United 
Kingdom, where the companies were registered, but also to export duty 
on gold sales and, in the case of Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, a 
royalty was due. For the year 1945/46, the mining industry (gold and 
other minerals) paid ;1,751,110 in taxes in the Gold Coast alone, which 
represented of the revised estimates of the Gold Coast revenue 
for that year (Chamb.of Ms., 1946). 
(i) Income tax 
The whole profits arising from mining operations were subject 
to the normal rate of Gold Coast income tax, which between 1945 and 
1952 was at the rate of 7s 6d in the E (1944/45 was the first year in 
which income tax was levied in the Gold Coast). In addition, a levy 
of 1s in the E was paid by the companies under the Concessions Ordinance, 
or under agreement with the Government. The latter tax replaced the 
former Concession Duty of 5- on profits, and in the case of Ashanti 
Goldfields the former royalty of 5`¡ on gross output (Sutherland, 1950, 
p.12). The companies' British income tax was also based on the whole 
of their profits, a deduction being made for the tax paid locally. 
This meant that as long as Gold Coast tax rates were lower than those 
obtaining in the United Kingdom, the Gold Coast government could not 
help the companies by tax reliefs, for if their local tax was reduced, 
the tax payable in the United Kingdom was increased by a like amount. 
The total burden of taxation by 1947 amounted to 12s 1O-d in the E, 
made up as shown in Table 6.1 
TABT.F 6.1 
DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES : AMOUNT /E 
In Gold Coast 
Income tax 
Profits tax 








* less reciprocal relief. 
In 1946, twelve mines were equipped for production, and of those only 
seven were earning profits (Table 6.2). The high rates of taxation 
were considered inimical to the attraction of fresh capital into the 
gold mining industry because of the low return which could be expected 
under such conditions (Gorman Award, 1947, Exhibit K). 
(ii) Export duty 
While the income tax rates were high in the post -war era, 
the additional high export duty was perhaps of even greater significance 
in affecting the profitability of gold mining. The principle of the 
gold duty was itself in question, since it represented a tax on output 
rather than earnings, thereby taking no account of operating costs. 
From 1924 to 1939, gold was subject to an export duty of 15% of the 
gold 'premium', being defined as the difference between the given price 
1,38 . 
TABT.F 6.2 
SUMMARISED PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNTS FOR 1945 -46 
Company (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Amalgamated 
Banket Areas 











Corp., Ltd. 1,744,449 830,046 1,019,931 725,118P 
Bibiani (1927) 
Ltd. 669,930 420,994 507,603 162,327P 
Bremang Gold 
Dredging Co. 159,136 110,058 144,975 14,161P 
Gold Coast Banket 
Areas 
Gold Coast Hain 
Reef Ltd. 348,726 178,261 251,727 96,999P 
Konongo Gold 
Mines 435,620 269,610 338,699 96,921P 
Marlu Gold Mining 
Areas 66,304 97,042 98,490 32,186L 
South Banket 
Areas 
Taquah & Abosso 
Mines 621,182 425,629 534,809 86,373P 
TOTALS £4,710,052 £2,696,802 £3,352,961 £1,357,091 
(i) Total revenue 
(ii) Working costs. 
(iii) Total charges 
(iv) Profit (P) or 
(bullion sales, and sundry revenue). 
(ii, depreciation and development costs). 
Loss (L). 
- = Mines not at the producing stage, but ready to begin production. 
Source: Gorman Award, 1947, Exhibit N. 
of gold, which in 1947 was 172s 3d per ounce, and the old par value of 
84s 11íd per ounce. In 1946, this was raised to 20¡,,. During the 
second world war, an Order in Council made by the Governor came into 
force on 12 December 1939, amending the table of export duties. The 
rate of duty payable on gold was altered to, 
"15 per centum of the first 65s O-i;-d of the gold premium, plus a 
war surtax of 50 per centum of that part of the gold premium 
in excess of 65s Oid." ( Chamb. of Ms., 1940, p.16). 
This was stressed as purely a wartime measure, and in 1946 the Government 
announced the removal of the surtax, but an increase in the export duty 
from 15% to 2c». This meant that in 1947, with the price of gold at 
172s 3d per ounce, the duty payable was 20jß x (172s 3d minus 84s 11íd) 
or 17s 5?d. per ounce. This new rate of duty was a particularly heavy 
burden for the low -profit mines, which had previously paid only 11s 7-d 
per ounce in export duty. To make matters worse, the increased export 
duty was accompanied by an amendment in the Customs Tariff regulations 
which also worked against the low -profit companies. Section 2 of 
Regulation No.11 of 1946, made under Section 13 of the Customs Tariff 
Ordinance (Cap.133) had repealed the Customs Tariff Regulation No.17 
of 139. The latter regulation had allowed any mining company a 
rebate on export duty if that company could prove that it would have 
incurred a loss had gold been sold at the old par value of 84s 112-d 
per ounce. The amending regulation of 1946, however, withdrew this 
rebate, and the low -grade marginal mines were thereby adversely affected. 
The local Chamber of lanes took up this issue with the Government, 
stating that, 
"The whole principle of a levy on the price of gold is 
unscientific and creates an excessive burden on the industry 
particularly the low -grade mines" (Chamb. of Ms., 1946, p.16). 
After making representation to the Government along these lines, it was 
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agreed that the revoked 1939 regulation should be enacted and made 
retrospective to 1 April 1946. However, notwithstanding this concession, 
the fact that the 20% gold duty was retained gave continuing cause for 
concern from the marginal mines; in 1947, taxation represented some 10% 
of the value of gold produced. The President of the Chamber of Mines 
expressed, in the Annual Report of the Chamber for 1947, his disappoint- 
ment 
... at the lack of grasp shown by the authorities of the true 
position of affairs with the continually rising costs in the 
purchase of stores and equipment as well as of labour" 
(Chamb. of Ms., 1947, p.16) . 
The export duty on gold therefore remained at 20; of the premium, 
subject to a refund of 15% of the loss that would have been incurred 
had the selling price been 84s 11-21-d per ounce. The net rate, therefore, 
varied from nil, where there was a trading loss of 39s 2d per ounce, 
to 4s 4d, where no profit or loss was made, and so increased to the 
full 17s 52-d when the ratio of profit to output exceeded 51 %. The 
two main objections to this system were that it converted any small 
profit by a low -grade mine into a loss, and that, expressed as a 
percentage of profits, it was a retrogressive tax, diminishing steeply 
as the profitability of the mine increased (Sutherland, 1950, p.12). 
From October 1, 1948, the Gold Export Duty was replaced by a 
Gold Duty, charged on all gold won at a rate varying with the 
profitability of the mine, i.e. the ratio of its profit to the value 
of its output. In other words, the burden of taxation was 
shifted 
from the lower -grade mines to the higher -grade mines, 
a more realistic 
situation. The new duty was expressed in shillings 
and pence and not 
ad valorem, and so it remained unaltered after 1949 
despite the increase 
in the price of gold obtained in that year as the 
result of the 
devaluation of the pound ster].in . This new duty 
gave some relief to 
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the low -grade mines. However, in 1951, further reforms in the taxation 
laws were made which further increased the economic strain on the 
marginal mines. Under the Minerals Ordinance of 1952, the Gold Duty 
was replaced by a Minerals Duty, which applied to all the minerals 
exported; its calculation was based on the same principle as had 
applied to its predecess-.r, based on the ratio of profits to production. 
However, under the Income Tax (Amendment) Ordinance of 1952, income 
tax was raised from the former level of 7s 6d in the L sterling to 9s. 
While, in the case of the mining industry, this new rate absorbed the 
old levy of 1s in the L for profits tax, the end result was still an 
increase in the local tax payable. In addition, under the Local 
Government Ordinance of 1951, the mining companies were thereafter 
liable to pay rates on their land concessions. Consequently, in spite 
of the increase in the selling price of gold from 172s 3d to 243s per 
ounce, following the 1949 devaluation of sterling, the economic 
position of the low -grade gold mines in particular became increasingly 
worse throughout the 1950s. Stores continued to rise in price, and 
taxes equally rose inexorably thereby squeezing the profit margins of 
the gold mining companies. 
3. Labour Supply 
A third problem which faced the gold mining industry in the 
post -war years was the increasing difficulty of obtaining and retaining 
an adequate supply of labour. The competition in the labour market, 
which had begun to prove a problem for the gold mining industry in the 
1930s, intensified in the post -war years. It was not until 1950 that 
the mining industry was allowed to establish a formal recruiting system 
in order to regularise its supply of labour. A base was set up in the 
Northern Territories, at Bolgatanga, the most convenient centre to tap 
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the stream of migrants from the north of the country and over the 
border from Upper Volta, moving south in search of employment. 
Prior to 1950, migrants reached the south by a system of 
illegal recruitment, described by an official of the mining industry 
as "wholesale slave trading" operated by "collectors ". There were a 
number of "collectors" licenced under the local authority to collect 
cargo for lorries plying between Bolgatanga and Lumasi; these collectors 
regularly collected "human cargo" at the same time (Mines Labour 
Enquiry, 1953, p.6). The men were then transported free of charge from 
the border to Bolgatanga, and thence to Kumasi. Since the fare from 
the border to Bolgatanga was 2s per head, the collector would "sell" 
his load of "human cargo" to another collector for 2s 6d per head. 
The second collector would then transport the men, again free of charge, 
to Kumasi, where he would "sell" his "load" for 25s per head, thereby 
making a profit of 5s per head on the ride. In this way, groups of 
labourers were "sold" to cocoa farmers in the south, and eventually 
many of the men would find their way to the mines, once the cocoa season 
was over. Contrary to prevailing ideas, therefore, these migrants 
from the north did not walk long distances to arrive in the south 
exhausted and unfit for work; they were brought south by lorry, free 
of charge, under this intricate but illegal recruiting scheme organised 
by the local collectors. This was the type of local organisation with 
which the official recruiting plan, established in 1950, had to compete. 
A Mines Transit Welfare Centre was established at Bolgatanga 
in 1950, headed by a certain Colonel Gilbert, who was the only person 
authorised to recruit labour on an official basis. Bolgatanga was 
chosen as the most suitable point for the labour agency, since it lies 
at the junction of two major roads in the North; one arm goes east to 
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Bawku, Mongonori and Pusiga in Upper Volta, the other arm westward to 
Navrongo and Po through Paga. Bolgatanga therefore commanded a wide 
'catchment' area for migrants entering Ghana in search of employment. 
This agency was originally sponsored on behalf of the mines 
of the Finsbury Pavement House group, comprising Amalgamated Banket 
Areas, Mar u, Gold Coast Mlain Reef and the Bremang Gold Dredging 
Company, but other mining companies later joined. All the mining 
companies had from time to time attempted to make up their deficit 
labour by organising on an 'ad hoc' basis the transport of workers 
from various points in the North, but the Government ruled such methods 
illegal, under the Labour Ordinance of 1948. Indeed, it was with 
reluctance that the mines were given the authority to set up their 
recruiting agency, and the scheme was sanctioned by the Government on 
the understanding that the men so engaged had voluntarily and 
spontaneously offered themselves for employment. The Recruiting 
Licence issued to Colonel Gilbert, by the Commissioner of Labour, was 
also accompanied by strict conditions to ensure that no man was forced 
into the employment of the mines if he preferred alternative work. 
The main features of the licence were as follows: 
A) that not more than 2000 labourers should be recruited under 
the Licence before 31st December in any one year for which 
the Licence was issued. 
B) that recruiting operations should be confined to the 
districts of Mamprusi and Wa. 
C) that any labourer recruited and brought to the mines from 
a distant place and then rejected as unsuitable should be 
given free transport back to his place of recruitment. 
D) that all labourers under the scheme should be given the 
opportunity to obtain a Certificate of Registration issued 
by the Labour Department at Bolgatanga, Kumasi, or any other 
station, before his engagement by the mines recruiting 
organisation. 
The scheme was, however, a failure, for many reasons, and 
was abandoned 
after two years. The Chiefs were reluctant to encourage the emigration 
of labour on such a large scale because of the loss to the Native 
Authorities' Treasuries which resulted. secondly, the Chiefs also 
complained that the workers returned from the south destitute and 
penniless, having spent all their wages on "riotous living" (Mines 
Labour Enquiry, 1953, p.7). It was also unsatisfactory from the mining 
companies' point of view, since, 
'Many recruits, it is understood, merely take advantage of the 
free transport to get them to the mining districts and then, 
after varying periods of service mostly short abscond. It is 
estimated that the average period they remain at work is 75 
days" Nines Labour Enquiry, 1953, p.6). 
The main difficulty, however, lay in the inability of Gilbert's 
agency to undercut the illegal but highly organised "collectors" 
organisation. Certainly, there was no lack of migrants moving south- 
ward, as is shown in records of the volume of labour crossing the 
ferries in the North (Table 6.3). The problem of obtaining a regular 
flow of labour therefore remained with the mining industry, and no 
formal recruiting system has subsequently evolved. Currently, the 
companies rely on men presenting themselves to the local Labour Offices, 
to which the companies forward details of the number and type of 
positions that are vacant. 
4. Labour Costs 
While labour shortages in the gold mining industry had some 
effect on the rundown of the industry in the post -war era, it was 
essentially the related issue of rising labour costs which proved the 
greater economic constraint on the profitability of gold mining after 
the second world war. Indeed, it is possible to say that of all the 
problems experienced by the industry after full operations were resumed 
in 1946, the continuing rise in labour costs was the most important 
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TOTALS 46,205 58,744 50,072 74,057 
1945-46 
Yeji 42,546 30,089 40,864 28,806 
Bamboi 13,757 5,797 13,469 10,942 
Buipe 278 328 111 913 
Krachi 35 152 50 268 
Akroso 7,809 5,517 7,531 5,741 
TOTALS 64,425 41,883 62,025 46,670 
1948-49 
Yeji 73,043 38,398 81,509 46,848 
Bamboi 34,269 21,090 29,717 23,961 
Buipe 69 390 41 679 
Krachi 156 2,236 138 395 
Akroso 16,539 14,489 16,417 14,862 
TOTALS 124,076 76,603 127,822 86,745 
Sources by permission of Bibiani Goldfields, Labour files. 
single factor leading to the post -war decline and contraction of gold 
mining in Ghana. In 1945, the Mines Employees Union was created and 
from that time, labour relations in the industry deteriorated, disputes 
and strikes became frequent, and demands for wage increases mounted. 
The number and the magnitude of the wage increases granted between 
1945 and 1961 contributed not only directly to the diminishing profit 
margins of the gold mining companies, but also indirectly to the spatial 
contraction of the industry. 
The first serious wages dispute occurred in 1947, at a time 
when the industry was struggling to recover from the wartime backlog 
of development work in face of higher prices for stores and equipment. 
The newly -inaugurated Mines Employees Union sent a petition to the 
Chamber of Mines, listing several claims in respect to the conditions 
of employment on the mines (Appendix VII. Since its foundation in 
1928, the Chamber of Mines acted as an intermediary body between the 
mines' labour force and the relevant Government departments, on all 
matters relating to the social and economic welfare of the mining 
industry. With the creation of the Union, the only change in these 
arrangements was that the unofficial representatives of the mines' 
labour force were replaced by officials of the Mines Employees Union. 
It was therefore under the new arrangements that the Union petitioned 
the Chamber in 1946 in respect of certain conditions of employment on 
the mines, but the Chamber replied that they were unable to concede to 
all the demands listed by the Union, although they were prepared to 
consider wage claims in respect of the lowest paid workers. As such, 
the Chamber submitted a schedule of wage rates to raise the minimum 
daily rate for underground and surface workers to 2s 6d and 2s 
respectively, the levels requested by the Union. These increases alone 
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were estimated to cost the gold mining industry an additional E150,000 
per annum. Individually this meant, taking Amalgamated Banket Areas 
as an example, 
... that these concessions will cost, with the present staff 
1500 a month extra - roughly equivalent to 200 ounces of gold 
extra, or 1500 tons of ore extra to be produced, or mining 12 
tons a month extra by each man" (Gorman Award, 1947, Exhibit °C). 
In other words, for some of the low -grade mines, as the above -mentioned 
company, the increases offered to the Union by the Chamber meant that 
they would have some difficulty in bearing the extra costs. 
The Union refused the offer, and intimated that a strike 
would take place on 29 September 1947. The strike lasted four weeks, 
and meanwhile the issue was referred to arbitration. The issues facing 
the Arbitrator, William Gorman, were of greater significance than the 
mere settlement of a wages claim; the entire future of the gold mining 
industry was at stake. This was made clear in the report of the 
Arbitrator (briefly referred to as the Gorman Award), which stated, 
"Any award, such as was asked for, would mean the end of the 
Banket mines and some of the other mines" (Gorman Award, 1947, 
p.14). 
From all the evidence produced at the enquiry, it was apparent that 
the industry could not bear the wage increases unless the selling 
price of gold improved, the burden of taxation was lessened, or the 
output of the mines rose substantially. A compromise was required if 
the industry was not to disintegrate. The selling price of gold had 
shown a mere 14% increase between 1938 and 1947, from 150s to 172s 3d 
per ounce (Table 6.4), while working costs had risen in the range 25i 
to 73i, from mine to mine between 1940 and 1947 (Table 6.5). In 1940, 
the companies had to pay out approximately 65i'. of the value of gold 
produced by way of disbursements on stores, wages, welfare facilities 
and other items of a recurrent nature; by 1.)47, this proportion had 
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TABLE 6.4 






1938 150.00 o 
1939 156.00 4 
1940 168.00 12 
1941 168.00 12 
1942 168.00 12 
1943 168.00 12 
1944 168.00 12 
1945 170.48 13.65 
1946 172.25 14.83 
1947 172.25 14.83 
Source: Gorman Award, 1947, Exhibit L. 
TABLE 6.5 
COST PER TON MILLED (ST-rrLLINGS) : 1940 and 1947 
(SELECTED MINES) 
Company 1940 1947 Increase 
Ariston 26.4 33.0 25.0 
Ashanti 35.3 61.3 73.7 
Bibiani 19.7 26.0 31.9 
Konongo 31.0 47.8 54.2 
Taquah & Abosso 21.5 29.2 35.8 
Source: Gorman Award, 1947, Exhibit 0. 
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TABLE 6.6 
DISBURSEMIENTS BY GOLD MINING COMPANIES 
(SELECTED YEARS) 











Value of gold 
produced 
DISBURSE'LTENTS 
;851,028 12.9 651,734 14.4 711,159 13.6 (i) 
(ii) 1,624,858 24.6 1,276,032 28.3 1,891,182 36.3 
(iii) 381,645 5.7 463,771 10.3 714,936 13.7 
(iv) 1,361,123 20.6 547,860 12.2 1,241,987 23.8 
(y) :68,844 1.0 63,664 1.4 100,424 1.9 
4,287,498 64.8 3,003,061 66.6 4,659,688 89.3 
(i) Government: Export duty, Customs duties, Rail and Harbour dues, 
Posts and Telegraphs (BUT EXCLUDING Income Tax and 
Profits Tax). 
(ii) Wages and Salaries. 
(iii) Stores purchased locally. 
(iv Stores imported. 
(v Medical and sanitation. 
Source: Gorman Award, 1947, Exhibit W. 
risen to nearly 90L (Table 6.6). At the same time, labour productivity 
had declined while wages had increased (Fig.6.2). 
It was in the light of these circumstances that the Gorman 
Award was made, and it was made retrospective to 1 April 1947. The 
effect of the award, in respect to the schedule of wages laid down 
therein, was to place some of the mines immediately into the 
category of marginal enterprises, although none actually closed. 
However, in order to survive, several of the companies working the 
low -grade banket deposits on the Tarkwa goldfield were forced to 
amalgamate; Amalgamated Banket Areas acquired the mines of Gold Coast 
Banket Areas, and South Banket Areas, in 1949, which gave that company 
large enough ore reserves to permit economies of scale. Secondly, 
the implementation of the Gorman Award wage rates meant a further delay 
in the completion of the long -term schemes which had been in hand 
before the outbreak of the second world war. Ore reserves development 
had been sacrificed during the war, and the companies were struggling 
to get back into the position as from 1939. It was estimated that the 
capital cost of the work in progress in 1947 amounted to some £4,000,000, 
and that a considerable amount of fresh capital would be required to 
bring the long -term plans into fruition (Gorman Award, Exhibit R). 
The effect of the Gorman Award had been to set these plans back yet 
again. 
Despite the fact that the Gorman report had stressed that 
the gold mining industry could not be expected to bear further wage 
increases if it were to survive as a profit -making industry, demands 
for wage increases became endemic throughout the 1950s. The next wage 
increase came in late 1949, following a general increase awarded in 

















































































































































































































































Sterling had been devalued in 1949, which meant that the selling price 
of gold rose. However, this increase in revenue was cancelled out by 
the simultaneous increase in labour costs; the new wage rates were 
some 17% higher than those granted by the Gorman Award. One year 
later, a further XL increase in the wage rates in the mining industry 
left some of the low -grade mines in an extremely weak economic position. 
Again, in 1952, the Union made demands for wage increases, and the 
settlement, raising the minimum daily rates for surface and underground 
labourers to 3s 6d and 4s 3d respectively, cost the gold mining 
companies an additional £636,000 per annum. 
It became increasingly clear that the constant agitation by 
Union leaders for wage increases was weakening the power of survival 
of the industry, unless circumstances outside its control changed in 
its favour. So, with this consideration in mind, the Government 
decided in 1952 to sell gold on the free market to obtain additional 
revenue from the premium price. For a short while, the premium from 
gold sales on the free market was sufficiently high to alleviate to 
some extent the full impact of the higher labour costs in the gold 
mining industry; at one time, the premium was as high as E1 per ounce, 
but it gradually tailed off until by the end of 1954, the premium was 
virtually negligible. By this stage, the industry was practically on 
its knees, and within a matter of months, three mines had closed down; 
Marlu Gold Mining Company in 1955, since profitable operations were 
no longer possible under the existing cost structure; Lyndhurst Deep 
Level (Gold and Silver) Ltd., in 1956, went into voluntary liquidation; 
and the Taquah and Abosso company, also in 1956, because of 
the prolonged 
strike of 1955/56. The future of most of the other mines 
was also in 
question, since ore reserves were standing at a low level 
(Table 6.7). 
TABLE 6.7 
GOLD IVIINIiVG CCMPANIES : ORE RESERVES AT 1954-55 
Company (i) (ii) (iii) 
Amalgamated 1,406,160* 284, 346 4.5 
Banket Areas 1,238,240 ** 373,111 3.0 
Ariston Gold Mines 2,156,003 425,745 5.0 
(1929) Ltd. 
Gold Coast Main 254,437 103,614 2.5 
Reef Ltd. 
Ashanti Goldfields 2,021,674 189,749 11.0 
Corp., Ltd. 
Bibiani (1927) Ltd. 1,481,048 249,198 5.5 
Konongo Gold Mines 197,470 33,675 6.0 
Ltd. 
(i.) Available ore reserves (tons). 
(ii) Current rate of depletion (tons per annum). 
(iii) Number of years for which developed ore is available. 
* underground sources. 
** surface sources. 
Source: 1956 Board of Enquiry, Table I, n.21. 
Production for :.the year 1955/56, at 562,445 ounces, was the lowest on 
record since 19L1/48. 
The circumstances surrounding the closure of Taquah and 
Abosso, the oldest mine in the country, dating from 1878, have been 
described as, 
... one of the most irresponsible acts ever committed by a 
Trade Union" (Chamb. of Ms., 1956, p.17). 
The Mines Employees Union had put forward yet another demand for wage 
increases in 1955, and called a strike in support of their claims. 
Meanwhile, the Government appointed a Board of Enquiry to look into 
the validity of the claims, but the strike continued to last a full 
three months, from November 1955 to February 1956. The unnecessary 
continuation of the strike after the official Board of Enquiry had 
been appointed in December 1955 was the direct cause of the closing of 
Taquah and Abosso. The management of the company had approached the 
Government in May 1955 for a loan to extend its development programme, 
but the Government refused; the company had borrowed á25,000 in November 
1953 from the Government. In spite of the refusal for further Government 
assistance in May 1955, the mine continued to function, since it had 
ore reserves stoped out for a further two years of active mining. 
However, the cost of keeping the mine in working condition during the 
strike in the latter part of 1955 exhausted the company's available 
capital funds. It has been estimated that the cost of pumping water 
out of the shafts and maintaining the other necessary services during 
the strike averaged £5,500 per week. In January 1956, therefore, the 
company approached the Goverment for an emergency loan to keep the 
mine in working order until the strike finished, but the request was 
refused. As a result, on 17 January 1956, with no capital left, Taquah 
and Abosso closed down. Throughout the duration of the strike, the 
154. 
Union adamantly refused to permit the minimum numbers of men, necessary 
for the safety of the mines, to continue at work (see Appendix VIII), 
and, 
... had it not been for the loyalty and willingness of the 
European staff in maintaining the essential services, every. 
deep -level mine in the country might have been lost through 
flooding" (Chamb. of Ms., 1956, p.17). 
The Taquah and Abosso company closed down, leaving to be flooded one 
year's supply of ore, valued at nearly X1,000,000, ready stoped out 
for mining. At the same time, some 3000 African employees of the 
company were put out of work as a result of its closure, and the piped 
water and electricity supplied by the mine to the town of Abosso were 
cut off (Board of Enquiry, 1956, p.51). 
In March 1956, the Government announced a temporary increase 
of 15iL in the wages of daily -rated labourers and a smaller increase 
for the higher paid labour, to take effect from 1 April 1956, pending 
the findings of the Board of 'Enquiry. The Board reported in June 1956, 
and it was made clear that the proposed increases could not be borne 
by many of the companies unless they were given public assistance. The 
Board recommended, 
... Government aid over a short -term period if wage adjustments 
have to be met" (Board of Enquiry, 1956, p.53). 
The survival of the industry depended on the reaction of the 
Government to that recommendation, since by that time all the companies 
showed dwindling profit margins (Table 6.8). The future of 
the industry 
lay with the politicians. 
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TABLE 6.8 
SUMMARY OF GOLD MINING C0MPANIES* PROFITS : 1948 -1955 
Year (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
E s d 
1948-49 13,484,724 940,767 405,380 3.6 172 3 
1949-50 12,804,190 1,371,148 898,903 7.0 203 9 
1950-51 14,397,137 2,493,900 1,474,471 10.2 248 - 
1951-52 14,461,119 2,149,623 1,036,146 7.2 251 3 
1952-53 14,450,985 1,894,389 899,703 6.2 264 10 
1953-54 14,476,907 1,897,538 918,081 6.3 256 3 
1954-55 13,878,603 1,697,608 730,872 5.3 250 2 
(i) Capital employed. 
(ii) Net profit before tax. 
(iii) Net profit after tax. 
(iv) ¡net profit to capital employed. 
(v) Average price of gold. 
* The Companies are: 
Amalgamated Banket Areas, Ltd. 
Taquah & Abosso Mines, Ltd. 
Ariston Gold Mines (1929) Ltd. 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, Ltd. 
Bibiani (1927) Ltd. 
Gold Coast Main Reef, Ltd. 
Konongo Gold Mines, Ltd. 
Lyndhurst Deep Level (Gold & Silver) Ltd. 
Bremang Gold Dredging Co., Ltd. 
Source: 1956 Board of Enquiry, Statement VII, p.92. 
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GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
The Government could not afford a repetition of the Taquah 
and Abosso episode, and so a programme of grants and interest -free 
loans was worked out to help the low -grade marginal mines continue in 
operation. The motives for the aid programme were clearly spelled 
out in socio- economic terms by the President, who, in a speech in the 
Legislative Assembly in August 1956, stated that the closure of the 
four marginal mines in question (Bibiani, Amalgamated Banket Areas, 
Gold Coast Main Reef, and Bremang Gold Dredging Company) would mean a 
direct loss of some 11,000 jobs and the loss of export earnings of 
over £.3,000,000 per annum, as well as an indirect loss of the livelihood 
of the traders and transport workers and others, who depended on the 
market provided by the mines. In these terms, the President stated 
that the Government, 
... would be prepared to give some measure of financial 
assistance to enable the mines to keep open" (Gold Coast 
Legislative Assembly Debates, 1956, p.490). 
It was this decision, therefore, that prevented a further spatial 
contraction of the gold mining industry. 
In the first instance, the Government offered the mines 
loans for specific development programmes, but this was rejected by 
the industry in favour of the revised offer of grants, totalling 
£200,000 to be shared by the four marginal mines. These grants were 
to be spread over two years, from mid -1956, and they were designed 
specifically to enable these companies to pay the wage increases 
awarded on the settlement of the three month strike. It was envisaged 
that a short -term programme of this nature would be sufficient to 
alleviate the full impact of the new wage rates, while allowing the 
mines to work out plans for increasing the scale of production 
to a 
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level at which they could continue operating unaided when the grant 
period came to an end. Then came Independence on March 6, 1957. 
GOVERNMENT POLICY AFTER INDEPENDENCE 
In 1957, the first objectives of the newly independent 
Government in the economic sphere were to ensure that output and 
employment in established enterprises were maintained. In this 
respect, the attitude of the new government towards private foreign 
enterprise engaged in key sectors of the economy was vital to the gold 
mining industry. It has been shown that by Independence the gold 
mining industry had become a problem industry, and that its survival 
depended on financial assistance from the local Treasury. Without 
continuing government support, the majority of the mines could not 
maintain their current level of production and employment beyond a 
few years. It was therefore in the national interest that the Ghana 
Government find a viable solution to the economic difficulties of the 
industry to prevent the loss of jobs and revenue, both vital to the 
well -being of the economy. Only three of the seven mines which were 
still operating in 1957 had an assured future on the eve of Independence. 
It was therefore crucial that the programme of grants worked out a 
mere nine months before Independence should not be interrupted. 
Fortunately, there was no change in policy towards foreign- 
owned interests in Ghana; there was no hint of nationalisation, and 
the financial aid programme continued. Indeed, the government demonstra- 
ted its sympathetic attitude to the economic difficulties of the 
industry by putting a bill to the Legislative Assembly to reform the 
tax laws. It was proposed that the existing Minerals Duty should be 
replaced by a Minerals Profits Tax. In essence, the embodiment of the 
amending bill would have meant that the existing tax levied on physical 
output would be commuted to a tax on profits. This reform in the 
taxation system was however aborted because of opposition to the bill 
in Parliament. It was argued that the mining companies would manipulate 
their accounts in their favour to avoid paying the correct level of 
taxation (Ghana; Parliamentary Debates, 1957, p.366). 
The period of grants to the marginal mines came to an end in 
July 1958, and it seemed that a further spatial contraction, with the 
accompanying socio- economic consequences, was inevitable unless the 
government proved its willingness to lend further support to the 
industry, and to Bremang and Amalgamated Banket Areas in particular. 
Although at the end of 1958 the gold mines received an unexpected 
measure of tax relief by a change in the United Kingdom tax laws, 
which placed the mining companies into the category of 'Overseas 
Trading Corporations' subject to lower rates of income tax, their 
financial difficulties were so great that complementary local measures 
were still required to save the marginal producers from closure. The 
Government therefore invited an overseas expert, Dr C.Monture, to 
advise on the possible adoption of a subsidy scheme for the low -grade 
marginal gold mines. Although Monture's report was never made public, 
it resulted in the Government giving interest -free loans to Bremang 
and Amalgamated Banket Areas. Bremang borrowed £150,000 to transfer 
one of its dredges from the Ancobra river to the middle Offin valley, 
and the latter company was lent the same amount for one year to improve 
its ore reserve position, and a further £150,000 per annum was to be 
made available to the company on the same terms for a further two years 
if the first year's development justified the additional assistance 
('Viest Africa, 1960, p.105). As a result of these loans to the two 
companies, the seven mines continued to operate, and 195960 produced 
a record output: the seven companies produced a combined output of 
915,317 ounces of gold, valued at 11,361,372. 
Despite these record figures, the industry ran into further 
economic difficulties, sparked off by the announcement of National 
T Minimum Wage Legislation in September 1960. This meant that the mines 
were forced to raise their daily wage rates by a further 1s 6d to bring 
them in line with the statutory minimum wage of 6s 6d per day. This 
came as a final blow to Amalgamated Banket Areas and Bibiani, the 
least profitable of the seven gold mining companies. In the case of 
the former company, the new wage increases merely cancelled out the 
loan granted by the Government earlier in the year; and in the case of 
Bibiani, it was already sustaining mounting losses every month by that 
stage. Neither company was capable of breaking even on costs without 
financial support from the Government, which was refused. Accordingly, 
both com-canies announced their intention to phase out operations to 
closure; Amalgamated Banket Areas on January 9, 1961, and Bibiani on 
January 13, 1961. The former company further stated on January 23 
that an immediate retrenchment of 1150 workers would take effect 
(Ghanaian Times, January 24, 1961). The closure of the two mines would 
have meant a loss of over 7000 jobs, and a loss of over á3,000,000 
revenue, of which at least half would have stayed in Ghana in the 
form of wages, minerals duty, the purchase of local stores and other 
items. 
The Government's response to these announcements of intent 
to close was not only immediate but dramatic. On January 24, the 
Government published the 'Hines Abandonment Bill', with an accompanying 
memorandun dated January 231 The contents of the Bill were not only 
distasteful but showed a complete reversal of policy toward foreign -owned 
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mining companies in Ghana. The Chairman of the Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation summed up the import of the Bill should it be enacted, 
"It would mean not only the end of overseas investment in 
Ghana's mines but in every other enterprise as well" 
(Ghanaian Times, January 26, 1961). 
Clause 1 of the Bill made it an offence for the holder of any mining 
concession to do any act calculated to prejudice the future operation 
of any underground working without the written permission of the Chief 
Inspector of Mines. Among the prescribed actions were working or 
removing shaft pillars, causing or permitting the flooding of workings, 
or failing to maintain in efficient working condition any plant or 
machinery used underground. The accompanying memorandum stated that 
the Chief Inspector of Mines would not permit closure unless the ore - 
bearing deposits accessible from the underground workings in question 
had been exhausted, or it was made clear that the workings could 
never again be operated on an economic basis. Under these conditions, 
if consent to close was denied to the applicant company, the company's 
only alternative was to surrender the concession or concessions to the 
State. But, in order to prevent marginal concessions being surrendered 
while the company continued to work highly profitable sections on its 
other mining concessions, it was required that if one concession was 
surrendered all concessions must be surrendered, according to Section 
2 of the Bill. The penalty which would be incurred for a violation 
of the terms of the Bill were severe; an initial fine of £100,000 or 
up to ten years' imprisonment, plus an additional fine of £1000 per 
day for continued offence. Section 7 of the Bill made its operation 
retrospective to the date of its notification to prevent any of the 
companies defeating the purpose of the Bill by closing before it could 
be enacted. It is not surprising that the mining industry protested 
vehemently against the Bill: 
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The solution to the crisis came with the Ghana Government's 
bid of £5,250,000 for the entire share capital of the five marginal 
mines. The companies involved were Amalgamated Banket Areas Ltd., 
Ariston Gold Mines (192:-) Ltd., Gold Coast Main Reef Ltd., Bremang Gold 
Dredging Co. Ltd., all members of the London -based Finsbury Pavement 
House group, and Bibiani (1927) Ltd., a sister company to Ashanti 
Goldfields Corporation Ltd. The offer was accepted, the 'Mines 
Abandonment Bill' was withdrawn, and the Ghana State Mining Corporation 
was born on March 1, 1961. None of the mines had closed down after 
all. The generous cash offer for the assets of the five companies 
went some way to alleviating the harsh terms of the aborted bill, 
since the price paid for the mines was about twice the market value of 
the shares quoted on the London Stock Exchange at that time. The 
purchase price had been cariculated at the average of the stocks' 
value over the previous five years, instead of on the existing depressed 
prices. The takeover of the marginal mines by the State at least 
ensured that the industry did not contract spatially, and the national 
interest had been saved even though the problem of marginality remained. 
It was hoped, at the time of takeover, that the five companies on 
aggregate would be capable of breaking even on costs as a result of 
their amalgamation into one operational unit, the Ghana State I ;Lining 
Corporation, although in fact the takeover was purely a political move, 
based on social and economic principles; the maintenance of employment 
in the mining communities, and the foreign exchange earning capacity 
of gold. 
At March' 1961, therefore, only two gold mining companies 
remained in private ownership, Konongo Gold Mines and Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation; and neither of these was suffering the same degree of 
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financial pressure that had forced the crisis in the industry. 
However, subsequently, the State acquired Konongo in 1965, by which 
time Konongo had become a marginal enterprise. The Konongo company 
first approached the Ghana Government as early as 1963 to buy its 
assets, largely owing to rising development costs and falling profits. 
Ghana's sterling reserves by that stage were standing at a low level, 
which precluded either an immediate or a high offer for the Konongo 
mine. After nearly two years of negotiations, a sum of £150,000 was 
offered to the company to cover the purchase of all buildings, equip- 
ment, machinery, stores, gold in process, and investments in two non- 
mining concessions held by the company.- In addition, it was agreed 
that the company would pay their African employees severance pay, and 
a sum of 40,000 was suggested. This the Mines Employees Union 
rejected, and they demanded the much higher sum of £300,000. The 
issue was referred to arbitration, and an award of £140,000 was made. 
The majority of the employees were immediately re- engaged by the State 
Mining Corporation: In 1965, as in 1961, the Government's intervention 
had averted the spatial contraction of gold mining in Ghana, and 
prevented the social disruption which the closure of the mine would 
have inevitably caused. The survival of the gold mining industry in 
Ghana after 1961 is due entirely to Government policy, which demonstra- 
tes the inter -relationship between politics and geography. 
In Part III of the study, the operations of the State Gold 
Mining Corporation are discussed in detail and its performance analysed 
in the light of the socio- economic principles which motivated its 
creation. The contemporary contribution of gold mining in the economy 
of Ghana is also examined. 
PART III 
A CONTEIv ORARY SURVEY 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE MINES OF TT-111; STATE GOLD MINING CORPORATION T
INTRODUCTION 
The takeover of five of the seven privately -owner gold mining 
companies by the Ghana Government in 1961 was of profound significance 
at many levels. Historically, it was a landmark in the structure of 
ownership of the industry which had been run for over eighty years by 
foreign limited liability companies. Politically, the takeover 
expressed the political ideology of a newly independent State, striving 
to match its newly -gained political freedom with economic independence. 
Socially, the takeover of the marginal mines assured the continued 
support of long -established mining communities and prevented large -scale 
unemployment in these areas. Geographically, the takeover had no 
immediate impact, in that the change in ownership did not alter the 
spatial pattern of gold mining in Ghana. However, in an indirect way, 
the takeover was of profound geographical significance in that it served 
to perpetuate the seven-ppint distribution which would certainly have 
contracted but for the Government's intervention. In economic terms, 
only Konongo Gold Mines Ltd., and Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd., 
would have remained on the economic landscape after 1961; two of the 
marginal mines would have closed immediately and the others would have 
ceased profitable operations a few years later. In these terms, 
therefore, the purchase of the marginal mines by the Ghana Government 
in 1961 did affect the geography of gold mining, albeit indirectly. 
The very nature of this indirect effect of the takeover serves to 
illustrate the two -way relationship between politics and geography. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief outline of 
the growth and development of the mines which are incorporated as the 
State Gold Mining Corporation. In this context, these histories serve 
to link the study backwards to Part II, by highlighting some of the 
aspects discussed in Chapters 3 -6, and forwards to the main body of 
Part III by setting the scene for the detailed analysis of the per- 
formance of the State mines in Chapters 8 -10. 
The State Gold Mining Corporation in its present form was 
incorporated in 1965, by Legislative Instrument No.400 of 1965, taking 
over from the previously established Ghana State Mining Corporation, 
formed in 1961, to include Konongo Gold Mines purchased by the Ghana 
Government in 1965. From 1961 to 1965, the names of the original 
companies were retained, but in 1965, new names were introduced. 
Thence, Amalgamated Banket Areas Ltd. became Tarkwa goldfields; Ariston 
Gold Mines (1929) Ltd., and Ghana Main Reef Ltd., became Prestea 
goldfields; Bibiani (1927) Ltd., became Bibiani goldfields; Bremang 
Gold Dredging Co. Ltd., became Dunkwa goldfields; and Konongo Gold 
Mines Ltd., became Konongo goldfields. With the addition of Konongo 
to the public sector in 1965, there remained only one gold mining 
company in private ownership, Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd., at 
Obuasi. In January 1969, this company was purchased by Lonrho, and 
under the purchase agreement, the Ghana government is part owner, 
holding 200 of the shares, with an option to purchase a further 200. 
By 1969, therefore, the State was the sole owner of six gold mining 
enterprises and a shareholder in the seventh. By imposing a high rate 
of taxation on gold exports, the State also takes a high percentage of 
the profits accruing from the Ashanti mine. In 1968, the State mines 
produced 355L of the total gold output by value, and gave employment to 
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60'-ío of the labour engaged in gold mining, while the private sector 
contributed 65% of the value of gold exports but employed only 410, 
of the total labour force in the industry. 
TARKWA GOLDFIELDS 
This is the sole mining enterprise working the banket 
deposits in Ghana. The property covers an area of 85 square miles, 
made up of contiguous concessions acquired from time to time. The 
offices and mill are centrally located in the property at Abbontiakoon 
( A'Koon), some three miles north of the town of Tarkwa, through which 
the Government railway passes. The headquarters of the State Gold 
Mining Corporation are in Tarkwa. Only two shafts are in active use, 
the A'Koon Vertical shaft (A.V.S.) and the Fanti South shaft, three 
miles to the north -east. A third shaft, the Ferguson Inclined shaft, 
is currently being sunk at the north- eastern extremity of the property 
to exploit the extension of the reef in that direction (Map 7.1). 
Tarkwa goldfields was formerly the property of Amalgamated 
Banket Areas Ltd. (A.B.A.), one of the members of the London -based 
Finsbury Pavement House group of companies. In 1961, the Ghana 
Government offered 1s for each of the 19,232,669 3s stock units 
(Skinner, 1963). This offer was a generous one, since by that year the 
company was in a state of virtual collapse in financial terms. Indeed, 
A.B.A. had never been a particularly attractive investment, as witnessed 
by the poor performance of its shares on the London Stock Exchange 
(Table 7.1) and by its equally poor record of dividend payments 
(Table 7.2). 
A.B.A. was registered in 1935, with an authorised capital 
of £3,300,000 issued in 3s stock units. Since the banket ore is of a 
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AMALGAMA'lED BANIT AREAS, LTD. SHARE QUOTATIONS 
(Selected Years) 
Year highest Lowest 
s d s d 
1947 5s units 6 10 3 11 
1948 
" 5 10 2 9 
1 949 " " 4 1 2 3 
1950 3s units 3 - 1 9 
1951 " " 2 11 1 9 
1952 " 2 1 1 - 
Source: Skinner's Mining Yearbook, 1950 and 1953. 
TABLE 7.2 
AMALGAMATED BANEET AREAS, LTD. DIVIDEND PAYMENTS 
Year Amount(%) 
1936 -37 5 
1937 -38 5 
1938 -39/1949 -50 NIL 
1950 -51 2i 
1951- 52/1960 -61 NIL 
Source: Skinner's Mining Yearbook, annual 1938 -63. 
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low grade relative to the quartz deposits in Ghana, A.B.A. aimed at 
acquiring a large enough area to permit a sufficiently large tonnage 
of ore to be mined at a profit. The company's original concession area 
covered 41.4 square miles, made up by the acquisition and amalgamation 
of AtKoon mine, from Tarkwa Gold Areas Ltd., and the Tacquah mine, from 
Tarkwa Southern Mines Ltd. Operations were later expanded by opening 
up and working the Mantraim, Pepe and Akontasi mines, all situated on 
the north -west limb of the Tarkwa syncline. The ore was initially 
treated in a small and old 'stamp and tube' mill, with a capacity of 
9000 tons per month, but in 1940 this was superceded by a new mill 
with a capacity of 60,000 tons per month, this tonnage to be made up 
from surface and underground sources of the order of 25,000 and 35,000 
tons respectively. The company also invested in two new shafts, A.V.S. 
and Mantraim, and erected a walking dragline to exploit the banket 
outcrop at Pepe. The fruits of these pre -war investments were delayed, 
since A.B.A., being a low -grade property, was put on a 'care and 
maintenance' basis from 1943 to 1946 under the wartime concentration 
scheme. All production and development ceased in that three -year 
period. 
Meanwhile debts accumulated, and the company was forced to 
acquire more concessions to enable it to increase the scale of mining 
to pay off the accumulated debts. It was at this stage that the 
directorate made the vital mistake of merely re- organising the original 
capital structure of the company instead of refloating the company and 
attracting fresh capital to pay for the purchase of the new concessions. 
The original authorised capital of £3,300,000 was reduced to £2,115,000 
and issued in share units of 3s and 5s each, while the difference of 
£820,000 was issued credited as fully paid up shares for the purchase 
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of the new areas. Thus, in 1949, the new amalgamation involved the 
adjacent mines of Gold Coast Banket Areas Ltd., South Banket Areas 
Ltd., and Banket Goldfields Ltd. The treatment plant on the Fanti 
section of the property was closed down in 1950, and the central plant 
at A'Koon was modified to treat some 80,000 tons per month. These 
new investments proved too costly in relation to the expected returns 
from mining, and from 1951 no dividend was declared. Indeed, 
dividends had been declared in only three years prior to 1950/51, and 
these were small. 
Thus, by 1950, A.B.A. was operating eight mines on the 
Tarkwa range, and since all had been acquired at different times, 
mining methods and equipment were far from standardised. The 1949 
amalgamation was not successful, since working costs continued to rise 
while profits fell, and the company was forced to shut down sections 
of the property; Akontasi was not reopened after the second world war 
and Pepe was closed in 1956. Despite a Government grant of £100,000 
in the late 1950s, a further contraction of operations became necessary 
in 1961. The future of A.B.A. was delicately balanced at takeover. 
Its chequered history has been best summed up by a former consulting 
engineer of the company, when he stated, 
... the history of the separate companies prior to 1950 and 
afterwards during amalgamation to the time of takeover by the 
Government makes dismal reading" (S.G.M.C.). 
Subsequently, the Tamsoo section was closed down in 1964 and the Mantraim 
section in 1965. A.B.A. produced 1,998,099 fine ounces of gold, valued 
at £24,623,763, from 1935 to 1961 (Fig.7.1). Since takeover to 1968 

































































































































































































































































This is the sole company working alluvial gold deposits in 
Ghana. The company's concessions cover an area of 61 square miles, 
and dredging is carried out by four electrically -powered dredges, two 
of British and two of American design. Two dredges (D1 and D2) 
operate on the Upper Offin river valley and its associated alluvial 
floats,currently (1969) located 46 miles north -west of Dunkwa; the 
third (D3) operates in the middle Offin, 9 miles west of Dunkwa; and 
the fourth (D4) is dredging for gold in the Jimi river valley, and 
currently located ten miles to the east of Dunkwa. The mine offices, 
reduction plant and the main housing compound are in the town of 
Dunkwa, situated at the confluence of the Offin and Jimi rivers, and 
through which the Government railway passes. A secondary camp, the 
operational base for D1 and D2, is located at Subin where additional 
workshops and living quarters exist. All four dredges are reaching 
the limits of the presently -held concessions, and continued operations 
depend on the acquisition of new dredging grounds, either by the 
extension of the existing areas, or by transferring the dredges to 
completely new grounds. A third alternative has been suggested, that 
the dredges rework the old tailings to recover much of finer gold 
which was inevitably lost in the past, but this would probably not 
produce a sufficient return to justify the operation. Currently, 
prospecting is being carried out along the Jimi ahead of D4, and 
should the grounds prove rich, the dredging rights will be acquired by 
agreement with the Ashanti company through whose concession area the 
Jimi passes. 
Dunkwa goldfields was formerly the property of the Bremang 
Gold Dredging Company Ltd., and its assets were bought by the Ghana 
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Government in 1961. At that date, Bremang was still a profitable 
concern, and the company would not have sold out; but since the company 
was one of the Finsbury Pavement House group, whose entire share capital 
in Ghana was involved in the takeover bid, the directorate decided to 
accept the Government's offer of 3s 9d for each of the 5,216,848 2s 
stock units (Skinner, 1963). This offer represented a fair price, 
according to the recent value of the shares as quoted on the Stock 
Exchange (Table 7.3), and at the same time was a fair compensation to 
the shareholders, whose expected dividends in the following few years 
would have inevitably decreased as the grounds were exhausted. 
Bremang had a relatively good record of dividend payments in the past 
(Table 7.4). 
Bremang was registered in 1936, with an authorised capital 
of £1,000,000, issued in 5s stock units. The original concessions 
covered 33.47 square miles of contiguous land, extending some 40 miles 
along the Ancobra river valley upstream from Prestea (Map 7.2). 
Although it was envisaged as a four -dredge operation, only two dredges 
had been commissioned before the outbreak of the second world war, and 
dredging was begun in August and September 1938. The company's other 
dredges did not begin operating until 1945 and 1947. Each dredge was 
based at a different section along the Ancobra, with the headquarters 
of the entire operation atHiawa, midway along the river. In addition, 
several temporary camps, generally within half a mile of each dredge, 
were established to house the operational labour force attached to each 
dredging unit. As the dredges progressed upstream, these camps moved 
with them. The permanent focus of operations, typical of deep -level 
mining, is therefore not characteristic of dredging. The focal point 
of a dredging operation is continuously shifting horizontally, and 
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TABLE 7.3 
BREMANG GOLD DREDGING COMPANY. SHARE QUOTATIONS 
(Selected Years) 
Year Highest Lowest 
s d s d 
1956 1 10 0 10 
1959 3 8 1 - 
1960 3 10 1 11 
Source: Skinner's Mining Yearbook,1963. 
TABLE 7.4 
BREMANG GOLD DREDGING COMPANY LTD. DIVIDEND PAYMENTS 
Year Amount ( %) 
1948 10 
plus a special bonus of 5%, out 
of a refund on Gold Export Duty 
1949 10 
1950 -51 7 
1951 -52 72 
1952 -53 72 
1953 -54 NIL 
1954 -55 5 
1955 -56 5 
1956 -57 NIL 
1957 -58 7-z 
1956 -59 15 
1959 -60 10 (interim) 
Source: Skinner's Mining Yearbook, 1961. 
lacks the same degree of permanency of site attached to deep -level 
mining activity. 
By 1950, much of the valuable ground had been worked, and 
the company therefore raised fresh capital to cover the purchase of 
new concessions, in the Offin and Jimi river valleys, the areas 
subsequently inherited by the State in 1961. It was estimated that the 
newly -leased grounds would extend the working life of the company by 
a further 25 years, from 1953, by which date some 85% of the original 
grounds along the Ancobra were worked out. All four dredges were 
moved between 1952 and 1959, at a cost of 21,250,000, excluding the 
costs of preparing new housing sites, rebuilding the reduction plant, 
workshops, offices and cutting access roads to the dredge river -sites. 
The entire removal operation, from dismantling the dredges on the 
Ancobra, transporting them some 60 -80 miles to their new paddock sites, 
by road, railway, and rebuilding them at their final destinations was 
paid for out of profits, except for the debenture loan from the Ghana 
Government between 1956 and 1958. Bremang had qualified for financial 
assistance at that period, as the result of a 10¡o wage increase given 
after the strike of 1955 -56, and the company used the loan to complete 
the transfer of its dredges which would otherwise have been delayed 
owing to the increased labour costs. 
Bremang had a successful history, and from 146,750, 441 cubic 
yards of auriferous gravel it recovered 744,282 fine ounces of gold, 
valued at £8,299,253 between 1938 and 1961 (Fig.7.2). Since takeover, 
the dredging subsidiary has produced 16jß of the State mines' aggregate 
gold output to 1968. It has also proved the most profitable asset of 
the Corporation, in that it maintained a positive balance account until 















































































































































































































occasional occurrence of diamonds in the gravels acids to the revenue, 
although for the most part only the larger stones can be recovered 
since the dredges are not adapted to the simultaneous recovery of 
diamonds and gold. 
BIBIÁNI GOLDFIELDS 
Bibiani is one of the three State subsidiaries working the 
gold- bearing quartz deposits, although it is not located along the main 
gold channel, but in an. 'offshoot crack'. The mining concessions cover 
16 square miles, and in addition there is an adjacent timber concession 
covering 61.5 square miles. The early history of the mine is full of 
vicissitudes, due largely to inaccessibility. Even today, transport 
is hardly adequate; it lies 54 miles west of Kumasi by road, and the 
nearest railhead is some 24 miles distant at Awaso. The shafts, 
offices, senior staff quarters and plant are set on the lower slopes 
of the Bibiani range, which reach over 500 feet, and overlook the town 
and workers' compound in the valley below (Map 7.3). There is every 
possibility that Bibiani will be closed down in the near future unless 
the current prospecting programme produces positive evidence of new 
ore -bodies of substantial value. Bibiani North mine is in the meantime 
being re- equipped for reopening; it has not been active since its short 
three -year life from 1939 -42, when it was worked by Gold Coast Selection 
Trust. There is some indication that this small mine may prove a 
fruitful investment, or at least stave off the worst social disruptions 
of closure of the main Bibiani mine, which in fact ceased active mining 
in September 1968. It has been on a 'care and maintenance' basis ever 
since pending the results of the current prospecting programme. 
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Bibiani goldfields was formerly the property of Bibiani (1927) 
Ltd., a sister mine to Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd. Owing to 
its increasing marginality, the management decided to close their 
Bibiani subsidiary in 1961, at which time the Government stepped in 
to avert the crisis, and offered 4s each for the 2,500,000 ordinary 4s 
share units (Skinner, 1963). This was a generous offer, since future 
prospects were minimal, and the market value of the company's shares 
had shown a marked decline in the post -war years (Table 7.5). 
Similarly, the dividends paid to the shareholders had also dropped 
in the 1950s (Table 7.6). Throughout its life, in. fact, Bibiani mine 
had always been the poor relation of Ashanti, and never proved as 
rewarding an investment as its sister company. 
Bibiani (1927) Ltd. bought the concessions in 1927, with an 
original capital of £12,000 comprising 30,000 fully paid 4s shares. 
As geological evidence proved the long -term prospects of the mine, 
the small initial capital was raised: to £100,000 in 1928, to £400,000 
in 1932 and. finally to £500,000 in 1936. Active development began in 
1930, and the original mill was commissioned in April 1933, with a 
capacity of 100 tons per day. As a result of excellent development 
results achieved in the mid- 1930s, a new plant was built with an 
ultimate capacity of 1000 tons per day. During the second world war, 
however, mining and development were severely curtailed at Bibiani 
owing to the shortage of supplies, and it was some time after the war 
that ore reserves reached the high pre -war level. Ore had to be 
quarried from the surface reef outcrop, in fact, to allow underground 
development work to make up the wartime backlog, but like all the low - 
grade properties rising costs reduced the profits after 1946. 
TABLE 7.5 
BIBIANI (1927) LTD. SHARE QUOTATIONS 
(Selected Years) 
Year Highest Lowest 
s d s d 
1947 4s units 30 6 22 1 
1948 27 - 13 9 
1949 20 - 13 3 
1952 8 10 5 4 
1953 7 7 4 7 
1954 6 9 3 9 
1958 2 9 1 3 
1959 4 8 2 - 
1960 4 5 1 11 
Source; Skinner's Mining Yearbook, 
1950, 1955 and 1961. 
TABLE 7.6 
BIBIAANI (1927) LTD. DIVIDEND PAYMENTS 
Year Amount ( %) 
1934 -35 12- 
1935 -36/36 -37 15 
1937 -38/1942 -43 25 
1943 -44 20 
1944- 45/45 -46 25 
1946 -47 15 
1947 -48 10 
1948 -49 122 
1949 -50 42 
1950 -51 20.83 
1951 -52 172 
1952 -53/53 -54 10 
1954 -55 5 
1955 -56 NIL 
1956- 57/59 -60 10 

























































































































































































































Between 1934 and 1961, Bibiani produced 1,868,335 fine ounces 
of gold, valued at £18,982,976 (Fig.7.3). When the State purchased 
Bibiani, it was very near the end of its working life, the ore reserves 
having shown a drastic decline from the mid -1950s in spite of the 
efforts of its former owners to halt the decline. Since 1961, Bibiani 
has produced 14% of the aggregate gold output of the State mines, but 
it has proved a very heavy financial burden. 
PRESTEA GOLDFIELDS 
The mines at Prestea are based on gold- bearing quartz 
deposits, and they are located at the southern end of the main gold 
channel. Prestea goldfields is an amalgamation of two former private 
companies, Ariston Gold Mines (1929) Ltd., and Ghana Main Reef Ltd., 
the smaller of the two concerns. Their operations are centred on the 
villages of Prestea and Bondaye respectively (Map 7.4). Prestea has 
the appearance of a true mining town, much more so than all the other 
mining towns, since the main. shaft is located practically astride the 
main street, and the offices, plant and African workers' housing 
compound are clustered around it. Only the senior staff quarters are 
set apart, some several hundreds of feet along the high ridges over- 
looking the town in the valley below. Prestea is connected to the 
main line railway by 18 miles of feeder line, and linked to the main 
Takoradi -Kumasi road by 20 miles of unsurfaced, laterite 'road'. The 
mines on the Prestea range are frequently cut off during excessive wet 
seasons when the river Ancobra has been known to rise over 20 feet in 












































































































































The combined concession areas cover 42 square miles in the 
Prestea district. Ariston Gold Mines (1929) Ltd. was formed in 1929, 
by amalgamation and reorganisation of earlier companies, and Ghana 
Main Reef Ltd. was formed in 1933. In 1961, the Ghana Government 
offered 4s for each of the 10,285,714 2s 6d stock units of Ariston, 
and 3s for each of the 4,457,450 5s stock units of Main Reef (Skinner, 
1963). Ariston was always the more profitable company, although like 
most of the other gold mining companies suffered dwindling profits in 
the post -war era, which affected both the share quotations on the 
Stock Exchange (Table 7.7) and the magnitude of dividends paid to the 
shareholders (Table 7.8). 
Although both the Ariston and Main Reef companies spent large 
sums in expanding the scale of operations (Ariston spent £1,250,000 
between 1947 and 1955 alone) it became increasingly difficult to 
maintain a reasonable level of ore reserves ahead of production, and 
as costs continued to rise, the surplus capital available for development 
fell behind, and by 1961 neither company had good future prospects. 
Ariston produced 2,759,246 fine ounces of gold, valued at £28,420,736 
between 1930 and 1961 (Fig.7.4), and since takeover to 1968 Prestea 
goldfields has contributed some 45i% of the total output of the State 
mines. 
KONONGO GOLDFIELDS 
Konongo is the newest acquisition of the State group of 
mines, which was bought in 1965 for £150,000. It is situated at the 
north- eastern extremity of the main gold channel, and mining is based 
on auriferous quartz deposits. Its concessions cover 20 square miles 
in the Ashanti -Akim district (Map 7.6). 
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TABLE 7.7 
ARISTON GOLD MINES (1929) LTD. SHARE QUOTATIONS 
(Selected Years) 
Year Highest Lowest 
s d s d 
1947 2s 6d stock units 13 10;- 9 1 
1948 11 4 7 3 
1949 10 6 6 10 
1958 4 10 3 7 
1959 5 11 3 5 
1960 5 7 2 5 
Source; Skinner's Mining Yearbook, 1950 and 1961. 
TABLE 7.8 
ARISTON GOLD MINES (1929) LTD. DIVIDEND PAYMENTS 
Year Amount ( %) 
1932 -33 -34 20 
1934 -35 72 
1935 -36 5 
1936 -37 10 
1937 -38 72 
1938 -39 20 
1939 -40 -41 172 
1941 -42 -43 15 
1943- 44- 45- 46 -47 -48 20 
1948,449 5 
1949 -50 30 
1950 -51 25 
1951- 52 -53 -54 30 
1954 -55 10 
1955 -56 5 
1956 -57 10 
1957 -58 30 
1958 -59 20 
1959 -60 10 
Source: Skinner's Mining Yearbook, 
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The former owner of this property was Konongo Gold Mines, 
registered in 1933, with an authorised capital of £675,000. The 
company originally acquired only 21 square miles in concessions, 
comprising the southern half of the Boabedroo concession from its 
neighbour, Lyndhurst Deep Level (Gold and Silver) Ltd., which worked 
the northern extension of the reef. For some years, Konongo milled 
the ore for both properties, as well as carrying out the development 
work for Lyndhurst. The latter company went into voluntary liquida- 
tion in 1956, whence Konongo acquired all its concessions. The ore - 
bodies on the Konongo goldfield have always proved to be richer than 
those of the other quartz mines, and consequently, relatively low 
tonnages were mined, and the plant had an ultimate capacity of a mere 
10,000 tons per month. The pressure of rising working costs in the 
post -war decades led the company to adopt a programme of selective 
mining, whereby only the high -grade pockets of ore were mined. 
This policy certainly paid the shareholders, who received 
substantial dividends in the 1950s (Table 7.9). However, as these 
reserves dwindled, so did the dividends, and the ruling share prices 
of the company also showed the inevitable crash after 1960 (Table 7.10). 
The company therefore approached the Government as early as 1963 to 
buy its assets, but it was not till 1965 that agreement was reached, 
by which time most of the valuable ore had been mined and all develop- 
ment work phased out. As a result, when the State purchased the 
Konongo mine in 1965, there was no more than one month's supply of ore 
ready blocked out for mining: An immediate advance of £925,000 was 
required by the State Gold Mining Corporation to enable them to pay 
the wages bill and finance a preliminary examination of the property. 
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TABLE 7.9 
KONONGO GOLD MINES. DIVIDEND YAYNPEIJTS 
Year Amount (10 







1959 -60 -61 














Source: Skinner's Mining Yearbook, 1963. 
TABLE 7.10 
KONONGO GOLD MINES SHARE QUOTATIONS 
(Selected Years) 
Year Highest Lowest 
s d s d 
1960 2s units 2 4 11 
1961 1 4 5 
1962 1 4 4 
1963 1 1 6 
1964 8 4 
1965 1 1 4 













































































































































































































































































Being a relatively rich mine, the Konongo company had a 
fairly successful history, and from 1936 -37 to 1964 -65 it produced 
1,291,564 fine ounces of gold, valued at £13,491,211 (Fig.7.5). 
Since it became part of the State group of mines, it has been a small 
producer, with an output of some 50,000 fine ounces of gold from 1965 
to 1968. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that by 1961 (and 1965 in the case of Konongo) 
none of the mines which the State inherited had good future prospects. 
Although all the companies had increased the scale of production in 
the late 1950s in an attempt to overcome rising costs, none was 
successful in arresting the decline in their profits. Dividends 
dwindled, and the poor share ratings quoted on the Stock Exchange 
these mining in Ghana longer an 
attractive investment. For some 80 years, gold mining had been a 
vital part of the economic fabric of the country, and the threat of 
closure of most of the gold mines posed social and economic problems 
for the newly- independent Ghana Government. It was against this back- 
ground that the State purchased the marginal mines. The extent to 
which the State Gold Mining Corporation has maintained production and 
employment in these long- established mining communities, and earned 
foreign exchange for the economy, is the subject of the final three 
chapters of the study. But, before pursuing these lines of investigation, 
this chapter would not be complete without a brief note on the Ashanti 
mine, as it has a bearing on the geography of gold mining in Ghana. 
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COROLLARY : A T1O1!L ON T:E_II ASNAïdTI P:iINC 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd. was registered in 1897, 
with an authorised capital of £250,000. The excellent development 
results achieved by the company justified raising fresh capital, which 
ultimately reached £3,000,000 issued in 15,000,000 shares of 4s each. 
Its continued future prosperity was underlined when Lonrho Ltd. bought 
the Ashanti mine in January 1969 for £15,000,000. The concession areas 
cover 100 square miles in the districts of Bekwai and Adansi, in the 
Ashanti region, and the mine is centred on the Obuasi township, some 
120 miles by rail from Takoradi. 
The gold- bearing reefs are well -defined and have proved to 
be immensely rich. The producing section of the mine extends over 
12,000 feet of strike and is served by six main surface shafts. 
Although the ore is by far the highest grade of all the gold deposits 
in Ghana, working costs tend to be very high because of the complexity 
of the metallurgical methods required to treat the ore, and in particular 
the difficulties of obtaining a constant ore mix in the mill which 
treats both free -milling gold from the quartz bodies, and gold locked 
up in sulphide ores. In this context, it is worth noting that the 
'cut -off' grade in the Ashanti mine is no less than 12 dwts per ton, 
which is nearly three times the average grade of ore mined by the State 
group: The modern treatment plant which was commissioned in 1947 was 
designed with an eventual capacity of 50,000 tons per month. The new 
owners plan to expand the capacity of the mine still further to some 
60,000 tons per month. Timber for the mine is obtained from the 
Corporation's timber concessions, and the company carries out reaffores- 
tation within its concessions; to 1966, over 5000 acres had been replanted. 
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TABLE 7.11 
ASHANTI GOLDFIELDS CORPORATION, LTD. DIVIDEND PAYMENTS 
(Selected Years) 

















1905 -06 -07 NIL 1950 621 2 
1907 -08 10 1951 -52 50 
1908 -09 NIL 1953 -54 40 
1910 50 1955 20 
1911 75 1956 35 
1912 -13 872 1957 25 
1914 -15 689 1958 62') 
1916 70 1959 50 
1917 -18 -19 75 1960 54 1/6 
1920 62i 1961 25 
1921 20 1962 50 
1922 25 1963- 64 -65 -66 371 
1967 29 1/6 
Source: Skinner's Mining Yearbook, annual 1901 -1968 
TABLE 7.12 
ASHANTI GOLDFIELDS CORPORATION, LTD. SHARE QUOTATIONS 
(Selected Years) 
Year Highest Lowest 
s d s d 
1917 4s units 22 6 15 - 
1918 22 11 2 18 - 
1919 25 6 20 - 
1923 12 1 6 6 
1924 12 9 6 











1939 85 56 - 
1960 25 3 12 9 
1961 13 6 8 2 
1962 11 7 7 1 
1963 15 9 9 7 
1964 13 6 6 7 
1965 9 4 5 6 
1966 12 3 5 10 
1967 13 3 8 10 




ASHANTI GOLDFIELDS CORPORATION, LTD. 
GENERAL STATISTICS FOR THE YEAR ENDING 30 SEPTEMBER 1966 
1. PRODUCTION 
Short tons treated, dry 
Grade milled, dwts /ton 
496,445 
20.47 
Gold produced, fine ounces 459,617 
Recovery, per cent 90.08 
Development footage 56,084 
Shaft sinking, feet 511 
2. FINANCE (Sterling) 
Revenue per ton treated 232s 5d 
Working cost/ton (excl.devt) 103s 10d 
Development cost /ton 13s 5d 
Proceeds from sales of bullion £5,790,964 
Sundry revenue 174,146 
Total revenue £5,965,110 
Mining costs (2,9202939 
Pension scheme, General 
Expenses- London, Bullion 
Realisation charges, 
Depreciation £ 487,380 £3,408,312_ 
£2,556,791 
Ghana Minerals Duty and 
Royalty, Ghana Taxes and 
U.K. Taxes £1,777,886 
Balance available for 
distribution E 778,905 
3. ORE RESERVES, at 30 Sept.1966, were: 
3,673,760 tons of ore containing 
3,638,663 fine ounces of gold at a grade of 
19.81 dwts per ton. 
Source: By permission of the Acting Mines Manager, A.G.C., 
Ltd., Obuasi. 
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Throughout its history, the Ashanti mine has proved the 
most consistently profitable gold mining enterprise in the country, 
and high dividends have rewarded its shareholders, although since the 
second world war, in common with all other gold mining companies, 
dividend payments have declined as rising costs squeezed profit margins 
(Table 7.11). The share quotations on the Stock Exchange have suffered 
a similar downward trend (Table 7.12), although when Lonrho's takeover 
bid was announced, Lonrho's shares doubled in value for a short time 
early in 1969, reflecting the high value the market attached to their 
acquisition of the Ashanti mine. 
From 1897 to 1966, Ashanti Goldfields Corporation produced 
over 10,000,000 ounces of gold, valued at nearly £100,000,000, and its 
future seems assured for many decades. Table 7.13 illustrates the 
performance of the company in a typical year. It demonstrates the 
positive balance achieved by the company, but it should be noted that 
although the gross profits are high, and ore reserves stand at a high 
level, the net profits are low, largely owing to the high burden of 
taxation borne by the company. The performance of the State mines is 
therefore placed in perspective against Ashanti's outstanding record 
of past and continuing profitability, and it is against this background 
that the operations of the State Gold Mining Corporation are analysed 
in Chapters 8, 9 and 10 of the study. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE PERFORMANCE OF GOLD MINING: 
A COMPARISON PRE - AND POST -TAKEOVER 
INTRODUCTION 
As was shown in Part II of the study, the gold mining industry 
in Ghana grew and developed in the hands of private companies, registered 
abroad, and financed by foreign capital. When the State entered this 
field of economic activity in 1961, the structure of ownership was 
fundamentally changed. The Ghana Government's purchase of the marginal 
gold mines was based on economic and social grounds: to maintain output 
and employment in these long- established mining communities. It is the 
purpose of this chapter to examine the trends in production over the 
period 1956 -1967 with a view to assessing how far the economic objective 
behind the takeover has been fulfilled. 
The economic significance of keeping open the marginal mines 
is related to the high external value of gold to the economy. Ghana's 
export trade, not unlike that of many of the developing countries, is 
essentially based on primary products. Eight commodities of primary 
origin account for over 98% of the value of Ghana's exports (Table 8.1). 
Although gold comprised less than one -tenth of the value of exports in 
1960, it was the third most important earner of foreign exchange, after 
cocoa, timber and their derivatives. Traditionally, gold has taken 
second place to cocoa, but its share of the country's export trade has 
declined, particularly since the second world war (Table 8.2). But, 
unlike other primary products, gold does not suffer the fluctuations in 
demand, price or value characteristic of Ghana's other export items. 
Under conditions of prosperity or recession, and in the face of 
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TABLE 8.1 






Cocoa beans and 
products 67 59.7 
GOLD 11 9.7 
Timber (logs) 10 9.1 
Timber (sawn) 5 4.8 
Diamonds 9 8.6 
Manganese 6 5.6 
Bauxite 0.5 0.5 
Cola nuts 1 1.1 
Others 2 1.7 
£114,000,000 100% 
Source: Economic Survey, 1961, Tables 102 and 103. 
TABLE 8.2 
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS: SELECTED YEARS 
1931 1938 1948 1962 1969 
Cocoa 59.0 40.9 77.0 60.0 68.0 
GOLD 11.0 43.7 10.5 10.1 8.5 
Timber 0.7 0.7 4.5 11.0 9.0 
Diamonds 5.0 4.9 1.8 6.6 6.3 
Manganese 4.0 8.2 4.9 4.9 2.0 
Bauxite - - 0.5 0.6 0.7 
Others 25.3 1.6 0.8 6.8 5.5 
10afc 100f i 00% 100% 100'% 
Stöurce: Annual Export Statistics. 
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technological change, the demand for gold and the price that the world 
is willing to pay never abates. It is this fundamental stabilising 
quality which makes gold an important source of regular and reliable 
revenue, provided that output can be maintained. In these terms, the 
closure of the marginal mines in 1961 would not only have meant the loss 
of revenue of some 710,000,000 per annum, but would also have left the 
Ghanaian economy even more dependent on a range of exports with a 
volatile market. 
Under State ownership, there is the additional advantage that 
proportionately more foreign exchange is fed back into the economy than 
when the mines were privately- owned, since a substantial part of the 
revenue from the sales of gold was formerly repatriated. It has been 
calculated that in 1961 -62, some 80% of the net proceeds from the sale 
of gold was converted to foreign exchange earnings by the State mines, 
which compared with some 65% of the revenue of the private sector, which 
in fact showed a 23% higher gross value on the sales of gold in that 
year (Birmingham et al., 1966, p.263). With these general considerations 
in mind, the performance of the gold mining industry will be examined, 
starting with a general survey of the trends in production over the 
period 1956 -1967, and followed by a more detailed analysis identifying 
the reasons for those trends. 
TRENDS IN PRODUCTION : 1956 -1967 
The secular trend in the physical output of the gold mining 
industry in Ghana from the 1950s has been downward (Fig.8.1). Within 
this general trend, two contrasting periods can be distinguished and 
these correspond closely to the pre - and post -takeover periods. From 
1956 to 1960, output increased by some 63 %, from 562,445 ounces of gold 
GHANA GOLD MINING INDUSTRY 
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in 1956 to 915,317 ounces of gold in 1960. The industry's output of 
nearly 1,000,000 ounces, valued at well over x.11,000,000, in 1960 
represented the highest figure ever achieved in the history of the 
industry, and it has not been recorded since that year. In fact, in 
the year before takeover a small decrease in output was recorded, and 
this decline became consolidated into a definite trend in the downward 
direction after 1961. It is, however, apparent that the secular decline 
in the industry's output over the whole period under discussion, and 
particularly the intensification of this trend after 1961, was due to 
contraction within the public sector; the privately -owned Ashanti mine 
has increased its annual output throughout. Equally, its share of total 
output has risen from 39jß in 1960 to 65gß in 1968, when the Ashanti mine 
was responsible for producing some 478,428 ounces out of the industry's 
total output of 727,809 ounces of gold. It is, therefore, the continued 
high output of the private sector which has maintained Ghana's gold 
production at its current level; the State mines have, individually 
and collectively, failed to arrest the drastic decline in output which 
began in the year before the marginal mines were purchased by the Ghana 
Government. 
A more detailed examination of the trends in production 
involves a consideration of the three elements of production: the 
tonnages of ore milled (or, in the case of dredging, the cubic yardage 
of gravel treated); the number of fine ounces recovered; and the final 
recovery grade achieved (Fig.8.2 a, b and c). While ultimately it is 
the quantity of gold recovered that is important, an examination of the 
changing relationship between the three elements of production gives 
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The scale of operations, as expressed by the tonnages of ore 
milled, on the State mines has shown a marked reduction in the 1960s. 
Each subsidiary had attained its maximum scale of mining by the turn of 
the decade: Tarkwa and Bibiani in 1959; Prestea in 1960; and Konongo in 
1961. Only the dredging subsidiary continued to expand its scale of 
annual throughput until 1965, after which the annual yardage of gravel 
treated has dropped. But, since it operates under a completely different 
set of conditions, its performance in this respect is not strictly 
comparable with that of the deep -level mines. In the first two years 
after takeover, a slight increase in the scale of mining was achieved 
over the 1960 level, but this could not be maintained and after 1963 a 
drastic cutback in the tonnages of ore mined was experienced by all the 
mines of the State group. It is only in the recent past that the 
industry has shown some slight sign of recovering from the acute state 
of depression into which it had fallen in the mid- 1960s. By 1968, all 
the mines in the public sector were operating at less than two -thirds 
of the capacity achieved in the pre- takeover period. The worst 
performance was sustained by Bibiani, which in 1968 milled a mere 58,000 
tons of ore compared to some 4000,000 tons in 1959. 
While the scale of mining has dropped significantly since 
takeover, the amount of gold recovered by the State mines has diminished 
at an even faster rate (Table 8.3). Relative to their respective peak 
production years, in 1968, Dunkwa produced only 64 %; Prestea 60%; 
Tarkwa and Konongo 33% each; and Bibiani a mere 11%. The disparity in 
the rates of decline between these two elements of production can be 
explained by the simultaneous drop in the grade of ore mined (Table 8.4). 
All five subsidiaries have experienced a progressive decline in the 
final recovery grade achieved, at varying rates according to the geological 
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TABLE 8.3 
TRENDS IN PRODUCTION : STATE MINES 
1968 OUTPUT COMPARED WITH PEAK YEAR 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
tons tons oz. OZ.` 
Tarkwa 755,229 1959 328,525 51 178,464 1959 54,857 33 
Prestea 623,822 1960 400,510 66 204,969 1959 118,095 60 
Bibiani 404,527 1959 58,537 15 86,075 1959 10,126 11 
Konongo 90,020 1961 38,339 40 65,607 1964 18,377 33 
Dunkwa* 12,780,900 1965 8,841,500 66 73,838 1963 47,932 64 
(a) Maximum tonnage mined. 
(b) Year. 
(c) Tonnage mined in 1968. 
(d) 1968 tonnage as ¡L peak year. 
(e) Peak gold output. 
(f) Year. 
(g) 1968 gold output. 
(h) 1968 gold output as % peak year. 
Source: S.G.M.C. 
TABLE 8.4 
* Cubic yardage dredged. 
TRENDS IN GRADE RECOVERED : STATE MINES 
1968 GRADE COMPARED WITH PEAK YEAR 
Maximum 
Year 
1968 drop over 
grade grade peak year 
dwts/ton dwts/ton 
Tarkwa 4.7 1959 3.3 30 
Prestea 6.7 1959 6.1 8 
Bibiani 4.6 1960 3.5 24 
Konongo 24.0 1964 9.6 65 
Dunkwa* 3.6 1963 3.1 24 
* grains /cubic yard. 
Note: 1 dwt(pennyweight) = 1/20th of an ounce. 
1 grain = 1/480th of an ounce. 
Source: S.G.M.C. 
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dictates of the ore -bodies worked. None of the State mines is endowed 
with rich ore -bodies, and of the. deep -level mines only Konongo can be 
classed as a medium -grade property, the others being low -grade. By 1967, 
it required 5 tons of ore to yield one ounce of gold at Tarkwa; at 
Bibiani 6 tons; at Prestea 3.5 tons; and at Konongo, the richest mine, 
2 tons. By contrast, the Ashanti mine contains very high -grade ore - 
bodies, and on the average one ounce of gold can be recovered from one 
ton of ore. Within this mine there are occasional lenses of exceptional 
value, such as the 1274 fissure (location 12 level, position 74 cross- 
cut) in the Ayeinm section; this particular section yields at least 
50 ounces to the ton, and is locally referred to as the "money box" 
Since the grade of ore mined has declined over the period under 
discussion concomitant with a reduction in the tonnage of ore milled, 
the quantity of gold produced has been limited by both these factors. 
The drop in grade would not be so significant in itself had tonnages 
been maintained at a higher level, but with the decline in the extraction 
rate, the simultaneous decline in the recovery grade has exacerbated 
the problem. Revenue has been depressed as a result. In this context, 
it is noticeable that any increase in the scale of operations tends to 
produce a higher recovery grade. For example, in the pre - takeover 
period, the expanded scale of production was accompanied by an increase 
in the final recovery grade, and conversely, after takeover, the reduced 
scale of mining led to a significant drop in the final recovery grade 
of several pennyweights per ton of ore milled. It is a well- established 
axiom of mining economics that the desired 'cut -off' grade can be 
achieved through economies of scale where the average grade of ore mined 
is low. This is a particularly relevant concept in respect of low -grade 
properties, whose unit overheads are as high as those of higher grade 
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properties, but whose unit return is considerably less. In such 
circumstances, large -scale mining operations must be adopted to achieve 
economies and the desired level of profits. This the State mines have 
been unable to do. Consequently, since takeover, not only has revenue 
declined but substantial losses have been sustained. 
From this general survey of the performance of the gold 
mining industry in Ghana over the period 1956 -1967, three trends can 
be identified: the pre- takeover increased scale of production, 1956 -1960; 
the post- takeover reduced scale of mining, 1961 -1967; and the contrasted 
performance of the public and private sectors, 1961 -1967. The rest of 
this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the factors responsible for 
these trends. 
PRODUCTION 1956 -1960 : STIMULI 
The increased scale of mining operations adopted by all the 
companies in the late 1950s was a direct response to the pressure of 
rising costs. The initial and most important stimulus to the adoption 
of this policy was the award of a 10% wage increase to all daily -rated 
labour as the result of a three -month strike, from November 1955 to 
February 1956, in support of wage claims. The cost to the mining 
industry of this award was of the order of £500,000, and this increase 
could only be borne by stepping up production as a means of achieving a 
higher gold output to pay for the increased labour costs. At the same 
time, the companies had to somehow redress the losses of revenue 
sustained during the period of the strike. For example, Amalgamated 
Banket Areas Ltd. lost some £450,000 of gold revenue during the strike, 
and it cost the company some £150,000 to keep the mine open during the 
three -month period. In addition, several working places had falls of 
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the hanging wall and required extensive retimbering once operations were 
resumed. What little surplus capital was available, since profits had 
been dwindling steadily since the second world war, was devoted to this 
cause. Secondly, the Government came to the rescue of the marginal mines 
by giving them financial assistance to cushion the full impact of the 
wage increases of 1956. Some £200,000 was distributed to four of the 
marginal mines, and this sum was spread over two years. Although the 
amount of aid was small, it did enable the mines to expand their scale 
of operations, so that after the aid ceased, the higher level of 
production which it permitted could be maintained from the industry's 
own. resources. Mechanisation was adopted wherever possible, particularly 
on the low -grade mines, to raise the level of labour productivity and 
achieve further economies. 
However, despite all the efforts to offset the cost inflation, 
the 'ceiling' was apparently reached in 1959 -60, and no further increases 
in the tonnages of ore mined could be achieved, largely owing to the 
low level of ore reserves, which inevitably limited further scale 
increases. In addition to the dwindling ore reserves, working costs had 
continued to rise with further wage increases in 1958 and again in 1960. 
The Minimum Remuneration Instrument of 1960 meant for the mining industry 
the payment of an additional 1s 3d per day to all daily -rated labourers 
to bring wages in the industry in line with the statutory national 
minimum daily wage of 6s 6d. This came as the final blow to the marginal 
mines; since 1956 working costs had risen at a faster rate than returns 
on the sale of gold (Table 8.5). 
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TABLE 8.5 








Tarkwa 10 47 42 
Prestea 15 70 45 
Bibiani 14 41 43 
Konongo 15 30 40 
Dunkwa 30 24 26 
Source: S.G.M.C. 
Neither physically nor financially were the mines able to effect further 
scale increases; both ore reserves and capital reserves were too low 
to permit it without additional Government support. Instead of 
extending further financial assistance to the industry, the Ghana 
Government chose the alternative of offering to purchase the assets of 
five of the seven surviving companies. 
PRODUCTION 1961 -1967 : CONSTRAINTS 
The post- takeover decline in production was therefore to some 
extent foreshadowed by the diminishing returns experienced by the 
former private companies in the last year of operations. However, the 
sequence of events leading up to takeover do not explain the magnitude 
of the fall in output since 1961, nor the marked intensification of the 
downward trend from 1963. The evidence suggests that the steep rate of 
decline in production sustained by the State mines after takeover can 
be attributed to two main factors, the lack of production inputs and 
the lack of adequate ore reserves. 
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1. The Lack of Production Inputs 
Production inputs are taken to mean physical inputs in the 
form of stores, supplies and spares. There is an intimate relationship 
between the availability of production inputs and the capacity of any 
enterprise to function; any shortage or restriction in the flow of 
inputs will depress production. 
When the Ghana Government bought the marginal mines in 1961, 
all ties with the former owners' supply organisation were broken. A 
central ordering department and a central store and distributing point 
was established at Tarkwa, the headquarters of the State Gold Mining 
Corporation. The aim of centralisation was to achieve economies through 
bulk ordering. At first, all supplies for the State mines were 
commissioned through a Government Agency, the Government Supply Commis- 
sion, which dealt with all state enterprises in this respect. The 
mines had therefore to compete with other productive industries in the 
public sector for an allocation of foreign exchange to buy its materials. 
This proved to be a most inadequate system since the Commission ran 
short of funds and this led to protracted delays in the payment of 
bills to overseas suppliers. Confidence abroad was lost and it became 
increasingly difficult for the State mines to obtain the delivery of 
essential stores. In addition, the terns of the Exchange Control Act 
of 1960, and the ever -tightening import licence regulations exacerbated 
the problem. The Government's intention to restrict foreign exchange 
spending to the barest essentials weighed particularly heavily on the 
gold mining industry, since the import -content of output is high, 
estimated at some 10°j (Birmingham et al., 1966, p.72). 
In February 1966, an Economic Committee was set up and all the 
outstanding bills were paid off. From that time, each State enterprise 
197. 
has controlled its own ordering system. The State Gold Mining Corpora- 
tion now deals directly with the suppliers, through a London -based 
secretary. However, it is apparent that the supply organisation is 
still not working as smoothly or efficiently as it did formerly. All 
the mine managers agreed unanimously that the long delays between 
sending the initial acquisition lists to headquarters and taking 
delivery of the items ordered is still one of the main constraints on 
production. Similarly, the lack of a technically- qualified representa- 
tive at the supply end to check the items before they leave for Ghana 
is regarded by all the mine managers as a major weakness in the system. 
Equally, while they all accept the theoretical value of a centralised 
supply organisation, it is generally felt that in practice the system 
is a failure. All the mine managers emphasised the difficulty they 
experience in having their acquisition lists approved immediately; it 
is more common for some weeks or even months to elapse, as query upon 
query._ arrives from headquarters before orders are eventually placed. 
The stultifying effect of this on production cannot be over -emphasised, 
as the following analysis of production patterns at each State subsidiary 
will show. It is suggested that the problem can best be described by 
examining the production of each mine in some detail using the quarterly 
reports for the period June 1965 to December 1967. These dates are 
chosen because formerly the State Gold Mining Corporation prepared only 
annual returns and these barely illustrate the trends except at a 
general level. The quarterly reports cover not only the actual output 
achieved by each subsidiary, but also include the budget estimates for 
each quarter; this allows a comparison of performance, projected and 
realised. The projected targets for each quarter were based on the 
assumption that normal conditions would prevail and that a continuous 
flow of production inputs would be assured. 
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(i) Tarkwa Goldfields 
In every single quarter, June 1965 to December 1967, Tarkwa 
consistently failed to fulfil the planned production targets (Fig.8.3a). 
The tonnages milled, the quantity of gold produced and the final 
recovery grade achieved were all substantially less than had 
been 
expected. The most important effect of the low level of production 
achieved relative to the target set for Tarkwa was that while 
working 
costs were not as high as had been budgeted, revenue was markedly 
lower 
than expected (Fig.8.3b). The savings in working costs were 
not in 
proportion to the drop in revenue. 
Throughout the period under discussion, Tarkwa goldfields 
achieved no more than just over half the tonnages that 
were expected. 
In no quarter was the target even near being met; the 
best performance 
in .the quarter ending March 1967, at 65 °jó of target, 
was still under 
three -quarters of the planned milling rate of 120,000 
tons for that 
quarter. The acute depression experienced by 
the State mines in the 
mid -1960s is well illustrated by Tarkwa's poor 
performance in the quarter 
to March 1966, when a mere 30 of target was 
attained. The quantity 
of gold recovered stood at even lower levels 
relative to target throughout 
the whole period, in the range of 25¡0 to 62°f. 
Over the eleven quarters, 
Tarkwa produced under half the amount of gold 
that had been expected. 
Consistent with the target tonnages per quarter, 
which varied between 
105,000 and 162,000 tons, it was estimated 
that the final recovery 
grade should be in the range 3.35 to 4 
dwts per ton. But, in fact, 
Tarkwa's final recovery grade over the 
period varied in the lower 
range of between 1.74 and 3.82 dwts per 
ton. This accounts for the 
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There were several reasons for the low level of output of 
Tarkwa goldfields, and two main sources of constraint can be 
identified: labour problems and the difficulty of obtaining supplies. 
Labour unrest, resulting in a series of labour disputes and 
strikes on the mine, was endemic, preceding and following the collapse 
of the labour control system at Tarkwa early in 1968. The removal of 
the monthly bonus payment from the shift- bosses in 1965, a measure 
taken to achieve economies, sparked off discontent and labour 
productivity dropped. Frequent stoppages of work caused by rioting and 
a general lack of discipline of the labour force had an adverse effect 
on production at Tarkwa. In addition, shortages of skilled underground 
labour were emphasised in every quarterly report as a contributory cause 
of the low level of production at the mine. 
Secondly, there was a shortage of drill steels which began to 
affect production in 1964, since underground operations were hindered. 
The non -delivery of mechanical spares and equipment for the power 
station led to repeated power failures which stopped production on 
several occasions. Even after the link to Volta power, effected in 
June 1966, electrical breakdowns continued, consequent on the non - 
availability of spare parts. Indeed, the rundown of stores, spares and 
essential materials affected the efficiency of all departments to a 
critical degree. The dearth of chemical reagents led to the closure 
of the mill between January 12 and March 7, 1966, and the non -delivery 
of cyanide forced a second shut -down from April 16 to May 8 in the 
same year. Even when the mill remained open, the scarcity of chemicals 
led to reduced metallurgical efficiency. It was not until the first 
quarter of 1968 that the essential stores, on order for over three 
years, arrived. The restricted flow of production inputs, on whose 
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assumed arrival the forecasts for production had been based, therefore 
accounts for the wide divergence between production targets and achieve- 
ment at Tarkwa goldfields, and the gradual intensification of labour 
difficulties throughout the period exacerbated the situation by adding 
to the number of lost workdays. 
(ii) Prestea Goldfields 
A similar set of constraints operated at Prestea, although 
on the average the mine had a better record of production over the 
period (Fig.8.4a). As a result, the disparity between the budget 
estimates and the actual returns was much less pronounced (Fig.8.4b). 
The quarterly milling rate achieved at the Prestea mine never 
fell below three- quarters of the target for any one quarter; it was 
maintained in the range 76% to 91% of target. Its aggregate accomplish- 
ment, in terms of the tonnages mined, was some 30/0 higher than Tarkwa's 
over the eleven quarters. The quantity of gold recovered was similarly 
higher than Tarkwa's relative to target, in the range 67/. in the quarter 
ending September 1965 to 90¡L in the last quarter of 1966. This never- 
theless represented a disproportionate loss of gold to tonnage milled, 
so that revenue was only some 75% of the expected earnings of the mine 
over the period. Savings in working expenditure from the reduction in 
the scale of operations were also small relative to the loss of projected 
revenue. The gold- bearing quartz deposits at Prestea assay higher than 
the banket ores at Tarkwa, and so the expected recovery grade at the 
mine, based on geological inference and sampling tests, was set in the 
higher range of 6.60 to 7.12 dwts per ton. This forecast was based on 
a quarterly extraction rate of between 99,000 and 135,000 tons, but, 
since these tonnages were not achieved, t o final recovery grade averaged 
between 4.77 and 6.56 dwts per ton. 
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The main reasons for Prestea's low level of output are 
similar to those described for Tarkwa, although labour difficulties were 
less significant. Prestea's problems were mainly physical, revolving 
around the shortage of production inputs. A large proportion of the 
capital stock was rendered immobile because of the non - delivery of 
spares. Breakdowns in the milling plant were frequent, and the milling 
capacity was impaired by a shortage of essential chemicals which 
persisted until the end of 1967, when copper sulphate stocks were very 
low. Underground mining and development work were also restricted by 
the interruption of the flow of materials from overseas suppliers who 
demanded prepayment before orders were dispatched. In the quarterly 
report to December 1965, it was recorded that development work was some 
eighteen months behind schedule as a result. The situation demanded a 
high degree of improvisation, and attempts were made to manufacture 
parts in the mine workshops. The entire production process was held 
up and efficiency reduced. On the other hand, the relative insignifi- 
cance of work- stoppages from labour unrest explains to some extent the 
higher level of production achieved by Prestea goldfields compared to 
Tarkwa. 
(iii) Bibiani ,goldfields 
The assessment of Bibiani's performance in relation to the 
budget estimates is rather more complicated than for either Tarkwa or 
Prestea, since in 1965 it was decided that, owing to the exhaustion of 
ore reserves, production at Bibiani was to be gradually scaled down to 
closure. The quarterly targets were therefore continuously reduced from 
52,000 tons to some 16,000 tons during the period under discussion. 
Thus, in the case of Bibiani, the targets were no more than guidelines, 
since precise forward estimates of production were complicated by the 
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scattered distribution of the several remnant blocks of ore left to 
mine. 
An examination of Fig.8.5a and b would tend to suggest that 
Bibiani's performance was remarkable compared to the previously described 
low level of production of its sister mines, since in eight quarters 
Bibiani produced much more than expected. This is more apparent than 
real, however, because not only did production in absolute terms decline 
very markedly at Bibiani from 1965, but the cost of mining was abnormally 
high relative to the revenue earned. For example, in 1967, it cost 
almost £35 to produce one ounce of gold, valued at 35 dollars: The 
cost of phasing out the mine, therefore, puts its performance into true 
perspective, and, for comparative purposes, Fig.8.5a and b must be read 
with that qualification in mind. The bizarre pattern of achievement 
over target in the range of 30% to 156% in respect of tonnages milled, 
and from 45i'%- to 147% in respect of gold recovered is meaningless for 
comparative purposes without a fuller knowledge of the conditions at 
the Bibiani mine at this period. In fact, the only value of the graphical 
representation of the quarterly statistics for Bibiani is that the steep 
trough noted in the nine -month period between September 1965 and June 
1966 brings out very clearly the time of greatest shortage of stores and 
spares. The mill at Bibiani was forced to close down for some weeks 
during this period. By the middle of 1967, there were only twelve 
blocks of ore left in the mine, and these varied in dimension and gold 
content and were located at different sections within the mine. The 
abnormally high cost of production was inevitable in light of the 
scattered distribution of the remaining pockets of mineable ore. It 
is in these terms, therefore, that Bibiani's performance over the period 
should be understood. The lack of production inputs at Bibiani merely 
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(iv) Konongo Goldfields 
Konongo goldfields, the fourth deep -level nine of the State 
group, began active mining under the new management only in July 1966, 
although it had been acquired one year earlier. All mining ceased in 
June 1965 while preparatory work for reopening was carried out underground. 
The Ghana Geological Survey Department simultaneously undertook a 
programme of surface prospecting for gold in the Konongo area. The 
quarterly production reports did not therefore appear until the September 
quarter of 1966. Operations re- started in July of that year but the 
mill was not reopened. The background to this policy is relevant to 
the analysis of the trends in production. 
When the mill ceased operating in June 1965, it was necessary 
to make an assessment of the amount of ore available in the mine before 
proceeding with any production plans for Konongo. The mine staff 
recalculated the tonnage left by the departing company at some 125,000 
tons at an average sampled grade of 9.5 dwts per ton. This comprised 
ore in abandoned blocks, drive pillars and surface stockpile, and the 
recalculated tonnage included substantial amounts of material of a 
lower grade than the private company could afford to mine. Latterly, 
the cut -off grade maintained by the private company had been some 10 
dwts per ton, whereas, with the inclusion of ore yielding as little as 
4.5 dwts per ton, the volume of ore reserves available was greater. 
Despite this, the viability of the mine was questioned, and it was 
concluded that, 
" ... the mine cannot be operated profitably as an integral 
unit ... the ore can be treated on a custom basis at another 
gold mill within the Corporation, provided that transport costs 
are reasonable" (S.G.M.C.) 
In essence, the Custom Ore Project was formulated to permit the 
exploration of the mine's potential without burdening it with heavy 
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milling costs, for the mine did not have the capacity to produce large 
enough tonnages to support the mill at anything near its maximum 
capacity. An approach was made to Ghana Railways and an attractive 
price of 17s 5d per short ton was quoted to ship the ore from Konongo 
to Tarkwa, based on a daily consignment of 170 -200 tons of ore. This 
scheme has been of mutual advantage to Konongo and Tarkwa; Konongo was 
saved the burden of overheads in maintaining the mill, and Tarkwa's 
mill has been used to better advantage. 
With the immediate availability of some 125,000 tons of ore, 
the target extraction rate was set at some 15,000 tons per quarter, a 
figure well within the capacity of the shafts. At this rate, Konongo 
had an assured life for two years, during which time it was hoped that 
new discoveries would further extend the life of the mine. However, 
despite the conservative targets set for Konongo, they were not met 
(Table 8.6). It is significant that the best performance was achieved 
in the first quarter, July to September 1966, when some 95% of the 
projected 15,000 tons was milled, and this yielded some 5¡% more gold 
than had been estimated for that quarter, largely because the final 
recovery grade was declared at 10.56 dwts per ton compared to the 
predicted average of 9.5 dwts per ton. However, in subsequent quarters, 
neither the estimated tonnages reached the mill at Tarkwa nor was the 
expected quantity of gold produced. Working costs were nevertheless 
high and exceeded the budget estimates in two of the seven quarters 
under discussion. 
The explanation for Konongo's failure to achieve its targets 
is somewhat different from that described for Tarkwa, Prestea and 
Bibiani. The above average performance of the mine in the first quarter 
of its resumed activity was entirely due to external circumstances. 
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TABLE 8.6 
KONONGO GOLDFIELDS : PRODUCTION JUNE 1966 - MARCH 1968 
Quarter ending 
Target Actual as Target Actallets 
tonnage target f.oz. 
September 1966 15,000 94.6 7,125 105.2 
December 15,000 85.2 7,125 70.7 
March 1967 15,000 65.3 7,125 62.5 
July 15,000 77.2 7,125 69.3 
September 15,000 92.8 7,500 83.5 
December 15,000 82.7 7,500 62 






as % target 
Revenue as 
°/, target 
9.5 10.56 99 105.2 
9.5 7.88 98.8 70.7 
9.5 9.10 88.3 66.1 
9.5 8.53 101 72.9 
10.0 9.00 88.4 83.5 
10.0 7.50 113.3 62.0 
10.0 8.57 110.8 53.3 
Source: S.G.M.C. 
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This period coincided with a low market price for timber, and so extra 
trucks were available on Ghana Railways to ship the ore from Konongo 
to Tarkwa. However, subsequently, there was a shortage of trucks, and 
Konongo's ore had to compete with timber and cocoa for the allocation 
of space. And so, while the projected figure of 15,000 tons of ore 
was virtually achieved at the mine, the ore did not reach the mill at 
Tarkwa at the same rate; the ore had to be stockpiled on the surface to 
await shipment. The availability of trucks on Ghana Railways was, 
therefore, the determining factor in Konongo's performance. The fact 
that the final recovery grade was less than estimated in all quarters 
but the first can be attributed to another factor; dilution of the ore 
through percolation. The fact that the ore is left in the open awaiting 
shipment, is exposed during transit to Tarkwa, and sits in open trucks 
at Tarkwa to await unloading means that some of the gold is lost since 
it is 'free' in the parent ore. 
At the Konongo mine, therefore, the shortage of stores was 
less significant in explaining the disparity between its performance 
and the targets set. By the time Konongo had reached the producing 
stage, the shortage of stores was becoming less acute than it had been 
earlier. The main constraints on its output were the relative availabi- 
lity of truck- space, the frequent delays on the railway from landslides 
and flooding of the track during the wet season, and the bad state of 
repair of the locomotives which led to breakdowns and further delays in 
the shipment of the ore. In March 1968, an additional five trucks were 
made available for the Konongo ore, which brought the total complement 
up to fifteen. Nevertheless, the stockpile of ore at the mine was some 
2500 tons at June 1968. 
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(v) Dunkwa Goldfields 
Like its sister companies, the dredging subsidiary of the 
State Gold Mining Corporation failed to meet its production targets, 
although the constraints on its output were of a different. character 
and more linked with the nature of dredging itself. All other things 
being equal, the planned throughput for the four dredges was between 
2,750,000 and 3,000,000 cubic yards per quarter. These targets were 
met in the range of 75jß -95 ¡:, and in only two of the quarters over the 
period under discussion was less than 8'L of target achieved; those 
coincided with the period of the most intense shortage of stores. 
However, the gold content of the gravel worked was found to be less than 
expected on the average and so Dunkwa's gold output was less than the 
quarterly estimates, and disproportionately low relative to the yardages 
treated (Fig.8.6a). At the same time, working costs remained high, 
and, in seven out of the eleven quarters, exceeded the budget estimates 
in the range 3 -2. By contrast, revenue was much lower than projected 
and it fell as low as 55% of the expected level in the quarter ending 
December 1967 (Fig.8.6b). 
Dunkwa goldfields was forced to work at sub -normal level 
throughout the period owing to the acute shortage of stores which 
hampered operations in all departments. Secondly, its poor performance 
can be attributed to the extreme variability of ground conditions. 
D1 encountered extremely shallow ground of low average value, and the 
running time of the dredge was reduced by the necessity to dig from 4 -6 
feet of bedrock to maintain flotation of the dredge. The extremes of 
high and low water in the Offin valley forced the shut -down of D1 and 
D2 for long periods; for some twenty -three days in the dry season early 
in 1966, and for a similar length of time during the excessive floods 
DUNKWA GOLDFIELDS 
PERCENT ACHIEVEMENT OF TARGET 
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experienced in the following wet season. It was virtually impossible 
to make up the lost dredging time from these interruptions, since the 
dredges have specified working speeds. The quarterly throughput of 
both D2 and D3 was adversely affected by the occurrence of gravels with 
an unusually high sand content,which tended to overload the equipment. 
D4, located in the Jimi valley, worked much richer ground, and its 
performance was consistently the best of the four dredges, but its 
working time was reduced from time to time owing to the necessity to 
circumvent natural obstacles in the valley floor. As a result of these 
variable physical conditions, none of the dredges was able to maintain 
full running hours throughout the period, and these unpredictable 
circumstances proved to be the major constraint on Dunkwa's production. 
The shortage of supplies, while important in reducing efficiency in 
all departments, was secondary in accounting for the failure to achieve 
the expected level of output. 
The Lack of Production Inputs : Summary 
The severe shortage of stores, spares and essential materials 
was a main cause of the decline in output in the public sector of the 
gold mining industry in Ghana in the 1960s, and was also responsible 
for the shortfall in output compared to target. Over the period July 
1965 to December 1967, the State mines produced some 691 :500 ounces of 
gold compared to target output of about 1,000,000 ounces. At the s 
time, working expenditure remained high throughout and on the average 
exceeded the budget estimates. The resultant losses were due, to 
circumstances largely beyond the control of the State Gold Mining 
Corporation. The scarcity of foreign exchange, the unsatisfactory 
supply organisation and the consequent interruption of the flow of 
production inputs stultified the entire production process. This 
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constraint was not unique to the State mines, but affected all other 
productive sectors of the publicly -owned enterprises in the country, 
and particularly those which depended to a high degree on imported 
materials. In addition, there were local factors which contributed to 
the poor performance of the State mines in this period. At Tarkwa, the 
collapse of the labour control organisation aggravated the situation; at 
Konongo, regular shipment of the ore to Tarkwa proved a problem; 
Bibiani's ore reserves were gradually exhausted; and in the case of the 
dredging subsidiary, adverse physical conditions affected its output. 
These various factors, therefore, explain why the State Gold Mining 
Corporation was unable to maintain output at the pre- takeover level, 
but there was a second major source of constraint on production, the 
lack of adequate ore reserves, and this factor explains the magnitude 
of the decline in production in the post -takeover years. 
2. The Lack of Ore Reserves 
Closely related to the post- takeover decline in the volume 
of production of all the State mines was an acceleration of the fall in 
known ore reserves (Table 8.7). At takeover, none of the deep -level 
mines had available more than from one year to eighteen months supply 
of ore reserves. 
There is an intimate relationship between the level of proven 
ore reserves and the level of production achieved in any one year, 
since basically, the amount of available ore is the pivot on which the 
continued production depends. It is desirable that ore mined is replaced 
through development of new areas to ensure future operations. The ore, 
the raw material of any mining enterprise, is a 'wasting asset', in 
that once mined, it is lost forever. The continued existence of the 
mine depends on the discovery of new ore bodies to replace those depleted 
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TABT.FI 8.7 
ORE RESERVES : NUMBER OF YEARS AVAILABT,F, 
(SELECTO YEARS) 
1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 
Tarkwa 4.50 2.50 1.75 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.00 
Prestea 5.00 4.00 3.00 1.75 1.25 1.20 2.00 
Konongo 6.00 4.00 4.00 3.75 1.75 1.00 1.00 
Bibiani 5.50 4.00 2.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
(Source: S.G.IYI.C. ) 
by mining. It is generally accepted that ore should be proven for four 
to five years ahead of production provided that further geological 
evidence indicates that further amounts of payable ore can be developed; 
it is obviously not practicable to determine in advance the total amount 
of ore that is present in a mine. It is also recognised that any increase 
in unit working costs may tend to eliminate, as unpayable, substantial 
tonnages from the declared reserve. The crisis in the gold mining 
industry in 1961 was largely the result of the inability of the private 
companies to maintain an adequate supply of ore reserves ahead of 
production in the light of the ever -increasing costs of production and 
development. Despite increased investment in exploration and development 
undertaken by all the private companies in the late 1950s, the results 
were negative. The lack of new discoveries of potentially profitable 
ore bodies, and the pressure of rising costs, which eliminated large 
tonnages from the profitable category, were the main factors responsible 
for the crisis of 1961. 
The State's inheritance, in respect of ore reserves, was 
therefore poor. Although the State Gold Mining Corporation has been 
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unable to redress the balance, it has continued to search for new sources 
of ore. As a result, the State mines have been forced to adopt a 'hand 
to mouth' policy, and the lack of success in locating new ore bodies 
within the presently held concession areas has stimulated a great deal 
of pessimism about their future. In reference to Tarkwa and Prestea, 
for example, it was stated that, 
"There is an impression created by the management that these 
State mines are exhausted and at best the few years' proved 
reserves should be mined out to enable complete shutdown" 
(Cudjoe, 1963, p.39). 
While this may be somewhat exaggerated, there is no doubt that capital 
is urgently required for further exploration in light of the foreign 
exchange earning capacity of gold and consistent with the Government's 
objective in keeping the mines open, as the following analysis of the 
position with respect to ore reserves will show. It is suggested that 
this can best be done by examining in detail the situation at each mine, 
and, since the evaluation of ore reserves is a long -term problem in 
mining it is considered best to use the annual statistics covering the 
period 1956 -1967. 
(i) Tarkwa Goldfields 
The ore reserve position at Tarkwa has been in a critical state 
since the mid -1950s (Fig.8.7a). At no stage since 1955 has the recommen- 
ded four to five years' forward knowledge of proven ore been attained. 
From 1956 to 1960, in spite of measures taken by the management to add 
to the reserve by substantially increasing the development footage 
driven, from 17,325 feet in 1956 to twice that amount, at 35,771 feet, 
in 1960, no new ore was discovered by the private company and development 
expenditure was wasted (Fig.3.7b). During this period of 'barren' 
development, production had increased in an effort to minimise unit 
working costs. Consequently, by 1961, there remained less than eighteen 
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months' proven ore at the prevailing rate of extraction. The State 
took over the mine at a critical time, when its future prospects 
seemed limited by this factor. And so, the new management increased 
the rate of development in an attempt to find new ore, and this reached 
a peak in 1963, when some 47,000 feet were driven. This effort did 
result in a slight increase in the mine's ore reserves, from a declared 
figure of 558,808 tons in 1963 to 745,095 tons in 1964. From 1964, 
development was curtailed, and by 1966 the annual footage driven had 
dropped to some 20,000 feet. This was inevitably paralleled by a drop 
in the available ore reserves, since production, albeit at a lower level 
than earlier, ate into reserves which were not being simultaneously 
replaced. Consequently, by 1967, Tarkwa's ore reserves were again at 
a critically low level, with less than one year's supply of ore blocked 
out. A more detailed examination of this problem will show that the 
difficulties which faced the former owners not only persisted after 
takeover but were magnified owing to the lack of adequate funds for 
development at the scale required to solve Tarkwa's ore reserve problem. 
The immense difficulty in maintaining an adequate level of ore 
reserves on a high- tonnage, low -grade property in the face of cost 
inflation is well illustrated by the case of Tarkwa goldfields. Large - 
scale mining is imperative on a low -grade mine if economies are to be 
effected, and this inevitably imposes a strain on the ore reserves. 
Throughout its history, the old company, Amalgamated Banket Areas Ltd., 
experienced one overriding difficulty, that mining tended to outstrip 
the ore being added to reserve from development. By the mid- 1950s, much 
of the easily -won ore had been mined, and the geological indications 
were that the sections ahead could be reached only through zones of 
unpayable reef, or by driving long cross -cuts through the country rock. 
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This implied higher costs per foot drive; from 1950 -1955, costs had 
doubled, from an average of E5 10s per foot to £10 per foot. The 
company's capital reserves were simultaneously dwindling as profit 
margins were squeezed by ever -increasing production costs, and the stage 
was reached when the scale of development was dictated by monthly 
profits. This stage had been reached as early as 1954, and in the 
company's annual report for that year it was stated, 
"If the company were able to afford the extra expense, there 
would be no doubt that the policy would be to increase 
development." 
The difficult geological conditions of the Tarkwa banket, as described 
in Chapter 2, prevented the development of particular sections in the 
mine where ore was known to exist in large quantities, but which 
remained economically inaccessible, despite the advances in mining 
technology which permitted greater physical accessibility to the 
irregular structure of the banket. For reasons of cost, therefore, the 
company's exploration and development programme was limited, and in the 
company's annual report for 1955, it was said that, 
"The northern section of the mine is too badly faulted to be 
tackled at the present time, if ever. The southern section 
is limited by a dyke which runs between the Main and South 
shaft (sic. of the Fanti section) ". 
The Ghana Government's grant of £100,000 to the company for the two -year 
period, mid -1956 to mid -1958, enabled Amalgamated Banket Areas to 
intensify its development programme in these years, but the ore reserves 
did not increase to any marked extent. The concomitant increase in 
production, also permitted by the grant, ate into the ore replaced by 
development. Long -term planning for the mine's future was virtually 
impossible unless further financial assistance could be secured. The 
Government proved sympathetic, in light of the mine's importance in the 
Tarkwa region as an employer of labour, and it awarded the company an 
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interest -free loan of 450,000 to be spread over three years. Mean- 
while, an 'ad hoc' committee set up to consider the whole question of 
aid to marginal mines recommended that the mines had the capacity to 
continue on their own resources. As a result, the Government withheld 
further financial aid from Amalgamated Banket Areas from December 1960. 
This proved disastrous, and the Directorate announced in January 1961 
their intention to close down the outlying sections of the property 
with immediate effect. 
At takeover, there was barely sufficient ore for one year's 
production, and subsequently development has not reached the scale 
demanded by the low level of ore reserves, largely owing to the lack of 
surplus capital. In addition, the development programme had to be 
curtailed owing to the shortage of drilling equipment and other stores 
contingent with the general shortage of production inputs already 
described. Since 1961, therefore, the State Gold Mining Corporation 
has found it impossible to build up an adequate level of ore reserves, 
and hence the 'hand to mouth' basis on which operations have continued. 
The level of ore reserves and the level of production are therefore 
inextricably bound together, and the constraining influence of the 
shortage of production inputs affected both. These factors in combination 
therefore largely account for the poor performance of Tarkwa goldfields 
since takeover in 1961. A new incline shaft is presently being sunk to 
the north -east of the property, and it is hoped that large tonnages of 
ore can be brought into reserve from this hitherto inaccessible section 
of the mine. At the time that the field work for this study was under- 
taken, active consideration was being given to the possibility of 
de- watering the Taquah & Abosso mine, whose premature closure in 1956 
was described in Chapter 6. It will be recalled that when that mine 
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closed, there was ore to the value of nearly g1 ,.000, 000, ready r moo., W :e 
out for mining. With these considerations in mind, Tar^?a goldfields 
may prove a better asset to the Corporation than it has to date. 
(ii) Prestea Goldfields 
Prestea's ore reserves have, like those of Tarkwa goldfields, 
steadily diminished from the mid -1950s (Fig.8.8a). In 1955, there Taa 
five years' supply of ore proven, but by the time of its takeove 
the Government, there was barely enough for two years of mining the 
prevailing rate of extraction. From 1956 to 1964, except for a slight 
improvement in the declared reserves in 1957, there has been a coLtinu- 
ous decline, in spite of efforts to arrest it by increasing the scale of 
development; from 1956 to 1960, the private owners increased the 
development footage driven three -fold in an effort to maintain the 
position as of 1955, but few positive finds were made (Fig.8.Sb). At 
the same time, the scale of mining had been stepped up to offset 
increases in working costs, and these extra tonnages were mined from 
reserve without replacement. One official of the Prestea company 
suggested that the poor inheritance of the State in respect of Prestea's 
ore reserves was largely the fault of the departing company, which `had 
'starved' the mine of development capital on the scale required since 
Prestea is a large- tonnage proposition. Nevertheless, Prestea's future 
was the most assured of all the State mines at takeover. Ore has been 
added to the reserve since 1961, but not at a sufficiently high rate to 
maintain the inherited two -year margin, which had dropped to about 
eighteen months by 1966. However, by the end of 1968, available ore 
reserves at Prestea were declared to be nearly 1,500,000 tons at 6.44 
dwts per ton; this would extend the life of the mine by nearly four 
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The development programme outlined by the State Gold Mining 
Corporation for its Prestea subsidiary was considerably delayed in the 
mid -1960s by the non -delivery of drilling equipment, such that by 
September 1965, an eighteen -month backlog of development work had 
accumulated. The major blocks of richer gold- bearing reef occur below 
30 level (approximately 4,500 feet below the surface). To reach these 
lenses, the former company had sunk two internal shafts, and these had 
reached 35 level by 1961. The Corporation's diamond drilling team has 
subsequently undertaken extensive surface prospecting to ascertain the 
extension of the reefs. And so, apart from the shortage of supplies 
which inevitably hindered development work, the main constraint on 
improving the level of ore reserves has been a geological one; the 
occurrence of vast zones of impoverishment within the reefs, which 
implies a considerable capital expenditure on 'barren' development to 
reach the richer lenses. This is a typical feature of the quartz mines 
in. general. 
(iii) Bibiani Goldfields 
The same pattern of declining ore reserves from the mid -1950s 
applies to Bibiani (Fig.8.9a). In 1956, there was sufficient ore for at 
least another five or six years' production. From that year, however, 
a drastic reduction in the level of available ore was experienced; from 
nearly 1,500,000 tons in 1956 to just over 250,000 tons in 1960. The 
rate of decline in the declared ore reserve position was in fact much 
higher than the rate of increase in production over the four -year period. 
The explanation of this steep drop in Bibiani's case is that substantial 
tonnages of low value ore were effectively eliminated from the payable 
category under the prevailing cost conditions. In an attempt to counter- 
act these losses, a search for new and richer ore bodies was undertaken 
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8500 feet in 1956 to nearly 18,000 feet in 1959. But no positive results 
were obtained, except for a slight increase in 1960 -61 (Fig.8.9b). 
Bibiani's future was delicately balanced by takeover since barely one 
year's supply of ore was available. No new ore bodies had been located 
by 1965, when all development ceased. A policy of gradual closure was 
adopted, and all the remaining pockets of ore were to be mined out. 
By the second half of 1967, there were a mere twelve blocks of ore left 
in the mine, the distribution of which is shown in Table 8.8. 
TABLE 8.8 
ORE RESERVES AT 1 JULY 1967 : BIBIANI MINE 






Level 3 2 7,060 4.16 1,225 
4 4 29,330 3.90 4,575 
5 1 5,010 4.25 852 
6 1 1,800 3.80 273 
7 3 9,860 4.17 1,647 
12 1 2,750 3.85 423 
Source: S.G.M.C. 
The problem of depletion of ore, a mine's only real asset, is 
well illustrated by Bibiani's case. Until the middle of the last decade, 
the former owners had succeeded in maintaining ore reserves at least 
five years ahead of production, but long -term planning became increasingly 
more difficult throughout the late 1950s as the search for the downward 
extension of the two main reefs, the South Ore Body and the Main Ore 
Body, became more costly and less productive owing to the narrowing of 
the reefs in depth and a concomitant decrease in gold content. The few 
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new discoveries of pockets of ore located below 12 level were found to 
be of insufficient size or value to offset the expansion in production 
which became necessary after 1956. In addition, rising costs made large 
tonnages of ore uneconomic, and with gradually dwindling profits, 
development was forcibly limited. The Ghana Government refused financial 
assistance which the company had requested to permit an intesification 
of exploration and prospecting to improve its ore reserves, and as a 
result the company was forced to announce its intention to put the mine 
on a care and maintenance basis. 
The Ghana Government bought the Bibiani mine at a time when 
it seemed to be near the end of its life, but it was anxious to forestall 
closure for social and economic reasons, and a further exploration 
programme was initiated. Hitherto, the old company had concentrated 
all development within the mine itself, but since the zone of minerali- 
sation was known to extend northwards, the Government authorised 
exploration in that direction. Meanwhile the mine was kept open by 
mining ore of very low grade, and certainly much lower grade ore than 
the departing company could have afforded to mine; Bibiani therefore 
remained open for seven years longer than anticipated at 1960. But, 
during this period up to 1965 no new ore had been proven, and it was 
realised that, 
... we now have to face the rundown and final closure of this 
area" (S.G.M.C.). 
The cost of keeping Bibiani open has been excessively high, and more 
so since the State Gold Mining Corporation does not have a reserve of 
working capital. It was therefore concluded in August 1968 that, 
" ...geological prospecting and exploratory diamond drilling 
undertaken over a considerable number of years by Bibiani (1927) 
Ltd., the Geological Survey Dept, and the State Gold Mining 
Corporation have discovered no potentially economic ore bodies, 
either in size or grade of ore, upon which development operations 
could have been concentrated to offset the depletion" (S.G.M.C.). 
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However, a subsequent survey contradicted these conclusions, and a 
possible extension to the life of the mine was recommended on the basis 
of fresh evidence unearthed from the records at the mine. These records 
indicated that an oe-body with an average grade of 18.6 dwts per ton 
had been located in the upper levels of the mine in April 1965, and it 
appeared that this had not been w:rked. The report also expressed the 
view that the results of the surface drilling programme of the 
Geological Survey should not be regarded as conclusive since, 
... it is highly probable that the angles for drilling were not 
correct. This would mean that the reef was completely missed. 
The average dip of the reef is between 48 degrees and 55 degrees 
and the drilling angle of 53 -65 degrees would probably deflect 
from the reef or barely scratch the surface of it" (S.G.M.C.). 
In the light of this new evidence the Government gave the mine a grant 
of £50,000 to prove or disprove the extension of the reef. Meanwhile, 
since all active mining ceased in September 1968, the mine has been on 
a care and maintenance basis pending the results of these new investiga- 
tions. 
The drastic decline in output at Bibiani since takeover has 
therefore been directly related to the depletion of ore reserves, and 
the lack of production inputs merely delayed the final cessation of 
active mining by some months. 
(iv) Konongo Goldfields 
The situation in respect of ore reserves at Konongo was 
similar to that described for the other State mines in that a decline 
was continuous from the mid -1950s (Fig.8.10a). A steady fall in the 
level of ore reserves of some 7000 tons per annum occurred from 1956 
to 1961, and although the former owners tried to halt this decline by 
increasing the scale of development from 3046 feet driven in 1956 to 8287 
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reserves fell at a much steeper rate, by some 40,000 tons per annum, or 
nearly six times the rate of decline of the previous five years. By 
1964, development had fallen to about half its peak level over the 
period under discussion, while at the same time the increased rate of 
extraction begun in the 1950s continued until the mine was bought by 
the Government in 1965. By that stage, there was only 33,000 tons in 
reserve, which was sufficient for only six months of mining. 
As the depth of mining increased, it was found that the strike - 
length of the ore -bodies decreased and pinched out to narrow stringers. 
This narrowing of the reefs meant higher mining costs and a concomitant 
reduction in the gold produced. To offset the increasing costs of 
mining, two paths were open to the company, to increase either the 
productive capacity of the mill or the pay limit of the ore to be mined. 
The latter alternative was chosen on the grounds that the ore reserves 
did not justify increasing the mill capacity, nor did future prospects 
indicate that ore reserves would ever attain a level to justify the 
increased capacity. Thus, a policy of 'selective' mining was adopted; 
only the high -grade blocks of ore were mined, leaving intact substantial 
tonnages of low value ore. The pay limit, or the 'cut -off' grade was 
raised in 1961 from 4.5 dwts to 7.5 dwts per ton. This explains the 
stark drop in the declared ore reserves between 1960 and 1961, from 
155,000 tons to 93,000 tons respectively. These circumstances illustrate 
one axiom of mining economics that, the LEVEL of working costs determines 
the VALUE of the ore that can be treated at a profit; physical accessi- 
bility does not necessarily imply economic accessibility. 
The policy of selective mining shortened the life of the mine, 
and its available ore reserves therefore fell at a faster rate than 
would have occurred by normal 'mass' mining procedure. The private 
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company, fully aware of this limitation, approached the Ghana Govern- 
ment in 1963 to purchase its assets, and, in the two years of negotiations 
which followed, the company carried on the bare minimum of development 
work. At the same time, production was maintained at a high level, and 
the company virtually 'picked out the eyes' of the mine, and the cut -off 
grade had reached 10.8 dwts per ton. At takeover in 1965, there was 
only 935 tons of ore blocked out for immediate mining, although known 
ore reserves were somewhat higher. Nevertheless, the State's inheri- 
tance was critically poor, and it was virtually impossible to carry on, 
and so all active mining was stopped in June 1965 while an examination 
of the property was undertaken. The staff recalculated the available 
ore reserves to be some 125,000 tons at an average sampled grade of 
9.5 dwts to the ton (Table 8.9). 
TABLE 8.9 
ORE RESERVES AT KONONGO 
CALCULATED AS CF JULY 1966 





Ore in accessible 
blocks 78,380 8.2 65 32,310 
Ore in blocks not 
immediately 
accessible 105,810 8.2 58 43,300 
Ore in pillars 15,810 16.2 58 12,820 
Surface stockpile 3,400 20.0 - 3,400 
Source: S.G.NI.C. 
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The mine was reopened in July 1966, but the ore was sent to 
the mill at Tarkwa to be treated, until such time as a level of ore 
reserves could be built up to justify reopening the mill. The develop- 
ment programme undertaken by the State Gold Mining Corporation has been 
confined to exploration of possible extensions of blocks in the upper 
level of the Boabedroo and Zongo sections of the mine. Simultaneously, 
surface prospecting has been carried out to the north -east of the 
property to ascertain the extension of the Gibson reef after favourable 
borehole indications were obtained from this area; some of the cores 
assayed over 150 dwts to the ton over 28 inches of reef. During 1968, 
considerable sums were also spent in putting out long drives and cross- 
cuts from 2 level Zongo to reach the intersection of the reef as 
defined by the borehole records. 
Konongo's low level of production since it became part of the 
State group of mines in 1965 is therefore directly related to the low 
level of ore reserves inherited at takeover, and the lack of production 
inputs had only a marginal effect on the mine's capacity to produce. 
(v) Dunkwa Goldfields 
Ore reserve availability is a markedly different question in 
a dredging operation, since it is possible to evaluate both the amount 
and value of the total ground to be dredged at the onset. The working 
life of a dredging operation can therefore be fairly accurately defined, 
all other things being equal. It is hardly surprising therefore that 
the available yardage of gravel showed a continuous decline over the 
period under discussion. The former company were forced to transfer 
the dredges to new dredging grounds in the 1950s since they had reached 
the end of their concessions in the Ancobra valley. When the State 
bought the dredging company's assets in 1961, there remained sufficient 
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ore for about ten years continued operation. Currently, there is some 
concern for the future of the dredging subsidiary as a four -dredge 
operation since all are reaching the limits of the presently -held 
concessions. In the quarterly report for the period ending Mar2h 1968, 
the life expectancies of the dredges were given as four years for D1 
and D2, 1.8 years for D3 and 2.9 years for D4. Negotiations were then 
taking place to acquire an extension of the areas leased in the upper 
Offin valley, and prospecting was being done ahead of D4 in the Jimi 
valley. In the case of Dunkwa goldfields, the level of ore reserves 
has had little direct influence on its reduced output since takeover. 
The only aspect of ore reserves which did bear on its performance was 
the frequent occurrence of low -value patches of ground. 
The Lack of Ore Reserves : Summary 
It has been shown that the persistently low level of ore 
reserves on the State mines was a major constraint on production since 
1961. None of the deep -level subsidiaries were able to accumulate 
adequate reserves Eo maintain production at the pre -takeover level. The 
particular circumstances accounting for this situation varied from mine 
to mine according to geological, economic and other factors. In the 
immediate pre - takeover years, the private companies were unable to 
arrest the decline in their ore reserves largely as the result of 
increasing working costs and dwindling profits which limited the scale 
of exploratory and development work which could be undertaken. After 
takeover, the decline in ore reserves intensified owing to the shortage 
of production inputs and the lack of a reserve of working capital with 
which to finance the large -scale development that was required. A 
circular pattern of cumulative causation resulted in diminishing returns; 
ore reserves remained low owing to the lack of production inputs and 
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surplus capital; production targets could not be net owing to the low 
level of available ore reserves. This vicious circle of inter- related 
events led to the downward trend in production experienced by the public 
sector of the gold mining industry in Ghana in the 1960s. The significance 
of these factors in affecting output is made even clearer when the 
performance of the State mines is contrasted with that of the private 
sector over the same period. 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
It has been shown that the output of the State Gold Mining 
Corporation in the 1960s could not be maintained at the level achieved 
in the years before takeover. By contrast, output in the private sector 
has continued to rise (Fig.8.11). Between 1958 and 1967, in common 
with all the other gold mining companies, Ashanti Goldfields Corporation 
increased its scale of operations in response to rising working costs. 
Thus, the tonnage of ore treated in the mill rose by some 50' over the 
period, and gold output increased accordingly from some 282,000 ounces 
in 1958 to some 475,000 ounces in 1967. What is particularly significant 
is that the final recovery grade, or the yield per ton, never fell below 
17 dwts and rose as high as 21.68 dwts in 1964. These figures tend to 
carry their own commentary. 
In essence, the ability of the Ashanti mine to attain an 
ever -increasing scale of production rested on two main factors, the 
strong financial balance of the company and its continuing high level 
of ore reserves of very high value ore. At September 1960, the ore 
reserves were declared at some 2,500,000 tons yielding 16.39 dwts per 
ton, and by September 1965, ore reserves had risen to some 3,290,000 













































































































































































































































































































































company has been able to increase development from some 43,000 feet in 
1958 to over 61,000 feet in 1967 with positive results so that the 
Ashanti company has never had any difficulty in maintaining ore 
reserves at least five years ahead of production. Although working 
costs had risen by some 75:, over the period, economies have been 
achieved through a continuous rise in the scale of production and by a 
concomitant rise in the grade of ore mined. While the downward spiral 
of production on the State mines can be explained by a circular and 
cumulative chain of negative forces, the upward spiral of production 
of the private sector can be attributed to a circular and cumulative 
chain of positive forces. A comparison of the performance of the two 
sectors in the 1960s can be likened to a comparison of the process of 
economic development between an underdeveloped and developed country, 
according to Gunnar Myrdal's thesis of circular and cumulative causation 
(Myrdal, 1957). One can say by analogy that the Ashanti mine is rich 
because it is rich, and the State mines are poor because they are poor. 
Ashanti Goldfields is rich as the State Gold Mining Corporation is poor 
on two counts, grade and volume of ore reserves, and capital funds. 
Profits can be achieved by the Ashanti company by mining ore as low as 
8 dwts per ton, whereas none of the State mines has ore yielding anything 
near 8 dwts, with the possible exception of Konongo. Equally, the 
State mines have never had a reserve of working capital with which to 
finance development. At the time of takeover, the Government did not 
provide the State Gold Mining Corporation with an initial capital fund; 
it was merely left to pay its way out of revenue from the sales of gold. 
This was a short -sighted policy especially in the light of the poor 
inheritance of the State in respect of ore reserves. In addition to 
the purchase price, a special development fund should have been 
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established. The shortage of production inputs merely aggravated the 
situation, and meant that the State mines were unable to maintain the 
level of production achieved by the former private companies. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the output of the gold mining industry has contracted 
during the 1960s, Ghana still retains its position as the sixth largest 
producer of gold in the free world. Equally in local terms, gold still 
has a high internal and external value in the economy; value added in 
1967 increased by about 20¡% bringing the mining sector's contribution 
to Gross Domestic Product to 3%; and gold exports, valued at some 
£9,000,000, made it the third largest earner of foreign exchange, after 
cocoa and timber. Production figures for 1968 indicate that the 
industry is recovering to some extent from the adverse conditions 
experienced in the mid- 1960s. Supplies began to flow with more 
regularity towards the end of 1968, and the Government voted a £3,500,000 
Development Fund to the State Gold Mining Corporation for the fiscal 
years 1966 -67 to 1968 -69. Thirdly, the establishment of the two -tier 
system of gold prices under which gold can fetch a higher price than 
35 US dollars per ounce, and the devaluation of the local currency, 
helped the Ashanti mine to proceed with its development programme at 
a higher rate of investment, and assisted the State Gold Mining Corpora- 
tion to redress some of the losses sustained in previous years. 
The Government's takeover of the marginal mines in 1961 
prevented the sudden loss of revenue of several millions of pounds, and, 
with Government support, the State mines have contributed to the country's 
foreign exchange earnings. There is an ever -retreating line between the 
profitable and sub -marginal ores that can be mined under the inflationary 
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economy that has obtained since the second world war. Under these 
conditions, the gold mining industry is barely able to survive without 
government support. In Ghana, the State chose to buy its marginal mines 
as the most suitable measure of the times, times characterised by a 
drive towards economic independence, and it is in these terms that the 
Government's takeover of the marginal mines should be understood. It 
was hoped that output and employment could be maintained in support 
of the long -established mining communities. Output has been maintained, 
albeit at a lower level than was anticipated. In Chapter 9, the extent 




CHARACTERISTICS OF TIE LABOUR FORCE IN GOLD MINING 
INTRODUCTION 
It was shown in Chapter 8 that output in the gold mining 
industry in Ghana has declined in recent years and particularly since 
the early 1960s owing to unfavourable circumstances largely outside 
the control of the industry itself. The analysis also revealed an 
element of contradiction in Government policy as it affected the ability 
of the public sector of the industry- to maintain output. On the one 
hand, the Government's direct participation in gold mining was based on 
the requirement of maintaining output of gold as a means of earning 
foreign exchange. On the other hand, the restrictions which the Govern- 
ment imposed on foreign exchange spending severely curtailed the 
productive capacity of the industry since it was unable to import the 
necessary production inputs. The takeover of the marginal gold mines 
was also based on social grounds, however, and it is the purpose of this 
chapter to describe and analyse the trends in employment in the industry 
over the period 1956 -1967 to assess the performance of labour as a 
factor of production, to investigate the structure of the labour force 
and to define some of its characteristics as they are relevant to 
production. 
Throughout the history of commercial gold mining in Ghana, 
the mines have been one of the main sources of employment on a large 
scale. The crisis in the industry in January 1961, when two of the 
largest mines threatened to close down, would have led to large -scale 
unemployment in these mining districts had the closures taken place. 
The Government's purchase of these two mines and three of the other 
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marginal properties averted the crisis, and assured not only continued 
employment to the mines' labour force but also the continued prosperity 
of the communities which have grown around the mining nuclei. Indeed, 
it was this social objective that was emphasised at the time of takeover. 
At local level, the mines attract population, both those 
seeking wage - earning employment on the mines and those who seek to 
benefit from the market potential offered by the geographical concentra- 
tion of spending power in and around the mining towns. The mines' 
labour force provides a permanent market for goods and services compared 
to the seasonal nature of the market in the cocoa -growing districts. 
In 1961, the five mines involved in the takeover had a combined labour 
force of some 17,000 -18,000, and the mining towns which have grown 
around the mines supported a combined population of some 46,800, and 
63,100 including Konongo which was added to the State group in 1965 
(Census, 1960, Special Report 'A'). 
At regional level, the mining industry absorbs a high 
proportion of wage - earning labour. For example, in the Western Region, 
where four of the five State mines are located, one -quarter of the 
industrial labour force was engaged in the mining industry in 1960 
(1963 Statistical Yearbook). The Western Region is sparsely populated 
and the mining areas stand out as islands of higher density. Employ- 
ment opportunities are limited to the industrial sector, with unemploy- 
ment in the Western Region the highest of all regions for the year 1960, 
when a monthly average of 3,450 people were registered as unemployed. 
The closure of the marginal gold mines would therefore have added to 
the already high unemployment in that region. 
In the national context, the mining industry has traditionally 
been one of the main foci of employment in the labour market, although 
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in the past two decades, its proportion of the total wage- earning labour 
force has declined relative to other employment (Tables 9.1 and 9.2). 
It should be noted that employment in the industrial sectors of the 
economy absorbs only some 25% of the total national labour force; over 
60;:, are still employed in agriculture. The rate of decline in the 
mining sector's share of the total labour force must be read in light 
of both the increasing accuracy of the data and the increasing number 
of reporting establishments. The contraction of the mining industry 
and the parallel growth of other labour- intensive industries are 
secondary factors. In 1960, the mining industry employed some 8.7% of 
the national labour force, and the mines involved in the takeover 
employed 4f. The national unemployment rate for that year was recorded 
at a conservative 25%, and so the additional burden of several thousand 
more unemployed would have aggravated an already unmanageable scale of 
unemployment. The social implications of the takeover of the marginal 
mines in January 1961 can therefore be readily understood in terms of 
their importance in the labour market at local, regional and national 
levels. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE LABOUR FORCE 
1. Africans Employed 
The most notable trend over the period 1956 -1967 has been the 
secular decline in the numbers employed in the gold mining industry 
(Fig.9.1); this has followed the contraction in output. In the late 
1950s, employment rose marginally in response to the increased scale of 
operations, from 15,388 employees in 1956 to 15,775 employees in 1960. 
But the adoption of mechanisation and labour - saving devices wherever 
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RECORDED NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES BY INDUSTRY : SELECTED YEARS 

































































DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES BY INDUSTRY : SELECTED YEARS 
1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 
(a) 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
(b) 14.7 17.2 1307 12.3 14.3 14.3 
(c) 12.0 9.8 8.1 7.9 6.8 7.4 
(d) 6.o 6.8 8.3 8.6 8.1 10.5 
(e) 17.1 18.8 18.8 15.5 18.6 13.2 
(f) 3.1 3.8 4.5 4.0 3.6 4.5 
(g) 11.6 10.3 10.0 10.4 8.2 8.3 
r) 9.5 8.5 9.5 8.7 7.7 8.0 
) 26.0 24.8 26.8 32.5 32.7 33.8 
Key to both tables: 
(a) All industries. 
(b) Agriculture, forestry and fishing. 
(c) MINING & QUARRYING. 
(d) Manufacturing. 
(e) Construction. 
f) Electricity, water and sanitation. 
(g) Commerce. 
ri) Transport, storage and communication. 
) Services. 
Source for both tables: Statistical Handbook 1967 
Economic Survey 1967. 
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TABLE 9.3 







Avera ge 5 excess 
Total U S 
Tarkwa 3800 4408 16 9 7 
Prestea 4500 4536 0.8 0.8 - 
Konongo 600 610 1.7 0.5 1.2 
Bibiani 996 1046 5 - 5 
U = Underground. S = Surface. 
in production. After 1960, the labour force on the State mines has 
declined by about 3000 to an annual average of some 11,800 employees in 
1967. The reduction in the numbers employed after takeover has not 
been entirely in step with the decline in output, however, since a 
considerable scale of 'latent' unemployment has been characteristic of 
the State mines labour force in the 1960s. On the basis of weekly 
labour returns for a sample 48 -week period, August 1967 -August 1968, it 
was found that for the four deep -level mines of the State group the target 
labour complements, designated in accordance with the target production 
levels, were exceeded in varying proportions by all the mines (Table 9.3). 
These statistics reveal that the highest rate of overemployment was at 
Tarkwa, where it was found that, over the 48 -week sample period, labour 
exceeded requirements by some 85,'L to 25. This is all the more significant 
in the light of the previously established trends in production at Tarkwa, 
which failed to achieve the target level of production in the same period. 
The degree of latent unemployment must, therefore, be even higher than 
these figures suggest. Apart from Bibiani, the other subsidiaries have 
contained the volume of excess labour within 2¡L. By sector, the higher 
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wastage of manpower is found underground on all the mines except at 
Bibiani, where the surface excess can be attributed to the large numbers 
working on the company's timber concession. Therefore, despite the 
reduction in the total numbers employed on the State mines, there still 
remains a considerable degree of over -manning in most sections relative 
to the output achieved. This situation can be understood largely in 
the light of the policy of maintaining full employment irrespective of 
the scale changes in production, as was explicitly stated by the then 
Mlanaging Director of the State Gold Mining Corporation in 1965, the 
nadir year for gold production, when he wrote, 
"In accordance with our policy of full employment, labour 
has not been laid off" (S.G.M.C.) 
Indeed, since 1961 there has been no large -scale retrenchment of labour 
even when the production targets were not being met, nor seemed likely 
to be met. This policy was clearly demonstrated at the Bibiani mine. 
Owing to the exhaustion of ore it became clear that closure was 
inevitable and from the middle of 1965, a gradual scaling down of 
operations came into effect. Little or no labour was dismissed; the 
redundant labour was merely redeployed to the other subsidiaries of the 
Corporation, the majority to Tarkwa. Between January 1966 and March 
1968, over 700 workers had been transferred from Bibiani; over half of 
these went to Tarkwa. It was considered that Tarkwa could most easily 
absorb the extra labour because of the size of its own labour force, but, 
in the light of the high degree of latent unemployment existing at 
Tarkwa, the logic of this seems doubtful. However, the transfer of 
these men from Bibiani demonstrates one of the main advantages of the 
amalgamation of the mines under one central administration, that the 
factors of production are readily mobilised between the subsidiaries as 
changing circumstances demand a change in the balance of factors at any 
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given time. The fact remains, nevertheless, that over -manning is 
characteristic of the State mines and contributes to the low level of 
productivity; this is discussed in a later section. In a developing 
country like Ghana, where employment opportunities are limited and 
unemployment rates high, it is generally regarded as commonplace to 
find that " ... 'disguised' unemployment pervades the whole economy 
in varying degrees" (Myint, 1965, p.89). 
2. Expatriates Employed 
Secondly, there has been a decline in the numbers of expatriates 
employed in the industry in recent years (Fig.9.2a). There was a steady 
drop in their numbers from 1956 to 1960, but after takeover the rate of 
reduction increased markedly; less than half the total of 521 expatriates 
employed in 1956 were found on the State mines by 1965, when the number 
had fallen to 158. The stark drop in the expatriate component of the 
labour force has produced a significant structural change in the ratio 
of African to European employees (Fig.9.2b). In 1956, there was one 
expatriate to every twenty -nine African employees, and by 1967, the 
ratio had changed to one expatriate to ninety -seven Africans. This 
trend can be attributed to two main factors: the increasing dissatisfac- 
tion of the expatriates with conditions in Ghana, and the increasing 
pace of Africanisation in the country. 
Dissatisfaction arose among the expatriate mining community 
partly as a result of the steep rise in the cost of living, combined 
with the sh=tage of consumer goods, which marked the immediate post - 
independence years in Ghana. Considerable inflationary pressure built 
up within the economy to 1965 and the national consumer price index 
rose by 37 points in one year alone from 1964 to 1965 (Economic Survey, 
1965, p.101). In addition, restrictions on the amount of salary that 
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could be repatriated became more severe; at present, a mere 10¡' of 
total salary can be repatriated although this applies only to the 
State mines. The conditions of service and the scales of remuneration 
are less attractive in the mining industry in Ghana than those obtain- 
ing in mining communities in other parts of the world. For example, 
it was stated by an official of the Corporation's dredging subsidiary 
that Dunkwa goldfields has lost no less than fourteen senior staff 
over the last eight years to the tin -fields of Malaya, where salaries 
are 2Z higher than in Ghana, and there are no restrictions on the 
proportion of salary that can be sent out of the country. All these 
negative factors produced a situation where resignations far outnumbered 
new recruitments of expatriate staff. At the time of the field 
investigation for this study, the Corporation had only one geologist 
in its employment, and he was a Russian- trained Ghanaian. In former 
years, each mine had a team of geologists. Since the world mining 
community is relatively small, the communication of conditions in 
different parts of the world appears to be relatively easy, and the 
State Gold Yining Corporation has found it increasingly difficult to 
attract expatriate staff in recent years. 
Secondly, rapid strides have been made in promoting Africans 
to junior and senior posts within the industry and particularly after 
takeover. In some cases, this has led to the over -extension of the 
capabilities of the promoted nationals. This fact was attested by the 
then Managing Director of the Corporation in a report of 1965 when, in 
the course of a general discussion of the serious shortage of qualified 
technical staff, he stated that several Africans had been promoted to 
higher posts, 
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" ... despite the fact that some of the African staff who have 
been promoted have not shown the qualities and drive required 
of them" (S.G.M.C.) 
According to the quarterly reports covering the period June 1965 to 
March. 1968, the number of Africans in senior and junior staff positions 
rose from 283 to 321 and from 744 to 1189 respectively. Every possible 
effort is being made to offer opportunities to Ghanaians to enter all. 
the various positions in the industry. Training courses are available 
at the Tarkwa School of Mines, inaugurated in 1960; higher degree 
courses are available in various related branches of mining at the 
University of Science and Technology in Kumasi; and Government scholar- 
ships for study abroad, at the Camborne School of Mines and elsewhere, 
are available. 
TIE GE OGRAPT -TT CAL ORIGIN OF LABOUR FORCE 
One of the most interesting and relevant aspects of the mines' 
labour force to the geographer is its origin. Very little detailed 
information has been collected on this subject, although there are 
many works dealing with more generalised aspects of migrant labour in 
Tropical Africa. Although economists traditionally treat labour as 
being rather immobile, this premise is not valid in many countries of 
the developing world, and particularly of West Africa, where labour 
displays a high degree of geographical mobility. Of Ghana, it has been 
noted that, 
"There cannot be many countries in the world in which migrant 
.labour is as important as it is in the Ghanaian economy" 
(Birmingham et al., 1966, p.131). 
The following discussion will show to what extent the mining industry's 
labour force is part of the stream of migrants entering into and moving 
within Ghana in search of wage -earning employment. Since this theme is 
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but part of the whole work, it has been necessary to select only a few 
aspects as they are relevant to an understanding of the performance of 
the gold mining industry. The analysis is based on the examination of 
all the labour record cards obtained at each mine, at various times 
during 1968. 
1. General Source Areas of Labour 
According to the 1960 Census, of the total of male employed 
migrants, 2.9% were attracted to the mining industry. Migrants are 
diffused through every sector of the economy; 63.8% in agriculture; 
a.V in manufacturing; 5.5`jó in construction; 0.9% in electricity, water 
and sanitation; 6.1% in commerce; in transport; and 7.9 in 
services. However, the traditional foci of migrants, agriculture and 
mining, are becoming secondary to the towns as destinations of migrant 
labour, as these statistics reveal. 
The labour force in the gold mining industry is largely drawn 
from within Ghana, apart from a few migrants from other West African 
countries, the largest group being from Nigeria. Over 90 of the mines' 
labour force is Ghanaian, although this figure includes migrants from 
Upper Volta. Since they form part of the north -south stream of migrants, 
it was considered justified to include this group (represented largely 
by the Moshie tribe, who inhabit the frontier region between Ghana and 
Upper Volta) with Ghanaians of northern origin (Table 9.4). The small 
number of migrants from other countries is derived from Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, and the Ivory Coast to the west, and from Cameroon, Nigeria, 
Dahomey and Togo to the east. The relative numbers from each of these 
countries decreases significantly with distance from source to mine. 
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TABT,F 9.4 
SOURCE AREAS OF LABOUR EMPLOYED ON THE STATE MINES: 





Tarkwa 46 42 10 100 
Prestea 61 33 6 100 
Bibiani 53 43 4 100 
Konongo 49 48 3 100 
Dunkwa 30 64 6 100 
Totals 94 6qß. 100 
The small fringe of international migrants apart, it is possible to 
reduce the complex mosaic of tribes working in the mining industry to 
two main groups, those from the north and those from the south. This 
division is based on the seven administrative regions of Ghana, the 
north comprising the Northern and Upper Regions, the south made up of 
the remaining five. This two -fold division corresponds to the broad 
geographical division of Ghana, valid from the point of view of physical 
or human geography (Dickson, 1968, p.686). This division has also 
practical implications in the distribution of work in the mining 
industry. 
2. Distribution of Labour by Source 
The most striking feature of the composition of the mines' 
labour force is the preponderance of northerners; more than half the 
labour drawn from within Ghana's borders is of northern origin. The 
relative proportions of northern and southern workers varies from mine 
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to mine, the highest northern component being found at Prestea, followed 
closely by Bibiani. At Tarkwa, there is a more even balance between the 
two ¿roues, and at Konongo, the ratio is near 1:1. It is only at Dunkwa 
that labour of southern origin outnumbers that from the north in the 
ratio 2:1. 
It is highly significant that the mines with the lowest 
proportion of labour from the south are those most isolated geographically 
from the main transport routes along which the southerners would travel 
in search of work (Map 9.1). It would appear that the compositional 
balance between the two groups at each mine bears a significant 
relationship to the location of each mine relative to the main inter- 
regional flows of migrants as they are determined by the transport 
network. Prestea's labour force has the lowest southern component, 
which comprises under one -third of the total labour force, whereas 
Tarkwa, only 18 miles to the south -east of Prestea, draws almost 45iß 
of its labour from the south. This difference in the balance of the 
two groups can be attributed to location. Tarkwa sits astride the main 
road and rail axis linking Takoradi with Kumasi, and to Accra by the 
central railway. Prestea, on the other hand, can only be reached by 
a tortuous bush track, and a small feeder rail line. Thus, Prestea's 
pull on the southern migrant is effectively less. This reasoning applies 
equally to Bibiani, whose southern component comprises only two- fifths 
of its total labour force. Bibiani is some 20 miles from the nearest 
railhead at Awaso, and is linked to Kumasi by 54 miles of feeder road. 
Thus, Bibiani's pull on the southern migrant is similarly weakened 
by its eccentric location in relation to the main lines of communication 
in the south. By contrast, Tarkwa and Konongo are located astride major 
















































































































































































































southern migrants. These facts suggest that their respective locations 
permit them to draw more easily on southern labour moving along the 
main transport axes. 
The effect of location in determining the extent of the 
mines' catchment area for labour can be demonstrated in more detail 
for Dunkwa goldfields, for which information relating to the origin 
of labour by administrative regions was made available. Dunkwa is the 
geographic centre of the fold- mining triangle, and is the most centrally 
placed in relation to the southern labour market Map 9.2). With some 
two -thirds of its labour force composed of southerners, it has by far 
the highest proportion of labour from this source of all the State mines. 
An official of the company stated in this context that prior to trans- 
ferring the headquarters of the dredging operation to Dunkwa, the southern 
component of the labour force was significantly less than it is today. 
The former headquarters was near Prestea, at Hiawa on the Ancobra river, 
and this is isolated relative to the main southern migration routes. 
The town of Dunkwa is situated on the Offin river, some 20 miles north- 
west of its confluence with the Prah river, midway along the main western 
road and rail axis which pass the town. It lies just within the Central 
Region, at its boundary with the Ashanti Region to the north, and is 
within 10 miles of the boundary of the Western Region to the south -west. 
Dunkwa is directly accessible from both the Western and Ashanti regions 
via the Takoradi -Kumasi route. Owing to this centrality, it is able to 
effectively tap the two -way flow of emigrants between these urban centres, 
as well as attracting a substantial number of workers from its own 
immediate region. With increasing distance from source to mine, and 
in the absence of direct access, the numbers reaching Dunkwa from other 
regions in the south drop off sharply. Thus, from the Eastern, Volta 
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and Brong -Ahafo regions came 59, 20 and 3 men respectively; this compares 
with the total number from the south of 843 men. 
By corollary, the effect of distance and the availability of 
direct transport links determine the detailed tribal composition of the 
mines' labour force. The most striking example of the influence of 
these factors can be demonstrated by singling out one tribe, the Ewes 
from the Volta region. Of the State mines, Konongo has the greatest 
proportion of Ewes, with 12¡ of its total labour force from this group, 
who form part of the east -west flow of migrants to Kumasi. The Ewes 
are poorly represented on the other mines, comprising less than 2°, of 
the total labour force of the four deep -level mines. None of these 
is as directly placed as Konongo to draw on this particular group of 
migrants. 
3. Dominant Tribes 
Notwithstanding the heterogeneous composition of the mines' 
labour force, several tribes can be singled out as dominating its 
structure (Table 9.5). It was pointed out earlier that the north provides 
over half the total labour employed in the gold mining industry. This 
is reflected in the detailed tribal division, with the Dagartis being 
the largest single tribe in the industry, comprising 18á of the total 
labour force of the State Gold Mining Corporation. On each mine, four 
main tribes comprise at least one -third of the total labour force. 
The Dagartis and the Frafras are numerically the strongest of the 
northern tribes represented; and of those from the south, the Fantis 
and Ashantis are the largest groups. Of course, the tribe native to 
each mining district supplies a core of local labour, but it is quite 
marked that migrants from outwith the immediate areas of each mine by 
far outnumber those derived from the local surrounding villages. One 
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TABLE 9.5 
DOMINANT TRIBES : BY l \NE 
NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGE TOTAL LABOUR FORCE 
TARKWA PRESTEA BIBIANI KONONGO 
Dagarti Dagarti Dagarti Ashanti 
929 793 150 106 
Fanti Fanti Ashanti Ewe 
555 292 137 88 
Frafra Was saw Frafra Dagarti 
231 152 90 71 
Wassaw Frafra Fanti Fanti 
223 146 86 46 
47% 30 34° 48 
TABLE 9.6 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR : BY SECTOR 
SURFACE UNDERGROUND 
North South North South 
Tarkwa 19 81¡ó 1007 ó 681 32¡á 1'cw 
Prestea 40 60 100 70 30 100 
Bibiani 47 53 100 70 30 100 
Konongo 40 60 100 60 40 10. 
Source for both tables: Labour record cards at each mine. 
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final noteworthy aspect of the tribal composition of the labour employed 
on the mines is that of the seventy tribes which meet there, two of the 
largest tribes in the south are barely represented. These are the 
Brongs and the Gas. The Brongs inhabit the area of maximum cocoa pro- 
duction and the Gas are the natives of the Accra area. It is suggested 
that the small numbers of each of these groups found in the mining 
industry can be attributed to the greater employment opportunities in 
their home areas, which minimises the need to migrate in search of 
employment. 
4. Distribution of Tribes by Sector 
The two -fold division of labour by source areas becomes more 
meaningful when it is related to the division of labour by sector. 
The surface occupations tend to be dominated by southerners and the 
underground jobs are largely carried out by northerners (Table 9.6). 
In the case of the small fringe of international migrants, there is no 
distinct preference shown for either sector, and so they have been 
omitted from the calculations. The relationship between source area 
and work sector is shown in greater detail on a tribal basis for Prestea 
goldfields (Fig.9.3). The eight dominant tribes were identified, and 
the proportion of each tribe working in a surface or underground job 
plotted. The diagram tends to carry its own commentary, and it serves 
to summarise in graphical form many of the foregoing points. 
5. Distribution of Tribes by Occupation 
Further definitive patterns emerge from a more detailed 
analysis of occupational preferences. The most striking characteristic 
is that labour of southern origin dominates the skilled occupations and 
shows a greater occupational spread whether in the surface or underground 
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sectors, whereas the northerner is essentially the true 'labourer' in 
both sectors (Table 9.7). This conclusive evidence of the relationship 
between the geographical source area of an employee and the type of 
work he adopts on the mines reflects very clearly the regional opportunity 
differential between the North and South of Ghana in terms of the level 
of education and the level of development. The relative opportunities 
offered through. these channels determine the level of skill a man can 
acquire in his home area. (sor the influence of education on the 
occupational structure of migrants in Ghana, see: Engtann, 1)69, pp.227- 
229 and Tables 10.17.2 x 10.17.3, p.229). The South has a much longer 
history of mass education and vocational training, fostered by the 
Basel Mission and the Colonial Administrators, who initiated artisan. 
and clerical training respectively. The development of the South, based 
on the many readily -exploited resources of the forest zone, pressed 
the advantage on the southerner in every way. The North has taken second 
place in all spheres of development (see: Dickson, 1968, pp.686 -696, for 
an elaboration of this theme). As a result of these historical factors, 
the northerner has remained economically backward and acquired few 
industrial skills from lack of opportunity. He is forced to migrate 
to the south for employment, but owing to his illiteracy and lack of 
manual skill, he is inevitably relegated to the role of 'labourer' on 
the mines. The occupational division in the mines' labour force 
between migrants from the south and north, into skilled and unskilled 
categories respectively, in fact follows closely the occupational 
distribution of these two groups in all other industries in Ghana 
(Birmingham et al., 1967, Vol.2, esp.Chapter 3). Three categories of 
work -type have been selected to illustrate this phenomenon in more 
detail as it occurs in the gold mining industry: these are clerks, 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































This type of work is almost exclusive to the southerner with 
only 7i of the clerical posts held by men of northern derivation. This 
marked division testifies to the high illiteracy rates still prevailing 
in the North of Ghana. The virtual exclusion of men from the north 
from this type of work is borne out even more clearly by the statistics 
relating to Junior Staff positions. At Bibiani, for example, of the 
total of sixty Junior Staff, only two men from the north had risen to 
these grades, forty -four were Ghanaians from the south, largely 
Ashantis, and the remaining fourteen were Nigerians. The more speciali- 
sed office jobs of draughting or tracing were similarly dominated by 
southerners; at Tarkwa the ratio was found to be 8:1. 
(ii) Artisans or tradesmen 
The northern migrant brings few manual skills with him to 
the mines. As a result, the tradesmen in the employment of the mines 
are almost exclusively southerners. The Mason is invariably a Fanti, 
the Carpenter either Fanti or Ahanta, the Electrician from Nigeria, 
Togo or from the Ewe tribe, and the Riggers appear to come solely from 
Liberia (Kroos). This southern domination of the skilled manual work 
pervades both surface and underground sectors. For example, at Bibiani, 
in the underground engineering section, the southerners outnumbered 
their northern countrymen in the ratio 8:1, and it is significant that 
those men from the north who have acquired these skills have service 
records with the mine of not less than thirteen years and one man had 
been at Bibiani for some nineteen years up to November 1968, the time 
of the survey. 
(iii) Unskilled Labourers 
By contrast, almost 7C;ß of the unskilled jobs are filled by 
northerners, whether in surface or underground jobs. These statistics 
speak for themselves. 
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TABLE 9.7 
























N 13 30 2291 
S 180 416 1189 
¡TOTALS 
S 
7% Tg, 68, 
93% 93% 32s 
N = Northerner. S = Southerner. 
Source: Labour record cards. 
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LABOUR AS A FACTOR OF PRODUCTION 
Having concentrated the discussion up to this point on the 
structure of the mines' labour force in quantitative terms, the 
qualitative aspects are clearly related, and perhaps more significant 
to the analysis of the contemporary performance of the gold mining 
industry in Ghana. The qualitative aspects involve a consideration of 
such factors as the stability of labour, the turnover and absenteeism 
rates that obtain and the productivity of labour; all of these elements 
bear on the efficiency of labour as a factor of production. Having 
established that the gold mines depend to a large degree on migrant 
labour to fulfil their requiprements, this raises the question of the 
extent to which the industry has been able to overcome the inherent 
disadvantages of reliance on this type of labour. Has the full sequence 
of "recruitment, advancement, maintenance and commitment" been achieved? 
It is suggested that three criteria can be used as indicators of stability 
or otherwise; the length of stay, turnover and absenteeism. 
T. Length of Stay 
In the context of migrant labour, there are two aspects to 
be considered as they affect the stability of the labour force: the 
permanent migrant and the temporary migrant. The permanent migrant 
is one who, once recruited, settles down in his place of employment, 
acquires a degree of proficiency, and accepts full entry into the wage - 
earning economy. The temporary migrant is one who stays a short time 
in the industrial economy before returning home with his earnings. 
The former provides the desired stability, the latter detracts from it. 
There is evidence to suggest that both types of migrant are 
found on the mines, where there is a small permanent core with a wide 
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fluid fringe of temporary migrants. Records relating to the length cf 
stay are not directly available, since each man takes his labour card 
with him on termination of employment. However, by using the oar-rent 
record cards, on which the date of engagement is recorded, it is =osaible 
to get some measure of the general trend; the results are tabulated on 
Table 9.8. No information of this kind was available at Duna or 
Konongo. 
TABIE 9.8 
DATE OF ENGAGEMENT OF LABOUR : SELECTED TIME INTERVALS 
pre -1940 1941 -50 1951 -60 1961 -65 1966 -68 
Tarkwa 4 110 470 1102 2302 
Prestea 3 78 537 772 1135 
Bibiani 9 92 376 429 25 
At the time of the survey (1968), between 4 and 60% of the employees 
had service records of two years and under; less than one -third had 
records of three to seven years of service, and the remainder had 
longer services of employment although the numbers diminish rapidly with 
the number of years. An almost insignificant core of workers had been 
engaged before 1950, giving them service records of some twenty years. 
It is pertinent to ask whether there is any significant difference 
between the northerners and southerners in respect of length of stay 
in the industry. A closer examination of the figures revealed that 
labour originating in the north tended to have shorter periods of 
service than its southern counterpart. For example, the Bibiani 
records showed that, although there was no significant difference 
between the length of stay of the two groups in the surface sector, 
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there was a marked difference in the underground workers' service 
periods of service; over half of the southerners in underground jobs 
had been engaged prior to 1961, whereas over two -thirds of the 
northerners had been engaged after 1961. Similarly, at Tarkwa, the 
new engagements made in the first nine months of 1968 represented some 
10j of the total labour complement at September 1968; of this 10¡;, 
8i:, were from the north and all were engaged in the underground sector. 
This pattern seemed typical throughout the industry and was corroborated 
by officials on the mines. From the available data, it therefore appears 
that the greater instability occurs in the underground sector, which 
is largely the domain of the northern migrant. More direct evidence of 
this instability can be gained from statistics relating to turnover, and 
it is clearly related to length of service. 
2. Labour Turnover 
It has frequently been alleged that high rates of labour 
turnover are characteristic of the labour situation in West Africa, 
as a direct result of the predominance of temporary migrants in the 
work -force (see particularly, I.L.O. African Labour Survey, 1958; 
Galenson, 1959). Some attribute the high turnover rates to the "low 
satisfaction level of labour ", in the sense that, once he has saved 
some predetermined sum of money, he returns home having fulfilled his 
objective, while others conclude that the high turnover is due to the 
sheer love of changing jobs (Seers -Ross Report, 1952). 
According to the information pertaining to the mining 
industry, it is apparent that, while high, labour turnover is not as 
high as is commonly supposed (Table 9.9). Some officials of the gold 
mining industry quoted figures of up to 200% for turnover, but the 
records did not bear out these verbal estimates. The average rate of 
annual turnover for 1967 was some 40jó. 
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TABLE 9.9 




Tarkwa 81% 43% 62% 
Prestea 5Z, 22% 39% 
Bibiani 50% 22% 36% 
Konongo 54% 18% 39% 
Dunkwa 18% 18% 
The statistics reveal that the highest rates of labour turnover are 
found in the underground sector, and in the light of the previously 
established fact that it is the northern migrant who dominates in this 
area, it would seem likely that it is this element in the labour force 
which is largely responsible for the higher number of unit changes 
underground. By using Spearman's Rank Correlation to test for any 
statistical relationship between turnover and the northern component 
in the labour force, a result of .9500 was obtained. This tends to 
suggest that there is a definite relationship between the two variables, 
and the high statistical correlation obtained could be assumed to 
confirm the general assertion that the migrant from the north comes 
south for only short periods of employment and returns home at the 
harvesting season in the north, when his labour is required in the 
fields. Being largely unskilled, the employee from the north is 
naturally more mobile, first of necessity and secondly, from his 
unawareness of conditions from one job to the next. An examination of 
the labour record cards revealed a very high tendency for the unskilled 
worker to change his job on the mine with remarkable frequency; there 
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were numerous cases of weekly transfers from one department to another, 
from surface to underground and back to surface. This has also been 
found to be typical of the building industry in Ghana (Seers -Ross 
Report, 1952, p.98). The current rates of turnover in the gold mining 
industry show a decided improvement over previous years. In 1948, the 
rate of turnover in the underground sector was estimated to be some 
90%, and in 1955 some mine managers estimated the turnover was as high 
as 150% per annum (1956 Board of Enquiry, p.36). Notwithstanding these 
recent improvements, an average of 40jß is still high, and there can be 
little doubt that the productivity of labour would show an improvement 
of a more stable labour force could be secured, with all the attendant 
advantages derived from a long term interest in the job, the reduced 
cost of initial training and the greater efficiency of cumulative 
experience. 
3. Absenteeism 
A third measure of the stability of the mines' labour force 
can be derived from a study of the rates of absenteeism. Absenteeism 
has also attracted considerable attention as a factor responsible for 
the general instability of labour in West Africa, but the allegations 
of high rates of absenteeism are rarely substantiated by factual evidence. 
In the Report of the Mines Board of Enquiry (1956) it was suggested that 
there were three possible causes of absenteeism in the mining industry: 
occasional farming, funerals, and sickness. 
From the available evidence for the gold mining industry, it 
appears that absenteeism is much lower than is commonly supposed 
(Table 9.10). It was possible to distinguish two elements of absenteeism. 
These are voluntary absenteeism (or the habit of not turning up to work 
for no apparent logical reason) and involuntary absenteeism (or those not 
at work for genuine reasons of illness or on leave with pay). 
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TABr,F 9.10 
PERCENTAGE ABSENTEEISM ON STATE MINES : 1967 -68 
Total 
Voluntary Involuntary not at work 
U S U S U S 
Ta-rkga 6.0 1.5 10.0 6.5 16 8 
Prestea 2.5 2.1 7.5 6.4 10 8.5 
Konongo 2.0 3.5 6.0 2.5 8 6 
Bibiani 1.4 1.6 6.6 8.4 8 10 
U = Underground. S = Surface. 
These figures show that voluntary absenteeism is fairly low and certainly 
much lower than involuntary absenteeism. The total rate of absenteeism 
is still less than 10% of the total book -strength of the labour force. 
On the larger mines, the trend seems to be that a higher number of man - 
days are lost through voluntary absenteeism in the underground sector, 
whereas on the smaller mines, as Bibiani and Konongo, the reverse is 
true. On the average, therefore, absenteeism is insignificant although 
in the earlier period much higher rates were recorded. For example, in 
the Report of the 1953 Mines Labour Enquiry Committee, it was indicated 
that the annual rate of absenteeism for the gold mining industry in 
1952 -53 was in the range of 3:;- 20.5;ó for the surface sector and from 3¡ 
to 29% for the underground sector. 
Of the three criteria chosen to measure instability, it appears 
that absenteeism is a relatively minor problem compared to the short 
service periods and the related high turnover in the labour force. It 
seems that over eighty years of commercial gold mining has done little 
to stabilise labour in the mining industry, despite the efforts of the 
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mining companies in that direction through the provision of housing, 
welfare, medical and recreational facilities on the mine camps. The 
dependence of the mines on migrant labour remains a fundamental fact, 
and the recruiting system does little to offset this basic problem. 
No formal recruiting procedure has yet evolved, and no formal contracts 
between employer and employee bind the employee to a predetermined 
length of service in the industry, such as is the case in the South 
African gold mining industry. Labour is engaged through the local 
labour exchange which advertises the vacancies in the mining industry 
as they arise. Once recruited, having passed through the security and 
medical procedures, a man is not bound to stay in the employment of the 
mine if he chooses to do otherwise. 
4. Labour Productivity 
Finally, the productivity of labour in the mining industry 
is clearly related to the foregoing factors. An examination of the 
labour force from the point of view of its productivity is perhaps the 
most important qualitative dimension by which to judge the performance 
of the gold mining industry inasmuch as labour is a factor of production. 
Of the national labour force, it has been said that Ghana's most serious 
manpower problem is "the widespread under- utilisation and low productivity 
of the labour force" (Survey of High -Level Manpower, 1961, p.15), and 
a comparison of labour productivity on Ghana's gold mines with that of 
similar mines in other parts of the world, suggests that the gold 
mining industry is no exception. For example, in 1955, it was found 
that labour productivity at Amalgamated Banket Areas was only two- thirds 
as high as at similar -sized mines, working the same type of deposit, 
at comparable depths, in South Africa, and only one -seventh as high as 
in the Australian gold mining industry. It is suggested that the best 
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way of assessing the current level of productivity is to analyse the 
trends in productivity in the industry over a wider timespan, covering 
the period 1956 to 1967; this will also allow a comparison of the 
situation pre - and post- takeover. 
As is demonstrated on Fig.9,4, two trends can be identified 
and these correspond to the pre - and post -takeover periods. From 1956 
to 1960, gradual increases in the labour productivity ratings were 
recorded, but after 1961 this trend was reversed, and labour productivity 
deteriorated. It will be recalled that a similar pattern was described 
for the production of the industry over the same period (Chapter 8). 
This raises two questions: What were the stimuli to the higher rates 
achieved in the late 1950s? and What were the constraints of the 1960s 
which influenced the reversal of the trend? It is suggestive that two 
inter -related variables, the relative scale of mining operations and 
the relative capital- intensities employed in each period, were largely 
responsible for the contrasted performance of the labour force in the 
pre- and post- takeover years. 
In considering the scale of mining operations, it seems that 
any increases in production were matched by similar increases in the 
productivity of the labour force, and in the extreme cases, the years 
in which peak production was attained were the years in which labour 
productivity ratings also reached a peak level; conversely, the nadir 
year for gold output corresponded to the year of lowest output per 
manyear. It would therefore appear that, all other things being equal, 
trends in output and output per manyear moved in harmony. Hence, the 
contraction of output of the State mines after 1961 can help to explain 
the deterioration in labour productivity, especially when combined with 






















































































































































































































































































































necessary for the scale of operations. Labour can maximise its potential 
productive value only when combined with other co- operant factors, not 
least of which is the supply and quality of capital aids or production 
inputs. It is therefore suggested that the difference in capital - 
intensity employed by the private companies and their successor, the 
State Gold Mining Corporation, in the administration of labour and in 
the utilisation of the total resource base, was a more important cause 
of the contrasting productivities achieved in the two periods. 
In addition to increasing the scale of operations in the 1950s 
in response to rising production costs, the private companies also 
attempted to achieve further economies by adopting measures to increase 
the productivity of labour. To this end, the mines of the Finsbury 
Pavement House group of mines (sic. those involved in the takeover 
with the exception of Bibiani (1927) Ltd.) brought in a team of 
Industrial Consultants to undertake a 'time and motion' study, with a 
view to establishing patterns of control, based on the principles of 
'scientific management'. This was the first time that these principles 
had been applied on so broad a front, and it was the first example of 
the application of highly sophisticated control patterns to what the 
Consultants called " ... primitive labour conditions as is found in 
West Africa" (Fraser and Somerset, 1958, pp.285 -348). This was a costly 
investment to the companies; an official of the industry estimated that 
it cost the companies some £10,000 per month over the seven -year survey 
period. The end -result was a series of Manuals of Standard Practice, 
one manual for every section of the whole mining operation. The 
Consultants also recommended that a Planning Department should be 
established. As the trends in productivity ratings show, outstanding 
improvements were achieved, mining methods and general organisational 
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procedures were streamlined and the productivity of labour rose as a 
result. Considering that these standards laid down in the Manuals were 
applicable regardless of the scale of operations, the question arises 
as to why the labour productivity fell at such a steep rate after 1961. 
It appears that many of the principles were abandoned with the change 
in administration. At Tarkwa goldfields, for example, according to 
all the interviewees, the Manuals of Standard Practice were abandoned 
for no explicable reason, and the labour control system dictated by 
the principles of scientific management was reintroduced only in the 
last quarter of 1968. At that stage, it was expected that it would be 
some months before the benefits of the re- established labour controls 
would show in the productivity ratings of Tarkwa goldfields. In light 
of the positive improvement in labour productivity achieved in the 
1950s by the application of these standards, it seems fairly certain 
that their removal in part or whole after 1961 partly explains the poor 
performance of the labour force in the gold mining industry in Ghana 
in the 1960s. 
In addition, a further stimulus to the level of output per 
manyear achieved in the late 1950s was the increased mechanisation in 
the gold mining industry in this period. A man's output is determined 
in no small measure by the tools at his disposal. Wherever possible, 
therefore, mechanisation was adopted, and this enhanced the productive 
value of the labour force; diesel and electrically- driven locomotives 
were introduced, and trucks and mechanical loaders replaced hand -tramming. 
Amalgamated Banket Areas Ltd., for example, installed new equipment to 
the value of £1,850,000 in an effort to increase the productivity of 
its work -force. Given this high level of mechanisation at takeover, the 
immobility of much of that equipment owing to the shortages of spares, 
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stores and other essential materials, explains the magnitude of the 
decline in labour productivity after 1961. 
Finally, there was one additional factor which contributed to 
the deterioration of productivity after takeover and this was the 
removal of the monthly bonuses to the shift -bosses. It was agreed by 
all the mine managers that this was one economy that was unjustified 
in that it had a marked adverse effect on output. The dilution of 
expert supervision owing to the decline in the expatriate staff numbers 
after 1961 and the concomitant promotion of nationals without the 
necessary experience or indeed authority over their fellow- countrymen, 
were secondary factors. Suggestions of nepotism, tribal favouritism 
and allegations of corruption in promoting nationals to higher posts 
were almost too frequent to be dismissed, but proved impossible to 
substantiate. 
As a corollary, it is notable that at any one time, vastly 
different levels of productivity obtain from mine to mine (Fig.9.5). 
Any comparative analysis of productivity is beset with difficulties 
since a wide range of factors must be considered; the grade of ore, the 
geological conditions which determine the method of mining that can be 
adopted and the extent of the development work required, the size of 
the mining operation and the efficiency of operations are all relevant 
factors. A comparison of labour productivity, as measured by tons per 
manyear and gold produced per manyear, gives, in fact, almost 
diametrically opposite rankings for the four deep -level State Mines 
(Table 9.11). 
These statistics reveal the inter -relationship between the 
grade of ore mined and the size of mining operations as they affect 





















































































































































































COMPARATIVE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITIES 





1961 1967 1961 1967 
Tarkwa 132 72 28 13 
Prestea 119 96 38 30 
Bibiani 129 71 26 11 
Konongo 77 79 41 34 
and the amount of development work required to reach the gold -bearing 
reef have a direct bearing on the numerical productivity ratings. For 
example, at Bibiani, where the reef is of considerable magnitude and 
the containing material is relatively friable, tonnages are more easily 
obtained with less effort than at Tarkwa, where the banket reef is as 
narrow as eight inches in places and the country rock is strong and hard. 
As a result, some 500 tons of ore would be blasted by one round of 30 
holes at Bibiani, whereas at Tarkwa, the same round of 30 holes would 
produce a mere 15 tons of ore. Similarly, there is a great difference 
in the amount of time that has to be spent in timbering the working 
places from mine to mine. In the quartz deposits, the timber supports 
have to be renewed annually, whereas the banket at Tarkwa is self - 
supporting. The number of hours a man spends at the working face also 
differs according to the time that is required to reach the face; at 
Tarkwa, a man spends an average of five hours in every 72 -hour shift 
at the face, compared to some six hours or over at Konongo. Finally, 
the general efficiency of operations, as reflected in the quality of 
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management and supervision of the labour force must affect its productivity. 
In this context, continuity of management is desirable, and it is note- 
worthy that Tarkwa goldfields, the mine with the poorest performance 
since takeover, had no less than fourteen different managers between 
1956 and 1968. It was also recognised that one of the main causes of 
the declining productivity at Tarkwa was due to the misapplication of 
available labour, the concern of the senior staff and the labour control 
organisations. The complex inter -relationship of all these factors as 
they bear on the productivity of labour, therefore, makes a comparative 
analysis of labour productivity between the mines of the State Gold 
Mining Corporation rather meaningless. The only definitive feature in 
this context is that, in each and every case, the productivity of 
labour improved in the years before takeover, and deteriorated there- 
after, the reasons for which have been outlined earlier. 
CONCLUSION 
It was stressed at takeover that the Government's prime 
objective was to maintain employment in these long- established mining 
communities. Since 1961, the State mines have employed an annual 
average of some 13,000 daily -rated workers, and disembursed over £14,000,000 
in wages (Table 9.12). The gold mining companies have always provided 
a wide variety of housing, welfare, medical and recreational facilities 
for the workers in an attempt to induce stability; the cost of the 
provision of these services to the State mines amounted to over £10,000,000 
between 1961 and 1967 (Table 9.13). None of the mines has yet 
sufficient accommodation to house all the workers (Table 9.14). 
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TABLE 9.12 
WAGES PAID TO DAILY -RATED LABOUR BY STATE MINES : 1961 -1967 




E E E E E E 
1961 732,894 631,602 408,562 142,261 - 1,915,`319 
1962 695,626 629,589 422,914 168,344 - 1,916,473 
1963 801,593 810,867 455,351 159,138 - 2,226,949 
1964 848,706 865,426 469,311 188,676 - 2,372,119 
1965 800,000 855,702 441,441 199,256 - 2,296,399 
1966 750,084 658,960 457,017 215,275 100,000 2,181,336 
1967 602,460 614,661 286,956 198,437 93,538 1,796,052 
Total State Mines 1961 -1967 £14,704,647 
* in private ownership until 1965. 
Source: Ghana Chamber of Mines, Annual returns of the member 
companies. 
TABLE 9.13 
COST OF SANITATION, HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SERVICES: 
STATE MINES, 1961 -1967 
Tarkwa Prestea Bibiani Dunkwa Konongo 
Total 
State Mines 
E E E E E E 
1961 39,869 45,638 21,529 11,784 - 118,820 
1962 44,241 56,487 22,738 14,773 - 138,239 
1963 45,297 37,261 23,548 13,887 - 120,993 
1964 55,494 28,090 28,529 18,393 - 130,506 
1965 60,000 60,631 23,451 18,007 - 162,089 
1966 66,394 64,580 24,100 19,460 16,941 191,475 
1967 49,402 51,400 23,000 15,000 16,000 154,802 
Source: As for Table 9.12. 
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TABLE 9.14 
HOUSING FOR EMPLOYEES OF STATE NINES: 







Tarkwa 2023 1984 4271 46/ 
Prestea 1348 1034 4528 23% 
Bibiani* 1731 1542 1411 100% 
Dunkwa 812 775 1155 24/ 
Konongo 249 155 649 29% 
* Bibiani's labour force had been cut by 50% after 1965. 
Because of the inadequacy of housing provided by the mining 
companies, the Central Government built housing estates in the mining 
areas to alleviate the rents charged to the miners in 
nearby villages, where miners paid from 35s to E2 per month for a room 
compared to the nominal monthly charge of between 2s 6d and 5s charged 
by the mines. Much of this investment would have been rendered immobile 
had the marginal mines closed, since thése mining towns could not offer 
employment on a comparable scale. In addition, plots of land are made 
available to any employee who wishes to take up permanent residence 
in the mining districts, but despite these measures, labour turnover 
remains high largely owing to the high proportion of temporary migrants 
in the labour force. 
In Ghana, where unemployment is one of the main political and 
economic problems, the implications of the sudden loss of thousands of 
jobs are obvious, but the problem should be kept in perspective, since 
it is only the semi -skilled and unskilled categories of labour that 
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TABLE 9.14 
HOUSING FOR EMPLOYEES OF STATE LINES: 







Tarkwa 2023 1984 4271 46% 
Prestea 1348 1034 4528 23% 
Bibiani* 1731 1542 1411 10% 
Dunkwa 812 775 1155 2410 
Konongo 249 155 649 29% 
* Bibiani's labour force had been cut by 50°jß after 1965. 
Because of the inadequacy of housing provided by the mining 
companies, the Central Government built housing estates in the mining 
areas to alleviate of high rents charged to the miners in 
nearby villages, where miners paid from 35s to £2 per month for a room 
compared to the nominal monthly charge of between 2s 6d and 5s charged 
by the mines. Much of this investment would have been rendered immobile 
had the marginal mines closed, since these mining towns could not offer 
employment on a comparable scale. In addition, plots of land are made 
available to any employee who wishes to take up permanent residence 
in the mining districts, but despite these measures, labour turnover 
remains high largely owing to the high proportion of temporary migrants 
in the labour force. 
In Ghana, where unemployment is one of the main political and 
economic problems, the implications of the sudden loss of thousands of 
jobs are obvious, but the problem should be kept in perspective, since 
it is only the semi- skilled and unskilled categories of labour that 
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would have faced unemployment over a long period. As T. Killick pointed 
out in this context, 
"Skilled craftsmen are in very short supply in the country, and 
as long as the skills learned in the mining were applicable to 
other forms of industrial activity there should not be much 
difficulty in finding new jobs for the 3500 workers in this 
category" (Birmingham et al., 1966, p.274). 
However, what Killick failed to take into account were the wider social 
implications of the closing of these mines. The mining towns supported 
a combined population of some 63,000 inhabitants in 1960, and they had 
grown at the expense of the smaller villages in the wider hinterlands 
of the mining areas. Rural depopulation resulted over a long period as 
people drifted to the mining towns to earn a livelihood from the market 
potential offered by the geographical concentration of spending power at 
these points. The mining towns today have acquired an urban character 
and offer a wide variety of services quite atypical of the other settle- 
ments in their respective regions. (For the influence of modern mining 
on the settlements in the mining areas of Ghana see: S.A.Darko, 1962). 
The phasing out of active mining operations at the Bibiani 
mine bears living witness to the social disruptions caused by closure. 
At the time of the field survey, the majority of the rooms in the 
housing compound were empty and in bad repair, since a large number of 
workers had by then (November 1969) been transferred to other subsidiaries, 
and the miners' village had a 'ghost town' appearance. The local 
population were extremely concerned about the imminent closure of the 
mine since the mine had been the 'lifeblood' of that area for so Jong. 
There were suggestions of trying to attract other labour- intensive 
industries into the area, such as a match factory based on the local 
timber resources, but owing to the geographical isolation of Bibiani, 
it is unlikely that any industry employing labour on the scale of the 
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Bibiani mine will be located there. There are sizeable bauxite deposits 
in the nearby Yenahin area, but it is doubtful whether the Corporation 
could finance their investigation, or whether the Government is likely 
to sanction such a project, particularly in the light of the more 
extensive bauxite deposits in the Kibbi area in the Eastern region, to 
the north of the Volta dam, which are currently being surveyed with a 
view to eventual exploitation. The future of the Bibiani area is as 
yet, therefore, unresolved. Another aspect of its closure that was 
causing concern was the possible closure of the mine's hospital at 
Bibiani. This serves an estimated population of some 22,000 inhabitants 
drawn from the wider hinterland. It is thus a social asset to the 
local region and not merely a mine service. This applies equally to 
the other mines which together account for some 6jó of the total hospital 
beds in the country, and in their local regions have a greater social 
significance than that figure suggests. It is, therefore, in these 
broader social terms that the implications of the Ghana Government's 
support of the gold mining industry can be understood. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE ECONOMICS OF GOLD MINING IN GHANA 
INTRODUCTION 
In the two preceding chapters, the contemporary performance 
of the gold mining industry in Ghana was discussed in the light of the 
Government's policy towards the marginal mines. It was shown that at 
takeover in 1961, two of the private gold mining companies were near 
collapse and the others involved in the takeover were fast approaching 
the point where operations would no longer be profitable. In these 
terms, the fall in their total yield which occurred after 1961 was to 
be expected, and only the State could face up to imminent losses to get 
the much needed revenue from gold and to ensure maximum employment in 
the mining districts. The rationale of keeping open marginal enterprises 
by public subsidy can, therefore, be understood in these terms. It is 
the purpose of this final chapter to investigate the extent to which 
the Government has had to subvent the mines of the State Gold Mining 
Corporation since 1961, and to assess the benefits fed back into the 
economy as a result of this support. But first, it is relevant to 
comment on the economic situation of the gold mining industry in the 
world context in order to put the economics of gold mining in Ghana 
into perspective. 
The world gold mining industry suffers peculiar economic 
problems which derive from the nature of the world market for its 
product. The extent of the market for any mineral is generally 
indicative of the economic condition of the industry in the producing 
country, but gold occupies a unique position in that demand for it never 
abates. The faith of centuries in the incomparable strength of gold as 
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a medium of international exchange has been maintained by virtue of its 
scarcity in economic concentrations and its high cost of production. 
Gold thus has an assured market, but the producer is at the great 
disadvantage that the price for his product is more or less static at 
the exchange price of 35 US dollars per ounce, fixed in 1934. This 
price is totally unrealistic in relation to current operating costs in 
most of the gold -producing countries. The fact that the United States 
Government is obliged, by legislation, to buy gold at this fixed rate 
provides a floor price for gold on the world market, and this price, 
less freight and other charges required to ship gold to New York, gives 
the 'shipping parity' price. If the price of gold falls on the other 
bullion markets below 35 US dollars per ounce (or its equivalent in 
other currencies), it pays the supplier to ship to New York. Under the 
International Monetary Fund Agreement, no member country party to the 
agreement can buy or sell gold outside the limits of 15 above or below 
parity. This has the effect of maintaining the price of gold per ounce 
at between 247s 6d and 252s 6d sterling equivalent. The price of gold 
is, therefore, highly institutionalised. Apart from the government 
buyers, a free market exists to serve the needs of industry and private 
buyers, but the price obtained in the free market rarely rises high 
enough to upset the official price. In March 1968, a 'two -tier' price 
system was introduced under which members of the gold pool decided that 
henceforth their holdings of gold would be available for monetary 
purposes only and that a free market would be permitted to operate. 
The free market price for gold reached a record level Of 44 US dollars 
per ounce in May 1969, but subsequently it has drifted down to the 
official price level. The slight improvement over the official price 
of gold since the introduction of the two -tier system has been of 
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particular advantage to the low -grade gold mines in that the increased 
revenue has enabled them to offset to some extent the endemic inflation 
in operating costs, but in the majority of cases, operating costs stand 
close to or above either the officially fixed price or the higher free 
market price df gold per ounce. It is estimated that half of the free 
world's gold is costing about 35 US dollars per ounce to produce. In 
North America, the cost of gold production averages between 30 and 34 
US dollars per ounce, but elsewhere it cannot be mined for much less 
than 35 US dollars per ounce. Even some of the South African mines are 
in the marginal category with operating costs between 33 and 34 US 
dollars per ounce, although generally costs average between 8 and 15 
US dollars, a level which is achieved only through economies of scale. 
By contrast, in India, the Phillipines and on the poorer State mines 
of Ghana, the cost of producing one ounce of gold reaches between 45 
and 55 US dollars. 
Under these circumstances, it is generally recognised that 
the supply of gold is unlikely to meet the ever -growing demand, and if 
output is to be maintained, financial aid in some form is imperative. 
With the price of gold at virtually the same level for over a quarter 
of a century, the ever -widening gap between unit costs and expected unit 
returns is inevitable, and this largely accounts for the introduction 
of formal aid schemes by the governments of the gold- producing countries. 
Ghana is, therefore, not alone in supporting the continued operation of 
gold mines which have become sub -economic under current cost conditions. 
One of the major problems of the world gold mining industry has been the 
plight of the low -grade properties, and a large number of these were 
forced to close under the inflationary economy which has obtained since 
the second world.war. The governments of nearly every gold -producing 
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country give aid to their marginal mines where the gold industry is of 
particular importance, as in Ghana, in providing foreign exchange and /or 
in the support of old established mining communities. The only major 
exception is the United States of America and its government has 
persistently refused to grant direct assistance to its gold producers. 
Outside South Africa, some 40¡L of the primary gold production is 
subsidised, although the form and method of operation of subsidies 
differ from country to country. Outside Ghana, aid tends to be given 
through institutionalised payments to private producers, either as a 
depletion allowance or a direct reduction of taxation or as a direct 
subsidy normally expressed as per ounce. Of the large producers, 
Canada has operated a formal aid scheme for over twenty years during 
which some 250,000,000 dollars have been distributed to the gold mining 
industry. But even so, a steady decline in yield has been evident for 
some years and it is estimated that by 1975, assuming that the official 
price is unchanged, only nine or ten of the thirty -four mines currently 
active will have survived. Most of the smaller producing countries, 
however, have positively encouraged the industry to grow with government 
help. Colombia, the leading South American producer, initiated a scheme 
r 
in 1967 to try to reverse the declining output; the Phillipines 
production has grown almost ten -fold, from some 48,000 ounces in 1953 
to 470,000 ounces in 1967 in direct response to government backing 
given to the industry. In Ghana, the principle differs in that the 
Government owns and operates the marginal mines itself as a State 
enterprise. In 1956 the Government had granted some small financial 
assistance to the marginal mines, but the aid came to an end in 1958. 
It was in that year, when financial conditions began to worsen for most 
of the privately -owned gold mines and many seemed unable to survive 
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without continued support, that the Ghana Government called in a 
Canadian expert to report on the possibility of introducing a permanent 
subsidy scheme with a view to enacting legislation similar to that 
existing in Canada. The report was not made public, and still remains 
classified material, but, whatever recommendations it contained, the 
Ghana Government took no positive action, along the lines of its terms 
of reference. It was not until 1961, when two of the marginal mines 
threatened to close, that government policy became clear. Long -term aid 
to private producers was rejected as an inappropriate measure, and 
instead, the Ghana Government chose the alternative of running the mines 
itself as a public corporation. It is, therefore, against this wider 
background that the economics of gold mining in Ghana should be understood. 
THE COST OF SUBVENTION 
It is suggested that the best means of determining the extent 
to which the gold mining industry in Ghana has required financial 
assistance from the Government to balance capital and operating accounts 
since 1961 is by describing and analysing the trends in profitability 
over the period 1956 -1967. The ever -increasing cost of gold production 
relative to revenue is well illustrated by the fate of the State mines 
in Ghana. As can be seen on Fig.10.1, two distinct periods can be 
identified in respect of the profitability of the industry, and these 
periods correspond to the pre- and post -takeover years. The secular 
trend is, however, one -way; in essence, a decline in profitability has 
been characteristic of the industry since the mid- 1950s, and this trend 
is rooted in the earlier immediate post -war years. The slim profit 
margins achieved by the private companies in the late 1950s were commuted 





































































































































































































































































































































































1960s, as expenditure overtook revenue at an ever -increasing pace. This 
downward trend in profitability has been the logical result of the 
peculiar economic problems facing gold producers in general and the 
low -grade properties in particular. In Ghana's case, these wider 
economic constraints were aggravated by internal economic problems 
which forced the State mines to operate in an economic straight- 
jacket. 
1. Trends in Profitability, 1956 -1967 
The five private companies, which are now incorporated as the 
State Gold I!iining Corporation, aggregated a very narrow margin of 
profit, of some £3,000,000, over the five years up to takeover (Table 
10.1). Although expenditure rose annually from 1956, much of the 
increase in costs was successfully offset by a similar rise in revenue 
owing to the increased scale of mining adopted by all the private 
companies in the late 1950s. By 1959 -60, however, these scale economies 
appeared to have reached a maximum, and despite a drop in expenditure 
for that year, there was a disproportionate fall in revenue from the 
sale of gold, and this signalled the departure from viability thereafter. 
The point of diminishing returns had been reached and by the end of 
1960, both Amalgamated Banket Areas Ltd. and Bibiani (1927) Ltd. had 
declared losses while the other companies declared significantly lower 
profits than those of the previous two to three years. These decreases 
followed the decline in yield recorded in the last year of private 
ownership. The main cause of the gradual narrowing of the profit margins 
was the repeated labour unit cost increases borne in the 1950s. The 
increased expenditure on this item, combined with the heavy burden of 
taxation, effectively reduced the amount of surplus capital available 
for development of ore reserves, and by 1961, the volume of ore available 
GIL). 
TABLE 10.1 
AGGREGATE PROFITS, STATE MINES : 1956 -1960 
Tarkwa Prestea Bibiani Dunkwa Konongo Aggregate 
E £ E E 
1956 123,149L 69,388P 19,872L 118,834P 117,093P 162,294P 
1957 58,497P 247,840P 76,165P 127,897P 172,20OP 682,599P 
1956 212,897P 206,035P 79,019P 198,193P 170,542P 866,686P 
1959 170,867P 214,82OP 68,731P 283,704P 131,410P 869,532P 
1960 121,099L 313,197P 12,837L 209,787P 90,804P 479,852P 
198,013P 1,051,280P 191,206P 938,415P 682,049P 3,060,963P 
P = Profit. L = Loss. 
TABLE 10.2 
AGGREGATE LOSSES, STATE MINES : 1961 -1967 
Tarkwa Prestea Bibiani Dunkwa Konongo* Aggregate 
1961 419,539L 64,938P 33,071L 134,251P - 253,421L 
1962 841,150L 204,8551, 191,445L 145,877P 1,091,573L 
1963 904,909L 265,193L 254,476L 229,968P 1,214,610L 
1964 872,641L 516,664 176,471L 82,109P 1,483,669L 
1965 1,046,031L 386,508L 329,423L 9,036L - 1,770,996L 
1966 930,787L 126,862L 435,144L 138,189L 77,887L 1,708,869L 
1967 808,479L 58,593L 291,064L 59,513L 64,539L 1,282,188L 
5,825,536L 1,513,737L 1,711,094L 385,467P 142,426L 6,805,326L 
* Konongo remained a private company until 1965. 
Source for both tables: S.G.M.C. 
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in advance of immediate requirements was much less than the norm of four 
to five years' supply. The profit ratio of the gold mining companies 
as a whole was scarcely such as to encourage further investment from 
outside sources in this field, especially with the ever -present limiting 
factor of the rigid price of gold. Even if further scale increases 
could have been effected to avert the crisis of impending closures, it 
was doubtful if a continuation of this policy was in the best interests 
of the companies since it would have more than likely resulted in 
exhausting the ore reserves and wearing out the plant and machinery 
with little hope of making an adequate return on the invested capital. 
And so, when the Government bought the marginal mines in 1961, 
their continued operation as economic enterprises was in doubt, and a 
small aggregate loss, of some £250,000, was sustained in the first year 
after takeover. Ever since, losses have mounted owing to the worsening 
of economic conditions which was foreshadowed in the last days of the 
private companies (Table 10.2). This sequence was inevitable in the 
absence of immediate measures to offset the upward march of operating 
costs. There were variations from mine to mine in the actual point in 
time at which operations ceased to be viable, but it is noteworthy that 
all the deep -level mines recorded their last profitable year immediately 
prior to takeover, and their peak profits in the penultimate year as 
private companies (Table 10.3). Only the dredging subsidiary of the 
State Gold Mining Corporation remained viable, as was expected, until 
1964 since when losses have also been sustained. 
A closer examination of the accounts of the mines of the State 
group reveals the relative burden of each subsidiary on the Government 
since takeover. In this context, the difference between revenue and 
expenditure can be expressed in two ways: as the working balance and as 
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TABLE 10.3 





Tarkwa 1958 1959 
Prestea 1960 1961 
Bibiani 1958 1959 
Dunkwa 1963 1964 
Konongo* 1964 1965 
* bought by State in 1965 
the final balance.1 This basic distinction permits a more detailed 
analysis of the situation and a more meaningful pattern emerges of the 
transition from viable to sub- economic operations (Fig.102a, b, c, d and 
e). Therefore, the working balance will be greater or smaller than the 
final balance depending on whether a final profit or loss is declared. 
All the mines experienced a similar sequence in that a working profit 
often became a final loss after development and other items of expenditure 
had been added to working costs. Different orders of magnitude apply 
in each case, but the general trends in profitability are sufficiently 
similar to justify a general appraisal. 
1. Working balance is defined as the difference between Total Revenue 
from the sale of gold, and incidental revenue, and Working 
Expenditure which comprises Mining, Milling, and General Charges. 
Final balance is defined as the difference between Total Revenue 
and Total Expenditure which comprises Working Expenditure PLUS 
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TABLE 10.4 
PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION TO AGGREGATE BALANCE : PRE - AND POST- TAIEOVER 
Period Tarkwa Prestea Bibiani Dunkwa Kónongo Aggregate 
1956-1960 6.4% 34.3% 6.2% 30.6¡ 22.5% P 
1961-1967 63¡<, 17% 18% 102% L 
P = Profit. L = Loss. 
One of the most significant features is that the companies 
that showed the smallest profit margins in the pre- takeover years, were 
those which have sustained the largest losses post- takeover (Table 10.4). 
Tarkwa goldfields has proved a particularly heavy financial 
burden on the Ghana Government, with a cumulative loss of nearly 
£5,500,000 in the years from 1961 to 1967. At no time since takeover 
did Tarkwa attain even a working profit (Fig.10.2a). The former owners 
managed to contain working expenditure above 'breakeven' costs largely 
owing to the timely Government grant and through economies of scale. 
However, the continuous rise in operating costs began to overtake 
revenue by 1960, when a significant drop in the working profit was 
recorded, and this small working profit became a loss when the final 
balance was stated. After 1961, losses mounted each year, and by 1965 
Tarkwa goldfields had reached an acute state of financial depression; 
in that year, Tarkwa's working loss amounted to some á700,000 and the 
final loss was over 1,000,000. A marked improvement in the working 
balance was achieved in 1966 and 1967, probably owing to the maximisation 
of the mill's capacity with the treatment of the additional ore from the 
Konongo mine under the Custom Ore Project, initiated in 1966. 
2(4 
Bibiani goldfields had an equally disappointing record after 
takeover since when losses have been consistently recorded (Fig.10.2b). 
The losses accumulated to 1967 were of the order of £1,750,000. As at 
Tarkwa, Bibiani's profit margins were gradually squeezed in the late 
1950s, and in the last year of private ownership, the small working 
profit was converted into a final loss. Thereafter, losses grew in 
scale till the low ebb encountered in 1966 when a peak loss of nearly 
£500,000 was sustained. Tarkwa and Bibiani goldfields have together 
accounted for some 80¡10 of the aggregate claim of the State mines for 
government subvention. 
By contrast, none of the other subsidiaries has sustained such 
dramatic losses relative to the scale of their operations. Prestea 
goldfields showed a working profit in all but two years, 1964 and 1965, 
although absolute losses were sustained from 1962 onwards (Fig.10.2c). 
Nevertheless, at its worst, Prestea's losses were contained within 
£500,000. The best average performance of all the State mines was 
achieved by Dunkwa goldfields, which continued to make profits until 
1964 (Fig.10.2e). Indeed, a positive working balance was maintained 
until 1965, although in that year a final loss of some `;9,000 was declared. 
On aggregate, the dredging subsidiary, in fact, made a profit over the 
six years from 1961 but its profits were not of sufficient magnitude to 
offset the losses incurred by its sister mines. Finally, Konongo gold- 
fields has declared both working and absolute losses since it became 
part of the State Gold Mining Corporation in 1965 (Fig.10.2d), and the 
additional burden of yet another uneconomic unit merely aggravated the 
financial distress of the Corporation. Had the mine coutiriued to operate 
as an integral unit after 1965, Konongo would have incurred even greater 
losses. Since 1961, the State mines required subvention of the order 
GO. 
of £9,000,000 to balance accounts (Fig.10.3). Before examining the 
reasons for the scale of these losses, a comment on the profitability 
of the private sector over the same period is appropriate. 
Had the logic of pure economics been followed, Ghana's gold 
mining industry would consist of one mine, that of the Ashanti Gold- 
fields Corporation, at Obuasi. In common with the State mines, a 
narrowing of profit margins has been evident in recent years. However, 
the similarity ends there. One of the marvels of the old mining world, 
the Ashanti mine has defied all predictions of the inevitability of 
declining grade with depth, and ore reserves are approaching some 
3,375,000 tons yielding one ounce of gold per ton of ore. However, 
the company needs such strength to carry the great burden of taxation 
and other charges imposed in Ghana and the United Kingdom. Its main 
economic problem has been the increasing level of taxation which has 
substantially reduced its profit margins in recent decades (Fig.10.4). 
Por example, in the financial year 1967 -68, taxation absorbed over 75t 
of the company's working profit. Nevertheless, in spite of repeated 
appeals for a reduction in taxation, there has never been any stage at 
which the company's balance gave cause for undue concern; it has paid 
dividends without interruption since 1900. Lonrho, the new owners, plan 
to achieve further economies of scale by expanding output to a level of 
80,000 tons per month, and on its current performance the Ashanti mine 
has both the financial strength and the grade of ore to undertake this 
planned expansion without affecting its profitability. 
2. Reasons for the Scale of Losses 
The foregoing examination of the trends in profitability 
revealed the large scale of subvention required by the State Gold 
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sustained between 1961 and 1967 can be attributed to two main factors, 
the inflation in working costs relative to the fixed price of gold, and 
the lack of capital funds for development. 
The price of gold remained in the region of 250s per ounce, except 
for a slight increase in the selling price in 1966 and 1967 as a result 
of the devaluation of the local currency. On the other hand, working 
costs rose by 82¡ between 1961 and 1967, from an average of 204s per 
ounce to an average of 372s per ounce respectively (Fig.10.5). Only 
in the first two years after takeover were unit costs kept below unit 
returns, so that the State Gold Mining Corporation made a working 
profit even though a final loss was declared. After 1964, costs 
escalated at an ever -increasing rate, as the scale of production 
declined for reasons of inadequate production inputs and dwindling ore 
reserves; overheads remain at a certain level regardless of the scale of 
production. As a result, unit costs overtook unit returns, and by 1967 
only Prestea had been able to hold down unit costs below the expected 
unit returns; the other subsidiaries' costs ranged from 284s to 594s 
per ounce. Of the five State mines, Tarkwa and Bibiani have consistently 
incurred above average unit working costs, whereas Prestea and Dunkwa 
have maintained below average unit costs relative to the Corporation's 
average; these trends reflect the relative grade of ore on each property. 
After the policy of gradual phasing out of operations to closure had 
been adopted at the Bibiani mine, working costs showed a dramatic 100¡ 
increase largely owing to the cost of obtaining the remaining ore which 
was scattered throughout the mine at different levels. There is little 
doubt that the unrealistic price of gold, static for over twenty -five 
years, was one of the major contributory causes of the state of 
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hardly explains the scale of the losses since the former private 
companies had on aggregate reduced unit working costs from an average 
of 175s per ounce of gold produced in 1956, to about 170s per ounce in 
1960. This improvement had been achieved through economies of scale and 
through higher'labour productivity. Conversely, therefore, the steep 
rise in unit working costs after takeover can be attributed to the drastic 
cutback in the scale of operations and the concomitant decline in labour 
productivity (Fig.10.6). 
Secondly, an examination of the method of accounting reveals a 
further reason for the magnitude of losses suffered by the State mines 
in the 1960s. Because of the low level of ore reserves inherited in 
1961, the immediate priority was to increase the ore reserves through 
development and prospecting, but the State Gold Mining Corporation was 
not given an initial fund out of which to finance such a programme. 
The mines were left to pay for every item of expenditure, whether 
recurrent overheads or special development costs, out of the revenue 
earned from the sale of gold. In other words, current income had to 
cover the working costs of winning gold, the costs of normal development 
to ensure continued operation, the costs of special development as shaft - 
sinking, and the costs of prospecting new areas. This was totally 
impossible as well as unrealistic. It should have been realised in 
1961 that in addition to the purchase price, a special capital fund 
should have been voted to the Corporation to provide a.basis on which 
a long -term development programme could be realised. It was not until 
1966 that the Ghana Government recognised this fundamental need, and 
a Development Fund amounting to some £3,500,000 was awarded to the 
State mines. But, by this stage, expenditure had overtaken revenue at 






















































































































































































As a result, the scale of development required to redress the low level 
of ore reserves has not been achieved, production has been limited by 
this factor, and revenue in turn limited by the level of production, 
and all of these factors have affected the level of working costs. In 
essence, the lack of capital funds from the onset in 1961 had very wide - 
ranging ramifications, the end- result being a massive deficit which 
the Government itself has had to cover by subvention. 
BENEFITS TO TTfl1 ECONOMY 
Against the aggregate loss of some £9,000,000 incurred by the 
State Gold Mining Corporation in the first six years of its existence, 
it is possible to balance the amount of foreign exchange generated from 
the sale of gold. Despite the weight of the employment argument, 
particularly in the country where socialism is the main driving force 
in political decision- making, it is suggested that the economic value 
of the gold industry as a major source of foreign exchange is perhaps 
a more potent argument in favour of keeping open these unprofitable 
mines by public subsidy. It is essentially Ghana's high external debt 
problem that is currently restraining the development of the economy 
and this in turn is restraining the further generation of new employment 
outlets at a rate compatible with the annual increase in the labour force. 
The capital- intensive post- independence development programme led to a 
drastic decline in the foreign exchange reserves of the country and a 
deterioration in the balance of payments (Fig.1O.7). In these terms, 
the continued support of the mines is justified in spite of the large 
losses sustained in so doing, especially when it is added that these 
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The actual foreign exchange earnings of the State Gold Mining 
Corporation are not directly available from official sources, but it 
has been possible to calculate the approximate foreign exchange value 
of the industry based on a formula used by T.Killick.2 The figures 
must not be regarded as final and accurate: they merely indicate the 
order of magnitude of the earnings. With this qualification in mind, 
it was estimated that on aggregate the State mines earned some £20,000,000 
in foreign exchange between 1961 and 1967 (Table 10.5). The estimates 
reveal that Prestea goldfields has proved the best asset of the State 
group of mines, contributing nearly half of the total earnings, while 
Bibiani provided the poorest return. This corroborates previously 
established patterns in respect of the relative contribution of each 
mine to output and employment. 
By linking the losses and earnings of the State mines with the 
labour employed over the period 1961 -1967, a more definitive statement 
of the benefits to the economy is made (Table 10.6). These statistics 
reveal that employment has been maintained at an annual average of some 
13,000 jobs, and that each employee has earned twice as much foreign 
exchange as the local loss incurred in maintaining his job. Thus, the 
objectives of takeover have been realised even though the cost to the 
Government has been higher than was anticipated. Tarkwa and Bibiani 
have proved the greatest financial burdens on the Government and their 
2. Foreign exchange earnings were calculated according to the following 
formula: 
(i) Net Proceeds from the sale of gold. 
(ii) Foreign exchange costs of production. 
(includes: a.Depreciation 
b.10, of working costs 
(the estimated import- content of output) 
(iii) Wage transfers abroad, taken at a per capita average of £2000 
ET FOREIGN EXCI3ANGE EARNINGS = (i) minus ( (ii) plus (iii) 
2t3U. 
TABLE 10.5 
ESTIMATED FOREIGN EXCHANGES EARNINGS OF STATE MINES : 1961 -1967 
Total 
Tarkwa Prestea Bibiani Dunkwa Konongo State 
Mines 
1961 1,115 1,466 579 433 3,593 
1962 907 1,536 512 352 - 3,307 
1963 1,065 1,416 447 604 - 3,532 
1964 897 1,094 416 456 - 2,863 
1965 462 1,251 485 485 - 2,683 
1966 149 1,032 77 324 43 1,625 
1967 763 1,364 92 394 161 2,774 
5,358 9,159 2,608 3,048 204 20,381 
TABLE 10.6 








1961 14,197 17.8 251.6 
1962 14,899 73.2 221.6 
1963 15,671 77.5 L25.3 
1964 14,190 104.2 201.7 
1965 12,383 134.3 232.8 
1966 10,967 155.8 148.1 
1967 11,804 108.6 235 
Average 
1961 -67 
13,444 £96 £216 
Source for both tables: based on data supplied by S.G.M.C. 
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earning capacity remained below the Corporation average throughout the 
period while losses per manyear remained consistently above average 
(Fig.10.8a and b). But, in every case, the steep increase in the losses 
per manyear and the sympathetic downward movement of earnings per 
manyear were caused by the contraction of output linked to the policy 
of full employment to the detriment of labour productivity. The 
reduction in the labour force over the period was not commensurate with 
the reduction in output and this accounts for the dramatic rate of 
increase in losses per manyear sustained. 
In addition to the foreign exchange earned by the Corporation and 
the employment which it supported, the industry contributed to the 
revenue of other sectors of the economy, albeit on a small scale. 
Linkages with other sectors of the economy are, in fact, weak, a 
characteristic typical of the whole economy. Being an export -oriented 
industry, gold mining has not stimulated 'offshoot' industries. Gold 
is exported to London for refining, and it undergoes no processing or 
transformation apart from the initial reduction and smelting into gold 
bars. But the industry does purchase local goods and services, and in 
this way there is some feedback into the economy by way of various 
payments: customs and harbour dues, rail freight charges, post, cable 
and telegraph charges, concession rents and payments to local chiefs, 
stores purchased locally etc. (Table 10.7). 
A new link has recently developed since the mines transferred to 
the Volta grid; formerly the mines generated their own power in situ. 
The mining industry is currently one of the main industrial consumers 
of power in Ghana, and in 1967 the mines bought 165,000,000 kwh from 
the Volta grid, which represented 11% of the total power consumed from 
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TABLE 10.7 
PAYMENTS BY STATE MINES TO OTHER SECTORS : 1961 -1967 
(a) (b) (c) (a) (e) (f) 
L. E E á E E 
1961 16,000 20,000 267,600 2,500 2,000 1,500 
1962 48,200 22,600 53,700 2,300 2,400 1,500 
1963 19,100 24,300 55,800 1,600 2,200 1,300 
1964 15,400 21,500 130,300 1,600 2,600 1,100 
1965 9,900 17,400 221,500 1,000 2,900 1,500 
1966 10,800 21,300 303,800 1,300 2,600 1,600 
1967 18,300 21,000 193,100 1,200 3,600 1,500 
(g) (h) (i) 
E 
1961 1,400,000 18,800 160,000 
1962 1,400,000 18,200 160,100 
1963 1,497,100 17,000 215,500 
1964 1,488,600 15,000 194,300 
1965 1,400,000 22,000 169,600 
1966 1,400,000 20,000 175,000 
1967 1,407,400 17,000 180,000 
Note: All figures rounded up to nearest £100. 
(a) Customs and harbour dues. 
(b) Railway freight charges. 
(c) Minerals duty, Income tax in U.I. and Ghana. 
(d) Posts, cables and telegrams. 
(e) Telephone rents and other charges. 
(f) Police and medical services. 
(g) Stores purchased locally. 
(h) Concession rents and payments to local chiefs. 
(i) Miscellaneous payments (Licences, Mines Dept. etc.). 
Source: Ghana Chamber of Mines, Confidential Annual Returns of the 
member companies. 
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the largest consumer). However, it is expected that, unless new deposits 
are developed, the demand from the mining industry is unlikely to rise 
much above the current takeoff. This power link apart, the gold mining 
industry has forged few inter -sectoral linkages. 
CONCLUSION 
On balance, it would appear that the foreign exchange earning 
capacity of gold is the more important justification than the maintenance 
of employment in supporting the continued operation of the gold mines, 
since the availability of foreign exchange in the economy is the linchpin 
on which development depends. By 1967, the State mines contribution 
to Gross Domestic Product was under 1c/L, its share of the national labour 
force was under 2¡ while its contribution to export earnings was nearly 
5iß 
There are some aspects of man's economic activities which 
cannot be measured in purely economic and capitalistic terms, especially 
in a country striving for economic independence. 'While the economist 
might suggest that the Ghana Government would have been better to employ 
the £5,250,000 purchase capital in providing other sources of employment 
such as the establishment of import -substitution industries to save 
foreign exchange, the geographer is inevitably led to refute such an 
argument, based as it is on purely economic grounds. At any rate, it 
is highly unlikely that the capital employed in purchasing the gold 
mines would have otherwise been available, and hence its opportunity 
cost is zero. In addition, as was pointed out earlier, Ghana's support 
of her marginal gold mines is not unique, since in most gold producing 
countries the industry only survives by public subsidy, and in the smaller 
producing countries, as Ghana, the wider social and political considerations 
284. 
override pure economic considerations, owing to the high internal and 
external value of gold to the economy. The geography of gold mining in 
Ghana today bears testimony to these considerations. Geography and 
politics are bound in a two -way relationship in influencing the forni 
and structure -of the economic landscape, as demonstrated by the survival 
of the gold mining industry in Ghana. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is not intended to write a complete summary of the previous 
chapters, but rather to put into perspective the most significant aspects 
of the growth and development of the gold mining industry in Ghana as 
they affected the economic geography of the country. 
It was not until the latter pert of the nineteenth century 
that foreign capitalists were able to undertake direct mining on a 
permanent basis; previously European contact had been limited to trade 
in gold dust by barter. The era of commercial gold mining was pioneered 
by Pierre Bonnat in 1877 and other companies soon followed his example. 
The Colonial authorities welcomed this new field of enterprise for the 
economic development of the country, and it was openly recognised that, 
given encouragement, gold mining could attain a high internal and 
external value in the economy. 
As soon as overseas prospectors moved in, land took on a value 
hitherto unknown; land rights in the Gold Coast, following the usual 
African pattern, were traditionally held by a group, and land was not 
originally a commodity to be traded. However, the local Chiefs were 
quick to realise the benefits that could accrue in offering valuable 
concessions to Europeans for a fee. In these terms, the development 
of modern mining represented the first serious impact of 4'Ïestern economic 
forces on traditional society. Wealth, far beyond the traditional 
limits, was now at the disposal of the native authorities as stool 
finances increased with the entry of European capital into the villages. 
It was not only the native authorities which profited from this new 
source of wealth, but others, as the African lawyers, whose services 
were in constant demand in respect of land transactions, also benefited. 
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The institutional and legal framework for the registration of companies 
did not exist in the Cold Coast, and so all the companies were registered 
abroad and financed by European shareholders. A few Africans tried to 
form companies, but they found it difficult to raise the necessary 
capital because the process of capital accumulation had barely begun, 
and technological and managerial expertise were largely absent. 
The pioneer companies were handicapped by local problems in 
establishing the industry on a firm basis, and although the mines that 
were first developed were close to the coast, the difficulties of 
transport and climate were considerable, and the difficulty of obtaining 
a secure title to their concessions was an added constraint. Until the 
turn of the twentieth century, there was no alternative means of trans- 
port except the ill -kept bush tracks, or, in more favoured areas, rivers 
with dubious navigability. Access to the mining districts was possible 
via the Ancobra river, and thence by bush -track. Several amateur 
proposals for lines of railway were mooted, but no positive action was 
taken until the end of the nineteenth century. Although the Colonial 
Office received several deputations from West African merchants, bankers, 
business groups and the mining community from the early 1880s, all 
pressing for the construction of railways, it was not until 1898 that 
the Sekondi -Kumasi line was sanctioned, and this to serve the needs of 
the nascent mining industry above all. 
The development of both mining and railways brought a 
considerable inflow of capital into the country, and this in turn 
stimulated exports of gold and other commodities, as cocoa, palm oil 
and timber, and encouraged imports. Indirectly too, the mining boom 
had an important influence on the establishment of ancillary services 
necessary for the economic development of the country. The first 
287. 
systematic survey of the Gold Coast was made largely to avoid the 
constant litigation and confusion over concession boundaries; the first 
official team of surveyors began work in 1901, and by 1906 a map of the 
Colony had been produced. In addition, a Department of Mines was 
established in'1903, and in 1913, a Geological Survey Department was 
set up. The Geological Survey investigated the distribution of the 
gold -bearing ore deposits in the country and, incidental to this 
research, made significant discoveries of other economic minerals, the 
most important being diamonds, manganese and bauxite. Gradually, the 
Government extended other minor but important services with a more 
efficient network of communications. For example, the volume of mail 
engendered by the mining boom of 1897 -1901 led to an increase in the 
number of post offices. But perhaps the most important single develop- 
ment facilitated by the new economic structure was the large -scale 
growth of the cocoa industry. The stations along the Sekondi -Kumasi 
railway quickly became marketing and collecting centres for cocoa. 
Modern gold mining also had an important effect on the labour 
market. The ever -growing demand from the mines for workers soon brought 
the wage -earning system within the experience of even the most remote 
villages in the Northern Territories. Owing to the local deficit of 
labour in the mining districts, the mining companies were forced to tap 
more distant sources of supply, and in 1905, recruited a party of men 
from the North. This movement was initially welcomed and assisted by 
local government officials, and although the experiment was slow to gain 
momentum, the seasonal pattern of migration from the North was firmly 
established by the mid- 1920s, and has remained an important characteristic 
of the labour market. The annual draining away of many able -bodied men 
from the Northern Territories, however, reduced the prospects of develop- 
ment there, and profoundly affected the character of village life. 
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After a brief post -war slump, the demand for labour increased, 
but the mines had considerable difficulty in tapping the north -south 
flow of migrant workers who were attracted into cocoa -farming and other 
employment outlets which had grown in number as economic development 
progressed. But, in 1924, an even more serious problem became apparent, 
when statistics revealed a very high death -rate among mine labourers. 
This resulted in the banning of recruiting in the North, and the 
establishment of Mining Health Areas, since it had been discovered that 
the high death -rate among the miners was due to the prevalence of 
hookworm and tuberculosis among the northern migrants, and to the 
unsatisfactory housing conditions, the polluted and insufficient water 
supply and the inadequate medical arrangements in most of the mining 
districts. Model villages were subsequently laid out, and the mining 
towns grew into sizeable settlements. Indeed, these centres have become 
among the largest settlements in their respective regions, and they have 
acquired an urban character offering a wide range of services, stimulated 
by the permanent market potential of the mining areas, derived from the 
geographical concentration of spending power at these points. Indeed, 
wage -earning labour represented a small minority of the total working 
population in the Gold Coast, and until the second world war at least, 
the mining labour force represented the most significant concentration 
of wage - earning employment on a large scale. But the mining communities 
were isolated, and since most of the value of the gold won left the 
country as repatriated salaries and dividends to the shareholders, the 
gold mines were economic enclaves, and stimulated few linkages with 
other sectors of the economy. In fact, the development of the gold 
mining industry typified the colonial pattern of development. 
The real contribution which the gold mining industry made up 
to 1945 was limited to the export of gold which brought in revenue by 
way of the payment of export duty, taxes and royalties to the local 
treasury. In addition, the marked improvement in internal communications 
first stimulated by the needs of the mining industry, influenced the 
development and export of other primary products. Finally, its role 
in affecting the structure of the labour market and the distribution 
of population were profound and permanent. The regional alignment of 
the economy was firmly established in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, with the development of the resources of the forest 
zone in the south and west. This remains the source of Ghana's 
principal primary products, and the importance of the gold mining 
industry in spearheading this development is apparent. 
The growth and development of gold mining thus offers the 
key to contemporary patterns, and although the industry has contracted 
spatially since the second world war, largely owing to the upward 
pressure of operating costs relative to the rigid price of gold, its 
contemporary importance in the economy is nevertheless apparent. In 
Ghana, as in many of the gold -producing countries where the gold industry 
is singularly important in supporting employment in long -established 
mining communities and earning foreign exchange for the economy, the 
industry survives under government subsidy. It is a striking fact that 
the voice of the gold producer for an increase in the selling price of 
gold goes unheard in official circles despite the vital role which gold 
plays on the international economic scene. While economists debate the 
inadequacy of gold reserves to solve the problem of international 
liquidity, no serious thought is given to the economic plight of the 
producers. Indeed, the demand side of the equation dominates discussions, 
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while the suppliers are offered no solace except a tacit recognition 
of their inability to match supply with demand. It is hardly surprising 
that the world gold mining industry is unable to meet the demand for 
the metal in the light of current costs inflation, and the implications 
of these conditions are well -illustrated by the case -study. In Ghana, 
where unemployment is high and foreign exchange is in short supply, the 
Government cannot afford closures. The six -point distribution of gold 
mining centred on the towns of Tarkwa, Prestea, Bibiani, Dunkwa, 
Konongo and Obuasi is not an economic one, since only the Ashanti mine 
remains a profitable enterprise. The geography of old mining in Ghana 
today is therefore artificial if measured in pure economic terms, but 
its survival in its present form demonstrates clearly the inter- 
relationship between politics and geography. 
After cocoa and timber, gold is Ghana's third major export, 
but in spite of the continued prosperity of the Ashanti mine in the 
private sector, this is a declining asset. In the long -term, the Ghana 
Government will have to face the closure of the gold mines since they 
are based on wasting assets, arid in the short -term, unless significant 
new discoveries of ore -bodies are made, or there is a substantial 
increase in the price of gold, the cost of maintaining the gold mining 
industry is bound to increase. 
There is little likelihood that the pace of economic develop- 
ment in Ghana will in the near future attain a rate compatible with the 
annual increase in the labour force since the high external indebtedness 
of the Ghanaian economy precludes any such dramatic improvement. The 
analysis of the performance of the gold mining industry since Independence 
and the identification of the constraints on its output have shed. some 
light on the wider problem of economic development in the developing 
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world in general. It was shown that production of the gold mining 
industry not only stagnated but declined because of inherited and 
externally- induced problems, creating for the State mines a vicious 
circle of poverty. In these terms, this study is more than a case -study 
in mineral geography in that it reflects, in microcosm, the wider social 
and economic problems of the developing world. 
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APPENDIX I 
GLOSSARY OF MINING TERMS IN USE IN GHANA 
Adit: A horizontal or slightly inclined tunnel entering a mine 
from the surface. 
Alluvial Deposit: Deposits of water borne sediment, sand, gravels, 
etc., containing minerals of value, e.g., alluvial gold, 
alluvial diamonds. 
Amalam: A metal united with mercury, e.g., Gold Amalgam. 
Amalgamation: The process of extracting gold and silver from crushed 
ores using mercury. 
Anticline: The arch formed by folded ground. 
Assay: The determination of the quantity of pure metal in an ore 
or alloy. 
Banket: A gold -bearing conglomerate of alluvial origin found 
underground. 
Bed -rock: The rock underlying alluvial deposits. 
Blocking out: Working in blocks; also proving an ore body on at 
least three sides. 
Boxpole: An ore pass or passageway connecting a stope to the level 
below. 
Breccia: A rock composed of angular fragments bonded together. 
Bullion; Gold or Silver in bars. 
Cage: Elevator in a mine shaft used to transport personnel, 
materials or ore in trucks. 
Carat: (a) A weight used in weighing precious stones; 142 carats 
approximately equals 1 os. 
(b) A term used to denote purity of gold jewellery; 24 
carats being taken as pure gold. 
Caving: (a) A method to assist support, in which the hanging -wall 
is broken or allowed to break at a determined distance 
from the working face. 
(b) A method of extraction by inducing controlled collapse 
of ore in a stope. 
Cementation process: A method of sealing off water occurring in 
shafts and tunnels by injecting cement under pressure 
via boreholes into the wall rock. 
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Chute: An ore pass. 
Shoot: Pay shoot refers to the payable portion of a reef or vein. 
Concentrate: The extract from ore or alluvial gravels after partial 
treatment and immediate to final separation of the mineral 
or diamonds. 
Conglomerate: Rock formed by round stones bonded together. 
Corduroys: Corduroy type blankets used to remove free gold from wet 
and finely crushed ore. 
Core: The sample obtained by boring with hollow drill. 
Country rock: The rock in which the lode is found. 
Cross -cut: A tunnel driven at a considerable angle to the strike of 
a reef or to a main drive. 
Dead Work: Preparatory or development work which is in itself 
unpayable. 
Development: Work done preparatory to production and to establish 
payable ore available. 
Dilution: The percentage of waste ground unavoidably extracted with 
payable ore. 
Dip; The inclination of a reef to the horizontal taken normal 
to the strike. 
Dredging: Excavation underwater; mechanical excavation of sands, 
mud, silts forming the bed of a river lake, etc.: either to 
maintain the depth of the waterway or to extract from the 
dredged material minerals of value. 
Drive: A graded tunnel. When driven parallel to the reef in the 
footwall it is termed a footwall drive; in the reef, a reef 
drive, and in the hanging wall a hanging wall drive 
(Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Limited term a drive 
parallel to the reef, a sidetie). 
Dwt: "Pennyweight" equal to one -twentieth of a troy ounce. 
Dyke: A later intrusion, similar to a lode intrusion but of no 
mineral value, cutting across reef and country rock. 
Eluvial: Rock broken down by natural forces but left in situ. 
Exposure: The horizontal length of reef indicated by development on 
any one level. 
Face: The rock face at the end of a drive or excavation. 
Fault: 
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A dislocation and displacement along a shear -plane in reef 
and country rock. The displacement is termed the "throw" 
and the direction of displacement names the fault, e.g., 
Up- throw. 
Fillin;: Waste rock or tailings used to fill mining excavations 
often permitting the removal of other supports particularly 
if these are of value. 
Fissure: A crack in the earth's crust. 
Footwall: The wall on the lower side of a reef, with regard to the 
general dip. 
Grade: The ratio by weight or in the case of alluvial deposits 
by weight to volume of the mineral to the ore or associated 
material. 
Hanging Wall: The wall on the upper side of a reef, with regard to 
the general dip. 
Hydraulicking: Breaking down surface deposits with a high velocity 
discharge of water. 
Inch -dwt.: The multiple of the width of reef in inches and the grade 
in pennyweights used as a basis for comparison. 
Incline: An inclined tunnel or shaft. 
Intake: The entrance to a mine or mine working taken by ventilating 
air: "Return" is used to indicate the exit path. 
Leaching; Separation of metals from their salts by treatment with a 
solvent. 
Lenticular: Shaped like a double convex lens, the shape often taken 
by separated small bodies of ore. 
Levels: Access tunnels to mine workings from the shaft, generally 
cut at regular intervals in depth and numbered according 
to their distance from the surface or datum level. 
Lode: A mineral deposit occurring between the walls of a fissure 
or crack in the earth's crust, often caused by the mineral 
intrusion, each separate intrusion is called a "vein ". 
The term "reef" is in common use in Ghana as an alternative 
to lode and, given a distinctive name, e.g., Main Reef, 
Cote d'Ore Reef, is used to differentiate veins. 
Mine Shaft: Entrance to a mine; rectangular or circular: usually 
vertical, occasionally inclined in which case it is termed 
an "inclined Shaft ". An "Internal Shaft" is one which 
does not open to the surface. 
Nugget: A lump of gold found in situ. 
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Open -Cast or Open -Cut: An excavation worked from and open to the surface. 
Ore: 
Ore Pass: 
Rock containing a mineral which can be worked with economic 
advantage. 
Passageway (cut in rock) for gravitational transit of ore. 
Ore Reserve: The quantity of payable ore that can be extracted as 
indicated by development. The reserves are further 
classified as "proved ", "probable" or "possible" depending 














That part of a lode exposed on the surface. 
Topsoil, clays, etc., covering a deposit to be worked. 
A field method used to separate out gold or diamonds from 
alluvial gravels or crushed ore by "washing" with water 
in a pan or bowl by hand. 
A rectangular excavation, a method used in working an 
alluvial deposit. 
A rich strip in a mineral vein, in a gold ore, seen as 
visible gold. 
Picking by hand from a moving belt obvious pieces of ore 
or waste rock as required. Picking the "eyes" out of a mine 
refers to the practice of extracting an undue proportion 
of the richest ore, thus lowering the average grade of the 
remaining ore reserves. 
Part of the vein left in situ as a support, often necessary 
in the vicinity of shafts and in workings under important 
surface sites to avoid subsidence. 
The dip of the pay chute on the line of strike. 
Sampling alluvial deposits by means of small pits. 
An alluvial gold deposit. 
A body of rich ore in a vein of small extent. 
To search for minerals, oil, etc. 
Wet pulverised ore from the mill. 
Reduction: A process of separating metals from their ores. 
Replacement Deposit: Deposit resulting from intrusion of reef material 
into the country rock and chemical alteration of the 
associated constituents to form a mineral deposit. Impregna- 
tion deposits are the result of a similar intrusion without 
chemical interaction taking place. A widespread intrusion 
gives a "massive deposit" with ill defined and irregular 
walls, limited intrusion creates a "contact deposit ". 
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Rise ( Raise) or Winze: A vertical or inclined passageway cut in rock to connect two levels in a mine. A rise is driven upwards 






A type of support in mine workings. 
An elevator in a mine shaft, used for the transport of ore, 
designed to carry a greater load per size than a cage and 
permitting direct loading from a chute and automatic 
unloading. 
The main producing workings in a metaliferous mine. Stoping 
methods have a general classification, either "underhand" 
or "overhand ", depending whether they are worked below or 
above the starting level and each method is referred to by 
a particular name, e.g., Rill Stoping, Flat -back, Shrinkage, 
etc. 
A drive in reef to begin a stope. 
The direction of a horizontal line following the reef channel. 
Stringers: Small veins; when occurring in a group are referred to as 
"Stockwork" and if of sufficiently high grade must be mined 
with associated rock. 
Sub -level; An intermediate level driven from a rise or winze. 
Subsidence: Collapse of ground at the surface due to mining excavations 
underground. 
The trough formed by folded beds. 









Miners who work on their own account and are paid for the 
ore or diamonds they obtain by the mine owner, differing 
from contract or piece workers who work as required by the 
mine owner. 
Complementary angle to the angle of dip: the rock enclosed 
by this angle. 
The shaft up which the ventilating air current passes out 
of a mine. "Downcast" refers to the shaft down which air 
enters the mine. 
The level at which natural drainage ceases. 
True Width of a reef at any point is the width measured 
normal to the dip at that point. Apparent Width is the 
width at any other angle. 
The openings in a mine such as adits, shafts, levels, 
drives, stopes, etc. 
Source: Annual Report of the Mines Department, 1960/61. 
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APPENDIX II 
YEARLY OUTPUT OF GOLD FROM 1880 
Year Ounces Fine Estimated 
Jan. -Dec. Gold Value 
Year Ounces Fine Estimated 
Apr. -Mar. Gold Value 
1880 -1883 45,220 z192,094 1923 -1924 200,703 £652,548 
1884 15,581 66,189 1924 -1925 210,301 893,359 
1885 21,182 89,981 1925 -1926 198,083 841,394 
1886 17,615 74,829 1926 -1927 189,117 803,369 
1887 19,107 81,168 1927 -1928 168,933 717,833 
1888 20,365 86,510 1928 -1929 167,115 709,903 
1889 24,294 103,200 1929 -1930 218,494 928,161 
1890 21,576 91,657 1930 -1931 246,075 1,045,327 
1891 20,742 88,112 1931 -1932 264,422 1,344,427 
1892 23,259 98,806 1932 -1933 284,841 1,696,342 
1893 18,620 79,099 1933 -1934 308,960 1,979,229 
1694 16,078 76,796 1934 -1935 337,065 2,358,680 
1895 21,539 91,497 1935 -1936 367,819 2,600,738 
1896 20,289 86,186 1936 -1937 461,621 3,244,503 
1897 19,962 84,797 1937 -1938 590,026 4,135,433 
1898 15,028 63,838 1938 -1939 701,417 5,075,524 
1899 12,076 51,300 1939 -1940 818,911 6,550,469 
1900 8,947 38,007 1840 -1941 882,241 7,410,824 
1901 5,223 22,187 1941 -1942 880,000 7,392,000 
1902 22,806 96,880 1942 -1943 721,315 6,059,046 
1903 59,979 254,790 1943 -1944 536,727 4,508,507 
1904 89,096 378,481 1944 -1945 527,628 4,432,075 
1905 153,913 653,821 1945 -1946 540,906 4,639,351 
1906 210,049 892,291 1946 -1947 604,250 5,204,103 
1907 273,898 1,163,517 1947 -1948 557,185 4,798,756 
1908 281,257 1,194,743 1948 -1949 632,014 5,873,846 
1909 230,494 979,074 1949 -1950 679,173 7,354,764 
1910 183,691 780,398 1950 -1951 694,886 8,625,272 
1911 253,977 1,079,024 1951 -1952 679,831 8,438,402 
1912 352,957 1,499,469 1952 -1953 7C0,139 8,690,475 
1913 388,126 1,648,770 1953 -1954 734,630 9,118,595 
1914 410,655 1,744,499 1954 -1955 787,922 9,780,081 
1915 404,781 1,719,638 1955 -1956 562,445 6,981,349 
1916 383,651 1,629,746 1956 -1957 767,204 9,522,920 
1917 364,707 1,549,275 1957 -1958 797,493 9,898,881 
1918 314,862 1,337,537 1958 -1959 842,113 10,452,728 
1919 295,226 1,254,258 1959 -1960 915,317 11,361,372 
1920 207,506 881,484 1960 -1961 878,459 10,903,872 
1921 203,395 863,979 1961 -1962 823,115 10,216,914 
Jan- Mar'22 55,665 236,425 1962 -1963 911,663 11,316,017 
Apr Mar 1963 -1964 912,592 11,327,547 
1922 -1923 204,073 866,902 1964 -1965 851,090 10,564,155 
1965 -1966 708,906 8,799,295 
Total 30,626,614 Z273,719,630 
Source: Ghana Chamber of Mines, 39th Annual Report, 1965 -66. 
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APPENDIX III 
LABOUR EMPLOYED IN GOLD MINING : 1904 -1966 
Europeans Africans 
S. U. Total S. U. Total 
1904 n.a. n.a. 611 n.a. n.a. 17,044 
1905 333 166 504 3,928 3,537 12,465 
1906 221 335 556 4,764 8,816 14,580 
1907 n.a. n.a. 560 n.a. n.a. 14,677 
1908 325 264 589 8,705 6,500 15,205 
1909 329 171 500 9,798 5,597 15,395 
1910 434 238 672 11,626 6,840 18,466 
1911 513 257 77o 10,902 7,391 18,293 
1912 478 234 712 9,467 7,454 16,921 
1913 360 204 564 7,970 7,124 15,094 
1914 329 208 537 7,371 7,833 15,204 
1915 291 184 475 7,217 7,607 14,824 
1916 267 180 447 7,556 6,987 14,543 
1917 258 150 408 7,790 7,212 15,002 
1913 217 113 330 6,483 6,344 12,827 
1919 192 95 287 5,698 5,307 11,005 
1920 190 75 265 5,822 3,953 9,775 
1921 186 66 252 6,479 3,834 10,313 
1922 195 78 273 6,897 5,243 12,140 
1922-1923 190 75 265 5,866 4,217 10,083 
1923-1924 178 79 257 5,929 4,096 10,025 
1924-1925 156 73 229 6,108 4,230 10,338 
1925-1926 135 55 190 5,116 4,019 9,135 
1926-1927 128 67 195 4,201 4,039 8,240 
1927-1928 124 78 202 4,034 3,797 7,831 
1928-1929 132 77 209 4,253 3,534 7,792 
1929-1930 132 68 200 4,106 3,280 7,386 
1930-1931 116 66 182 3,767 3,398 7,165 
1931-1932 107 64 171 3,978 4,026 8,004 
1932-1933 120 79 199 4,787 4,095 8,882 
1933-1934 153 102 255 5,839 4,613 10,452 
1934-1935 227 162 389 8,485 6,678 15,163 
1935-1936 364 257 621 14,502 9,033 23,535 
1936-1937 471 284 755 16,470 10,621 27,091 
1937-1938 482 301 783 15,552 11,761 27,313 
1938-1939 557 315 372 18,463 12,071 30,534 
1939-1940 597 325 922 20,891 12,833 33,724 
1940-1941 537 226 763 20,752 14,522 35,274 
1941-1942 484. 203 687 19,849 15,103 34,952 
1942-1943 427 158 585 18,385 14,035 32,42o 
1943-1944 334 126 460 13,953 8,991 22,944 
1944-1945 301 115 416 14,267 10,322 24,589 
1945-1946 286 135 421 15,835 10,923 26,758 
1946-1947 455 182 637 19,742 11,869 31,611 
1947-1948 497 254 751 13,985 13,263 32,249 
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APPI1NDIX III (contd.) 
Europeans Africans 
S. U. Total S. U. Total 
1948-1949 515 209 724 15,848 13,392 29,24o 
1949-1950 -508 235 743 15,800 13,120 28,920 
1950-1951 506 261 767 16,521 13,254 29,775 
1951-1952 525 268 793 16,155 12,775 28,930 
1952-1953 511 263 774 15,138 11,962 27,100 
1953-1954 53o 257 787 14,949 12,950 27,899 
1954-1955 537 269 806 12,857 12,507 25,364 
1955-1956 504 276 780 10,599 11,197 21,796 
1956-1957 468 246 714 9,962 11,111 21,073 
1957-1958 438 254 692 9,751 11,826 21,577 
1958-1959 457 269 726 10,304 12,250 22,554 
1959-1960 459 259 718 9,155 12,962 22,117 
1960-1961 354 226 580 8,267 11,352 19,619 
1961-1962 304 229 533 8,954 12,165 21,119 
1962-1963 289 232 521 9,121 12,279 21,400 
1963-1964 211 204 415 8,463 10,211 18,674 
1964-1965 185 159 344 8,558 9,838 18,396 
1965-1966 170 128 298 8,409 9,547 17,956 
S = Surface. U = Underground. n.a. = not available. 
Sources; A.R.M.D., 1904 -1915 Chamber of Mines, A.R., 
1955 and 1966. 
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APPENDIX IV 
COMPETING CLAIMS TO TITLE OF LAND IN THE GOLD COAST : 
Memorandum from the Gold Coast Exploration and Trading 
Co. Ltd. Enclosure in letter, dated 17th September 
1903, to Colonial Office. (C096/414) 
34, Clements Lane, 
Lombard Street, E.C. 
7th September, 1903. 
MEMORANDUM 
The properties originally purchased by this Company were 
known as Baidoo, Ageewah, Impatassie and Subirihu, and their leases 
were dated respectively as follows, viz: - 
Baidoo dated 20/7/97 area 4 miles by 8 miles 
Ageewah " 15/6/96 " 8 miles by 8 miles 
Impatassie " 14/1/96 " about 12 miles square. 
The above three properties were leased to the Company by Chief Yireh 
and signed by the paramount chief Agieman of Dixcove. The Subirihu 
Mine lease, dated 2/3/99, is a small property to the south of the above 
mentioned properties, and was leased by Chief Agieman of Dixcove. 
All the necessary legal documents vesting the property in 
the Company have been duly registered on the Gold Coast, and so far 
everything has been properly and legally done, and the Company has 
been in possession and actively working the Baidoo and Impatassie 
properties since 1896, and have paid a yearly rental of £125 per annum. 
It was not until the July of 1901 that this Company heard 
of any opposition or claim against the Company's title, and this was 
through the Scottish Wassau Syndicate, who held deeds dated as follows: 
October, 1900 (Ehyirebaka concession) 
15/4/01, (Tua Concession) 
30/4/01, (Okkubeybaka concession). 
These properties were leased to them by Chief Chante and purported to 
cover practically the whole of the area of our properties previously 
mentioned, namely, Baidoo, Ageewah and Impatassie. 
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In November, 1901, arrangements were made whereby the Scottish 
Wassau Syndicate joined this Company, and we thus acquired their 
interest in the leases above mentioned. 
In the following year, (1902) we again had notification of 
further opposition to our properties through the Bansu Properties 
Limited of Liverpool, who were applying for certificates of validity 
to properties known as 
Ekkubeybaka, lease dated 12/1/01 
Kukubeybaka " " 16/1/01 
Yeransoo n " 20/10/00 
and it was assumed that these properties also overlapped our original 
Baidoo and Impatassie properties, and the lessee to the Bansu Properties 
Ltd. was the same Chief as the one to the Scottish Wassau Syndicate, 
namely Chief Qwesi Ghante. 
It would appear from the above that Chief Qwesi Ghante has in 
these two instances granted duplicate leases for the same property. 
After considerable trouble arrangements were made with the 
Bansu Properties Ltd. whereby they amalgamated with this company and 
vested the interests in their leases in this Company for a valuable 
consideration. 
In the meantime the case came before the Court and our 
original Baidoo and Impatassie leases were declared by Justice Morgan 
to be invalid on the ground that although obtained from Chief Yireh, 
the rightful soil chief, they were confirmed by Chief Agieman, who, it 
was proved in Court, had no right to confirm, and the Court upheld 
Chief Ghante's claim as Paramount Chief to this District. The result 
was that we entirely lost our property under the original leases, 
namely, Baidoo, Ageewah, Subirihu and Impatassie. 
In the meantime the properties of the Bansu Properties Ltd. 
had been surveyed and it would appear that they do not overlap any 
portion of our original Baidoo property, but it is clear that Chief 
Ghante has absolutely no knowledge of the area of the district over 
which he is Paramount Chief, and has from the documents above mentioned 
leased twice over the same property to different people. 
The result is that in attempting to save our properties by 
obtaining certificates of validity we have practically bought them 
three times over, besides spending some E40,000. in development work 
on the Baidoo and Impatassie properties. 
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The following are the respective official enquiry Numbers 





210, Cape Coast Ehyirebaka 
764, " Tua 
765, " " Okkubeybaka 
73, " " Ekkubeybaka 
74 " " Kukubeybaka 
4079 " " Yeransoo 
N.B. It should be mentioned that no one is seeking to disturb the 
Company or asking for possession of the Baidoo propertys and except 
for the provisions of the Concessions Ordinance 1900 the Company 
could probably maintain possession. 
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APPENDIX V 
GOVE' lia T NOTICE OF 1895 
PROHIBITING LAND GRANTS FOR INDUSTRIAL PURPOSES 
(CO879/46/19540 : enclosure in no.32) 
GOVERNMENT NOTIFICATION 
Whereas grants and concessions have been made by Chiefs 
within the Protectorate without the consent of the Governor of the 
Colony - 
Notice is hereby given that no document hereafter made 
purporting to grant or convey any right over or interest in land, save 
and except the right to occupy agricultural land for the purposes of 
Native husbandry or the right to occupy building land for the erection 
of a Native house, will be recognised in any way by the Government 
unless it shall bear the signature of the Governor, or of such officer 
as he shall appoint for the purpose, in token of her Majesty's approval. 
Grants and Concessions already made without such consent will 
be recognised only to such extent and on such conditions as may here- 
after be determined, but the grantees of rights in respect of which 
there is a reasonable prospect of efficient and continuous work being 
done within a reasonable time will receive all due consideration. 
By his Excellency's Command, 
F.M.HODGSON, 
Colonial Secretary. 
Colonial Secretary's Office, Accra, 
October 10th, 1895. 
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APPENDIX VI 
SURVEYING THE MINING PROPERTIES : A DESCRIPTION 
(Extract from "We Two in West Africa" by Moore 
and Guggisberg, 1909: 153 -154). 
The work of marking the boundaries of the mining properties 
had been carried out by my husband's department, the Gold Coast Survey. 
It was, indeed, the raison d'etre of that party, and was of such a 
peculiar nature that I believe a short account of how it came about 
and how it was done will interest the lay reader, besides showing him 
how it was that such a small colony as the Gold Coast came to spend 
more money on survey work than other larger and more important parts 
of the empire. 
For many years European companies had been taking up blocks 
of land for gold- mining purposes. This meant that a company entered 
into an agreement with the tribe to which the land belonged to lease 
the ground for a number of years at a certain rent, the agreement 
being made legal and receiving the sanction of the Government by going 
through certain formalities in the European judge's court. 
Now, if you take up land in England or any other open 
country, it is comparatively simple to run a fence or wall about it, 
or to set up stone pillars at the corners, or, if you do not want to 
do even that much, to mark its position on a map. Anyway you can take 
some simple steps to show people that the land is yours. On the Gold 
Coast, however, it is quite a different matter; your measures must be 
heroic. 
To begin with, there was no reliable map in those days. 
Then, to build a fence or erect marks around a property in a forest so 
dense as to require cutting through, and of such rapid growth as to 
cover any landmark in a few months, would not only necessitate great 
labour but would be of little use in warning newcomers that the ground 
was reserved. 
To meet the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Government 
decided that the mine boundaries were to be avenues, at least 3 feet 
wide, cut through. the forest, and marked with boundary posts bearing 
name- plates at every thousand feet. It was understood that this 
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boundary should be cut and the concession properly surveyed before the 
company could obtain a document called a certificate of validity, 
entitling it to the full use of the land, but otherwise no steps were 
taken to enforce the early execution of the work. 
Now, cutting a boundary for nine or ten miles around a 
concession was an expensive undertaking, so nearly all the companies 
deferred the operation. Year by year more properties were leased and 
more companies formed until such a state of chaos arose as has seldom 
been equalled in any country. 
What happened was something like this. Some European 
prospector, I will call him Mr Brown, would find good evidence of gold 
at a place, say, half a mile east of Odumase village. He would go to 
Chief Adu of Odumase, arrange with him for renting a block of land of 
five square miles around his find, and pay him a sum of anything 
between E5 and £50 on account. A little later Mr Brown would go through 
the necessary formalities before the European judge and the lease of 
Odumase Concession would be filed in the court. Then off would go Mr 
Brown to Europe, with a box of gold specimens, to sell his mine or 
float a company as the case might. A few months later along would 
come Mr Jones to the same village and start prospecting. About a 
quarter -mile west of the village he would find sufficient traces of 
gold to warrant his leasing a five -mile block around that spot from 
Chief Adu. Inquiring the name of the village he would be told it was 
Adukrom, for every Gold Coast village has two names, one the name of 
its chief and the other coming from some other cause. In this case, 
Krom being village, Adukrom meant the "village of Adu"; and Ase meaning 
near, Odumase meant the "village near the Odum tree ". 
Leaving a payment on account with Chief Adu, Mr Jones would 
travel down to the Coast and go through the same formalities over 
"Adukrom Concession" before the judge as Mr Brown had done with "Odumase ". 
The judge would file the lease, never guessing that the two concessions 
covered practically the same ground. How could he, with no map to guide 
him? Then, off would go Mr Jones to Europe to float a company to work 
"Adukrom Concession ". 
The fun began when Brown's and Jones' respective companies 
began active operations and discovered that they owned the same piece 
of ground. And as this was happening all over the mining districts 
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the Courts of Justice soon began to assume a festive aspect. The 
chiefs, loving a law case like all natives do, turned up in force, 
followed by their elders, brothers and cousins; the mining companies 
paid heavily in fees, and the native barristers grew eloquent and fat - 
stoutness and wealth keep pace with the native. It was all very well 
for them and the-chiefs, but the British public's money went like 
water and companies meaning work were paralysed by uncertainty. 
Upwards of a thousand concession leases were filed in the courts and 
no Government official knew where any of them were - no one whose 
duty it was to do so existed. 
It was into this chaos that Major Sir Matthew Nathan, R.E., 
stepped when he was appointed Governor in December 1900. The action 
he took was immediate and decisive, and resulted in the arrival in 
1901 of Major Alan Watherston, R.E., and a party of Sapper officers 
and men to survey the mining district. 
The task before Major Watherston was a heavy one. A country 
absolutely unsuited to any kind of rapid survey, a_confused mass of 
concessions to sort out, and a tangled skein of legal complications 
and Government red tape to unravel. He threw himself into the work, 
however, with the energy and cheeriness born in the man, and with axe, 
pencil and knife soon solved the difficulties just enumerated. There 
was many a mining company that owed Major Watherston a debt of gratitude 
for the rapid way in which he extricated it from its troubles. 
With the small party that had been hastily gathered together 
it was only possible in the first season to survey a line along the 
sea -coast and to send a couple more into the interior through the 
mining district, on to which to base or tie the surveys of the 
concessions. In the following years the Sappers were reinforced by a 
large party of Queensland and New Zealand surveyors, skilled men and 
old hands at the game. With about forty Europeans and 700 natives 
divided into ten parties, the work went right merrily, survey operations 
being carried on during the dry season from October to May, the 
remaining four months of rain being spent away from the "Coast ", one 
on the voyage home and out, and three months on leave, or in mapping 
work in London. 
The work of mapping the Gold Coast was probably one of the 
most formidable tasks a surveyor has ever been called on to tackle, 
as the country is undoubtedly the most difficult in the world to survey. 
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In open countries where villages, hills, and other features of the 
landscape can be seen miles away, map -making is a comparatively easy 
business, but it is quite another matter when you are buried in a dense 
forest and can only see, with luck, ten yards ahead. 
I do not mean to say that forest surveys have not been 
executed in other parts of the world, for they have been successfully 
carried through. But in those cases it was possible to circumvent 
the forest so that only a few of the survey lines had to be driven 
through it, nor was the forest so thick and the climate so bad as in 
the Gold Coast. There it was a question of cutting your way, seemingly 
blindly, day after day, week after week, in one monotonous grind in the 
damp gloom of the tropical forest. The lane so formed was accurately 
measured with surveying instruments, and was slowly pushed on at a 
rate of about a mile a day until it met another lane, cut by some 
other party which, starting about fifty miles from the first, had 
gradually converged on to it by pre- arranged plans. 
These surveyed lanes formed a kind of skeleton framework on 
which to build the map of the country. Bush tracks, streams, and 
villages in the neighbourhood were rapidly surveyed from each lane by 
the junior surveyors with magnetic compasses and steel chains, natives 
being ultimately trained to do this part of the work. 
A mining concession was surveyed in somewhat the following 
manner. Starting from the point which the lease showed to be the 
datum of the property, and which was generally marked by the shaft or 
pit where the prospector had originally found the gold which had made 
him take up the land, the surveyor cut and measured his way through 
the forest until he knew by his calculations that he was on the spot 
where the boundary should be. Then he would cut this boundary in the 
correct direction, measuring and calculating as he went, until he 
arrived at the point where the corner should be. Here he would change 
his direction again, and cut on to the next corner. Proceeding on 
this system he would eventually arrive at the place where he started 
the boundary, if his calculations and measurements had been correct. 
The only thing then remaining was to cut another lane to join the 
boundary to one of the main survey lanes previously described so that 
the concession could be placed on the map. 
The reader can imagine what wearisome work this must have 
been, especially if a surveyor lost his assistant and had no white man 
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to talk to. The monotonous slogging away at the "bush ", the minute 
eye- wearing work with the instruments, the endless calculations, the 
close hot -house atmosphere, the eternal gloom, the lonely evenings, 
the heavy sweating sleep in the still damp of the nights. 
Small wonder that, after eight months of this, the "coaster" 
gives a whoop of -joy on seeing the smoke of his homeward -bound ship 
on the horizon and behaves like an excited boy on his voyage home. 
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APPENDIX VII 
PETITION FROM MINES EMPLOYEES UNION, 1946 
(Source: Gorman Award, 1947, Exhibit 'A') 
THE GOLD COAST MINES EMPLOYEES UNION (REGISTERED) 
HEAD OFFICE, ABOSO 
The Secretary, 




P.O. Box No. 1, 
Abos o, 
7th June, 1946. 
I am directed by the Executive Council of this Union to inform 
you that it is their desire for a deputation of selected members to 
meet your Chamber on the following matters: - 
(1) Viages (a) maximum of the rates of wages of the Surface and 
Underground labourers to be raised to 3s and 3s 6d per day 
respectively. 
Surface Rate Minimum rate 1/9 
Underground 2/0 
(b) That a general increment of 1s may be given to the employees 
to stand in substitute of the filar Bonus thus ignored the African 
Miners since the outbreak of the War. 
(2) Hours of work - Forty -two hours a week for both surface and 
underground workers. 
(3) Overtime - Government method and practice to be adopted. 
(4) Holidays - (a) All public holidays so declared to be observed 
and enjoy with full pay. 
(b) Annual leave - The following vacation leave should be 
granted with full pay. 
6 weeks to Headmen. 
4 weeks to skilled and clerical workers. 
2 weeks to Labourers. 
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(c) The travelling expenses for employees going on leave be 
borne by the Company. 
(d) That an employee of regular attendance being temporary 
sick must be considered for pay provided the Medical Officer's 
certificate is available. 
(5) Gratuities - After five years' continued service a worker be 
eligible for the award of gratuity calculated on the basis 
of one -twentieth of a month's pay for each completed month of 
service. 







THE CLOSURE OF TAQUAH ; ABOSSO MINE : 
ATTITUDE OF THE MINES EMPLOYEES UNION 
(Source: 1956 Board of Enquiry, Appendix 9) 
GOLD COAST MINES EMPLOYEES UNION 
No .iv /H ,/Vol.2- 076 56 
The General Manager, 








5th January, 1956. 
TARQUAH AND ABOSSO CLOSING DOWN 
The National Executive Council of the above Union in session 
on the 3rd January, 1956 directs me to inform the Gold Coast Chamber of 
Mines and its member TARQUAH & ABOSO MINES LTD. that the intention of 
its directors to cease pumping so as to allow the underground workings 
to flood in order to make it impracticable to re -open the Mines there- 
after, is of no serious problem to the Union. 
It is the Union's sole responsibility to regulate the wages 
of the work people and to improve upon the existing poor conditions in 
the mining industry. It therefore falls outside its responsibility in 
matters of such as confronts the directors. 
It should be noted that Taquah and Aboso Mines as party in 
this trade dispute cannot at the last resort evade the present crisis 
by closing down. If this were to happen the Union will not compromise 
on the claim of 15 per cent general increase with a retrospective 
payments as from 13th October, 1953. 
The Council wishes to emphasize this point that the workers 
of the Taquah and Abosso Mines would only return to the Mine after the 
closing down for any specified work upon special and favourable agreement 
being reached between the Union and the Company. 
Yours faithfully, 




RLr'L++RENCLS AND SETtF:CtED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Documentary material available for historical research 
in the Gold Coast. Trans.Gold Coast and Togolanc 
Soc., 1, 1952: 21 -23. 
ALTJN, G.K. Gold mining in Ghana. Trans.Instn.Min.Metall., 46, 
pt.10, 1956 -57: 505 -526. 
ALLEN, G.K. Gold mining in Ghana. Afr.Affairs, 7, 22C, 
221 -240. 
AMALGAMATED BANNT AREAS, LTD. 
Annual Reports. 
ARISTON GOLD MINES (1929) LTD. 
Annual Reports. 
ARGENTI, N. The gold mines of West Africa. London; Argenti, 
Sechiari & Co., 1947. 
ASHMEAD, F. Twenty -five years of mining. 1380 -1904. A retrospective 
review. Reprinted from the Mining Journal, London, 
1909. 
BARBOT, J. A description of the Coasts of North and South Gu-irea. 
Paris, 1732. 
BARCLAYS BANK, D.C.O. 
The Gold Coast: an economic survey. 1955. 
Ghana: an economic survey. 1960. 
BARLTHROP, E.g. Labour in West Africa. Corona, 1, 6, July 1949: 11 -13. 
BATES, D.A. Past history of geological research in Gold Coast and 
some problems awaiting investigation. J.W.Afr.Science 
Ass., 3, 1957: 45 -47. 
BERGNE, J.A'C. West African banket: some surveying, geological and 
other features. Bull.Instn.Min.Metall., No.465, 1L44. 
KEVIN, H.J. The Gold Coast economy about 1880. Trans.Gold Coast 
and Togoland Hist.Soc., 2, 1956: 73 -86. 
BIBIANI (1927) LTD. 
Annual Reports. 
BING, G. Reap the whirlwind. An account of Kwame Nkrumah's 
Ghana from 1950 to 1966. MacGibbon and Kee, 1968. 
BIRMINGHAM, b., NEUSTADT, I., and OMABOE, E.N. (eds.). 
A study of contemporary Ghana. Vo1.1, The economy of 
Ghana. 1966; Vol.2, Some aspects of social structure. 
1967. Allen & Unwin. 
313. 
BISHOP, D. W. , and. HUGHES, W.J. 
A contribution to the geology of the manganese ore 
deposits in the Gold Coast Colony and in Ashanti. 
Trans.Instn.Min.Metall., 1930; 142 -191. 
BLANCHARD, F.M. Gold dredging in West Africa. New York, Engng.Min.J., 
137, April 1936: 175 -177. 
BLAY, J.B. The Gold Coast Mines Employees Union. Ilfracombe, 
Stockwell, 1950. 
BOATENG, E.A. The Tarkwa gold mining industry: a retrospect. 
Achimota, Bull.Gold Coast Geogrl.Ass., 2, 1, 1957. 
A geography of Ghana. C.U.P., 1959. 
BONDS, E.M. Mining at Marlu (Gold Coast). London, Inane Quarry 
Engng., î, June 1951: 197 -202. 
BOSMAN, W. A new and accurate description of the Coast of Guinea. 
(A reprint of the edition of 1705.) London, Ballantyne 
& Co., 1907. 
BOURRET, F.M. Ghana: the road to independence, 1919 -1957. Revised 
edn., O.U.P., 1960. 
BOWLER, L.P. Notes on the Gold Coast of Africa. Trans.Instn.iVIin. 
Engrs., 11, 1903: 413 -414. 
BRAY, A. Notes on the banket reefs of the Gold Coast Colony. 
Trans.Instn.Min.Piletall,, 38, 290, November 1928: 21 -26. 
BREMANG GOLD DREDGING CO. LTD. 
Annual Reports. 
BRUHL, P.T. Gold crushing and cyaniding in a West African mill. 
New York, Engng.Min.J., 106, January 13, 1918: 54 -57. 
BURTON, R.F. Gold on the Gold Coast. J.Soc.Arts, 30, 1882: 785 -794. 
and CAMERON, V.L. 
To the Gold Coast for gold. 2 Vols. Chatto & Windus, 
1883. 
BUSSCHAU, W.J. Gold and international liquidity. The flow of credit 
in relation to gold in the international monetary system. 
Johannesburg, South African Institute of International 
Affairs, 1961. 
CAMERON, V.L. The goldfields of West Africa. J.Soc.Arts, 30, 1882: 
777 -785. 
CAMPBELL, J.M. Notes on some gold occurrences in Ashanti. Trans. 
Instn.Min.Metall., 24, 1915; 252 -268. 
CANDLISH, L.D. Diamond recovery from gravels and clays in the Gold 
Coast Colony. Min.Mag., June 1931: 333 -342. 
314. 
CARDINALL,, A.W. A bibliography of the Gold Coast (1496 -1931) issued as 
a companion volume to the census report of 1931. Accra, 




CLARIDGE, W. W. 
The Gold Coast; an historical approach. Afr.Affairs, 
d6, 183, April 1947: 89-97. 
The flotation of gold ore at the Bibiani mine. 
Johannesburg, S.Afr.Min.Engng.J., Nov.2, 1935: 281 -283. 
Some geographical aspects of West African development. 
Bell, 1966. 
A history of the Gold Coast and Ashanti. 2 Vols. 
Murray, 1915. 
CLIFFORD, E.L.R. Our days on the Gold Coast. John Murray, 1919. 
COLLINS, B.I. The geology_ of the Tarkwa goldfield. Private publica- 
tion, 1909. 
COOPER, W.G.G. Gold Coast bauxite. Bull.Imp.Inst.,, 3, 1936; 
331 -347. 
CORNISH, T. Gold mining on the Gold Coast. Min.J., 24 Aug. 1901: 
1108 -1149. 
COX- GEORGE, N.A. Studies in finance and development: the Gold Coast 
experience, 1914 -1918. Public Finance, 13, 2, 1958: 
146 -177. 
CURL, J.H. West African mines. Min.Ma., Sept.1904: 42 -46. 
CYANIDING gold ore at the Ashanti mine, Gold Coast. New York, Enjng. 





DE KUN, N. 
DICKSON, K.B. 
New factors in Gold Coast mining. Min.Wld., 111 
Nov.29, 1930: 472 -473. 
The changing pattern of settlements in the mining 
areas of Ghana. Unpublished M.A.Thesis, University 
of London, 1962. 
Effects of modern mining on settlements in the mining 
areas of Ghana. Bull.Ghana Geogrl.Ass., 8, 1, 1963. 
Mi rant labour in the Gold Coast. Achimota, University 
College of Gold Coast, 1954. 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd. London, the 
Corporation, 1902. 
The mineral resources of Africa. Amsterdam, Elsevier 
Publishing Co., 1965. 
Background to the problem of economic development in 
Northern Ghana. Ann.Ass.Amer.Geogrs., 1968: 686 -696. 
315. 
DICKSON, K.B. A historical geography of Ghana. C.U.P., 1969. 
DOUBTFIRE, T. Gold- dredging on the Offin. Gliksten J., 10, 1, 
1968: 12. 
DREDGING for gold on the Gold Coast. Min.J., Nov.29, 1902: 1615 -1616. 
DUPONT, H. 
EDtiTARDS, Y. 
Les gisements auriferes de la Cote d'Or d'Afrique. 
Paris, 1901. 
Ashanti gold mine. Camborne, Camborne Sch.Min.Mag., 
21, June, 1951: 67 -81. 
ENGMAANN, E.V.T. Geo ra.hical distribution of .opulation characteristics 
in Ghana: an aspect of population geography. Unpublished 





Ghana: a historical interpretation. Wisconsin U.P., 
1959. 
An introduction to the history of West Africa. Second 
edition. C.U.P., 1959. 
J.L. Post -mineralisation fissuring at Ashanti mine. 
Bull.Instn.Min.Metall., No.466, Nov.1941. 
Minerals. Scientific American, 209, 3, Sept.1963. 
V.R. The mines of Ashanti Goldfields Corporation. 
Min.Mag., j, May 1916: 257 -268. 
FERGUSON, G.E. Report on a mission to Attabubu. Accra, 1890. 
FOOT, L.R. and JONES, T.F.E. 
The Gold Coast and the Fantis: a complete compendium 
for miners, traders, and students of native life. 
London, Gold Coast Globe Publishing Co., 1904. 
FORDS, S.H. Manganese in the Gold Coast. J.Afr.Soc., 1920: 
278 -184. 
FOSTER, D.J. Labour superintendence on the Gold Coast. San 
Francisco, Min.Scient.Press, 3 Feb.1912: 202 -203. 
FRANKEEL, S.H. Investment and return on equity capital in the South 
African Gold Mining Industry, 1887 -1965. Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell, 1967. 
FRASER, H.H. and SOMERSET, O.E.A. 
Scientific management principles applied to West 
African mining. Bull.Instn.Min.Metall., No.617, 
April 1958: 285 -348. 
GALENSON, W.(ed.)Labor and economic development. New York, John Wiley 
& Sons, 1959. 
GENi.VESIS of auriferous conglomerates of the Gold Coast. Q.J.Geol.Soc., 
1893: 290. 
316. 
GENOUD, R. Nationalism and economic development in Ghana. New 
York, Praeger, 1969. 
GHANA - see also under GOLD COAST. 
CENSUS OFFICE.1960 Population Census of Ghana. Accra, 1962. 
CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS. 
Economic Survey. Annual, 1957 -1968. Accra, 1958 -1969. 
1963 Statistical Yearbook. Accra, 1966. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 
National Planning Commission Report on minin° and 
mineral industries, by J.E.CUDJOE, undated ?1963). 
Typescript. 
References in the reports of the Director of 
Geological Surveys to occurrences of economic minerals 
in Ghana. (Bull.No.28), 1962. 
GOVERNMENT, 1959. 
Second Development Plan, 1959 -1964. 
, 1960. 
Survey of High -Level manpower in Ghana. 
, 1961. 
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into concessions. 
1964. 
Seven -year plan for national reconstruction and 
development: financial years 1963/64 -1969/70. 
, 1968. 
Two -year development plan: a plan for the period 
mid- 1968/mid -1970. 
MINES DEPT. Report on the Mines Department for the period 1st 
April - 31st March, 1956. Accra, 1957. 
Last Report issued for year 1963/64. Accra, 1965. 
MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY. 
Handbook of commerce and industry. Second edition. 
Accra, 1959. 
MISCELLANEOUS OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS. 
Commercial and Industrial Bulletin, No.31 etc., 5 July 
1963 etc. Accra, 1963- 
Land and Concessions Bulletin. No.25 etc., 5 July 
1963 etc. Accra, 1963- 
Minerals profits tax bill. Accra, 1957. 
GHANA'S mineral wealth. W.Afr.Rev., 31, 497, 1960: 65 -67. Accra, 1962. 
317. 
GOLD; a world survey. Economic Research Dept., Charter Consolidated 
Limited, Nov. 1969. 
GOLD: Ashanti Goldfields metallurgy. Min.Mag., 26, 1, Jan.1922: 3 -4. 
GOLD Coast Handbook. Accra, West African Publicity Co., 1937. 
GOLD Coast mines, West Africa. Melbourne, Min.Engng.Rev., 1911: 
480 -484. 
GOLD COAST - see also under GHANA. 
CENSUS OFFICE.The Gold Coast 1931: a review of conditions in the 
Gold Coast in 1931 as compared with those of 1921, 
based on figures and facts collected by the Chief 
Census Officer of 1931, together with a historical, 
ethnographical and sociological survey of the people 
of that country. Accra, Govt. Printer, 1932. 
The Gold Coast: census of population, 1948. Report 
and tables. Crown Agents, 1950. 
CHAMBER OF MINES. 
Annual reports, 1928 -1957: continued as GHANA ... 1958 - 
Gold from the Gold Coast. Accra, 1950. 
FORESTRY DEPT.Gold Coast timber industry: report of a fact -finding 
committee. Accra, Govt. Printer, 1951. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 
Annual reports, 1913 -1957: continued as GHANA ... 1958- 
Outlines of the mineral and water -power resources of 
the Gold Coast, British Nest Africa, with hints on 
prospecting, by A.E.KITSON. Accra, 1925 (Bulletin No.1). 
The geological and mining features of the Tarkwa -Abosso 
goldfield, by O.A.S.WHITELAW. 1929. (Memoir No.1) 
References to occurrences of economic minerals in the 
Gold Coast, recorded in the Annual Reports of the 
Director, Geological Survey, by A.E.KITSON and W.J.FELTON. 
1930. (Bulletin No.5) 
The geology of the Obuasi goldfield, by N.R.JUNNER. 
1932. (Memoir No.2). 
The geology of the Prestéa goldfield, by W.G.G.COOPER. 
1934. (Memoir No.3). 
Gold in the Gold Coast, by N.R.JUNNER, with appendix: 
Gold Coast laws and their effect on mining, by P.R.WILD. 
1935. (Memoir No.4). 
The bauxite deposits of the Gold Coast, by W.G.G.000PER. 
1936. (Bulletin No.7). 
318. 
GOLD COAST (contd.) 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (contd.) 
A bibliography of Gold Coast geology, mining and 
archaeology to March 193.7, by W.T.JAI,ZGS. 1937. 
(Bulletin Nó.9). 
The geology of the Tarkwa goldfield and adjacent 
country, by T.HIRST. 1938. (Bulletin No.10). 
The geology and mineral resources of the Gold Coast, 
by N.R.JUNNER. Accra, 1938. 
The geology of the Konongo gold belt and surrounding 
country, by T.HIRST. 1942. (Bulletin No.11). 
The Tarkwa goldfield, by N.R.JUNNER. 1942. (Memoir 
No.5). 
The geolor;y of the Nsuta manganese ore deposits, by 
H.SERVICE. 1943. (Memoir No.6). 
The diamond deposits of the Gold Coast, with notes 
on other diamond deposits in West Africa, by N.R.JUNNER. 
1943. (Bulletin No.12). 
Reports on the Bibiani goldfield, by T.HIRST and 
N.R.JUNNER. 1946. (Memoir No.9). 
GOVERNMENT. Annual Reports of the Governor to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies. 1870 -1957. 
Annual Blue Book. 1870-1954. 
, 1918. 
Papers relating to the reafforestation of areas denuded 
of forest by the requirements of the mines and railways. 
(Sessional Paper 7 of 19178). 
, 1919. 
Report on the discovery of diamonds at ABOMOSO, 
North -west of Kibbi, Eastern Province, Gold Coast, by 
A.E.IITSON. (Sessional Paper 9 of 1918/19). 
, 1930. 
Corresaondence relating to the proposed Western 
Province railwa from Tarkwa to Bibianiha. Sessional 
Paper 10 of 1930 31 . 
, 1930. 
Further correspondence relating to the proposed 
Western Province railway, Tarkwa-Bebianiha. (Sessional 
Paper 20 of 1930/31). 
, 1930. 
Memorandum by Sir Albert Kitson, C.M.G., C.B.E. on 
the operations of the Geological Surve De.artment of 
the Gold Coast, 1913 -1930. Sessional Paper 22 of 
1930/31). 
319. 
GOLD COAST (contd.) 
GOVERNMENT, 1933. 
The gold and other mineral resources of the Gold Coast 
and Sierra Leone: an address delivered in London on 
the 12th October 1932 by N.R.JUNNER, Director of the 
Geological Survey. (Sessional Paper 1 of 1933). 
1935. 
Papers relating to the accident which Occurred on the 
5th June, 1934 at the Prestea Mine, in which forty -one 
persons were killed. (Sessional Paper 1 of 1935). 
1941. 
An interim report on the prevalence of silicosis and 
tuberculosis among mine workers in the Gold Coast. 
(Medical Officer, A.J.MURRAY). 
1944 
Firewood reserves. (Sessional Paper 8 of 1944). 
1944. 
General plan for development in the Gold Coast. 
1947. 
Memorandum on colonial mining policy. (Sessional 
Paper 9 of 1947). 
1947. 
In the matter of the Trades Dispute (Arbitration and 
Inquiry) Ordinance, 1941 and in the Matter of a Trade 
Dispute between the Gold Coast Panes Employees Union 
and the Gold Coast Chamber of Mines. Award of 
Arbitrator. (Arbitrator, W.GOPiïAN). 
1951, 
The development plan, 1951. 
1952. 
Re ort of the Commission of En.uir into the health 
needs of the Gold Coast. Sessional Paper 5 of 1952). 
1953. 
Report of the Nines Labour en uq iry committee. 
MINES DEPT. Annual Reports 1903 -1957. Continues as GHANA. 
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY AND MINES. 
Memorandum on mining in the Gold Coast, by D.A.SUTHERLAND. 
Accra, 1951. 
MINISTRY OF TRADE AND LABOUR. 
Report of the Gold Coast Mines Board of Inquiry, 1956. 
Accra, Govt. Printer, 1956. 
GOLDFIELDS of the Gold Coast. New York, Engng.Min.J., /1, May 13, 
1901: 623. 
320. 
GOLD prospects of the Offin River. Min.Wld., 133, July 1937; 99. 
GOLD resources of the 'Western World'; aid to marginal producers. 
San Francisco, Wld.Min., 21, 5, May 1968: 38 -45. 
GOULD, P.R. 
GREAT BRITAIN 
The development of the transport pattern in Ghana. 
Northwestern Univ., Dept. of Geography, 1960. 
COLONIAL OFFICE, 1883. 
Further correspondence regarding Affairs of the Gold 
Coast. African No.249. (CO 879/19). 
, 1884 
Farther correspondence regarding Affairs of the Gold 
Coast. African No.268. (CO 879/20). 
, 1885. 
Further correspondence regarding Affairs of the Gold 
Coast. African No.277. (Co 879/21). 
, 1886. 
Further correspondence regarding Affairs of the Gold 
Coast. African No.321. (CO 879/24). 
, 1888. 
Further correspondence 
Coast. African No.333 
regarding Affairs of the Gold 
. (CO 879/25). 
, 1889. 
Further correspondence 
Coast. African No.351. 
re arding Affairs of the Gold 
,CO 879/28). 
, 1894. 
Correspondence relating to proposed construction of 
railways in the Gold Coast. African (West) No.4 1. 
(CO 879/38). 
, 1897. 
Further correspondence relating to proposed construction 
of railways in the Gold Coast. African (West) No.464. 
(CO 879/40). 
, 1899. - 
Further correspondence relating to land grants and 
concessions on the Gold Coast. African (West) No.531. 
(CO 879/49). 
, 1901. 
Correspondence relating to land concessions and 
regulations on the Gold Coast. African (West) No.578. 
(CO 879/57). 
, 1902. 
Further correspondence relating to concessions and 
railways on the Gold Coast. African (West) No.652. 
(CO 879/67). 
321. 
GREAT BRITAIN (contd.) 
COLONIAL OFFICE, 1906. 
Correspondence relating to railway rates on the Gold 
Coast. African (West) No.803. (CO 879/91). 
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 1882. 
Further correspondence regarding Affairs of the Gold 
Coast. Cmnd.3386. 
, 1910. 
Report on Forests, by H.M.THOMPSON. Cmnd.4993. 
, 1911. 
Corres ondence relating to the alienation of tribal 
land on the Gold Coast. Cmnd.5743. 
1912/13. 
Report by H.C.BELFIELD on the legislation governing 
the alienation of native lands in the Gold Coast 
Colony. Cmnd.6278. 
1941. 
Report by Major G.St.J.ORDE -BROWNE on labour conditions 
in West Africa. Cmnd.6277. 
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE. 
Gold Coast: Original Correspondence. 1877 -1940 
inclusive. (CO 96/120-CO 96/769). 
GREEN, T. 
Gold Coast: Acts. (CO 97). 
Gold Coast: Sessional Papers. (CO 98). 
Gold Coast: Government Gazettes. (CO 99). 
Gold Coast: Blue Books of Statistics. (CO 100). 
Gold Coast: Confidential Print. (CO 879). 
The world of gold. Michael Joseph, 1968. 
GRIFFITH, S.V. Diamond mining in the Gold Coast. IVH.n.Mag., 41, 




Shaft sinking in West Africa (Bogosu mine). Min.Mag., 
1935: 282 -286. 
Trade unionism and socialism in Ghana. Presence 
Africaine, 23, 51, 1964: 16 -25. 
An African Survey: A study of problems arising in 
Africa south of the Sahara. O.U.P., 1938. 
Some banket deposits of the Gold Coast, West Africa. 
Newcastle, Trans.Fed.Instn.I+ttin.Engrs., 2, 1890/91: 
69 -84. 
322. 
HAMBER, T.R. The mine. Cassell, 1953. 
HANCE, W.A. African economic development. Revised edition. 
New York, Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 
1967. 
HAUSER, A. A note on some labour problems in Ghana. Bull.Inter- 
Afr.Labour Inst., 4, 6, Nov.1957: 76 -83. 
Absenteeism and labour turnover in manufacturing 
industry in the Dakar region. Ibadan, N.I.S.E.R., 
Conference Proc., Dec.1960: 161 -170. 
HAYFORD, J.E.C. Gold Coast land tenure and the Forest Bill. London, 
C.Ivi.Phillips, 1911. 
HEIGHAM, J.B. Industrial relations in the Gold Coast. Bull.Inter- 
Afr.Labour Inst., 2, 6, Nov.1955: 8 -24. 
HENNESSY, M.N. Diamond mining by Gold Coast Africans. Crown Colonist, 
20, 224, July 1950: 422 -423. 
HOBSON, G.V. and ROBINSON, A.M. 
The Gold Coast banket: some aspects of its geology 
in relation to mining. Trans.Instn.Min.'IVIetall., 
Sept.1942/43: 311 -346. 
HODDER, B.W. Tin mining on the Jos Plateau. Econ.Geogr., 32, 




and HARRIS, D.R. (eds.) 
Africa in Transition. Methuen & Co.Ltd., 1967. 
Notes on the early history of Tarkwa as a gold mining 
district. Gold Coast Rev., 2, 1 Jan.1926: 78 -117. 
The economics of mining. Stanford University Press, 
1933. 
Amalgamated Banket Areas: description of operations. 
Mine Quarry Engn., .2, May 1940: 123 -127. 
Ariston: particulars of operations. Mine Quarry 
Engng., June 1940: 153 -159, 191 -193. 
Bremang: the alluvial dredging operations. Mine 
Quarry Engng., Sept.1940: 243-248. 
Marlu Gold Mining Areas. Mine Quarry Engng., Oct. 
1940: 272 -278, 305 -309. 
Bibiani: description of the mining operations. Mine 
Quarry Engng., 6, Jan.1941: 9 -13. 
Bibiani: recovery operations and surface plant. Mine 
Quarry Engng., 6, Feb.1941: 33 -36. 
H[TTCHISON, W.F. The gold trade of the Gold Coast, 1826 -1890. Liverpool, 
Elder Dempster Mag., March 1935: 8 -10. 
323. 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE. 
African labour survey. I.L.O., 1958. 
IRVINE, J. The gold mines of West Africa. J.Soc.Arts., , 
Feb.1899: 305 -313. 
JACKSON, A.D. and MORGAN, W.A. (eds.) 
West African mining handbook. London, The Financial 
Times, 1909. 
JAMES, V.T. The mineral resources of the Gold Coast. Min.J., 
Centenary Number, May 1935: 117 -118. 
JOHNSON, A.F. A bibliography of Ghana, 1930 -1961. Longmans, for 
the Ghana Library Board, 1964. 
JOHNSTON, H.J. Mining methods of Ashanti (Obuasi shoot). Min.Mag. , 
1/, Sept.1917: 108 -110. 
JONES, W.R. Minerals in industry. Fourth edn., Penguin books, 
1963. 
JUNNER, N.R. Gisements de manganese de Nsuta, Gold Coast. Congres 
international des Mines, de la Metallurgie, et de la 
geologie appliquee, Vile session, Paris, 1935. 
Gold Coast Geological Survey: a department that pays. 
Liverpool, W.Afr.Rev., 6, July 1935: 67. 
Mineral wealth of the Gold Coast. Liverpool, W.Afr. 
Rev., 106, July 1936: 117. 
The Bonsa diamond field, Gold Coast Colony. Bull.Imp. 
Inst., 34, 3, 1936: 373 -374. 
Progress in geological investigation and mineral 
developments in the Gold Coast. Bull.Imp.Inst., 
1, 1946: 44 -62. 
JUSTICE, J.N. Diamond drilling in West Africa. Trans.Instn.Min. 
Metall., 12, 1903: 301 -339. 
KAVANAGH, P.M. Have 6000 years of gold mining exhausted the world's 
gold reserves? Montreal, Bull.Can.Ivlin.letall., 672, 
April 1968: 553 -558. 
KIMBLE, D. A political history of Ghana. The rise of Gold Coast 
nationalism, 1850-1923. O.U.P., 1963. 
IONDLEBERGER, C.P. Economic development. Second edition. McGraw -Hill, 
1965. 
IffRKP,2AN, E. A report upon a survey of African labour on the mines 
of the Gold Coast, with reference to its supply, 
distribution, efficiency and administration. Johannes- 





Brief description of the Geological Map of the Gold 
Coast (prepared for the International Geological Map 
of Africa). Madrid, Graficas Reunidas, 1928. 
Some minerals of the Gold Coast. Accra, Teachers J., 
2, 9, 1930. 
West African gold mining and the 'concessions industry'. 
West African Pamphlets No.25, 1904. (Reprinted from 
the Engineering Magazine.) 
Some effects of mining on the forest in the Tarkwa 
district. Farm & Forest, j, 1, June 1946: 45 -50. 
LLOYD- JACOB, D. and FELLS, P. 
Gold. New York, Walker & Co., 1971. 
McCARTHY, E.T. Gold mining in the Gold Coast. Min.J., 1 July, 1882. 
Early days on the Gold Coast. Min.Mag., Dec.1909. 
MACDONALD, G. Report on conditions of minin: labour in the Northern 
Territories of the Gold Coast. The Ross Institute, 
1952. 
MACDONALD, G.A. The Gold Coast, Past and Present. Longmans & Co., 1898. 
Gold in West Africa. J.Afr.Soc., 1, 1901/02: 416. 
McGOWAN, H.A. Treatment Bibiani mine, West 
Trans.Instn.Min.Metall., 57, 1948: 141 -164. 
MACHINERY and equipment at Nanwa gold mines. Min.J., 235, 1950: 395 -396. 
MAPS 
Map of a position of Western Province of the Gold Coast Colony, with 
the river Ancobra, showing concessions belonging to the African 
Consolidated Mines, Ltd. Compiled by R.B.N.WALKER and E.W.BONSON. 
London, 1884. 
Map of the Gold Coast with part of Ashanti, showing the positions 
and areas of mining properties. Compiled by H.WALLACH. Scale: 
1 :253,440. London, 1900. 
Philips' Goldfields map of West Africa, Tarkwa section. Scale: 2 miles 
to the inch. London, G. Philip & Son, 1901. 
Map of the West African gold mines. Drawn and compiled by the 
CHARTOGRAPHIC COMPANY; issued by the West African (Gold Coast) 
Mining Corporation, Ltd. Scale: about 24 miles to the inch. 
London, Chartographic Co., 1901. 
A map of the Gold Coast with part of Ashanti and the Ivory Coast, 
showing positions and areas of mining properties. Compiled by 




Plan of the Tarkwa district, showing concessions surveyed by the 
Gold Coast pines Survey, West Africa: under the direction of MAJOR 
A.E.WATHERSTON. Scale; 1388 yards to the inch. London, 1904/5. 
Map of the West African goldfields. Compiled by A.J.CLEVELY, Map 
specialist, from the 1 :125,000 Gold Coast maps (by permission of 
the War Office). Scale: 4 miles to the inch. Ilford, 1909. 
Provisional geological map of the Gold Coast and Western Togoland, 
with brief descriptive notes thereon, by A.E.KITSCN. G.C.G.S. 
Bull.No.2, 1928. 
Map of part of the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti showing the 
positions of gold and diamond mining properties. Fourth edn., 
revised to April 1934. Scale: 7 miles to the inch. London, C.D. 
Syndicate, 1934. 
Geological and gold mining map of the Gold Coast (southern section). 
Scale: 1.500,000. Accra, G.C.Survey, 1934 
Map of the Gold Coast, indicating the position of mining properties. 
Chicago, Min.Wld., Nov.17, 1934: 454 -455. 
Atlas of the Gold Coast. A portfolio of 12 maps, prepared by the 
G.C.Survey Dept. Scale: 1:2,000,000. Accra, 1952, and subsequent 
editions. 
MEREDITH, H. An account of the Gold Coast of Africa with a brief 
history of the African Company. A facsimile of the 
edition of 1812. Frank Cass & Co., 1967. 
METCALFE, G.E. Great Britain and Ghana: Documents in Ghana History, 
1807 -1957. Nelson, on behalf of the University of 
Ghana, 1964. 
METCALFE, J.E. Mining on the Gold Coast. Cambridge, Sands, Clays 
& It2i..nes, 2, 4, 1936: 143 -150. 
MINING in the Gold Coast Colony. Min.Wld., 157, 1949: 311 -313; 158, 
1950: 174. 
MONTAGU, S. & CO. LTD. 
Annual Bullion Review. London,- Samuel Montagu & Co. 
Ltd. 
MOORE, D. and GUGGISBERG, F.G. 
We two in West Africa. W. Heinemann, 1909. 
MOREL, E.D. Affairs of West Africa. Especially appendix on the 
gold mining industry. W. Heinemann, 1902. 
MOSELY, F.A: and WALLT R, P.H. 
Gold in general and the Gold Coast in particular. 
Landon & Evitt, the Stock Exchange, 1935. 
MOUNTAIN, H.G. Mining in the Gold Coast. Accra, 1939. 
326. 
MURRAY, A.J. and CROCKETT, J.A. 
Report on silicosis and tuberculosis among mine 
workers in the Gold Coast. Accra, Govt. Printer, 1947. 
MINT, H. The economics of developing countries. Second edn. 
Hutchinson, 1965. 
MYRDAL, G. Economic theory and underdeveloped regions. Methuen, 
1957. 
NOAKES, F.D.L. and SHAW, K.D. 
The technological gold rush. New Scientist, 41, 634, 
Jan.30 1969; 235 -238. 
NORRIS, G.C. Gold concentration at the Amalgamated Banket Areas 
reduction plant. Trans.Instn.Min.Metall., , 1ß5O: 
249 -264. 
The Ghana mining industry. Johannesburg, S.Afr.Min. 
Engng.J., 68, 1957: 385 -387. 
OLIVER, R. and FAGE, J.D. 
A short history of Africa. Penguin Books, 1962. 
PEDLAR, F.J. Economic geography of West Africa. Longmanns, 1955. 
PERKINS, F.C. Dredges; improved English gold dredges in West Africa. 
Chicago, Min.dld., Sept.5, 1908: 347 -348. 
PERRY, E.J. Mining and milling at Amalgamated Banket Areas. Mine 
uarry Engng., 18, July 1952: 218 -222. 
PIAULT, M.P. Migrant labour in Africa south of the Sahara: the 
migration of workers in West Africa. Bull.inter -Afr. 
Labour Inst., 8, 1, 1961: 98 -102. 
POUNDS, N.J.G. Geographical factors in the exploitation of minerals, 
in London Essays in Geography, edited by L.D.STAbP 
and S.W.WOOLRIDGE. L.S.E.Publications, 1951. 
PROTHERO, R.M. Labour migration in British West Africa. Corona, 2, 
5, 1957: 169 -172. 
RALPH, J. The Gold Coast: the sick man of the mining industry. 
Min.J., 22 Oct.1910: 1226 -1230; 29 Oct.1910: 1254 -1256. 
RED Book of West Africa. W.H. & L.Collingbridge, 1920. 
REVIEWING the mines 1. Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, Limited. 
Min.Wld., 158, 1950: 9 -11. 
RICKARD, T.A. The primitive use of gold. Trans.Instn.Min.Metall., 
4, 1934/5: 49 -87. 
RIMMER, D. The crisis in the Ghana economy. J.Mod.Afr.Stud., 
4, 1966: 17 -32. 
ROBSON, P. and LURY, D.A. (eds.) 




Labour roblems of West Africa. Penguin Books, 1958. 
The Tarquah goldfield, Gold Coast, West Africa. 
Newcastle, Trans.Fed.Inst.Min.Engrs., 22, 1901: 
402 -417; 23, 1902: 527 -531. 
SCHWARZ, W. Crisis in Ghana's gold mines. d.Afr.Rev., 32, 402, 
June 1961: 5 -9. 
SEERS, D. and ROSS, C.R. 
Report on financial and physical problems of develop- 
ment in the Gold Coast. Accra, Office of the Govt. 
Statistician, 1952. 
SIMPSON, Prof. Sir W. 
Report to the Secretary pf State for the Colonies on 
sanitary conditions of the mines and mining villages 
in the Gold Coast and Ashanti. Crown Agents, 1925. 
SKIRTCHLEY, J.A. A visit to the goldfields of Wassaw, West Africa. 
J.Roy.Geogrl.Soc., 48, 1878: 274 -283. 
SKINNER, W.E. (compiler) 
Mining Yearbook (incorporating the Mining Manual). 
Annual. London, J.E.Skinner and the Financial Times. 
The West African gold mining handbook. London, 'V.E. 
Skinner, 1934 
SHANNON, I. International liquidity: a study of the economic 
functions of gold. Melbourne, F.W.Cheshire, 1964. 
SHARPLESS, F.F. Gold Coast, Jest Africa. San Francisco, Min.Scient. 
Press., Dec. 17, 1910: 800 -803. 
West Coast of Africa (Gold Coast). New York, 
Columbia University, Sch.Mines 32, 2, 1911: 119 -125. 
SHOCK, L.R. Genesis of the Tarkwa banket. New York, Engng.iIin.J., 
/2, 1905: 1235. 
SPEAK, S.J. The gold -producing region of West Africa. Scot. 
Geogrl.Mag., Jan.1902: 30 -34 
STATISTICAL position of the West African gold mines. New York, 
Engng.Min.J., July 1910: 114 -115. 
STONE, G. The mining laws of the British Empire and of Foreign 
Countries. Vol.2. West Africa. Imperial Mineral 
Resources Bureau, 1920. 
SUTHERLAND, D.A. The primitive uses of gold and methods of gold mining, 
with particular reference to the Gold Coast. Accra, 
Govt. Printer, 1952. 
SURVEY of West African mining. Suppl.W.Afr.Rev., 12, 162, 1941: 76 -92. 
328. 
SZERESZWESKI, R. Structural changes in the economy of Ghana, 1890 -1911. 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965. 
TAYLOR, H. Handbook of West African gold mines. Hutchinson, 1947. 
THE GOLDFIELDS of the West Coast of Africa. New York, Engng.Min.J., 
May 1901: 623. 
THE GOLD mining industry in Ghana. Gold Min.Rec., 2/, 1958; 203 -207. 





Geological survey of Lyndhurst concessions in the 
Gold Coast. Mine Quarry Engng., 18, 1952: 149 -155; 
183 -188. 
Gold and the dollar crisis. Newhaven, Yale U.P., 1961. 
The Witswatersrand goldfields banket and mining practice, 
with an appendix on the banket of the Tarkwa goldfield, 
West Africa. London, 1902. 
TRYON, F.G. and ECKEL, E.G. (eds.) 




Description and method of working the Obuasi reef of 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation. Trans.Instn.Min. 
Metall., 38, 290, Nov.1928: 4 -20. 
The Ashanti Goldfields Corporation. Min.Mag., L6, 6, 
June 1932: 329 -337. 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, Ltd., 1897 -1947: a 
short history. London, the Corporation, 1947 
Some notes on the Bibiani gold mine, West Africa. 
Trans.Instn.Min.Metall., j, 1943: 125 -140, 140 -164. 
DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. 
Economic survey of Africa since 1950. New York, 1959. 
UNITED STATES 
BUREAU OF MINES. 
Mineral resources of British West Africa. U.S.Bur. 
Mines Foreign. Miner.Surv., 1, 2, Dec.1943. 
Mineral facts and problems. U.S.Bur.Mines Bull.585, 
1962; Bull.630, 1965. 
VOSKUIL, W.H. The search for mineral adequacy. Geogrl.J., Z8, 8, 
1959: 385 -399. 







honongo raine: a description. Mine Quarry Engng., 12, 
Sept.1946: 65 -72. 
and ROBERTSON, A.S. 
Analysing mining operations. Johannesburg, S.Afr.Min. 
En ag .J., 62, Nov.1951: 517 -521. 
\Iallach's West African Manual. F.C.Mathieson 3c Sons, 
1900. 
A history of Ghana. Second edn. Allen & Unwin, 1958. 
F. The sodium sulphide process of gold recovery. Trans. 
Instn.Min.Metall., 21., 1918: 372 -336. 
Weekly, from 1916. London, Overseas Newspapers 
(Agencies) Ltd. 
WEST African gold. London, J.R.Williamson k Co., 1934 
WEST African gold mines in 1914. Min.Wld., 1915: 121 -122, 150 -151. 
WFETHAM, E.H. and CURRIE, J.I. 
The economics of African countries. C.U.P., 1969. 
WILKINSON, W.F. Gold mining in West Africa: the producing mines. New 
York, Engng.Min.J., Jan.1907: 182. 
Gold production on the Gold Coast, 1907. New York, 
gng.Min.J., Jan.1908: 57. 
WILLS, J.B. (ed.) Agriculture and land -use in Ghana. O.U.P., for the 
Ghana Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 1962. 
WYATT, L. Report on the Tarauah Rold mines and mineral products 
of the Axim district. London, 1379. 
ZIMlVMERMAN, E.W. World resources and industries. Revised edn. New 
York, Harper k Bros., 1951. 
